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Preface
The Evo Devo Universe Community
In 2007, John M. Smart and I entered in contact discussing issues about 
universal change and broad cosmological and futuristic views. We noticed that 
scholars studying the cosmos where mainly into theoretical  physics.  It  is of 
course an important approach, but it does not connect with life, intelligence and 
technology.  Yet,  we  were  also  aware  of  dispersed  insights  in  cosmology, 
theoretical  and  evolutionary  developmental  (evo-devo)  biology  and  the 
complexity  sciences,  which  are  providing  ways  to  understand  our  universe 
within a broader framework. 
We thought that these results and hypotheses deserved to be explored, 
criticized,  and  analyzed  by  an  international  interdisciplinary  research 
community which we set up in 2008: ‘Evo Devo Universe (EDU)’. Such a 
framework  promises  to  advance  our  understanding  of  both  unpredictable 
“evolutionary”  processes  and  predictable  “developmental”  processes  at  all 
scales, including the human scale.
I welcome any researcher interested in these topics to join the research 
community at http://evodevouniverse.com 
The Conference on the Evolution and Development of the Universe 
John and I first started to work actively on building the EDU website in 
2008 (http://www.evodevouniverse.com). However, we understood that having 
a website and a virtual community was not enough. To effectively collaborate, 
human beings still  need to meet  in  flesh.  We thus focused our  energy into 
setting  up  "The  First  International  Conference  on  the  Evolution  and 
Development of the Universe" project1.
With the early support and interest of Alain Prochiantz (neurobiologist), 
Jean-Pierre  Luminet  (cosmologist)  and Francis  Heylighen (systems theorist) 
our conference project was funded by  The Complex Systems Institute,  Paris 
(ISC-PIF). 
Speakers at the conference were selected by our scientific committee 
based on their abstract. Yet, after the conference, I organized a more in depth 
peer-review on all papers, except one. Exceptionally, we decided not to peer-
review  Crane's  paper,  because  it  was  since  1994  on  the  popular  arXiv 
repository as a non-published pre-print, and researchers already referred to it 
"as it was". However, in this Special Issue, Crane's position was updated and 
clarified in his response to my commentary on his paper.
The special issue you have here is thus a selection of papers presented 
at the conference, plus a few other papers by Crane, Heylighen and Salthe. This 
volume is also the result  of time and efforts from many referees  (about 40 
referee reports in total).  
I admire and endorse Richard Gordon's courage and position to refuse 
anonymous refereeing. I find the arguments for non-anonymous refereeing very 
1  EDU 2008, http://evodevouniverse.com/wiki/Conference_2008 
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compelling. Thomas Durt and Nicolás Lori also engaged in a transparent peer-
review, which was long and sometimes difficult. Their disagreement about the 
definition of information in physics gave rise to a discussion which is reflected 
in this proceedings by Lori's commentary:  On definitions of Information in  
Physics. I think that referees should be more recognized in this indispensable 
task for the scientific community. It is not normal that they do it on a voluntary 
basis and almost without recognition. A  system  to  academically  and 
publicly recognize this effort is yet to be invented. 
After the peer-review, I organized a public invitation to comment on the 
selected papers2.  I used the "Open Peer Commentary" (OPC) model for this 
purpose,  which  was  initially  used  by  journals  Current  Anthropology and 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences.  
The  purpose  of  OPC  is  to  provide  a  concentrated  constructive 
interaction  between  author  and  commentators.  The  target  article, 
commentaries,  and authors'  responses are published together.  I am delighted 
with  the  outcome  of  this  call  for  commentaries,  which  generated  12 
commentaries.  Counting author's replies,  this makes a total  of 20 additional 
manuscripts to the main articles, giving additional discussion, critique, debate 
to this special issue. These exchanges show research as it is done, with explicit 
disagreements and debates. If authors agree to provide further responses to new 
commentaries, we would be glad to also continue this OPC process for later 
issues of Foundations of Science. 
Finally, I apologize for the varying layouts of this proceedings preprint. 
I invite the demanding reader to wait a few months for the publication of all 
articles in Foundations of Science. 
 December 2009,
Clément Vidal.
2  http://evodevouniverse.com/wiki/EDU_2008_Call_for_Commentaries 
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Introduction
This  introduction  provides  a  quick  overview of  what  you  will  find  in  this 
volume. 
Scale Relativity - Nottale, Chaline, Auffray and Noble. 
Laurent Nottale presents a review of Scale Relativity (ScR), a natural 
extension of Einstein's general relativity. The principle of relativity has been 
successfully applied to position, orientation and motion and is at the core of all 
physical  theories.  However,  problems  related  to  scales  are  ubiquitous  in 
science. In particular, physics struggles for decades to connect in a meaningful 
way quantum theory (microphysics) with classical physics (macrophysics). In a 
similar manner, relating our knowledge of macrophysics to the cosmological 
scale leads to arduous problems in cosmology, for example about dark matter 
or vacuum energy density. 
Scale Relativity proposes "to extend theories of relativity by including 
the scale in the very definition of the coordinate system, then to account for 
these scale transformations in a relativistic way." (p57) How is it possible? And 
why did Einstein not found this extension before? As often in the history of 
physics, part of the answer lies in the mathematical tools. 
Einstein  struggled  years  to  develop  the  general  relativity  theory  of 
gravitation,  because  it  involved  non-euclidian  geometries.  These  geometries 
are (or were) counter-intuitive to manipulate and understand, and they were not 
used in physics before. Similarly, ScR uses a fundamental mathematical tool to 
deal with scales: fractals. This leads to an extension of general relativity (i.e. it 
includes its  previous results)  by constructing a theory of fractal  space-time. 
Fractals were only studied in depth by Mandelbrot in the 1950's, although they 
were known by mathematicians much before (e.g. Georg Cantor's triadic set). 
This  simple  yet  fundamental  approach  generates  a  proliferation  of 
results, which are both theoretical and with concrete applications and validated 
predictions. Let us mention of few of them. A new light on quantum mechanics 
can be thrown, since it is possible to derivate postulates of quantum mechanics 
with  ScR3.  A  macroscopic  Schrödinger  equation  is  derived,  which  brings 
statistical  predictability characteristic of QM into other scales in nature.  For 
example,  the position of exoplanets can be predicted in a statistical  manner. 
The theory predicts that they have more chances to be found at such or such 
distance from their star. On cosmological scales, ScR also predicted with great 
precision the value of the cosmological constant (see section 3.1.2). There are 
many other fascinating implications of the theory, not only in physics, but also 
in earth sciences,  history,  geography and biology.  All  these are reviewed in 
Nottale's paper. 
The theory can also be applied in systems biology, as testified in more 
details  in  Charles  Auffray's  and  Denis  Noble's  commentary.  In  his  reply, 
Nottale describes quite in general how ScR can be applied to various systems, 
3 Nottale, L., and M. N. Celerier. 2007. Derivation of the postulates of quantum mechanics 
from  the  first  principles  of  scale  relativity.  Journal  of  Physics  A-Mathematical  and 
Theoretical 40, no. 48: 14471-14498. http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.2418.
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and gives an indication on how this can be applied in biology more specifically. 
Using updated data, he also corrects the prediction of the full arctic ice melting, 
which is now predicted to be in 2014-2015 instead of 2011... 
Scale  Relativity  is  a  fundamental  approach  to  science  and  has 
consequences  for  nearly  all  sciences.  ScR  suggests  that  cosmology, 
fundamental particle physics, structure formation, biology, geology, economy 
and other fields might be approached with tools derived from the same few 
principles exposed in this paper. Although, as Nottale explains, a lot of work 
still  has  to  be  done,  the  exposed vision  is  extraordinarily  far  reaching  and 
inspiring. For these reasons, I am delighted to deliver Laurent Nottale the EDU 
2008 Best Paper Award.  
Jean  Chaline's  paper  applies  ScR  principles  to  biological  and 
paleontological  data.  He  shows  in  his  paper  that  log-periodic  behaviors  of 
acceleration or deceleration can be applied to branching macroevolution and to 
the time sequences of major evolutionary leaps. This includes the global tree of 
life,  sauropod  and  theropod  dinosaurs  postural  structures,  North  American 
fossil equids, rodents, primates, echinoderms clades and human ontogeny. 
Causality and symmetries - Heylighen and Longo
Back to fundamental physics, Francis Heylighen conducts a reflection 
on our most fundamental scientific concepts: time and causality. He explains 
how the concept of self-organization can be applied in this context. Starting 
from  a  random  graph  of  events,  he  shows  how  a  transitive  closure  can 
transform it  into  a  partial  order  relation  of  precedence  and thus  generate  a 
causal structure. 
In his commentary,  the mathematician  Giuseppe Longo explores the 
relationship  between  the  properties  of  symmetry  captured  by  mathematical 
group structures  and logical  structures  used  by Heylighen.  In  his  response, 
Heylighen formulates another fundamental problem, which is that causal laws 
of classical mechanics are reversible in their formulations, whereas "the laws of 
thermodynamics, on the other hand, are intrinsically irreversible as they imply 
a maximization of entropy". 
Greben's Cosmological Model
Jan Greben presents a cosmological model where the vacuum energy 
dominates  the  universe.  He  claims  that  this  model  avoids  the  horizon  and 
cosmological constant problems, and also provides a possible explanation for 
dark  matter.  Greben  also  includes  a  model  of  the  evolution  of  the  early 
universe,  which  describes  the  formation  of  elementary  particles  from  a 
supposed classical state with perfect symmetry and zero entropy. 
Quantum Darwinism – Durt, Lori and Blin
Thomas  Durt's  paper  Anthropomorphic  Quantum Darwinism as  an 
explanation for Classicality tackles a very basic question about our nature as 
observers. Why is our representation of the world classical although at smallest 
scales,  it  is  quantum? Durt  reminds  us  that  "millions  of  years  of  evolution 
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modelled our vision of the world, leading us to become blind to aspects of it 
that are not advantageous from the point of view of the acquisition of useful 
information." He  proposes  along  the  lines  of  Zurek's  Quantum Darwinism 
approach  that  the  basis  in  which  we measure  the  external  world  obeys  an 
optimality  principle that  results from a biological  selection mechanism: "the 
fittest is the best-informed." More precisely, he aims at establishing the identity 
between  "classical  islands"  and  our  cognitive  representation  of  what 
elementary particles are. 
Nicolás Lori's commentary On definitions of information in physics and 
Durt's reply Competing definitions of Information versus Entropy in Physics is 
a discussion about the concept of  information in physics. It is important to 
note that this concept, although fundamental, is difficult to use, and not always 
defined in the same manner. 
Nicolás Lori and Alex Blin's paper Application of Quantum Darwinism 
to Cosmic Inflation: an example of the limits imposed in Aristotelian logic by 
information-based  approach  to  Gödel’s  incompleteness constitutes  another 
application of Quantum Darwinism, here in cosmology. To formalize quantum 
darwinism and cope with the random extinction of information, they define and 
distinguish  between  Formal  Axiomatic  Systems  (FAS)  and  Darwinian 
Axiomatic Systems (DAS). After reminding us that "Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems showed that a non-trivial axiomatic system cannot be both complete 
and consistent" they add that "the FAS is the choice for consistency and the 
DAS is the choice for completeness". This approach is then applied to cosmic 
inflation.  This constitute  a very original  reflection yet  involving speculative 
hypotheses like cosmic inflation or baby universes.
Life and Complexity: Jagers op Akkerhuis, Hengeveld,Van Straalen and Ekstig
In  "Life,  the  organism  and  death",  Gerard  Jagers  op  Akkerhuis 
conducts  a  reflection  on the definition of life.  He first  constructs  a broader 
context, a “theory of life”, from which he derives a definition of life. He uses 
hierarchy  theory  to  this  end,  and  defines  a  ranking  called  the  "operator 
hierarchy".  From this  hierarchical  perspective,  he argues that  to define  life, 
construction is more important than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In his 
commentary Definitions of life are not only unnecessary, but they can do harm 
to understanding, Rob Hengeveld radically criticises this endeavour, which he 
considers of no scientific interest. Nico van Straalen insists on the importance 
of the transition from non-life to life in his commentary The issue of "closure" 
in Jagers op Akkerhuis's operator theory. In his response, Jagers op Akkerhuis 
addresses  this  issues  and  argues  in  particular  that,  as  his  title  expresses, 
Explaining the origin of life is not enough for a definition of life. 
Börje  Ekstig argues  that  there  is  an  acceleration  of  complexity  in 
evolution.  His  paper,  Complexity  and Evolution  -  a  study  of  the  growth  of 
complexity  in  organic  and  cultural  evolution,  presents  a  model  integrating 
evolution  on  large  time  scales,  and  the  development  of  an  individual.  He 
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suggests some methods to estimate the growth of complexity in evolution, and 
also connects biological and cultural evolution. 
Natural Philosophy with Salthe, Fairlamb and Van de Vijver.
Stanley Salthe's reflection on the  Development (and evolution) of the 
Universe presents a broad and challenging outlook in natural philosophy.  He 
argues  that  Aristotelian  causal  analysis,  and especially  final  causes,  can  be 
helpful  for  dealing  with  complex  systems.  More  precisely,  he  takes  a 
developmental  perspective  to  model  our  world,  and  uses  a  "specification 
hierarchy"  to  describe  the  emergence  of  systems  of  higher  levels  in  the 
universe.  Horace Fairlamb questions the metaphysics behind Salthe's paper, 
and  asks  whether  implications  of  a  supposed  developmental  trajectory  are 
necessarily  materialistic.  In  her  commentary,  Gertrudis  Van  de  Vijver 
explores the concept of "critique" in relation to objectivism and dogmatism. 
Instead of Aristotle,  she also suggests that Kant and Husserl might be more 
appropriate philosophers to be inspired by to tackle the issue of final causes, or 
teleology. 
Big Questions with Crane, Vidal, Greben, Vaas, Stewart and Rottiers.
Louis Crane's paper explores philosophical implications of a supposed 
quantum theory of gravity. He builds on Lee Smolin's Cosmological Natural 
Selection (CNS) and conjectures that  future civilizations will want to create 
black  holes.  In  my commentary  to  this  seminal  paper,  I  distinguished  two 
purposes  of  such  a  black  hole  engineering  endeavor:  either  for  (i)  energy 
production or for (ii) universe production. In his reply, Crane makes clear that 
the  purpose  of  energy  production  now  interests  him  most,  as  "a  practical 
suggestion for the middle-term future". 
In  my  paper,  I  explore  computational  and  biological  analogies  to 
address the fine-tuning issue in cosmology. I show that current solutions are not 
actually satisfying, to motivate other kinds of approaches. First, I analyze what 
are  physical  constants  from  a  physical  perspective.  Then,  I  explore 
computational and biological  analogies to tackle this issue, and propose and 
extension of CNS, stimulated by ideas from Crane and other authors. Inspired 
by  a  biological  analogy,  I  named  this  extension  of  CNS  "Cosmological 
Artificial Selection" (CAS). 
In his commentary On the nature of initial conditions and fundamental 
parameters in physics and cosmology,  Jan Greben criticizes the idea of fine-
tuning of initial conditions, suggesting that his cosmological model does not 
need such fine-tuning. In my reply, I argue that this reasoning only holds if we 
take seriously the idea that “nature is quantum mechanical”. I also clarify some 
epistemological issues related to fine-tuning.
Rüdiger  Vaas in  his  commentary  Cosmological  Artificial  Selection: 
Creation out of something? discusses some  far-reaching  problems of CAS. I 
address them and clarify their scientific or philosophical nature in my response.
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In The meaning of life in a developing Universe, John Stewart takes a 
broad  evolutionary  view  on  the  cosmos.  After  summarizing  the  arguments 
supporting  the  proposition  that  biological  evolution  has  a  trajectory,  he 
attempts to extend it to the universe. He also builds on the work of Crane and 
other authors to explore the idea that "our universe and the evolution of life 
within it is a developmental process that has itself been shaped by evolutionary 
processes of even wider scale".  He further  argues that  at  a particular  point, 
evolution  will  continue  to  advance  only  if  we  decide  to  advance  the 
evolutionary process intentionally. 
Franc  Rottiers criticizes  Stewart's  proposition  that  humanity  has 
discovered the trajectory of past  evolution,  as just  one possible perspective. 
Stewart  suggests  to  replace  postmodern  scepticism  and  relativism  "with  an 
evolutionary grand narrative that can guide humanity to participate successfully 
in the future evolution of life in the universe".
My commentary to Stewart's paper is, as the title suggests, an Analysis  
of Some Speculations Concerning the Far-Future of Intelligent Civilizations. It 
concerns some (relatively) minor speculative issues where we disagree. Those 
disagreements are clarified and qualified in Stewart's response. 
I  hope  the  reader  will  be  inspired  by  the  insights  gathered  in  this 
volume to further build an even more comprehensive view on the cosmos.
December 2009,
Clément Vidal.
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Abstract
In the first part of this contribution, we review the development of the theory of
scale relativity and its geometric framework constructed in terms of a fractal and
nondifferentiable continuous space-time. This theory leads (i) to a generalization
of possible physically relevant fractal laws, written as partial differential equation
acting in the space of scales, and (ii) to a new geometric foundation of quantum
mechanics and gauge field theories and their possible generalisations.
In the second part, we discuss some examples of application of the theory to
various sciences, in particular in cases when the theoretical predictions have been
validated by new or updated observational and experimental data. This includes
predictions in physics and cosmology (value of the QCD coupling and of the cosmo-
logical constant), to astrophysics and gravitational structure formation (distances of
extrasolar planets to their stars, of Kuiper belt objects, value of solar and solar-like
star cycles), to sciences of life (log-periodic law for species punctuated evolution,
human development and society evolution), to Earth sciences (log-periodic decelera-
tion of the rate of California earthquakes and of Sichuan earthquake replicas, critical
law for the arctic sea ice extent) and tentative applications to systems biology.
1 Introduction
One of the main concern of the theory of scale relativity is about the foundation of
quantum mechanics. As it is now well known, the principle of relativity (of motion)
underlies the foundation of most of classical physics. Now, quantum mechanics, though it
is harmoniously combined with special relativity in the framework of relativistic quantum
mechanics and quantum field theories, seems, up to now, to be founded on different
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grounds. Actually, its present foundation is mainly axiomatic, i.e., it is based on postulates
and rules which are not derived from any underlying more fundamental principle.
The theory of scale relativity [67, 68, 69, 72, 79, 95] suggests an original solution to
this fundamental problem. Namely, in its framework, quantum mechanics may indeed be
founded on the principle of relativity itself, provided this principle (applied up to now to
position, orientation and motion) be extended to scales. One generalizes the definition of
reference systems by including variables characterizing their scale, then one generalizes the
possible transformations of these reference systems by adding, to the relative transforma-
tions already accounted for (translation, velocity and acceleration of the origin, rotation
of the axes), the transformations of these scale variables, namely, their relative dilations
and contractions. In the framework of such a newly generalized relativity theory, the laws
of physics may be given a general form that transcends and includes both the classical and
the quantum laws, allowing in particular to study in a renewed way the poorly understood
nature of the classical to quantum transition.
A related important concern of the theory is the question of the geometry of space-time
at all scales. In analogy with Einstein’s construction of general relativity of motion, which
is based on the generalization of flat space-times to curved Riemannian geometry, it is
suggested, in the framework of scale relativity, that a new generalization of the description
of space-time is now needed, toward a still continuous but now nondifferentiable and frac-
tal geometry (i.e., explicitly dependent on the scale of observation or measurement). New
mathematical and physical tools are therefore developed in order to implement such a gen-
eralized description, which goes far beyond the standard view of differentiable manifolds.
One writes the equations of motion in such a space-time as geodesics equations, under the
constraint of the principle of relativity of all scales in nature. To this purpose, covariant
derivatives are constructed that implement the various effects of the nondifferentiable and
fractal geometry.
As a first theoretical step, the laws of scale transformation that describe the new
dependence on resolutions of physical quantities are obtained as solutions of differential
equations acting in the space of scales. This leads to several possible levels of description
for these laws, from the simplest scale invariant laws to generalized laws with variable
fractal dimensions, including log-periodic laws and log-Lorentz laws of “special scale-
relativity”, in which the Planck scale is identified with a minimal, unreachable scale,
invariant under scale transformations (in analogy with the special relativity of motion in
which the velocity c is invariant under motion transformations).
The second theoretical step amounts to describe the effects induced by the internal
fractal structures of geodesics on motion in standard space (of positions and instants).
Their main consequence is the transformation of classical dynamics into a generalized,
quantum-like self-organized dynamics. The theory allows one to define and derive from
relativistic first principles both the mathematical and physical quantum tools (complex,
spinor, bispinor, then multiplet wave functions) and the equations of which these wave
functions are solutions: a Schrodinger-type equation (more generally a Pauli equation
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for spinors) is derived as an integral of the geodesic equation in a fractal space, then
Klein-Gordon and Dirac equations in the case of a full fractal space-time. We then briefly
recall that gauge fields and gauge charges can also be constructed from a geometric re-
interpretation of gauge transformations as scale transformations in fractal space-time.
In a second part of this review, we consider some applications of the theory to various
sciences, particularly relevant to the questions of evolution and development. In the
realm of physics and cosmology, we compare the various theoretical predictions obtained
at the beginning of the 90’s for the QCD coupling constant and for the cosmological
constant to their present experimental and observational measurements. In astrophysics,
we discuss applications to the formation of gravitational structures over many scales, with
a special emphasis on the formation of planetary systems and on the validations, on the
new extrasolar planetary systems and on Solar System Kuiper belt bodies discovered since
15 years, of the theoretical predictions of scale relativity (made before their discovery).
This is completed by a validation of the theoretical prediction obtained some years ago
for the solar cycle of 11 yrs on other solar-like stars whose cycles are now measured. In
the realm of life sciences, we discuss possible applications of this extended framework to
the processes of morphogenesis and the emergence of prokaryotic and eukaryotic cellular
structures, then to the study of species evolution, society evolution, embryogenesis and
cell confinement. This is completed by applications in Earth sciences, in particular to
a prediction of the Arctic ice rate of melting and to possible predictivity in earthquake
statistical studies.
2 Theory
2.1 Foundations of scale relativity theory
The theory of scale relativity is based on the giving up of the hypothesis of manifold
differentiability. In this framework, the coordinate transformations are continuous but
can be nondifferentiable. This implies several consequences [69], leading to the following
steps of construction of the theory:
(1) One can prove the following theorem [69, 72, 7, 22, 23]: a continuous and nondif-
ferentiable curve is fractal in a general meaning, namely, its length is explicitly dependent
on a scale variable ε, i.e., L = L(ε), and it diverges, L → ∞, when ε→ 0. This theorem
can be readily extended to a continuous and nondifferentiable manifold, which is therefore
fractal, not as an hypothesis, but as a consequence of the giving up of an hypothesis (that
of differentiability).
(2) The fractality of space-time [69, 104, 66, 67] involves the scale dependence of
the reference frames. One therefore adds to the usual variables defining the coordinate
system, new variables ε characterizing its ‘state of scale’. In particular, the coordinates
themselves become functions of these scale variables, i.e., X = X(ε).
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(3) The scale variables ε can never be defined in an absolute way, but only in a relative
way. Namely, only their ratio ρ = ε′/ε does have a physical meaning. In experimental
situations, these scales variables amount to the resolution of the measurement apparatus
(it may be defined as standard errors, intervals, pixel size, etc...). In a theoretical analysis,
they are the space and time differential elements themselves. This universal behavior leads
to extend the principle of relativity in such a way that it applies also to the transformations
(dilations and contractions) of these resolution variables [67, 68, 69].
2.2 Laws of scale transformation
2.2.1 Fractal coordinate and differential dilation operator
Consider a variable length measured on a fractal curve, and, more generally, a non-
differentiable (fractal) curvilinear coordinate L(s, ε), that depends on some parameter s
which characterizes the position on the curve (it may be, e.g., a time coordinate), and on
the resolution ε. Such a coordinate generalizes to nondifferentiable and fractal space-times
the concept of curvilinear coordinates introduced for curved Riemannian space-times in
Einstein’s general relativity [69].
Such a scale-dependent fractal length L(s, ε), remains finite and differentiable when
ε 6= 0, namely, one can define a slope for any resolution ε, being aware that this slope is
itself a scale-dependent fractal function. It is only at the limit ε → 0 that the length is
infinite and the slope undefined, i.e., that nondifferentiability manifests itself.
Therefore the laws of dependence of this length upon position and scale may be written
in terms of a double differential calculus, i.e., it can be the solution of differential equations
involving the derivatives of L with respect to both s and ε.
As a preliminary step, one needs to establish the relevant form of the scale variables
and the way they intervene in scale differential equations. For this purpose, let us apply
an infinitesimal dilation dρ to the resolution, which is therefore transformed as ε→ ε′ =
ε(1 + dρ). The dependence on position is omitted at this stage in order to simplify the
notation. By applying this transformation to a fractal coordinate L, one obtains, to first
order in the differential element,
L(ε′) = L(ε+ ε dρ) = L(ε) + ∂L(ε)
∂ε
ε dρ = (1 + D˜ dρ)L(ε), (1)
where D˜ is, by definition, the dilation operator.
Since dε/ε = d ln ε, the identification of the two last members of equation (1) yields
D˜ = ε
∂
∂ε
=
∂
∂ ln ε
. (2)
This form of the infinitesimal dilation operator shows that the natural variable for the
resolution is ln ε, and that the expected new differential equations will indeed involve
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quantities such as ∂L(s, ε)/∂ ln ε. This theoretical result agrees and explains the current
knowledge according to which most measurement devices (of light, sound, etc..), including
their physiological counterparts (eye, ear, etc..) respond according to the logarithm of
the intensity (e.g., magnitudes, decibels, etc..).
2.2.2 Self-similar fractals as solutions of a first order scale differential equa-
tion
Let us start by writing the simplest possible differential equation of scale, then by solving
it. We shall subsequently verify that the solutions obtained comply with the principle
of relativity. As we shall see, this very simple approach already yields a fundamental
result: it gives a foundation and an understanding from first principles for self-similar
fractal laws, which have been shown by Mandelbrot and many others to be a general
description of a large number of natural phenomena, in particular biological ones (see,
e.g., [60, 103, 59], other volumes of these series and references therein). In addition, the
obtained laws, which combine fractal and scale-independent behaviours, are the equivalent
for scales of what inertial laws are for motion [60]. Since they serve as a fundamental
basis of description for all the subsequent theoretical constructions, we shall now describe
their derivation in detail.
The simplest differential equation of explicit scale dependence which one can write is
of first order and states that the variation of L under an infinitesimal scale transformation
d ln ε depends only on L itself. Basing ourselves on the previous derivation of the form of
the dilation operator, we thus write
∂L(s, ε)
∂ ln ε
= β(L). (3)
The function β is a priori unknown. However, still looking for the simplest form of
such an equation, we expand β(L) in powers of L, namely we write β(L) = a + bL + ....
Disregarding for the moment the s dependence, we obtain, to the first order, the following
linear equation, in which a and b are constants:
dL
d ln ε
= a + bL. (4)
In order to find the solution of this equation, let us change the names of the constants as
τF = −b and L0 = a/τF , so that a + bL = −τF (L− L0). We obtain the equation
dL
L − L0 = −τF d ln ε. (5)
Its solution reads
L(ε) = L0
{
1 +
(
λ
ε
)τF}
, (6)
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where λ is an integration constant. This solution corresponds to a length measured on a
fractal curve up to a given point. One can now generalize it to a variable length that also
depends on the position characterized by the parameter s. One obtains
L(s, ε) = L0(s)
{
1 + ζ(s)
(
λ
ε
)τF}
, (7)
in which, in the most general case, the exponent τF may itself be a variable depending on
the position.
The same kind of result is obtained for the projections on a given axis of such a fractal
length [69]. Let X(s, ε) be one of these projections, it reads
X(s, ε) = x(s)
{
1 + ζx(s)
(
λ
ε
)τF}
. (8)
In this case ζx(s) becomes a highly fluctuating function which may be described by a
stochastic variable.
The important point here and for what follows is that the solution obtained is the
sum of two terms, a classical-like, “differentiable part” and a nondifferentiable “fractal
part”, which is explicitly scale-dependent and tends to infinity when ε → 0 [69, 17].
By differentiating these two parts in the above projection, we obtain the differential
formulation of this essential result,
dX = dx+ dξ, (9)
where dx is a classical differential element, while dξ is a differential element of fractional
order. This relation plays a fundamental role in the subsequent developments of the
theory.
Consider the case when τF is constant. In the asymptotic small scale regime, ε ≪ λ,
one obtains a power-law dependence on resolution that reads
L(s, ε) = L0(s)
(
λ
ε
)τF
. (10)
We recognize in this expression the standard form of a self-similar fractal behaviour with
constant fractal dimension DF = 1 + τF , which have already been found to yield a fair
description of many physical and biological systems [60]. Here the topological dimension
is DT = 1, since we deal with a length, but this can be easily generalized to surfaces
(DT = 2), volumes (DT = 3), etc.., according to the general relation DF = DT + τF . The
new feature here is that this result has been derived from a theoretical analysis based on
first principles, instead of being postulated or deduced from a fit of observational data.
It should be noted that in the above expressions, the resolution is a length interval,
ε = δX defined along the fractal curve (or one of its projected coordinate). But one may
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also travel on the curve and measure its length on constant time intervals, then change
the time scale. In this case the resolution ε is a time interval, ε = δt. Since they are
related by the fundamental relation
δXDF ∼ δt, (11)
the fractal length depends on the time resolution as
X(s, δt) = X0(s)×
(
T
δt
)1−1/DF
. (12)
An example of the use of such a relation is Feynman’s result according to which the mean
square value of the velocity of a quantum mechanical particle is proportional to δt−1 [33,
p. 176], which corresponds to a fractal dimension DF = 2, as later recovered by Abbott
and Wise [1] by using a space resolution.
More generally, (in the usual case when ε = δX), following Mandelbrot, the scale
exponent τF = DF −DT can be defined as the slope of the (ln ε, lnL) curve, namely
τF =
d lnL
d ln(λ/ε)
. (13)
For a self-similar fractal such as that described by the fractal part of the above solution,
this definition yields a constant value which is the exponent in Eq. (10). However, one can
anticipate on the following, and use this definition to compute an “effective” or “local”
fractal dimension, now variable, from the complete solution that includes the differentiable
and the nondifferentiable parts, and therefore a transition to effective scale independence.
Differentiating the logarithm of Eq. (6) yields an effective exponent given by
τeff =
τF
1 + (ε/λ)τF
. (14)
The effective fractal dimension DF = 1 + τF therefore jumps from the nonfractal value
DF = DT = 1 to its constant asymptotic value at the transition scale λ.
2.2.3 Galilean relativity of scales
The above scale laws have been obtained as solutions of the simplest possible differential
equation acting in scale space. Now the main method of the scale relativity theory consists
of constraining the various laws which are obtained by mathematical and/or physical tools
by the principle of relativity applied to scale transformations.
In order to check whether the obtained laws come indeed under the principle of scale
relativity, one should verify that these laws are covariant under a transformation of scale.
We have found that these simple scale laws are the sum of a scaling (fractal) part and
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of a scale-independent part. The question of the compatibility with the principle of scale
relativity concerns the scale-dependent part.
It reads L = L0(λ/ε)τF (Eq. 10), and it is therefore a law involving two variables
(lnL and τF ) in function of one parameter (ε) which, according to the relativistic view,
characterizes the state of scale of the system (its relativity is apparent in the fact that we
need another scale λ to define it by their ratio). Note that, to be complete, we anticipate
on what follows and consider a priori τF to be a variable, even if, in the simple law first
considered here, it takes a constant value.
Let us take the logarithm of Eq. (10). It yields ln(L/L0) = τF ln(λ/ε). The two
quantities lnL and τF then transform, under a finite scale transformation ε → ε′ = ρ ε,
as
ln
L(ε′)
L0 = ln
L(ε)
L0 − τF ln ρ , (15)
and, to be complete,
τ ′F = τF . (16)
These transformations have exactly the same mathematical structure as the Galilean
group of motion transformation (applied here to scale rather than motion), which reads
x′ = x− t v, t′ = t. (17)
This is confirmed by the dilation composition law, ε→ ε′ → ε′′, which writes
ln
ε′′
ε
= ln
ε′
ε
+ ln
ε′′
ε′
, (18)
and is therefore similar to the law of composition of velocities between three reference
systems K, K ′ and K”,
V ′′(K ′′/K) = V (K ′/K) + V ′(K ′′/K ′). (19)
Since the Galileo group of motion transformations is known to be the simplest group that
implements the principle of relativity, the same is true for scale transformations.
It is important to realize that this is more than a simple analogy: the same physical
problem is set in both cases, and is therefore solved under similar mathematical structures
(since the logarithm transforms what would have been a multiplicative group into an
additive group). Indeed, in both cases, it amounts to find the law of transformation of
a position variable (X for motion in a Cartesian system of coordinates, lnL for scales
in a fractal system of coordinates) under a change of the state of the coordinate system
(change of velocity V for motion and of resolution ln ρ for scale), knowing that these state
variables are defined only in a relative way. Namely, V is the relative velocity between the
reference systems K and K ′, and ρ is the relative scale: note that ε and ε′ have indeed
disappeared in the transformation law, only their ratio remains. This remark founds the
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status of resolutions as (relative) “scale velocities” and of the scale exponent τF as a “scale
time”.
Recall finally that, since the Galilean group of motion is only a limiting case of the
more general Lorentz group, a similar generalization is expected in the case of scale
transformations, which we shall briefly consider in Sec. 2.2.6.
2.2.4 Breaking of scale invariance
The standard self-similar fractal laws can be derived from the scale relativity approach.
However, it is important to note that Eq. (6) provides us with another fundamental
result. Namely, it also contains a spontaneous breaking of the scale symmetry. Indeed, it
is characterized by the existence of a transition from a fractal to a non-fractal behaviour
at scales larger than some transition scale λ. The existence of such a breaking of scale
invariance is also a fundamental feature of many natural systems, which remains, in most
cases, misunderstood.
The advantage of the way it is derived here is that it appears as a natural, sponta-
neous, but only effective symmetry breaking, since it does not affect the underlying scale
symmetry. Indeed, the obtained solution is the sum of two terms, the scale-independent
contribution (differentiable part), and the explicitly scale-dependent and divergent contri-
bution (fractal part). At large scales the scaling part becomes dominated by the classical
part, but it is still underlying even though it is hidden. There is therefore an apparent
symmetry breaking, though the underlying scale symmetry actually remains unbroken.
The origin of this transition is, once again, to be found in relativity (namely, in the
relativity of position and motion). Indeed, if one starts from a strictly scale-invariant law
without any transition, L = L0(λ/ε)τF , then adds a translation in standard position space
(L → L+ L1), one obtains
L′ = L1 + L0
(
λ
ε
)τF
= L1
{
1 +
(
λ1
ε
)τF}
. (20)
Therefore one recovers the broken solution (that corresponds to the constant a 6= 0 in the
initial scale differential equation). This solution is now asymptotically scale-dependent
(in a scale-invariant way) only at small scales, and becomes independent of scale at large
scales, beyond some relative transition λ1 which is partly determined by the translation
itself.
2.2.5 Generalized scale laws
Discrete scale invariance, complex dimension and log-periodic laws Fluctu-
ations with respect to pure scale invariance are potentially important, namely the log-
periodic correction to power laws that is provided, e.g., by complex exponents or complex
fractal dimensions. It has been shown that such a behaviour provides a very satisfactory
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and possibly predictive model of the time evolution of many critical systems, including
earthquakes and market crashes ([121] and references therein). More recently, it has
been applied to the analysis of major event chronology of the evolutionary tree of life
[19, 86, 87], of human development [14] and of the main economic crisis of western and
precolumbian civilizations [44, 86, 50, 45].
One can recover log-periodic corrections to self-similar power laws through the re-
quirement of covariance (i.e., of form invariance of equations) applied to scale differential
equations [75]. Consider a scale-dependent function L(ε). In the applications to temporal
evolution quoted above, the scale variable is identified with the time interval |t−tc|, where
tc is the date of a crisis. Assume that L satisfies a first order differential equation,
dL
d ln ε
− νL = 0, (21)
whose solution is a pure power law L(ε) ∝ εν (cf Sect. 2.2.2). Now looking for corrections
to this law, one remarks that simply incorporating a complex value of the exponent ν
would lead to large log-periodic fluctuations rather than to a controllable correction to
the power law. So let us assume that the right-hand side of Eq. (21) actually differs from
zero
dL
d ln ε
− νL = χ. (22)
We can now apply the scale covariance principle and require that the new function χ
be solution of an equation which keeps the same form as the initial equation
dχ
d ln ε
− ν ′χ = 0. (23)
Setting ν ′ = ν + η, we find that L must be solution of a second-order equation
d2L
(d ln ε)2
− (2ν + η) dL
d ln ε
+ ν(ν + η)L = 0. (24)
The solution reads L(ε) = aεν(1 + bεη), and finally, the choice of an imaginary exponent
η = iω yields a solution whose real part includes a log-periodic correction:
L(ε) = a εν [1 + b cos(ω ln ε)]. (25)
As previously recalled in Sect. 2.2.4, adding a constant term (a translation) provides a
transition to scale independence at large scales.
Lagrangian approach to scale laws In order to obtain physically relevant general-
izations of the above simplest (scale-invariant) laws, a Lagrangian approach can be used
in scale space, in analogy with its use to derive the laws of motion, leading to reverse the
definition and meaning of the variables [75].
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This reversal is an analog to that achieved by Galileo concerning motion laws. Indeed,
from the Aristotle viewpoint, “time is the measure of motion”. In the same way, the
fractal dimension, in its standard (Mandelbrot’s) acception, is defined from the topological
measure of the fractal object (length of a curve, area of a surface, etc..) and resolution,
namely (see Eq. 13)
t =
x
v
↔ τF = DF −DT = d lnL
d ln(λ/ε)
. (26)
In the case, mainly considered here, when L represents a length (i.e., more generally, a
fractal coordinate), the topological dimension is DT = 1 so that τF = DF − 1. With
Galileo, time becomes a primary variable, and the velocity is deduced from space and
time, which are therefore treated on the same footing, in terms of a space-time (even
though the Galilean space-time remains degenerate because of the implicitly assumed
infinite velocity of light).
In analogy, the scale exponent τF = DF − 1 becomes, in this new representation, a
primary variable that plays, for scale laws, the same role as played by time in motion laws
(it is called “djinn” in some publications which therefore introduce a five-dimensional
‘space-time-djinn’ combining the four fractal fluctuations and the scale time).
Carrying on the analogy, in the same way as the velocity is the derivative of position
with respect to time, v = dx/dt, we expect the derivative of lnL with respect to scale
time τF to be a “scale velocity”. Consider as reference the self-similar case, that reads
lnL = τF ln(λ/ε). Derivating with respect to τF , now considered as a variable, yields
d lnL/dτF = ln(λ/ε), i.e., the logarithm of resolution. By extension, one assumes that
this scale velocity provides a new general definition of resolution even in more general
situations, namely,
V = ln
(
λ
ε
)
=
d lnL
dτF
. (27)
One can now introduce a scale Lagrange function L˜(lnL,V, τF ), from which a scale action
is constructed
S˜ =
∫ τ2
τ1
L˜(lnL,V, τF ) dτF . (28)
The application of the action principle yields a scale Euler-Lagrange equation that writes
d
dτF
∂L˜
∂V
=
∂L˜
∂ lnL . (29)
One can now verify that, in the free case, i.e., in the absence of any “scale force” (i.e.,
∂L˜/∂ lnL = 0), one recovers the standard fractal laws derived hereabove. Indeed, in this
case the Euler-Lagrange equation becomes
∂L˜/∂V = const⇒ V = const. (30)
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which is the equivalent for scale of what inertia is for motion. Still in analogy with motion
laws, the simplest possible form for the Lagrange function is a quadratic dependence on
the scale velocity, (i.e., L˜ ∝ V2). The constancy of V = ln(λ/ε) means that it is
independent of the scale time τF . Equation (27) can therefore be integrated to give the
usual power law behaviour, L = L0(λ/ε)τF , as expected.
But this reversed viewpoint has also several advantages which allow a full implemen-
tation of the principle of scale relativity:
(i) The scale time τF is given the status of a fifth dimension and the logarithm of the
resolution, V = ln(λ/ε), its status of scale velocity (see Eq. 27). This is in accordance with
its scale-relativistic definition, in which it characterizes the state of scale of the reference
system, in the same way as the velocity v = dx/dt characterizes its state of motion.
(ii) This allows one to generalize the formalism to the case of four independent space-
time resolutions, Vµ = ln(λµ/εµ) = d lnLµ/dτF .
(iii) Scale laws more general than the simplest self-similar ones can be derived from
more general scale Lagrangians [74, 75] involving “scale accelerations” IΓ = d2 lnL/dτ 2F =
d ln(λ/ε)/dτF , as we shall see in what follows.
Note however that there is also a shortcoming in this approach. Contrarily to the
case of motion laws, in which time is always flowing toward the future (except possibly
in elementary particle physics at very small time scales), the variation of the scale time
may be non-monotonic, as exemplified by the previous case of log-periodicity. Therefore
this Lagrangian approach is restricted to monotonous variations of the fractal dimension,
or, more generally, to scale intervals on which it varies in a monotonous way.
Scale dynamics The previous discussion indicates that the scale invariant behaviour
corresponds to freedom (i.e. scale force-free behaviour) in the framework of a scale physics.
However, in the same way as there are forces in nature that imply departure from iner-
tial, rectilinear uniform motion, we expect most natural fractal systems to also present
distorsions in their scale behaviour with respect to pure scale invariance. This implies
taking non-linearity in the scale space into account. Such distorsions may be, as a first
step, attributed to the effect of a dynamics of scale (“scale dynamics”), i.e., of a “scale
field”, but it must be clear from the very beginning of the description that they are of ge-
ometric nature (in analogy with the Newtonian interpretation of gravitation as the result
of a force, which has later been understood from Einstein’s general relativity theory as a
manifestation of the curved geometry of space-time).
In this case the Lagrange scale-equation takes the form of Newton’s equation of dy-
namics,
F = µ
d2 lnL
dτ 2F
, (31)
where µ is a “scale mass”, which measures how the system resists to the scale force, and
where IΓ = d2 lnL/dτ 2F = d ln(λ/ε)/dτF is the scale acceleration.
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In this framework one can therefore attempt to define generic, scale-dynamical be-
haviours which could be common to very different systems, as corresponding to a given
form of the scale force.
Constant scale force A typical example is the case of a constant scale force. Setting
G = F/µ, the potential reads ϕ = G lnL, in analogy with the potential of a constant
force f in space, which is ϕ = −fx, since the force is −∂ϕ/∂x = f . The scale differential
equation writes
d2 lnL
dτ 2F
= G. (32)
It can be easily integrated. A first integration yields d lnL/dτF = GτF +V0, where V0 is
a constant. Then a second integration yields a parabolic solution (which is the equivalent
for scale laws of parabolic motion in a constant field),
V = V0 +GτF ; lnL = lnL0 + V0τF + 1
2
Gτ 2F , (33)
where V = d lnL/dτF = ln(λ/ε).
However the physical meaning of this result is not clear under this form. This is
due to the fact that, while in the case of motion laws we search for the evolution of the
system with time, in the case of scale laws we search for the dependence of the system
on resolution, which is the directly measured observable. Since the reference scale λ is
arbitrary, the variables can be re-defined in such a way that V0 = 0, i.e., λ = λ0. Indeed,
from Eq. (33) one gets τF = (V − V0)/G = [ln(λ/ε)− ln(λ/λ0)]/G = ln(λ0/ε)/G. Then
one obtains
τF =
1
G
ln
(
λ0
ε
)
, ln
( L
L0
)
=
1
2G
ln2
(
λ0
ε
)
. (34)
The scale time τF becomes a linear function of resolution (the same being true, as
a consequence, of the fractal dimension DF = 1 + τF ), and the (lnL, ln ε) relation is
now parabolic instead of linear. Note that, as in previous cases, we have considered here
only the small scale asymptotic behaviour, and that we can once again easily generalize
this result by including a transition to scale-independence at large scale. This is simply
achieved by replacing L by (L − L0) in every equations.
There are several physical situations where, after careful examination of the data, the
power-law models were clearly rejected since no constant slope could be defined in the
(logL, log ε) plane. In the several cases where a clear curvature appears in this plane, e.g.,
turbulence [29], sandpiles [11], fractured surfaces in solid mechanics [13], the physics could
come under such a scale-dynamical description. In these cases it might be of interest to
identify and study the scale force responsible for the scale distorsion (i.e., for the deviation
from standard scaling).
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2.2.6 Special scale-relativity
Let us close this section about the derivation of scale laws of increasing complexity by
coming back to the question of finding the general laws of scale transformations that meet
the principle of scale relativity [68]. It has been shown in Sec. 2.2.3 that the standard
self-similar fractal laws come under a Galilean group of scale transformations. However,
the Galilean relativity group is known, for motion laws, to be only a degenerate form of
the Lorentz group. It has been proven that a similar result holds for scale laws [68, 69].
The problem of finding the laws of linear transformation of fields in a scale transfor-
mation V = ln ρ (ε → ε′) amounts to finding four quantities, a(V), b(V), c(V), and d(V),
such that
ln
L′
L0 = a(V) ln
L
L0 + b(V) τF , (35)
τ ′F = c(V) ln
L
L0 + d(V) τF .
Set in this way, it immediately appears that the current ‘scale-invariant’ scale trans-
formation law of the standard form of constant fractal dimension (Eq. 15), given by
a = 1, b = V, c = 0 and d = 1, corresponds to a Galilean group.
This is also clear from the law of composition of dilatations, ε → ε′ → ε′′, which has
a simple additive form,
V
′′ = V+ V′. (36)
However the general solution to the ‘special relativity problem’ (namely, find a, b, c and d
from the principle of relativity) is the Lorentz group [58, 68]. This result has led to the
suggestion of replacing the standard law of dilatation, ε→ ε′ = ̺×ε by a new Lorentzian
relation, namely, for ε < λ0 and ε
′ < λ0
ln
ε′
λ0
=
ln(ε/λ0) + ln ̺
1 + ln ̺ ln(ε/λ0)/ ln
2(λH/λ0)
. (37)
This relation introduces a fundamental length scale λH , which is naturally identified,
toward the small scales, with the Planck length (currently 1.6160(11)× 10−35 m) [68],
λH = lP = (~G/c
3)1/2, (38)
and toward the large scales (for ε > λ0 and ε
′ > λ0) with the scale of the cosmological
constant, λH = L = Λ
−1/2 [69, Chap. 7.1].
As one can see from Eq. (37), if one starts from the scale ε = λH and applies any
dilatation or contraction ̺, one obtains again the scale ε′ = λH , whatever the initial
value of λ0. In other words, λH can be interpreted as a limiting lower (or upper) length-
scale, impassable, invariant under dilatations and contractions, which has the nature of a
horizon.
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As concerns the length measured along a fractal coordinate which was previously scale-
dependent as ln(L/L0) = τ0 ln(λ0/ε) for ε < λ0, it becomes in the new framework, in the
simplified case when one starts from the reference scale L0
ln
L
L0 =
τ0 ln(λ0/ε)√
1− ln2(λ0/ε)/ ln2(λ0/λH)
. (39)
The main new feature of special scale relativity respectively to the previous fractal or scale-
invariant approaches is that the scale exponent τF and the fractal dimension DF = 1+τF ,
which were previously constant (DF = 2, τF = 1 ), are now explicitly varying with scale,
following the law (given once again in the simplified case when we start from the reference
scale L0):
τF (ε) =
τ0√
1− ln2(λ0/ε)/ ln2(λ0/λH)
. (40)
Under this form, the scale covariance is explicit, since one keeps a power law form for the
length variation, L = L0(λ/ε)τF (ε), but now in terms of a variable fractal dimension.
For a more complete development of special relativity, including its implications as
regards new conservative quantities and applications in elementary particle physics and
cosmology, see [68, 69, 72, 102].
The question of the nature of space-time geometry at Planck scale is a subject of intense
work (see e.g. [5, 57] and references therein). This is a central question for practically all
theoretical attempts, including noncommutative geometry [20, 21], supersymmetry and
superstrings theories [43, 111], for which the compactification scale is close to the Planck
scale, and particularly for the theory of quantum gravity. Indeed, the development of loop
quantum gravity by Rovelli and Smolin [113] led to the conclusion that the Planck scale
could be a quantized minimal scale in Nature, involving also a quantization of surfaces
and volumes [114].
Over the last years, there has also been significant research effort aimed at the devel-
opment of a ‘Doubly-Special-Relativity’ [4] (see a review in [5]), according to which the
laws of physics involve a fundamental velocity scale c and a fundamental minimum length
scale Lp, identified with the Planck length.
The concept of a new relativity in which the Planck length-scale would become a
minimum invariant length is exactly the founding idea of the special scale relativity theory
[68], which has been incorporated in other attempts of extended relativity theories [15, 16].
But, despite the similarity of aim and analysis, the main difference between the ‘Doubly-
Special-Relativity’ approach and the scale relativity one is that the question of defining
an invariant length-scale is considered in the scale relativity/fractal space-time theory
as coming under a relativity of scales. Therefore the new group to be constructed is a
multiplicative group, that becomes additive only when working with the logarithms of
scale ratios, which are definitely the physically relevant scale variables, as one can show
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by applying the Gell-Mann-Levy method to the construction of the dilation operator (see
Sec. 2.2.1).
2.3 Fractal space and quantum mechanics
The first step in the construction of a theory of the quantum space-time from fractal
and nondifferentiable geometry, which has been described in the previous sections, has
consisted of finding the laws of explicit scale dependence at a given “point” or “instant”
(under their new fractal definition).
The next step, which will now be considered, amounts to write the equation of motion
in such a fractal space(-time) in terms of a geodesic equation. As we shall see, this equation
takes, after integration, the form of a Schro¨dinger equation (and of the Klein-Gordon and
Dirac equations in the relativistic case). This result, first obtained in Ref. [69], has later
been confirmed by many subsequent physical [72, 74, 28, 17] and mathematical works, in
particular by Cresson and Ben Adda [22, 24, 8, 9] and Jumarie [51, 52, 53, 54], including
attempts of generalizations using the tool of the fractional integro-differential calculus
[9, 26, 54].
In what follows, we consider only the simplest case of fractal laws, namely, those char-
acterized by a constant fractal dimension. The various generalized scale laws considered in
the previous section lead to new possible generalizations of quantum mechanics [72, 102].
2.3.1 Critical fractal dimension 2
Moreover, we simplify again the description by considering only the case DF = 2. Indeed,
the nondifferentiability and fractality of space implies that the paths are random walks
of the Markovian type, which corresponds to such a fractal dimension. This choice is
also justified by Feynman’s result [33], according to which the typical paths of quantum
particles (those which contribute mainly to the path integral) are nondifferentiable and of
fractal dimension DF = 2 [1]. The case DF 6= 2, which yields generalizations to standard
quantum mechanics has also been studied in detail (see [72, 102] and references therein).
This study shows that DF = 2 plays a critical role in the theory, since it suppresses the
explicit scale dependence in the motion (Schro¨dinger) equation – but this dependence
remains hidden and reappears through, e.g., the Heisenberg relations and the explicit
dependence of measurement results on the reolution of the measurement apparatus.
Let us start from the result of the previous section, according to which the solution
of a first order scale differential equation reads for DF = 2, after differentiation and
reintroduction of the indices,
dXµ = dxµ + dξµ = vµds+ ζµ
√
λc ds, (41)
where λc is a length scale which must be introduced for dimensional reasons and which,
as we shall see, generalizes the Compton length. The ζµ are dimensionless highly fluctu-
ating functions. Due to their highly erratic character, we can replace them by stochastic
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variables such that <ζµ>= 0, <(ζ0)2>= −1 and <(ζk)2>= 1 (k =1 to 3). The mean is
taken here on a purely mathematic probability law which can be fully general, since the
final result does not depend on its choice.
2.3.2 Metric of a fractal space-time
Now one can also write the fractal fluctuations in terms of the coordinate differentials,
dξµ = ζµ
√
λµ dxµ. The identification of this expression with that of Eq. (41) leads to
recover the Einstein-de Broglie length and time scales,
λx =
λc
dx/ds
=
~
px
, τ =
λc
dt/ds
=
~
E
. (42)
Let us now assume that the large scale (classical) behavior is given by Riemannian
metric potentials gµν(x, y, z, t). The invariant proper time dS along a geodesic writes, in
terms of the complete differential elements dXµ = dxµ + dξµ,
dS2 = gµνdX
µdXν = gµν(dx
µ + dξµ)(dxν + dξν). (43)
Now replacing the dξ’s by their expression, one obtains a fractal metric [69, 85] (which is
valid only on the geodesics). Its two-dimensional and diagonal expression, neglecting the
terms of zero mean (in order to simplify its writing) reads
dS2 = g00(x, t)
(
1 + ζ20
τF
dt
)
c2dt2 − g11(x, t)
(
1 + ζ21
λx
dx
)
dx2. (44)
We therefore obtain generalized fractal metric potentials which are divergent and ex-
plicitly dependent on the coordinate differential elements [67, 69]. Another equivalent
way to understand this metric consists in remarking that it is no longer only quadratic in
the space-time differental elements, but that it also contains them in a linear way. Now
this metric being valid only on the fractal geodesics, the question of finding its general
expression for the whole fractal space-time remains an open question.
As a consequence, the curvature is also explicitly scale-dependent and divergent when
the scale intervals tend to zero. This property ensures the fundamentally non-Riemannian
character of a fractal space-time, as well as the possibility to characterize it in an intrin-
sic way. Indeed, such a characterization, which is a necessary condition for defining a
space in a genuine way, can be easily made by measuring the curvature at smaller and
smaller scales. While the curvature vanishes by definition toward the small scales in
Gauss-Riemann geometry, a fractal space can be characterized from the interior by the
verification of the divergence toward small scales of curvature, and therefore of physical
quantities like energy and momentum.
Now the expression of this divergence is nothing but the Heisenberg relations them-
selves, which therefore acquire in this framework the status of a fundamental geometric
test of the fractality of space-time [66, 67, 69].
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2.3.3 Geodesics of a fractal space-time
The next step in such a geometric approach consists in the identification of wave-particles
with fractal space-time geodesics. Any measurement is interpreted as a selection of the
geodesics bundle linked to the interaction with the measurement apparatus (that depends
on its resolution) and/or to the information known about it (for example, the which-way-
information in a two-slit experiment [72].
The three main consequences of nondifferentiability are:
(i) The number of fractal geodesics is infinite. This leads to adopt a generalized
statistical fluid-like description where the velocity V µ(s) is replaced by a scale-dependent
velocity field V µ[Xµ(s, ds), s, ds].
(ii) There is a breaking of the reflexion invariance of the differential element ds. Indeed,
in terms of fractal functions f(s, ds), two derivatives are defined,
X ′+(s, ds) =
X(s+ ds, ds)−X(s, ds)
ds
, X ′−(s, ds) =
X(s, ds)−X(s− ds, ds)
ds
, (45)
which transform one in the other under the reflection (ds ↔ −ds), and which have a
priori no reason to be equal. This leads to a fundamental two-valuedness of the velocity
field.
(iii) The geodesics are themselves fractal curves of fractal dimension DF = 2 [33].
This means that one defines two divergent fractal velocity fields, V+[x(s, ds), s, ds] =
v+[x(s), s] + w+[x(s, ds), s, ds] and V−[x(s, ds), s, ds] = v−[x(s), s] + w−[x(s, ds), s, ds],
which can be decomposed in terms of differentiable parts v+ and v−, and of fractal parts
w+ and w−. Note that, contrarily to other attempts such as Nelson’s stochastic quantum
mechanics which introduces forward and backward velocities [63] (and which has been
later disproved [42, 125]), the two velocities are here both forward, since they do not
correspond to a reversal of the time coordinate, but of the time differential element now
considered as an independent variable.
More generally, we define two differentiable parts of derivatives d+/ds and d−/ds,
which, when they are applied to xµ, yield the differential parts of the velocity fields,
vµ+ = d+x
µ/ds and vµ− = d−x
µ/ds.
2.3.4 Covariant total derivative
We now come to the definition of the main tool of the scale relativity theory, a covariant
derivative which includes in its very construction the various effects of the space-time
nondifferentiable geometry. Such a method is inspired from Einstein’s general relativity,
in which the effects of the curved geometry are included into the construction of a co-
variant derivative DAi = dAi + ΓijkA
jdxk allowing to write the equation of motion as
a geodesic equation, Duk/ds = 0, which keeps the form of Galileo’s equation of inertial
motion (strong covariance). In the scale relativity theory, a similar mathematical tool is
constructed, which is based on the same concept (namely, include the effect of geometry
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in the differentiation process allowing to write a geodesic equation under the strongly
covariant form d̂Vk/ds = 0), but which is also different since it accounts for the three
above manifestations of nondifferentiability instead of that of curvature.
We mainly consider here the non-relativistic case. It corresponds to a three-dimensional
fractal space, without fractal time, in which the invariant ds is therefore identified with the
time differential element dt. One describes the elementary displacements dXk, k = 1, 2, 3,
on the geodesics of a nondifferentiable fractal space in terms of the sum of two terms (omit-
ting the indices for simplicity) dX± = d±x + dξ±, where dx represents the differentiable
part and dξ the fractal (nondifferentiable) part, defined as
d±x = v± dt, dξ± = ζ±
√
2D dt1/2. (46)
Here ζ± are stochastic dimensionless variables such that <ζ±>= 0 and <ζ
2
±>= 1, and
D is a parameter that generalizes, up to the fundamental constant c/2, the Compton
scale (namely, D = ~/2m in the case of standard quantum mechanics). The two time
derivatives are then combined in terms of a complex total time derivative operator [69],
d̂
dt
=
1
2
(
d+
dt
+
d−
dt
)
− i
2
(
d+
dt
− d−
dt
)
. (47)
Applying this operator to the differentiable part of the position vector yields a complex
velocity
V = d̂
dt
x(t) = V − iU = v+ + v−
2
− i v+ − v−
2
. (48)
In order to find the expression for the complex time derivative operator, let us first
calculate the derivative of a scalar function f . Since the fractal dimension is 2, one needs
to go to second order of expansion. For one variable it reads
df
dt
=
∂f
∂t
+
∂f
∂X
dX
dt
+
1
2
∂2f
∂X2
dX2
dt
. (49)
The generalization of this writing to three dimensions is straighforward.
Let us now take the stochastic mean of this expression, i.e., we take the mean on the
stochastic variables ζ± which appear in the definition of the fractal fluctuation dξ±. By
definition, since dX = dx+dξ and <dξ>= 0, we have <dX>= dx, so that the second term
is reduced (in 3 dimensions) to v.∇f . Now concerning the term dX2/dt, it is infinitesimal
and therefore it would not be taken into account in the standard differentiable case. But in
the nondifferentiable case considered here, the mean square fluctuation is non-vanishing
and of order dt, namely, <dξ2>= 2Ddt, so that the last term of Eq. (49) amounts in
three dimensions to a Laplacian operator. One obtains, respectively for the (+) and (-)
processes,
d±f
dt
=
(
∂
∂t
+ v±.∇±D∆
)
f . (50)
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Finally, by combining these two derivatives in terms of the complex derivative of Eq. (47),
it reads [69]
d̂
dt
=
∂
∂t
+ V.∇− iD∆. (51)
Under this form, this expression is not fully covariant [110], since it involves derivatives
of the second order, so that its Leibniz rule is a linear combination of the first and second
order Leibniz rules. By introducing the velocity operator [90]
V̂ = V − iD∇, (52)
it may be given a fully covariant expression,
d̂
dt
=
∂
∂t
+ V̂.∇, (53)
namely, under this form it satisfies the first order Leibniz rule for partial derivatives.
We shall now see that d̂/dt plays the role of a “covariant derivative operator” (in
analogy with the covariant derivative of general relativity), namely, one may write in its
terms the equation of physics in a nondifferentiable space under a strongly covariant form
identical to the differentiable case.
2.3.5 Complex action and momentum
The steps of construction of classical mechanics can now be followed, but in terms of
complex and scale dependent quantities. One defines a Lagrange function that keeps its
usual form, L(x,V, t), but which is now complex, then a generalized complex action
S =
∫ t2
t1
L(x,V, t)dt. (54)
Generalized Euler-Lagrange equations that keep their standard form in terms of the new
complex variables can be derived from this action [69, 17], namely
d̂
dt
∂L
∂V −
∂L
∂x
= 0. (55)
From the homogeneity of space and Noether’s theorem, one defines a generalized complex
momentum given by the same form as in classical mechanics, namely,
P = ∂L
∂V . (56)
If the action is now considered as a function of the upper limit of integration in Eq. (54),
the variation of the action from a trajectory to another nearby trajectory yields a gener-
alization of another well-known relation of classical mechanics,
P = ∇S. (57)
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2.3.6 Motion equation
Consider, as an example, the case of a single particle in an external scalar field of poten-
tial energy φ (but the method can be applied to any situation described by a Lagrange
function). The Lagrange function , L = 1
2
mv2−φ, is generalized as L(x,V, t) = 1
2
mV2−φ.
The Euler-Lagrange equations then keep the form of Newton’s fundamental equation of
dynamics F = mdv/dt, namely,
m
d̂
dt
V = −∇φ, (58)
which is now written in terms of complex variables and complex operators.
In the case when there is no external field (φ = 0), the covariance is explicit, since
Eq. (58) takes the free form of the equation of inertial motion, i.e., of a geodesic equation,
d̂
dt
V = 0. (59)
This is analog to Einstein’s general relativity, where the equivalence principle leads to
write the covariant equation of motion of a free particle under the form of an inertial
motion (geodesic) equation Duµ/ds = 0, in terms of the general-relativistic covariant
derivative D, of the four-vector uµ and of the proper time differential ds.
The covariance induced by the effects of the nondifferentiable geometry leads to an
analogous transformation of the equation of motions, which, as we show below, become af-
ter integration the Schro¨dinger equation, which can therefore be considered as the integral
of a geodesic equation in a fractal space.
In the one-particle case the complex momentumP reads
P = mV, (60)
so that, from Eq. (57), the complex velocity V appears as a gradient, namely the gradient
of the complex action
V = ∇S/m. (61)
2.3.7 Wave function
Up to now the various concepts and variables used were of a classical type (space,
geodesics, velocity fields), even if they were generalized to the fractal and nondifferen-
tiable, explicitly scale-dependent case whose essence is fundamentally not classical.
We shall now make essential changes of variable, that transform this apparently
classical-like tool to quantum mechanical tools (without any hidden parameter or new
degree of freedom). The complex wave function ψ is introduced as simply another expres-
sion for the complex action S, by making the transformation
ψ = eiS/S0 . (62)
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Note that, despite its apparent form, this expression involves a phase and a modulus since
S is complex. The factor S0 has the dimension of an action (i.e., an angular momentum)
and must be introduced because S is dimensioned while the phase should be dimensionless.
When this formalism is applied to standard quantum mechanics, S0 is nothing but the
fundamental constant ~. As a consequence, since
S = −iS0 lnψ, (63)
one finds that the function ψ is related to the complex velocity appearing in Eq. (61) as
follows
V = −i S0
m
∇ lnψ. (64)
This expression is the fondamental relation that connects the two description tools while
giving the meaning of the wave function in the new framework. Namely, it is defined here
as a velocity potential for the velocity field of the infinite family of geodesics of the fractal
space. Because of nondifferentiability, the set of geodesics that defines a ‘particle’ in this
framework is fundamentally non-local. It can easily be generalized to a multiple particle
situation, in particular to entangled states, which are described by a single wave function
ψ, from which the various velocity fields of the subsets of the geodesic bundle are derived
as Vk = −i (S0/mk)∇k lnψ, where k is an index for each particle. The indistinguishability
of identical particles naturally follows from the fact that the ‘particles’ are identified with
the geodesics themselves, i.e., with an infinite ensemble of purely geometric curves. In
this description there is no longer any point-mass with ‘internal‘ properties which would
follow a ‘trajectory’, since the various properties of the particle – energy, momentum,
mass, spin, charge (see next sections) – can be derived from the geometric properties of
the geodesic fluid itself.
2.3.8 Correspondence principle
Since we have P = −iS0∇ lnψ = −iS0(∇ψ)/ψ, we obtain the equality [69]
Pψ = −i~∇ψ (65)
in the standard quantum mechanical case S0 = ~, which establishes a correspondence
between the classical momentum p, which is the real part of the complex momentum in
the classical limit, and the operator −i~∇.
This result is generalizable to other variables, in particular to the Hamiltonian. Indeed,
a strongly covariant form of the Hamiltonian can be obtained by using the fully covariant
form Eq. (53) of the covariant derivative operator. With this tool, the expression of the
relation between the complex action and the complex Lagrange function reads
L = d̂S
dt
=
∂S
∂t
+ V̂ .∇S . (66)
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Since P = ∇S and H = −∂S/∂t, one obtains for the generalized complex Hamilton
function the same form it has in classical mechanics, namely [95, 102],
H = V̂ .P − L . (67)
After expansion of the velocity operator, one obtains H = V.P − iD∇.P − L, which
includes an additional term [110], whose origin is now understood as an expression of
nondifferentiability and strong covariance.
2.3.9 Schro¨dinger equation and Compton relation
The next step of the construction amounts to write the fundamental equation of dynamics
Eq. (58) in terms of the function ψ. It takes the form
iS0
d̂
dt
(∇ lnψ) = ∇φ. (68)
As we shall now see, this equation can be integrated in a general way under the form of
a Schro¨dinger equation. Replacing d̂/dt and V by their expressions yields
∇Φ = iS0
[
∂
∂t
∇ lnψ − i
{
S0
m
(∇ lnψ.∇)(∇ lnψ) +D∆(∇ lnψ)
}]
. (69)
This equation may be simplified thanks to the identity [69],
∇
(
∆ψ
ψ
)
= 2(∇ lnψ.∇)(∇ lnψ) + ∆(∇ lnψ). (70)
We recognize, in the right-hand side of Eq. (70), the two terms of Eq. (69), which were
respectively in factor of S0/m and D. This leads to definitely define the wave function as
ψ = eiS/2mD, (71)
which means that the arbitrary parameter S0 (which is identified with the constant ~ in
standard QM) is now linked to the fractal fluctuation parameter by the relation
S0 = 2mD. (72)
This relation (which can actually be proved instead of simply being set as a simplifying
choice, see [99, 95]) is actually a generalization of the Compton relation, since the geo-
metric parameter D =<dξ2> /2dt can be written in terms of a length scale as D = λc/2,
so that, when S0 = ~, it becomes λ = ~/mc. But a geometric meaning is now given
to the Compton length (and therefore to the inertial mass of the particle) in the fractal
space-time framework.
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The fundamental equation of dynamics now reads
∇φ = 2imD
[
∂
∂t
∇ lnψ − i {2D(∇ lnψ.∇)(∇ lnψ) +D∆(∇ lnψ)}
]
. (73)
Using the above remarkable identity and the fact that ∂/∂t and ∇ commute, it becomes
− ∇φ
m
= −2D∇
{
i
∂
∂t
lnψ +D∆ψ
ψ
}
. (74)
The full equation becomes a gradient,
∇
{
φ
m
− 2D∇
(
i ∂ψ/∂t+D∆ψ
ψ
)}
= 0. (75)
and it can be easily integrated, to finally obtain a generalized Schro¨dinger equation [69]
D2∆ψ + iD ∂
∂t
ψ − φ
2m
ψ = 0, (76)
up to an arbitrary phase factor which may be set to zero by a suitable choice of the ψ
phase. One recovers the standard Schro¨dinger equation of quantum mechanics for the
particular case when D = ~/2m.
2.3.10 Von Neumann’s and Born’s postulates
In the framework described here, “particles” are identified with the various geometric
properties of fractal space(-time) geodesics. In such an interpretation, a measurement (and
more generally any knowledge about the system) amounts to a selection of the sub-set of
the geodesics family in which are kept only the geodesics having the geometric properties
corresponding to the measurement result. Therefore, just after the measurement, the
system is in the state given by the measurement result, which is precisely the von Neumann
postulate of quantum mechanics.
The Born postulate can also be inferred from the scale-relativity construction [17,
99, 95]. Indeed, the probability for the particle to be found at a given position must
be proportional to the density of the geodesics fluid at this point. The velocity and the
density of the fluid are expected to be solutions of a Euler and continuity system of four
equations, for four unknowns, (ρ, Vx, Vy, Vz).
Now, by separating the real and imaginary parts of the Schro¨dinger equation, setting
ψ =
√
P × eiθ and using a mixed representation (P, V ), where V = {Vx, Vy, Vz}, one
obtains precisely such a standard system of fluid dynamics equations, namely,(
∂
∂t
+ V · ∇
)
V = −∇
(
φ− 2D2∆
√
P√
P
)
,
∂P
∂t
+ div(PV ) = 0. (77)
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This allows one to univoquely identify P = |ψ|2 with the probability density of the
geodesics and therefore with the probability of presence of the ‘particle’. Moreover,
Q = −2D2∆
√
P√
P
(78)
can be interpreted as the new potential which is expected to emerge from the fractal
geometry, in analogy with the identification of the gravitational field as a manifestation of
the curved geometry in Einstein’s general relativity. This result is supported by numerical
simulations, in which the probability density is obtained directly from the distribution of
geodesics without writing the Schro¨dinger equation [47, 102].
2.3.11 Nondifferentiable wave function
In more recent works, instead of taking only the differentiable part of the velocity field
into account, one constructs the covariant derivative and the wave function in terms of
the full velocity field, including its divergent nondifferentiable part of zero mean [81, 99].
This still leads to the standard form of the Schro¨dinger equation. This means that, in
the scale relativity framework, one expects the Schro¨dinger equation to have fractal and
nondifferentiable solutions. This result agrees with a similar conclusion by Berry [10] and
Hall [46], but it is considered here as a direct manifestation of the nondifferentiability of
space itself. The research of such a behavior in laboratory experiments is an interesting
new challenge for quantum physics.
2.4 Generalizations
2.4.1 Fractal space time and relativistic quantum mechanics
All these results can be generalized to relativistic quantum mechanics, that corresponds
in the scale relativity framework to a full fractal space-time. This yields, as a first step,
the Klein-Gordon equation [70, 72, 17].
Then the account of a new two-valuedness of the velocity allows one to suggest a
geometric origin for the spin and to obtain the Dirac equation [17]. Indeed, the total
derivative of a physical quantity also involves partial derivatives with respect to the space
variables, ∂/∂xµ. From the very definition of derivatives, the discrete symmetry under
the reflection dxµ ↔ −dxµ is also broken. Since, at this level of description, one should
also account for parity as in the standard quantum theory, this leads to introduce a bi-
quaternionic velocity field [17], in terms of which Dirac bispinor wave function can be
constructed.
We refer the interested reader to the detailed papers [72, 17, 18].
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2.4.2 Gauge fields as manifestations of fractal geometry
The scale relativity principles has been also applied to the foundation of gauge theories,
in the Abelian [70, 72] and non-Abelian [92, 102] cases.
This application is based on a general description of the internal fractal structures of
the “particle” (identified with the geodesics of a nondifferentiable space-time) in terms of
scale variables ηαβ(x, y, z, t) = ̺αβ εα εβ whose true nature is tensorial, since it involves
resolutions that may be different for the four space-time coordinates and may be corre-
lated. This resolution tensor (similar to a covariance error matrix) generalizes the single
resolution variable ε. Moreover, one considers here a more profound level of description
in which the scale variables may now be function of the coordinates. Namely, the internal
structures of the geodesics may vary from place to place and during the time evolution,
in agreement with the non-absolute character of the scale space.
This generalization amounts to construct a ‘general scale relativity’ theory. The
various ingredients of Yang-Mills theories (gauge covariant derivative, gauge invariance,
charges, potentials, fields, etc...) can be recovered in such a framework, but they are now
founded from first principles and are found to be of geometric origin, namely, gauge fields
are understood as manifestations of the fractality of space-time [70, 72, 92, 102].
2.4.3 Quantum mechanics in scale space
One may go still one step further, and also give up the hypothesis of differentiability of
the scale variables. Another generalization of the theory then amounts to use in scale
space the method that has been built for dealing with nondifferentiability in space-time
[90]. This results in scale laws that take quantum-like forms instead of classical ones, and
which may have several applications, as well in particle physics [90] as in biology [100].
3 Applications
3.1 Applications to physics and cosmology
3.1.1 Application of special scale relativity: value of QCD coupling
In the special scale relativity framework, the new status of the Planck length-scale as
a lowest unpassable scale must be universal. In particular, it applies also to the de
Broglie and Compton relations themselves. They must therefore be generalized, since in
their standard definition they may reach the zero length, which is forbidden in the new
framework.
A fundamental consequence of these new relations for high energy physics is that the
mass-energy scale and the length-time scale are no longer inverse as in standard quan-
tum field theories, but they are now related by the special scale-relativistic generalized
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Compton formula, that reads [68]
ln
m
m0
=
ln(λ0/λ)√
1− ln2(λ0/λ)/ln2(λ0/lP)
, (79)
where m0λ0 = ~/c. This relation generalizes, for m > m0 and λ < λ0, the Compton
relation mλ = ~/c which connects any mass-energy scale m to a length-scale λ.
As a consequence of this new relation, one finds that the grand unification scale be-
comes the Planck energy scale [68, 69]. We have made the conjecture [68, 69] that the
SU(3) inverse coupling reaches the critical value 4π2 at this unification scale, i.e., at an
energy mPc
2/2π in the special scale-relativistic modified standard model.
By running the coupling from the Planck to the Z scale, this conjecture allows one
to get a theoretical estimate for the value of the QCD coupling at Z scale. Indeed its
renormalization group equation yields a variation of α3 = αs with length scale given to
second order (for six quarks and NH Higgs doublets) by [69]
α−13 (r) = α
−1
3 (λZ) +
7
2π
ln
λZ
r
+
11
4π(40 +NH)
ln
{
1− 40 +NH
20π
α1(λZ) ln
λZ
r
}
− 27
4π(20−NH) ln
{
1 +
20−NH
12π
α2(λZ) ln
λZ
r
}
+
13
14π
ln
{
1 +
7
2π
α3(λZ) ln
λZ
r
}
. (80)
The variation with energy scale is obtained by making the transformation given by
Eq. (79) in which we take as reference scale the Z boson scale, i.e., λ0 = λZ and m0 = mZ .
This led in 1992 to the expectation [68] α3(mZ) = 0.1165 ± 0.0005, that compared well
with the experimental value at that time, α3(mZ) = 0.112± 0.010, and was more precise
by a factor 20.
This calculation has been more recently reconsidered [12, 102], by using improved
experimental values of the α1 and α2 couplings at Z scale (which intervene at second
order), and by a better account of the top quark contribution. Indeed, its mass was
unknown at the time of our first attempt in 1992, so that the running from Z scale to
Planck scale was performed by assuming the contribution of six quarks on the whole scale
range.
However, the now known mass of the top quark, mt = 174.2± 3.3 GeV [107] is larger
than the Z mass, so that only five quarks contribute to the running of the QCD coupling
between Z scale and top quark scale, then six quarks between top and Planck scale.
Moreover, the possibility of a threshold effect at top scale cannot be excluded. This led
to an improved estimate :
αs(mZ) = 0.1173± 0.0004, (81)
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which agrees within uncertainties with our initial estimate 0.1165(5) [68]. This expectation
is in very good agreement with the recent experimental average αs(mZ) = 0.1176±0.0009
[107], where the quoted uncertainty is the error on the average. We give in Fig. 1 the
evolution of the measurement results of the strong coupling at Z scale, which compare
very well with the theoretrical expectation.
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Figure 1: Measured values of αs(MZ) from 1992 (date of the theoretical prediction) to 2006
[107] compared with the expectation αs(mZ) = 0.1173 ± 0.0004 made from assuming that the
inverse running coupling reaches the value 4pi2 at Planck scale (see text). The 2008 experimental
value is unchanged (0.1176 ± 0.0009).
3.1.2 Value of the cosmological constant
One of the most difficult open questions in present cosmology is the problem of the
vacuum energy density and its manifestation as an effective cosmological constant. In
the framework of the theory of scale relativity a new solution can be suggested to this
problem, which also allows one to connect it to Dirac’s large number hypothesis [69, Chap.
7.1], [72].
The first step toward a solution has consisted in considering the vacuum as fractal,
(i.e., explicitly scale dependent). As a consequence, the Planck value of the vacuum energy
density is relevant only at the Planck scale, and becomes irrelevant at the cosmological
scale. One expects such a scale-dependent vacuum energy density to be solution of a scale
28
EDU 2008 p42
differential equation that reads
d̺/d ln r = Γ(̺) = a+ b̺+O(̺2), (82)
where ̺ has been normalized to its Planck value, so that it is always < 1, allowing a
Taylor expansion of Γ(̺). This equation is solved as:
̺ = ̺c
[
1 +
(r0
r
)−b]
. (83)
This solution is the sum of a fractal, power law behavior at small scales, that can be
identified with the quantum scale-dependent contribution, and of a scale-independent term
at large scale, that can be identified with the geometric cosmological constant observed
at cosmological scales. The new ingredient here is a fractal/non-fractal transition about
some scale r0 that comes out as an integration constant, and which allows to connect the
two contributions.
The second step toward a solution has been to realize that, when considering the
various field contributions to the vacuum density, we may always chose < E >= 0 (i.e.,
renormalize the energy density of the vacuum). But consider now the gravitational self-
energy of vacuum fluctuations. It writes:
Eg =
G
c4
< E2 >
r
. (84)
The Heisenberg relations prevent from making < E2 >= 0, so that this gravitational
self-energy cannot vanish. With < E2 >1/2= ~c/r, we obtain an asymptotic high energy
behavior due to quantum effects
̺g = ̺P
(
lP
r
)6
, (85)
where ̺P is the Planck energy density and lP the Planck length. From this equation one
can make the identification −b = 6, so that one obtains ̺ = ̺c
[
1 + (r0/r)
6].
Therefore one of Dirac’s large number relations is proved from this result [69]. Indeed,
introducing the characteristic length scale L = Λ−1/2 of the cosmological constant Λ
(which is a curvature, i.e. the inverse of the square of a length), one obtains the relation:
K = L/lP = (r0/lP)
3 = (mP/m0)
3, (86)
where the transition scale r0 can be identified with the Compton length of a particle of
mass m0. Then the power 3 in Dirac’s large number relation is understood as coming
from the power 6 of the gravitational self-energy of vacuum fluctuations and of the power
2 that relies the invariant scale L to the cosmological constant, following the relation
Λ = 1/L2. The important point here is that in this new form of the Eddington-Dirac’s
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relation, the cosmological length is no longer the time-varying c/H0 (which led to theories
of variation of constants), but the invariant cosmological length L, which can therefore
be connected to an invariant elementary particle scale without any longer a need for
fundamental constant variation.
Now, a complete solution to the problem can be reached only provided the transition
scale r0 be identified. Our first suggestion [69, Chap. 7.1] has been that this scale is given
by the classical radius of the electron.
Let us give an argument in favor of this conjecture coming from a description of
the evolution of the primeval universe. Despite its name (which comes from historical
reasons), the classical radius of the electron re is of a quantum nature, since it actually
defines the e+e− annihilation cross section and the e−e− cross section σ = πr2e at energy
mec
2. This length corresponds to an energy Ee = ~c/re = 70.02 MeV. This means that it
yields the ‘size’ of an electron viewed by another electron. Therefore, when two electrons
are separated by a distance smaller than re, they can no longer be considered as different,
independent objects.
The consequence of this property for the primeval universe is that re should be a
fundamental transition scale. When the Universe scale factor was so small that the inter-
distance between any couple of electrons was smaller than re, there was no existing genuine
separated electron. Then, when the cooling and expansion of the Universe separates the
electron by distances larger than re, the electrons that will later combine with the protons
and form atoms appear for the first time as individual entities. Therefore the scale re and
its corresponding energy 70 MeV defines a fundamental phase transition for the universe,
which is the first appearance of electrons as we know them at large scales. Moreover,
this is also the scale of maximal separation of quarks (in the pion), which means that the
expansion, at the epoch this energy is reached, stops to apply to individual quarks and
begins to apply to hadrons. This scale therefore becomes a reference static scale to which
larger variable scales driven with the expansion can now be compared. Under this view,
the cosmological constant would be a ‘fossil’ of this phase transition, in similarity with
the 3K microwave radiation being a fossil of the combination of electrons and nucleons
into atoms.
One obtains with the CODATA 2002 values of the fundamental constants a theoretical
estimate
K(pred) = (5.3000± 0.0012)× 1060, (87)
i.e. CU = lnK = 139.82281(22), which corresponds to a cosmological constant (see [69]
p. 305)
Λ(pred) = (1.3628± 0.0004)× 10−56 cm−2 (88)
i.e., a scaled cosmological constant
ΩΛ(pred) = (0.38874± 0.00012) h−2. (89)
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Finally the corresponding invariant cosmic length scale is theoretically predicted to be
L(pred) = (2.77608± 0.00042) Gpc, (90)
i.e., L(pred) = (8.5661± 0.0013)× 1025 m.
Let us compare these values with the most recent determinations of the cosmological
constant, sometimes now termed, in a somewhat misleading way, ‘dark energy’ (see Fig. 2).
The WMAP three year analysis of 2006 [122] has given h = 0.73 ± 0.03 and ΩΛ(obs) =
0.72 ± 0.03. These results, combined with the recent Sloan (SDSS) data [123], yield,
assuming Ωtot = 1 (as supported by its WMAP determination, Ωtot = 1.003± 0.010)
ΩΛ(obs) =
Λc2
3H20
= 0.761± 0.017, h = 0.730± 0.019. (91)
Note that these recent results have also reinforced the cosmological constant interpretation
of the ‘dark energy’ with a measurement of the coefficient of the equation of state w =
−0.941 ± 0.094 [123], which encloses the value w = −1 expected for a cosmological
constant.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the measured values of the dimensionless cosmological constant ΩΛh2 =
Λc2/3H2100, from 1975 to 2008, compared to the theoretical expectation Λ = (me/αmP)
6 (1/lP)
2
[69] that gives numerically ΩΛh
2(pred) = 0.38874 ± 0.00012.
With these values one finds a still improved cosmological constant
ΩΛh
2(obs) = 0.406± 0.030, (92)
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which corresponds to a cosmic scale
L(obs) = (2.72± 0.10) Gpc, i.e., K(obs) = (5.19± 0.19)× 1060, (93)
in excellent agreement with the predicted values L(pred) = 2.7761(4) Gpc, and K(pred) =
5.300(1)× 1060.
The evolution of these experimental determinations [102] is shown in Fig. 2 where they
are compared with the theoretical expectation
ΩΛh
2(pred) = 0.38874± 0.00012. (94)
The convergence of the observational values toward the theoretical estimate, despite an
improvement of the precision by a factor of more than 20, is striking, although this es-
timate is partly phenomenological, since it remains dependent on a conjecture about
the transition scale, which clearly needs to be investigated and comprehended more pro-
foundly. The 2008 value from the Five-Year WMAP results is ΩΛh
2(obs) = 0.384± 0.043
[49] and is once again in very good agreement with the theoretical expectation made 16
years ago [69], before the first genuine measurements in 1998.
3.2 Applications to astrophysics
3.2.1 Gravitational Schro¨dinger equation
Let us first briefly recall the basics of the scale-relativistic theoretical approach. It has
been reviewed in Sec. 2.3 in the context of the foundation of microphysics quantum me-
chanics. We shall now see that some of its ingredients, leading in particular to obtain
a generalized Schro¨dinger form for the equation of motion, also applies to gravitational
structure formation.
Under three general conditions, namely, {(i) infinity of geodesics (which leads to in-
troduce a non-deterministic velocity field), (ii) fractal dimension DF = 2 of each geodesic,
on which the elementary displacements are described in terms of the sum dX = dx+ dξ
of a classical, differentiable part dx and of a fractal, non-differentiable fluctuation dξ, (iii)
two-valuedness of the velocity field, which is a consequence of time irreversibility at the
infinitesimal level issued from non-differentiability, one can construct a complex covariant
derivative that reads
d̂
dt
=
∂
∂t
+ V.∇− iD∆ , (95)
where D is a parameter that characterizes the fractal fluctuation, which is such that
< dξ2 >= 2Ddt, and where the classical part of the velocity field, V is complex as a
consequence of condition (iii) (see [17, 95] for more complete demonstrations).
Then this covariant derivative, that describes the non-differentiable and fractal geome-
try of space-time, can be combined with the covariant derivative of general relativity, that
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describes the curved geometry. We shall briefly consider in what follows only the Newto-
nian limit. In this case the equation of geodesics keeps the form of Newton’s fundamental
equation of dynamics in a gravitational field,
D̂V
dt
=
d̂V
dt
+∇
(
φ
m
)
= 0, (96)
where φ is the Newtonian potential energy. Introducing the action S, which is now
complex, and making the change of variable ψ = eiS/2mD, this equation can be integrated
under the form of a generalized Schro¨dinger equation [69]:
D2∆ψ + iD ∂
∂t
ψ − φ
2m
ψ = 0. (97)
Since the imaginary part of this equation is the equation of continuity (Sec. 3), and
basing ourselves on our description of the motion in terms of an infinite family of geodesics,
P = |ψ|2 naturally gives the probability density of the particle position [17, 95].
Even though it takes this Schro¨dinger-like form, equation (97) is still in essence an
equation of gravitation, so that it must come under the equivalence principle [73, 2],
i.e., it is independent of the mass of the test-particle. In the Kepler central potential case
(φ = −GMm/r), GM provides the natural length-unit of the system under consideration.
As a consequence, the parameter D reads:
D = GM
2w
, (98)
where w is a constant that has the dimension of a velocity. The ratio αg = w/c actually
plays the role of a macroscopic gravitational coupling constant [2, 82].
3.2.2 Formation and evolution of structures
Let us now compare our approach with the standard theory of gravitational structure
formation and evolution. By separating the real and imaginary parts of the Schro¨dinger
equation we obtain, after a new change of variables, respectively a generalized Euler-
Newton equation and a continuity equation, namely,
m (
∂
∂t
+ V · ∇)V = −∇(φ+Q), ∂P
∂t
+ div(PV ) = 0, (99)
where V is the real part of the complex velocity field V and where the gravitational
potential φ is given by the Poisson equation. In the case when the density of probability
is proportional to the density of matter, P ∝ ρ, this system of equations is equivalent
to the classical one used in the standard approach of gravitational structure formation,
except for the appearance of an extra potential energy term Q that writes:
Q = −2mD2∆
√
P√
P
. (100)
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The existence of this potential energy, (which amount to the Bohm potential in stan-
dard quantum mechanics) is, in our approach, readily demonstrated and understood:
namely, it is the very manifestation of the fractality of space, in similarity with New-
ton’s potential being a manifestation of curvature. We have suggested [83, 91, 93] that it
could be the origin of the various effects which are usually attributed to an unseen, ‘dark’
matter.
In the case when actual particles achieve the probability density distribution (structure
formation), we have ρ = m0P . Then the Poisson equation (i.e., the field equation) be-
comes ∆φ = 4πGmm0|ψ|2 and it is therefore strongly interconnected with the Schro¨dinger
equation (which is here a new form for the equation of motion). Such a system of equations
is similar to that encountered in the description of superconductivity (Hartree equation).
We expect its solutions to provide us with general theoretical predictions for the structures
(in position and velocity space) of self-gravitating systems at multiple scales [74, 27]. This
expectation is already supported by the observed agreement of several of these solutions
with astrophysical observational data [69, 73, 82, 76, 80, 77, 78, 48].
3.2.3 Planetary systems
Let us briefly consider the application of the theory to the formation of planetary systems.
The standard model of formation of planetary systems can be reconsidered in terms of
a fractal description of the motion of planetesimals in the protoplanetary nebula. On
length-scales much larger than their mean free path, we have assumed [69] that their highly
chaotic motion satisfy the three conditions upon which the derivation of a Schro¨dinger
equation is based (large number of trajectories, fractality and time symmetry breaking).
In modern terms, our proposal is but a ‘migration’ theory, since it amounts to take into
account the coupling between planetesimals (or proto-planets) and the remaining disk.
But, instead of considering a mean field coupling, we consider the effect of the closest
bodies to be the main one, leading to Brownian motion and irreversibility.
This description applies to the distribution of planetesimals in the proto-planetary neb-
ula at several embedded levels of hierarchy [73]. Each hierarchical level (k) is characterized
by a length-scale defining the parameter Dk (and therefore the velocity wk) that appears
in the generalized Schro¨dinger equation describing this sub-system. Through matching of
the wave functions for these different subsystems (for example, the inner solar system in
its whole constitutes the fundamental ‘orbital’ n = 1 of the outer solar system), the ratios
of their structure constants wk are expected to be themselves given by integer numbers
[73]. This expectation is supported by the observed sub-structures of our solar system,
which are organised according to constants w0 = 144.7± 0.7 km/s (inner system), 3×w0
(Sun and intramercurial system), w0/5 (outer solar system), w0/(5× 7) (distant Kuiper
belt). This hierarchical model has allowed us to recover the mass distribution of planets
and small planets in the inner and outer solar systems [76].
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The Sun One can apply this approach to the organization of the Sun surface itself. One
expects the distribution of the various relevant physical quantities that characterize the
solar activity at the Sun surface (Sun spot number, magnetic field, etc...) to be described
by a wave function whose stationary solutions read ψ = ψ0 e
iEt/2mD. In this relation, the
parameter D = GM/2w must now be directly related to the Sun itself, which naturally
leads to take M = M⊙ and w = w⊙ = 437.1 km/s, which is the Keplerian velocity at
the Sun radius R⊙ = 0.00465 AU. It is also remarkable that this velocity is very close to
3 × 144.7 = 434.1, where w = 144.7 km/s is the structural constant of the inner solar
system (in accordance with the expectation of integer ratios for the gravitational structure
constants [73], and of most of the extrasolar planetary systems discovered up to now (see
what follows and Fig. 6).
The energy E results from the rotational velocity and, to be complete, should also
include the turbulent velocity, so that E = (v2rot + v
2
turb)/2. This means that we expect
the solar surface activity to be subjected to a fundamental period:
τ =
2πmD
E
=
4πD
v2rot + v
2
turb
, (101)
The parameter D at the Sun radius is D = GM⊙/2w⊙, then we obtain:
τ =
2πGM⊙
w⊙(v
2
rot + v
2
turb)
. (102)
The average sideral rotation period of the Sun is 25.38 days, yielding a velocity of 2.01
km/s at equator [108]. The turbulent velocity has been found to be vturb = 1.4±0.2 km/s
[56]. Therefore we find numerically
τ = (10.2± 1.0) yrs. (103)
The observed value of the period of the Solar activity cycle, τobs = 11.0 yrs, nicely supports
this theoretical prediction. This is an interesting result, owing to the fact that there is,
up to now, no existing theoretical prediction of the value of the solar cycle period, except
in terms of very rough order of magnitude [127].
Moreover, since we have now at our disposal a simple and precise formula for a stellar
cycle which precisely accounts for the solar period, the advantage is that it can be tested
with other stars. The observation of the magnetic activity cycle of distant solar-like stars
remains a difficult task, but it has now been performed on several stars. A first attempt
gives very encouraging results (see Fig. 3), since we obtain indeed a satisfactory agreement
between the observed and predicted periods, in a statistically significant way, despite the
small number of objects.
The intramercurial system organized on the constant w⊙ = 3 × 144 = 432 km/s.
The existence of an intramercurial subsystem is supported by various stable and transient
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Figure 3: Comparison between the observed values of the period of solar-like star cycles (inactive
stars with better determined behavior in Table 1 of Ref. [115]) and the predicted periods (see
text). The open point is for the Sun. The correlation is significant at a probability level P ≈ 10−4
(Student variable t ≈ 5).
structures observed in dust, asteroid and comet distributions (see [27]). We have in
particular suggested the existence of a new ring of asteroids, the ‘Vulcanoid belt’, at a
preferential distance of about 0.17 AU from the Sun.
The inner solar system (earth-like planets), organized with a constant wi = 144 km/s
(see Fig. 6).
The outer solar system organized with a constant wo = 144/5 = 29 km/s (see Fig. 4),
as deduced from the fact that the mass peak of the inner solar system lies at the Earth
distance (n = 5). The Jovian giant planets lie from n = 2 to n = 5. Pluton lies on n = 6,
but is now considered to be a dwarf planet part of the Kuiper belt.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the semi-major axis of Kuiper belt objects (KBO) and scattered
Kuiper belt objects (SKBO), compared with the theoretical predictions (arrows) of probability
density peaks for the outer solar system [27] (see text). The existence of probability density
peaks for the Kuiper belt at ≈ 40, 55, 70, 90 AU, etc..., has been theoretically predicted in 1993
before the discovery of these objects [71], and it is now supported by the observational data, in
particular by the new small planet Eris at 68 AU, whose mass is larger than Pluto, and which
falls close to the expected probability peak n = 8 at 70 AU (see text).
Kuiper belt The recently discovered Kuiper and scattered Kuiper belt objects (Fig.
4) show peaks of probability at n = 6 to 9 [27], as predicted before their discovery [71].
In particular, the predicted peak around 57 AU (n = 7) is the main observed peak in
the SKBO distribution of semi-major axes. The following peak (n = 8), predicted to
be around 70 AU, has received a spectacular verification with the discovery of the dwarf
planet Eris (2003 UB313) at 68 AU, whose mass larger than Pluton has recently led to a
revision of planetary nomenclature.
Distant Kuiper belt Beyond these distances, we have been able to predict a new
level of hierarchy in the Solar System whose main SKBO peak at 57 AU would be the
fundamental level (n = 1) [37]. The following probability peaks are expected, accord-
ing to the n2 law, to lie for semi-major axes of 228, 513, 912, 1425, 2052 AU, etc....
Once again this prediction has been validated by the observational data in a remark-
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Figure 5: Distribution of the semi-major axis of very distant scattered Kuiper belt objects
(SKBO) , compared with the theoretical predictions of probability density peaks (see text). We
have taken the main SKBO peak at ≈57 AU (which is the predicted n = 7 peak of the outer
solar system) as fundamental level (n = 1) for this new level of hierarchy of the solar system.
The figure plots the histogram of the variable (a/57)1/2, where a is the semimajor axis of the
object orbit in AU. The theoretical prediction, done before the discovery of the distant objects,
is that the distribution of this variable should show peaks for integer values, as now verified by
the observational data.
able way (see Fig. 5), since 4 bodies, including the very distant small planet Sedna,
have now been discovered in the 513 AU peak (n = 3), 7 bodies in the 228 AU peak
(n = 2) , and now one very distant object at about 1000 AU (data Minor Planet Center,
http://www.cfa.harvard.edu/iau/mpc.html).
Extrasolar planets We have suggested more than 16 years ago [69, 71], before the
discovery of exoplanets, that the theoretical predictions from this approach of planetary
formation should apply to all planetary systems, not only our own solar system. Mean-
while more than 300 exoplanets have now been discovered, and the observational data
support this prediction in a highly statistically significant way (see [73, 82, 27] and Fig. 6).
The presently known exoplanets mainly correspond to the intramercurial and inner
solar systems. The theoretical prediction, made in 1993 [69, Chap. 7.2], according to
which the distribution of semi-major axes a is expected to show peaks of probability for
integer values of the variable 4.83(a/M)1/2, where M is the star mass, remains validated
with a high statistical significance (see Fig. 6). In particular, in addition to the peaks
of probability corresponding to the inner solar system planets (n = 3 Mercury, n = 4
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Figure 6: Observed distribution of the semi-major axes of 300 exoplanets (June 2008 data
[117]) and inner solar system planets, compared with the theoretical prediction (vertical lines).
The figure gives the histogram of the distribution of the variable 4.83(a/M)1/2 , where a is
the semi-major axis of the planet orbit and M is the star mass. One predicts the occurence
of peaks of probability density for semimajor axes an = GM(n/w0)
2, where n is integer and
w0 = 144.7 ± 0.7 km/s is a gravitational coupling constant (see text). The planets of the inner
solar system (Mercury, Venus, the Earth and Mars) fall respectively in n = 3, 4, 5 and 6.
The probability to obtain such an agreement by chance, measured by comparing the number
of exoplanets falling around the predicted peaks (integer values n, red vertical lines) to those
which fall between the predicted peaks (n+ 1/2) is now found to be P = 5× 10−7.
Venus, n = 5 Earth, n = 6 Mars), two additional predicted peaks of probability, the
‘fundamental’ one at 0.043 AU/M⊙ and the second one at 0.17 AU/M⊙, have been made
manifest in extrasolar planetary systems. In particular, the validation of the principal
prediction of the SR approach, namely, the main peak at the fundamental level n = 1,
is striking since it now contains more than 70 exoplanets. A power spectrum analysis
of the distribution of exoplanets of Fig. 6 yields a definite peak with a power p = 16
for the predicted periodicity of (a/M)1/2, which corresponds to the very low probability
P = 1.1×10−7 that such a periodicity be obtained by chance. This value of the probability
is supported by another method (see legend of Fig. 6). It is important to note that this
observed distribution now combines exoplanets found from different methods which have
their own limitations, and it is therefore strongly biased; however this bias is expected to
change only their large scale distribution (for example the larger number of exoplanets
at intramercurial distances and its decrease at large distance probably come from such
an observational bias), so that it does not affect the SR prediction and its test, which
concerns a small scale modulation in terms of 4.83(a/M)1/2 (i.e., the differences between
the peaks at integer values and the holes between the peaks).
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3.3 Applications to sciences of life
The scale relativity theory has also been recently applied to sciences other than physical
sciences, including sciences of life, sciences of societies, historical [34] and geographical
sciences [61, 35, 36] and human sciences [124, 88, 94, 101]. We refer the interested reader
to the books [86, 98], to parts of review papers or books [84, 90, 96] and full review papers
on this specific subject [6, 100] for more details.
3.3.1 Applications of log-periodic laws
Species evolution Let us first consider the application of log-periodic laws to the
description of critical time evolution. Recall that a log-periodic generalization to scale
invariance has been obtained as a solution to wave-like differential scale equations, which
can themselves be constructed from the requirement of scale covariance (see Sec. 2.2.5).
Interpreted as a distribution of probability, such solutions therefore lead to a geometric
law of progression of probability peaks for the occurence of events.
Now several studies have shown that many biological, natural, sociological and eco-
nomic phenomena obey a log-periodic law of time evolution such as can be found in some
critical phenomena : earthquakes [119], stock market crashes [120], evolutionary leaps
[19, 86, 87], long time scale evolution of western and other civilizations [86, 87, 45], world
economy indices dynamics [50], embryogenesis [14], etc... Thus emerges the idea that
this behaviour typical of temporal crisis could be extremely widespread, as much in the
organic world as in the inorganic one [121].
In the case of species evolution, one observes the occurrence of major evolutionary
leaps leading to bifurcations among species, which proves the existence of punctuated
evolution [41] in addition to the gradual one. The global pattern is assimilated to a ‘tree
of life’, whose bifurcations are identified to evolutionary leaps, and branch lengths to
the time intervals between these major events [19]. As early recognized by Leonardo da
Vinci, the branching of vegetal trees and rivers may be described as a first self-similar
approximation by simply writing that the ratio of the lengths of two adjacent levels is
constant in the mean. We have made a similar hypothesis for the time intervals between
evolutionary leaps, namely, (Tn − Tn−1)/(Tn+1 − Tn) = g. Such a geometric progression
yields a log-periodic acceleration for g > 1, a deceleration for g < 1, and a periodicity for
g = 1. Except when g = 1, the events converge toward a critical time Tc which can then
be taken as reference, yielding the following law for the event Tn in terms of the rank n:
Tn = Tc + (T0 − Tc) g−n, (104)
where T0 is any event in the lineage, n the rank of occurrence of a given event and g is
the scale ratio between successive time intervals. Such a chronology is periodic in terms
of logarithmic variables, i.e., log |Tn − Tc| = log |T0 − Tc| − n log g.
This law is dependent on two parameters only, g and Tc, which of course have no
reason a priori to be constant for the entire tree of life. Note that g is not expected to
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Figure 7: The dates of major evolutionary events of seven lineages (common evolution from life
origin to viviparity, Theropod and Sauropod dinosaurs, Rodents, Equidae, Primates including
Hominidae, and Echinoderms) are plotted as black points in terms of log(Tc−T ), and compared
with the numerical values from their corresponding log-periodic models (computed with their
best-fit parameters). The adjusted critical time Tc and scale ratio g are indicated for each lineage
(figure adapted from Refs. [19, 86, 87]).
be an absolute parameter, since it depends on the density of events chosen, i.e., on the
adopted threshhold in the choice of their importance (namely, if the number of events
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is doubled, g is replaced by
√
g). Only a maximal value of g, corresponding to the very
major events, could possibly have a meaning. On the contrary, the value of Tc is expected
to be a characteristic of a given lineage, and therefore not to depend on such a choice.
This expectation is supported by an analysis of the fossil record data under various choices
of the threshold on the events, which have yielded the same values of Tc within error bars
[87].
A statistically significant log-periodic acceleration has been found at various scales
for global life evolution, for primates, for sauropod and theropod dinosaurs, for rodents
and North American equids. A deceleration law was conversely found in a statistically
significant way for echinoderms and for the first steps of rodents evolution (see Fig. 7 and
more detail in Refs. [19, 86, 87]). One finds either an acceleration toward a critical date
Tc or a deceleration from a critical date, depending on the considered lineage.
It must be remarked that the observed dates follow a log-periodic law only in the
mean, and show a dispersion around this mean (see [86, p. 320]. In other words, this
is a statistical acceleration or deceleration, so that the most plausible interpretation is
that the discrete Tn values are nothing but the dates of peaks in a continuous probability
distribution of the events. Moreover, it must also be emphasized that this result does not
put the average constancy of the mutation rate in question. This is demonstrated by a
study of the cytochrome c tree of branching (in preparation), which is based on genetic
distances instead of geological chronology, and which nevertheless yields the same result,
namely, a log-periodic acceleration of most lineages, and a periodicity (which corresponds
to a critical time tending to infinity) in some cases. The average mutation rate remains
around 1/20 Myr since about 1 Gyr, so that one cannot escape the conclusion that the
number of mutations needed to obtain a major evolutionary leap decreases with time
among many lineages, and increases for some of them.
Embryogenesis and human development Considering the relationships between
phylogeny and ontogeny, it appeared interesting to verify whether the log-periodic law
describing the chronology of several lineages of species evolution may also be applied
to the various stages in human embryological development. The result, (see Figure in
Chaline’s contribution), is that a statistically significant log-periodic deceleration with a
scale ratio g = 1.71±0.01 is indeed observed, starting from a critical date that is consitent
with the conception date [14].
Evolution of societies Many observers have commented on the way historical events
accelerate. Grou [44] has shown that the economic evolution since the neolithic can be
described in terms of various dominating poles which are submitted to an accelerating
crisis-nocrisis pattern, which has subsequently been quantitatively analysed using log-
periodic laws.
For the Western civilization since the Neolithic (i.e., on a time scale of about 8000
years), one finds that a log-periodic acceleration with scale factor g = 1.32± 0.018 occurs
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Figure 8: Comparison of the median dates of the main economic crises of western civilization
with a log-periodic accelerating law of critical date Tc = 2080 and scale ratio g = 1.32 (figure
a). The last white point corresponds to the predicted next crisis (1997-2000) at the date of the
study (1996), as has been later supported in particular by the 1998 and 2000 market crashes,
while the next crises are now predicted for (2015-2020), then (2030-2035). Figure b shows the
estimation of the critical date through the optimisation of the Student’s t variable. This result is
statistically significant, since the probability to obtain such a high peak by chance is P < 10−4
(figure adapted from Fig. 47a of Ref. [86]).
toward Tc = 2080±30 (see Fig. 8), in a statistically highly significant way. This result has
been later confirmed by Johansen and Sornette [50] by an independent study on various
market, domestic, research and development, etc... indices on a time scale of about 200
years, completed by demography on a time scale of about 2000 years. They find critical
dates for these various indices in the range 2050-2070, which support the longer time scale
result.
One of the intriguing features of all these results is the frequent occurence of values
of the scale ratio g close to g = 1.73 and its square root 1.32 (recall that one passes from
a value of g to its square root by simply doubling the number of events). This suggests
once again a discretization of the values of this scale ratio, that may be the result of a
probability law (in scale space) showing quantized probability peaks . We have considered
the possibility that g = 1.73 ≈ √3 could be linked to a most probable branching ratio of 3
[19, 86], while Queiros-Conde´ [112] has proposed a ‘fractal skin’ model for understanding
this value.
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3.3.2 History and geography
The application of the various tools and methods of the scale relativity theory to history
and geography has been proposed by Martin and Forriez [34, 61, 35, 36]. Forriez has
shown that the chronology of some historical events (various steps of evolution of a given
site) recovered from archeological and historical studies can be fitted by a log-periodic
deceleration law with again g ≈ 1.7 and a retroprediction of the foundation date of the site
from the critical date [34, 35]. Moreover, the various differential equation tools developed
in the scale relativity approach both in scale and position space, including the nonlinear
cases of variable fractal dimensions, have been found to be particularly well adapted to
the solution of geographical problems [61].
3.3.3 Predictivity
Although these studies remain, at that stage, of an empirical nature (it is only a purely
chronological analysis which does not take into account the nature of the events), they
nevertheless provide us with a beginning of predictivity. Indeed, the fitting law is a two
parameter function (Tc and g) that is applied to time intervals, so that only three events
are needed to define these parameters. Therefore the subsequent dates are predicted after
the third one, in a statistical way. Namely, as already remarked, the predicted dates
should be interpreted as the dates of the peaks of probability for an event to happen.
Examples of such a predictivity (or retropredictivity) are:
(i) the retroprediction that the common Homo-Pan-Gorilla ancestor (expected, e.g., from
genetic distances and phylogenetic studies), has a more probable date of appearance at
≈ −10 millions years [19]; its fossil has not yet been discovered (this is one of the few
remaining ‘missing links’);
(ii) the prediction of a critical date for the long term evolution of human societies around
the years 2050-2080 [86, 50, 87, 45];
(iii) the finding that the critical dates of rodents may reach +60 Myrs in the future,
showing their large capacity of evolution, in agreement with their known high biodiversity;
(iv) the finding that the critical dates of dinosaurs are about −150 Myrs in the past,
indicating that they had reached the end of their capacity of evolution (at least for the
specific morphological characters studied) well before their extinction at −65 Myrs;
(v) the finding that the critical dates of North american Equids is, within uncertain-
ties, consistent with the date of their extinction, which may mean that, contrarily to the
dinosaur case, the end of their capacity of evolution has occured during a phase of en-
vironmental change that they have not been able to deal with by the mutation-selection
process;
(vi) the finding that the critical date of echinoderms (which decelerate instead of accelerat-
ing) is, within uncertainties, the same as that of their apparition during the PreCambrian-
Cambrian radiation, this supporting the view of the subsequent events as a kind of “scale
wave” expanding from this first shock.
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Figure 9: Observed rate of Southern California earhquakes of magnitude larger than 5 (his-
togram). The data are taken from the U.S. Geological Survey EarthQuake Data Center (years
1932-2006) and EarthQuake Data Base (Historical earthquakes, years 1500-1932). This rate is
well fitted by a power law subjected to a log-periodic fluctuation decelerating since a critical
date Tc = 1796 (red fluctuating line). The model predicts the next probability peak around the
years 2050 [97].
3.3.4 Applications in Earth sciences
As last examples of such a predictivity, let us give some examples of applications of
critical laws (power laws in |T − Tc|γ and their log-perodic generalizations) to problems
encountered in Earth sciences, namely, earthquakes (California and Sichuan) and decline
of Arctic sea ice.
California earthquakes The study of earthquakes has been one of the first domain of
application of critical and log-periodic laws [119, 3]. The rate of California earthquakes
is found to show a very marked log-periodic deceleration [97, 98]. We show indeed in
Fig. 9 the observed rate of Southern California earhquakes of magnitude larger than 5,
compared with a log-periodic deceleration law. This model allows us to predict future
peaks of probability around the years 2050 then 2115.
45
EDU 2008 p59
14 16 18 20 22 24 26
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
14 16 18 20 22 24 26
2
4
6
8
10
12
Figure 10: Time evolution during 14 days of the replicas of the May 12, 2008 Sichuan earth-
quake (data obtained and studied May 27, 2008 from the seismic data bank EduSeis Explorer,
http://aster.unice.fr/EduSeisExplorer/form-sis.asp). The (up) figure gives the magnitudes of
the replicas and the (down) figure the rate of replicas. Both show a continuous decrease to
which are added discrete sharp peaks. The peaks which are common to both diagrams show a
clear deceleration according to a log-periodic law starting from the main earthquake (red ver-
tical lines), which allows one to predict the next strongest replicas with a good precision. For
example, the peak of replicas of 25 May 2008 could be predicted with a precision of 1.5 day from
the previous peaks. Reversely, the date of the main earthquake (May 12.27 2008, magnitude
7.9) can be retropredicted from that of the replicas with a precision of 6 h.
Sichuan 2008 earthquake The May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and its replicas also
yields a good example of log-periodic deceleration, but on a much smaller time scale (see
Fig 10).
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Figure 11: Observed evolution of the minimum arctic sea ice extent, according to the data of
the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC, http://nsidc.org/), from 1979 to 2008.
The minimum ocurs around 15 September of each year. This evolution is compared to: (i) the
standard fit corresponding to an assumed constant rate of extent decrease (blue line); (ii) a fit
by a critical law accelerating toward a critical date Tc = 2012. The second fit is far better and
has allowed us to predict the 2007 and 2008 low points before their observation [98]. It implies
that the arctic sea is expected to be totally free from ice by September 2011.
Arctic sea ice extent It is now well-known that the decrease of arctic sea-ice extent has
shown a strong acceleration in 2007 and 2008 with respect to the current models assuming
a constant rate (≈ 8% by decade), which predicted in 2006 a total disappearance of the
ice at minimum (15 september) for the end of the century. From the view point of these
models, the 2007 and now 2008 values (see Fig. 11) were totally unexpected.
However, we have proposed, before the knowledge of the 2007 minimum, to fit the
data with a critical law of the kind y = y0 − a|T − Tc|γ . Such an accelerating law
has the advantage to include in its structure the fact that one expect the ice to fully
disappear after some date, while the constant rate law formally pushed the date of total
disappearance to infinity. The fit of the data up to 2006 with the critical law was already
far better than with the constant rate law, and it actually allowed us to predict a full
disappearance epoch far closer than previously expected and a low 2007 point [98]. The
2008 point has confirmed the validity of the model in an impressive way (Fig. 11). We
obtain by the χ2 method a best fit for the minimum ice surface (in square kilometers),
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y = 8 − 12.3 × |T − 2012|−0.86. The critical time is as early as Tc = 2012, which means
that a full ice melting is predicted for September 2011, and is even possible for September
2010, for which the model gives only 1.2 million km2 of remaining ice surface.
The application of the same method to the mean surface data during August and
October months also shows a clear acceleration toward Tc = 2013, which means that only
one year (2012) after the first total melting, the arctic sea can be expected to be free from
ice during several months (August to October).
3.4 Applications of scale relativity to biology
One may consider several applications to biology of the various tools and methods of the
scale relativity theory, namely, generalized scale laws, macroscopic quantum-type theory
and Schro¨dinger equation in position space then in scale space and emergence of gauge-
type fields and their associated charges from fractal geometry [69, 86, 90, 6, 95]. One knows
that biology is founded on biochemistry, which is itself based on thermodynamics, to which
we contemplate the future possibility to apply the macroquantization tools described in
the theoretical part of this article. Another example of future possible applications is to
the description of the growth of polymer chains, which could have consequences for our
understanding of the nature of DNA and RNA molecules.
Let us give some explicit examples of such applications.
3.4.1 Confinement
The solutions of non-linear scale equations such as that involving a harmonic oscillator-
like scale force [75] may be meaningful for biological systems. Indeed, its main feature
is its capacity to describe a system in which a clear separation has emerged between an
inner and an outer region, which is one of the properties of the first prokaryotic cell. We
have seen that the effect of a scale harmonic oscillator force results in a confinement of
the large scale material in such a way that the small scales may remain unaffected.
Another interpretation of this scale behavior amounts to identify the zone where the
fractal dimension diverges (which corresponds to an increased ‘thickness‘ of the material)
as the description of a membrane. It is indeed the very nature of biological systems to have
not only a well-defined size and a well-defined separation between interior and exterior,
but also systematically an interface between them, such as membranes or walls. This
is already true of the simplest prokaryote living cells. Therefore this result suggests the
possibility that there could exist a connection between the existence of a scale field (e.g.,
a global pulsation of the system, etc..) both with the confinement of the cellular material
and with the appearance of a limiting membrane or wall [90]. This is reminiscent of
eukaryotic cellular division which involves both a dissolution of the nucleus membrane and
a deconfinement of the nucleus material, transforming, before the division, an eukaryote
into a prokaryote-like cell. This could be a key toward a better understanding of the first
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major evolutionary leap after the appearance of cells, namely the emergence of eukaryotes.
3.4.2 Morphogenesis
The generalized Schro¨dinger equation (in which the Planck constant ~ can be replaced
by a macroscopic constant) can be viewed as a fundamental equation of morphogenesis.
It has not been yet considered as such, because its unique domain of application was, up
to now, the microscopic (molecular, atomic, nuclear and elementary particle) domain, in
which the available information was mainly about energy and momentum.
However, scale relativity extends the potential domain of application of Schro¨dinger-
like equations to every systems in which the three conditions (infinite or very large number
of trajectories, fractal dimension of individual trajectories, local irreversibility) are ful-
filled. Macroscopic Schro¨dinger equations can be constructed, which are not based on
Planck’s constant ~, but on constants that are specific of each system (and may emerge
from their self-organization).
Now the three above conditions seems to be particularly well adapted to the description
of living systems. Let us give a simple example of such an application.
In living systems, morphologies are acquired through growth processes. One can
attempt to describe such a growth in terms of an infinite family of virtual, fractal and
locally irreversible, trajectories. Their equation can therefore be written under the form
of a fractal geodesic equation, then it can be integrated as a Schro¨dinger equation.
If one now looks for solutions describing a growth from a center, one finds that this
problem is formally identical to the problem of the formation of planetary nebulae [27],
and, from the quantum point of view, to the problem of particle scattering, e.g., on an
atom. The solutions looked for correspond to the case of the outgoing spherical probability
wave.
Depending on the potential, on the boundary conditions and on the symmetry con-
ditions, a large family of solutions can be obtained. Considering here only the simplest
ones, i.e., central potential and spherical symmetry, the probability density distribution of
the various possible values of the angles are given in this case by the spherical harmonics,
P (θ, ϕ) = |Ylm(θ, ϕ)|2. (105)
These functions show peaks of probability for some angles, depending on the quantized
values of the square of angular momentum L2 (measured by the quantum number l) and
of its projection Lz on axis z (measured by the quantum number m).
Finally a more probable morphology is obtained by ‘sending’ matter along angles of
maximal probability. The biological constraints leads one to skip to cylindrical symmetry.
This yields in the simplest case a periodic quantization of the angle θ (measured by an
additional quantum number k), that gives rise to a separation of discretized ‘petals’.
Moreover there is a discrete symmetry breaking along the z axis linked to orientation
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Figure 12: Morphogenesis of a ‘flower’-like structure, solution of a generalized Schro¨dinger
equation that describes a growth process from a center(l = 5, m = 0). The ‘petals’, ‘sepals’ and
‘stamen’ are traced along angles of maximal probability density. A constant force of ‘tension’
has been added, involving an additional curvature of ‘petals’, and a quantization of the angle θ
that gives an integer number of ‘petals’ (here, k = 5).
(separation of ‘up’ and ‘down’ due to gravity, growth from a stem). The solutions obtained
in this way show floral ‘tulip’-like shapes (see Fig. 12 and [84, 90, 95]).
Coming back to the foundation of the theory, it is remarkable that these shapes are
solutions of a geodesic, strongly covariant equation d̂V/dt = 0, which has the form of
the Galilean motion equation in vacuum in the absence of external force. Even more
profoundly, this equation does not describe the motion of a particle, but purely geometric
virtual possible paths, this given rise to a description in terms of a probability density
which plays the role of a potential for the real particle (if any, since, in the application to
elementary particles, we identify the ‘particles’ with the geodesics themselves, i.e., they
become pure relative geometric entities devoid of any proper existence).
3.4.3 Origin of life
The problems of origin are in general more complex than the problems of evolution.
Strictly, there is no ‘origin’ and both problems could appear to be similar, since the
scientific and causal view amounts to consider that any given system finds its origin in an
evolution process. However, systems are in general said to evolve if they keep their nature,
while the question is posed in terms of origin when a given system appears from another
system of a completely different nature, and moreover, often on times scales which are
very short with respect to the evolution time. An example in astrophysics is the origin
of stars and planetary systems from the interstellar medium, and in biology the probable
origin of life from a prebiotic medium.
A fondamentally new feature of the scale relativity approach concerning such problems
is that the Schro¨dinger form taken by the geodesic equation can be interpreted as a
general tendency for systems to which it applies to make structures, i.e., to lead to self-
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organization. In the framework of a classical deterministic approach, the question of
the formation of a system is always posed in terms of initial conditions. In the new
framework, the general existence of stationary solutions allows structures to be formed
whatever the initial conditions, in correspondence with the field, the symmetries and the
boundary conditions (namely the environmental conditions in biology), and in function
of the values of the various conservative quantities that characterize the system.
Such an approach could allow one to ask the question of the origin of life in a renewed
way. This problem is the analog of the ‘vacuum’ (lowest energy) solutions, i.e., of the
passage from a non-structured medium to the simplest, fundamental level structures. In
astrophysics and cosmology, the problem amounts to understand the apparition, from the
action of gravitation alone, of structures (planets, stars, galaxies, clusters of galaxies, large
scale structures of the Universe) from a highly homogeneous and non-structured medium
whose relative fluctuations were smaller than 10−5 at the time of atom formation. In the
standard approach to this problem a large quantity of postulated and unobserved dark
matter is needed to form structures, and even with this help the result is dissatisfying. In
the scale relativity framework, we have suggested that the fundamentally chaotic behavior
of particle trajectories leads to an underlying fractal geometry of space, which involves
a Schro¨dinger form for the equation of motion, leading both to a natural tendency to
form structures and to the emergence of an additional potential energy, identified with
the ‘missing mass(-energy)’.
The problem of the origin of life, although clearly far more difficult and complex,
shows common features with this question. In both cases one needs to understand the
apparition of new structures, functions, properties, etc... from a medium which does not
yet show such structures and functions. In other words, one need a theory of emergence.
We hope that scale relativity is a good candidate for such a theory, since it owns the two
required properties: (i) for problems of origin, it gives the conditions under which a weakly
structuring or destructuring (e.g., diffusive) classical system may become quantum-like
and therefore structured; (ii) for problems of evolution, it makes use of the self-organizing
property of the quantum-like theory.
We therefore tentatively suggest a new way to tackle the question of the origin of life
(and in parallel, of the present functionning of the intracellular medium) [90, 6, 100]. The
prebiotic medium on the primordial Earth is expected to have become chaotic in such a
way that, on time scales long with respect to the chaos time (horizon of predictibility), the
conditions that underlie the transformation of the motion equation into a Schro¨dinger-
type equation, namely, complete information loss on angles, position and time leading
to a fractal dimension 2 behavior on a range of scales reaching a ratio of at least 104-
105, be fulfilled. Since the chemical structures of the prebiotic medium have their lowest
scales at the atomic size, this means that, under such a scenario, one expects the first
organized units to have appeared at a scale of about 10 µm, which is indeed a typical
scale for the first observed prokaryotic cells. The spontaneous transformation of a classical,
possibly diffusive mechanics, into a quantum-like mechanics, with the diffusion coefficient
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becoming the quantum self-organization parameter D would have immediate dramatic
consequences: quantization of energy and energy exchanges and therefore of information,
apparition of shapes and quantization of these shapes (the cells can be considered as the
‘quanta’ of life), spontaneous duplication and branching properties (see herebelow), etc...
Moreover, due to the existence of a vacuum energy in quantum mechanics (i.e., of a non
vanishing minimum energy for a given system), we expect the primordial structures to
appear at a given non-zero energy, without any intermediate step.
Such a possibility is supported by the symplectic formal structure of thermodynamics
[109], in which the state equations are analogous to Hamilton-Jacobi equations. One can
therefore contemplate the possibility of a future ‘quantization’ of thermodynamics, and
then of the chemistry of solutions, leading to a new form of macroscopic quantum (bio)-
chemistry, which would hold both for the prebiotic medium at the origin of life and for
today’s intracellular medium.
In such a framework, the fundamental equation would be the equation of molecu-
lar fractal geodesics, which could be transformed into a Schro¨dinger equation for wave
functions ψ. This equation describes an universal tendency to make structures in terms
of a probability density P for chemical products (constructed from the distribution of
geodesics), given by the squared modulus of the wave function ψ =
√
P × eiθ. Each
of the molecules being subjected to this probability (which therefore plays the role of a
potentiality), it is proportional to the concentration c for a large number of molecules,
P ∝ c but it also constrains the motion of individual molecules when they are in small
number (this is similar to a particle-by-particle Young slit experiment).
Finally, the Schro¨dinger equation may in its turn be transformed into a continuity and
Euler hydrodynamic-like system (for the velocity V = (v++v−)/2 and the probability P )
with a quantum potential depending on the concentration when P ∝ c,
Q = −2D2∆
√
c√
c
. (106)
This hydrodynamics-like system also implicitly contains as a sub-part a standard diffusion
Fokker-Planck equation with diffusion coefficient D for the velocity v+. It is therefore
possible to generalize the standard classical approach of biochemistry which often makes
use of fluid equations, with or without diffusion terms (see, e.g., [64, 118]).
Under the point of view of this third representation, the spontaneous transformation
of a classical system into a quantum-like system through the action of fractality and small
time scale irreversibility manifests itself by the appearance of a quantum-type potential
energy in addition to the standard classical energy balance. We therefore predict that
biological systems must show an additional energy (quite similar to the missing energy of
cosmology usually attributed to a never found ‘dark matter’) given by the above relation
(106) in terms of concentrations, when their total measured energy balance is compared
to the classically expected one.
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But we have also shown that the opposite of a quantum potential is a diffusion po-
tential. Therefore, in case of simple reversal of the sign of this potential energy, the
self-organization properties of this quantum-like behavior would be immediately turned,
not only into a weakly organized classical system, but even into an increasing entropy
diffusing and desorganized system. We tentatively suggest [95] that such a view may pro-
vide a renewed way of approach to the understanding of tumors, which are characterized,
among many other features, by both energy affinity and morphological desorganization.
3.4.4 Duplication
n=0 n=1
E = 3 D  ω E = 5 D  ω
Figure 13: Model of duplication. The stationary solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation in
a 3D harmonic oscillator potential can take only discretized morphologies in correspondence
with the quantized value of the energy. Provided the energy increases from the one-structure
case (E0 = 3Dω), no stable solution can exist before it reaches the second quantized level at
E1 = 5Dω. The solutions of the time-dependent equation show that the system jumps from the
one structure to the two-structure morphology.
Secondly, the passage from the fundamental level to the first excited level now pro-
vides one with a (rough) model of duplication (see Figs. 13 and 14). Once again, the
quantization implies that, in case of energy increase, the system will not increase its size,
but will instead be lead to jump from a single structure to a binary structure, with no
stable intermediate step between the two stationary solutions n = 0 and n = 1. Moreover,
if one comes back to the level of description of individual trajectories, one finds that from
each point of the initial one body-structure there exist trajectories that go to the two final
structures. In this framework, duplication is expected to be linked to a discretized and
precisely fixed jump in energy.
It is clear that, at this stage, such a model is extremely far from describing the com-
plexity of a true cellular division, which it did not intend to do. Its interest is to be a
generic and general model for a spontaneous duplication process of quantized structures,
linked to energy jumps. Indeed, the jump from one to two probability peaks when going
from the fundamental level to the first excited level is found in many different situations of
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which the harmonic oscillator case is only an example. Moreover, this duplication property
is expected to be conserved under more elaborated versions of the description provided
the asymptotic small scale behavior remains of constant fractal dimension DF ≈ 2, such
as, e.g., in cell wall-like models based on a locally increasing effective fractal dimension.
3.4.5 Bifurcation, branching process
Such a model can also be applied to a first rough description of a branching process
(Fig. 14), e.g., in the case of a tree growth when the previous structure remains instead
of disappearing as in cell duplication.
Note finally that, although such a model is still clearly too rough to claim that it
describes biological systems, it may already be improved by combining with it various
other functional and morphological elements which have been obtained. Namely, one
may apply the duplication or branching process to a system whose underlying scale laws
(which condition the derivation of the generalized Schro¨dinger equation) include (i) the
model of membrane through a fractal dimension that becomes variable with the distance
to a center; (ii) the model of multiple hierarchical levels of organization depending on
‘complexergy’ (see herebelow).
Figure 14: Model of branching and bifurcation. Successive solutions of the time-dependent 2D
Schro¨dinger equation in an harmonic oscillator potential are plotted as isodensities. The energy
varies from the fundamental level (n = 0) to the first excited level (n = 1), and as a consequence
the system jumps from a one-structure to a two-structure morphology.
3.4.6 Nature of first evolutionary leaps
We have also suggested applications to biology of the new quantum-like mechanics in
scale space [90].
In the fractal model of the tree of life described hereabove [19], we have voluntarily
limited ourselves to an analysis of only the chronology of events (see Fig. 7), indepen-
dently of the nature of the major evolutionary leaps. The suggestion of a quantum-type
mechanics in scale space and of the new concept of complexergy [90, 100], which is a
new conservative quantity appearing from the symmetry of the new scale variables (more
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precisely, of the fractal dimension become variable and considered as a fifth dimension)
allows one to reconsider the question.
One may indeed suggest that life evolution proceeds in terms of increasing quantized
complexergy. This would account for the existence of punctuated evolution [41], and for
the log-periodic behavior of the leap dates, which can be interpreted in terms of probability
density of the events, P = |ψ|2 ∝ sin2[ω ln(T − Tc)]. Moreover, one may contemplate the
possibility of an understanding of the nature of the events, even though in a rough way
as a first step.
Indeed, one can expect the first formation of a structure at the fundamental level
(lowest complexergy), which is generally characterized by only one length-scale (this is the
analog in scale space of the left part of Fig. 13 which concerns position space). Moreover,
the most probable value for this scale of formation is predicted to be the ‘middle’ of the
scale-space, since the problem is similar to that of a quantum particle in a box, with the
logarithms of the minimum scale λm and maximum scale λM playing the roles of the walls
of the box, so that the fundamental level solution has a peak at a scale
√
λm × λM .
The universal boundary conditions are the Planck-length lP in the microscopic domain
and the cosmic scale L = Λ−1/2 given by the cosmological constant Λ in the macroscopic
domain (see Sec. 3.1.2). From the predicted and now observed value of the cosmological
constant, one finds L/lP = 5.3 × 1060, so that the mid scale is at 2.3 × 1030 lP ≈ 40 µm.
A quite similar result is obtained from the scale boundaries of living systems (≈0.5
Angstro¨ms - 30 m). This scale of 40 µm is indeed a typical scale of living cells. Moreover,
the first ‘prokaryot’ cells appeared about three Gyrs ago had only one hierarchy level (no
nucleus).
In this framework, a further increase of complexergy can occur only in a quantized
way. The second level describes a system with two levels of organization, in agreement
with the second step of evolution leading to eukaryots about 1.7 Gyrs ago (second event
in Fig. 7). One expects (in this very simplified model), that the scale of nuclei be smaller
than the scale of prokaryots, itself smaller than the scale of eucaryots: this is indeed what
is observed.
The following expected major evolutionary leap is a three organization level system,
in agreement with the apparition of multicellular forms (animals, plants and fungi) about
1 Gyr ago (third event in Fig. 7). It is also predicted that the multicellular stage can
be built only from eukaryots, in agreement with what is observed. Namely, the cells of
multicellulars do have nuclei; more generally, evolved organisms keep in their internal
structure the organization levels of the preceeding stages.
The following major leaps correspond to more complicated structures then more com-
plex functions (supporting structures such as exoskeletons, tetrapody, homeothermy,
viviparity), but they are still characterized by fundamental changes in the number of
organization levels. Moreover, the first steps in the above model are based on spheri-
cal symmetry, but this symmetry is naturaly broken at scales larger than 40 µm, since
this is also the scale beyond which the gravitational force becomes larger than the van
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der Waals force. One therefore expects the evolutionary leaps that follow the appari-
tion of multicellular systems to lead to more complicated structures, such as those of
the Precambrian-Cambrian radiation, than can no longer be described by a single scale
variable.
3.4.7 Origin of the genetic code
We therefore intend, in future works, to extend the model to more general symmetries,
boundary conditions and constraints. We also emphasize once again that such an approach
does not dismiss the role and the importance of the genetic code in biology. On the
contrary, we hope that it may help understanding its origin and its evolution.
Indeed, we have suggested that the various biological morphologies and functions
are solutions of macroscopic Schro¨dinger-type equations, whose solutions are quantized
according to integer numbers that represent the various conservative quantities of the
system. Among these quantities, one expects to recover the basic physical ones, such as
energy, momentum, electric charge, etc... But one may also contemplate the possibility
of the existence of prime integrals (conservative quantities) which would be specific of
biology (or particularly relevant to biology), among which we have suggested the new
concept of complexergy, but also new scale ‘charges’ finding their origin in the internal
scale symmetries of the biological systems.
The quantization of these various quantities means that any such system would be
described by a set of integer numbers, so that one may tentatively suggest that only
these numbers, instead of a full continuous and detailed information, would have to be
included in the genetic code. In this case the process of genetic code reading, protein
synthesis, etc... would be a kind of ‘analogic solutioner’ of Schro¨dinger equation, leading
to the final morphologies and functions. Such a view also offers a new line of research
toward understanding the apparition of the code, namely, the transformation of what was
a purely chemical process into a support of information and of its implementation, thanks
to the quantization of the exchanges of energy and other conservative quantities.
We intend to develop this approach in future works, in particular by including the scale
relativity tools and methods in a system biology framework allowing multiscale integration
[6, 100], in agreement with Noble’s ‘biological relativity’ [65] according to which there is
no privileged scale in living systems.
4 Conclusion
The theory of scale relativity relies on the postulate that the fundamental laws that govern
the various physical, biological and other phenomenons find their origin in first principles.
In continuity with previous theories of relativity, it considers that the most fundamental
of these principles is the principle of relativity itself. The extraordinary success due to
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the application of this principle, since now four centuries, to position, orientation, motion
(and therefore to gravitation) is well known.
But, during the last decades, the various sciences have been faced to an ever increasing
number of new unsolved problems, of which many are linked to questions of scales. It
therefore seemed natural, in order to deal with these problems at a fundamental and first
principle level, to extend theories of relativity by including the scale in the very definition
of the coordinate system, then to account for these scale transformations in a relativistic
way.
We have attempted to give in this article a summarized discussion of the various de-
velopments of the theory and of its applications. The aim of this theory is to describe
space-time as a continuous manifold without making the hypothesis of differentiability,
and to physically constrain its possible geometry by the principle of relativity, both of
motion and of scale. This is effectively made by using the physical principles that directly
derive from it, namely, the covariance, equivalence and geodesic principles. These prin-
ciples lead in their turn to the construction of covariant derivatives, and finally to the
writing, in terms of these covariant derivatives, of the motion equations under the form
of free-like geodesic equations. Such an attempt is therefore a natural extension of gen-
eral relativity, since the two-times differentiable continuous manifolds of Einstein’s theory,
that are constrained by the principle of relativity of motion, are particular sub-cases of
the new geometry in construction.
Now, giving up the differentiability hypothesis involves an extremely large number
of new possible structures to be investigated and described. In view of the immensity
of the task, we have chosen to proceed by steps, using presently known physics as a
guide. Such an approach is rendered possible by the result according to which the small
scale structure which manifest the nondifferentiability are smoothed out beyond some
relative transitions toward the large scales. One therefore recovers the standard classical
differentiable theory as a large scale approximation of this generalized approach. But one
also obtains a new geometric theory which allows one to understand quantum mechanics
as a manifestation of an underlying nondifferentiable and fractal geometry, and finally to
suggest generalizations of it and new domains of application for these generalizations.
Now the difficulty with theories of relativity is that they are meta-theories rather than
theories of some particular systems. Hence, after the construction of special relativity
of motion at the beginning of the twentieth century, the whole of physics needed to be
rendered ‘relativistic’ (from the viewpoint of motion), a task that is not yet fully achieved.
The same is true as regards the program of constructing a fully scale-relativistic science.
Whatever be the already obtained successes, the task remains huge, in particular when
one realizes that it is no longer only physics that is concerned, but now many other sci-
ences, in particular biology. Its ability to go beyond the frontiers between sciences may be
one of the main interests of the scale relativity theory, opening the hope of a refoundation
on mathematical principles and on predictive differential equations of a ‘philosophy of
nature’ in which physics would no longer be separated from other sciences.
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theory and applications”
Charles Auffray1 and Denis Noble2
1- Functional Genomics and Systems Biology for Health, CNRS Institute of
Biological Sciences; 7, rue Guy Moquet, BP8, 94801 Villejuif, France. Tel: +33-1-49-
58-34-98; E-mail: charles.auffray@vjf.cnrs.fr; URL: http://www.vjf.cnrs.fr/genexpress/
2- Department of Physiology, Anatomy and Genetics; Oxford University, Parks Road,
Oxford OX1 3PT, United Kingdom. Tel: +44-18-65-272-533; E-mail:
denis.noble@dpag.ox.ac.uk; URL: http://noble.physiol.ox.ac.uk/People/DNoble/
Abstract
With scale relativity theory, Laurent Nottale has provided a powerful conceptual and
mathematical framework with numerous validated predictions that has fundamental
implications and applications for all sciences. We discuss how this extended
framework may help facilitating integration across multiple size and time frames in
systems biology, and the development of a scale relative biology with increased
explanatory power.
Extending the principle of relativity to scales: a new scientific paradigm?
Have we reached the limits of applicability of the principle of relativity? From Galileo
to Einstein, it has been extended by removing theoretical constraints that represent
privileging viewpoints of measurement lacking a priori bases. First the constraint of
privileged location was removed: the Earth is no longer the centre of the Universe;
then that of velocity: only relative velocities can be observed; then that of
acceleration: an accelerating body experiences a force indistinguishable from that of
gravity. To a large degree, this has unified our understanding of the Universe. But
there is an exception: it matters whether we are talking of microphysics or
macrophysics. At the micro level, we have to use quantum mechanics; at the macro
level, general relativity. Could this distinction be resolved by removing yet another
constraint? The obvious candidate is that of scale. Why should there be privileged
scales for quantum mechanics or astrophysics? This led Laurent Nottale to remove
yet another constraint, that of general space-time differentiability.
In this extended framework, only scale ratios have physical meaning, not absolute
scales. The laws of quantum mechanics become manifestations of the fractal, non-
differentiable geometry of space-time constrained by the principle of relativity
extended to scales, and all the axiomatic postulates of quantum mechanics can be
derived from the first principles of scale relativity theory. Moreover, Laurent Nottale
introduces the notion of ‘complexergy’ which is the equivalent for scale to what
energy is for motion. Complexergy is linked to the complexity of the system under
consideration, leading to insights on the emergence of discrete levels of
organisation. The hierarchy is not continuous: this is obviously true at the microlevel
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(from quarks to atoms) and the astronomical level (from stars through to
superclusters). It is also true at the middle level, of importance for biological
sciences. From molecules to organisms and beyond, we can also distinguish
discrete levels.
Validated predictions of scale relativity: which will trigger acceptance of the
theory?
Scale relativity has implications for every aspect of physics, from elementary particle
physics to astrophysics and cosmology. It provides numerous examples of
theoretical predictions of standard model parameters, a theoretical expectation for
the Higgs boson mass which will be potentially assessed in the coming years by the
Large Hadron Collider, and a prediction of the cosmological constant which remains
within the range of increasingly refined observational data.  Strikingly, many
predictions in astrophysics have already been validated through observations such
as the distribution of exoplanets or the formation of extragalactic structures. The
possibility offered by the theory to have classical and quantum mechanics operating
in a common framework makes it possible to interpret quantum laws as anti-diffusion
laws. This allows revisiting the nature of the classic-quantum transition and the
foundations of thermodynamics, with a wide range of as yet unexplored possible
consequences for chemistry and biology.
This work is a testimony that extending the principle of relativity to scale represents a
fundamental change of paradigm, with a wide range of consequences for physical
and other sciences in terms of concepts, tools, and applications. The scale relativity
theory and tools extend the scope of current domain-specific theories, which are
naturally recovered, not replaced, in the new framework. This may explain why the
community of physicists has been slow to recognize its potential and even to
challenge it. Hence we are led to wonder which of the successful predictions of scale
relativity will trigger its acceptance and spread within the scientific community. The
prediction that the Artic sea will be free from ice during one to three months as soon
as 2011-2012 may represent such a test.
Towards a scale relative biology?
As it can be considered as a theory of emergence and self-organisation reflecting the
constraints imposed by the fractal geometry of space-time on all structures in nature,
scale relativity has also important implications for biology.  The pervasive presence
of space and time dimension limitations in biological systems led Laurent Nottale to
investigate the potential of his theory for understanding them, with initial application
to time and structural regularities during species evolution, embryonic development
and morphogenesis. His most recent proposals deal with the origin of the genetic
code and of life itself.
Indeed, a major difficulty in modelling biological systems is that the formalisms we
use for the different levels of organisation (genes, protein networks, subcellular
systems, cells, tissues, organs) and time frames are different. It is difficult therefore
to derive genuinely multi-level solutions. This is solved by using the outputs from one
level as inputs to another. Could there be a better way of doing this? Could scale
relativity be applied to extend the conceptual and mathematical framework of
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systems biology for integration across multiple time and size scales? This would
open for a more systematic unification which could also provide an independent
basis for validation of the scale relativity theory itself.
Application of scale relativity to biology represents a huge challenge for theoretical,
computational and experimental biologists. As Nottale shows so elegantly for
microphysics and astrophysics, the fractal nature of space-time leads naturally to
quantised jumps in levels of organisation. The evolution of viruses, prokaryotes,
eukaryotes, multicellular organisms, organs and systems would then be seen as
representing an outcome not dissimilar to the existence of stars, galaxies, and
clusters at astronomical dimensions or of the various forms of microphysical
structures.
This requires abandonment of a unitary concept of causation in biology. The ‘cause’
of the existence of different levels of organisation would not be comparable to the
‘cause’ of particular activities in particular organisms. This is compatible with the
theory of biological relativity proposed by one of us (Noble 2006, 2008), i.e. the
principle that there is no privileged level of causation in biology. As in physics, these
ideas and proposals have yet to be known or accepted by most biologists, and much
work remains to be done to sustain the development and deployment of a scale
relative biology (Auffray and Nottale, 2008; Nottale and Auffray, 2008).
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Multiscale integration in scale relativity theory
Answer to Auffray’s and Noble’s commentary:
Scale relativity: an extended paradigm for physics and biology?
Laurent Nottale
Abstract - We give a "direction for use" of the scale relativity theory and apply it
to an example of spontaneous multiscale integration including four embedded
levels of organization (intracellular, cell, tissue and organism-like levels). We
conclude by an update of our analysis of the arctic sea ice melting.
Auffray and Noble, in their commentary, raise the important question of multiscale
integration in biology and of the ability of the scale relativity theory to contribute
by new insights and methods to a future possible solution of this problem (and of
other questions in life and other sciences).
In order to give elements of answer, let us recall how the scale relativity theory can
be used for practical applications.
The construction of the theory of scale relativity proceeds by extension and
generalization with respect to currently existing theories. Its founding principles
are the same as those on which these theories are founded (principles of relativity
and covariance, of optimization – least action and geodesic principles), but applied
also to scale transformations of the reference system. As a consequence, its
equations are themselves extensions of the standard fundamental equations (Euler-
Lagrange equations for particles and fields, energy equation). Moreover several
equivalent representations of these equations have been established (geodesic
form, Schrödinger quantum-mechanical form and fluid dynamical form with
quantum potential), which connect various domains and methods often considered
as totally or partially disconnected (quantum and classical mechanics, diffusion,
hydrodynamics).
This allows one to suggest a fast way to apply it to various systems (where, for
example, the current methods have failed): it consists in starting from the standard
description and in looking for the possible existence of the additional terms
introduced by the scale relativity theory.
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 More generally, let us give some "directions for use" of the scale reativity theory:
(I) Laws of scale transformation. The main new ingredient of the theory is the
explicit introduction in the description (physical quantities and their equations) of
explicit scale variables (« resolutions ») achieving a "scale space". The theory does
not deal (only) with the scaling properties of the standard variables, but also and
mainly of these new variables. The scale laws of the coordinates which depend on
them, then of the physical functions of these coordinates are obtained as
consequences. The scale relativity approach writes these laws of scale
transformation in terms of differential equations acting in the scale space. One
recovers in this way the standard fractal laws with constant fractal dimension as the
simplest possible laws, but one also generalizes them in many ways (including the
possibility of quantum-like laws in scale space).
For a given system, one can therefore
(1) (i) attempt to analyse in a differential way the scale behavior of the system,
then
         (ii) write the corresponding differential equation,
         (iii) solve them and
         (iv) compare these solutions to the observational / experimental data, or, in a
more empirical approach
(2)  (i) look for:
- transitions from scale-dependence to scale-independence, and/or between
different fractal dimensions;
- variations of the fractal dimensions, including linear variation, log-periodic
fluctuations, divergence, etc...;
then
           (ii) study the cause for this deviation from pure self-similarity (scale force,
geometric distorsion in scale space...).
(II) Laws of motion. On the basis of the internal laws of scale which have been
obtained for a given system in step (I), one now construct the laws of motion (by
defining and using a covariant derivative which includes the effects of the fractal
geometry). The various representations of the laws of motion in scale relativity
theory include the following forms and their generalizations:
- geodesic equation / fundamental equation of dynamics,
- Schrödinger equation,
- diffusion equations,
- hydrodynamics equations including a quantum potential.
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The application of the scale relativity approach to a given system may therefore
involve the following possibilities, depending on the standard description of the
system:
-(i) check for the existence in the studied system of the additional terms in the
covariant total derivative and in the corresponding equation of dynamics;
-(ii) look for signatures of a quantum-type system (probability density which is the
square of the modulus of a wave function, existence of a phase involving
interferences);
- (iii) complete the diffusion Fokker-Planck type equation by a backward Fokker-
Planck equation (as a consequence of microscopic time scale irreversibility);
- (iv) check for the existence of an additional quantum-type potential in the
hydrodynamic form of the equations.
We can now apply this method to the specific question of multiscale integration.
Let us give a hint of what would be the successive steps of such an application (a
fully developped description lies outside the scope of this short answer and will be
the subject of future publications).
One starts from a "point", which represents the smallest scale considered (for
example, intracellular "organelles"), then one writes a motion equation which can
be integrated in terms of a macroscopic Schrödinger-type equation. Actually, the
solutions of this Schrödinger equation are naturally multiscaled. It yields the
density of probability of the initial "points", which describes a structure at a larger
scale (the "cell" level). Now, while the "vacuum" (lowest energy) state usually
describes one object (a single "cell"), excited states describe multi objects ("tissue-
like" level), each of which being often separated by zones of null densities
(therefore corresponding to infinite quantum potentials) which may represent
"walls" (looking, e.g., like an Abrikosov lattice). Note that the resulting structure is
not only qualitative, but also quantitative, since the relative sizes of these three
levels can be obtained from the theoretical description. Finally, such a "tissue" of
individual "cells" can be inserted in a growth equation which takes itself a
Schrödinger form. Its solutions yield a new, larger level of organization, such as
the "flower" of Fig. 12 of the paper. Finally, the matching conditions between the
small scale and large scale solutions allow to connect the constants of these two
equations, and therefore the quantitative scales of their solutions.
Let us conclude this answer by a short update of one of the questions also raised by
Auffray and Noble's commentary, namely, that of the fast decrease of the arctic sea
ice extent. We have given in Fig. 11 of the paper a fit of the US National Snow and
Ice Data Center data up to 2008 by a critical law yielding a very close critical date
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of 2012. The 2009 minimum is now known: its value of 5.1 millions of square km
is the third lowest value registered, of the order of the 2007 and 2008 values and it
therefore confirms (within fluctuations) the acceleration. A simple model of fractal
fracture of the sea ice (see "The Arctic sea-ice cover: Fractal space-time domain",
A. Chmela, V.N. Smirnovb and M.P. Astakhovb, Physica A 357, 556) leads
naturally to an exponential increase of the enlightened surface, and then of the
melting. A fit of the data up to 2009 by such a model (which is close to the critical
one) still yields a very close date of full ice melting in 2014-2015.
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The Self-organization of Time and Causality:
steps towards understanding the ultimate origin
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Abstract: Possibly the most fundamental scientific problem is the origin of
time and causality. The inherent difficulty is that all scientific theories of origins
and evolution consider the existence of time and causality as given. We tackle this
problem by starting from the concept of self-organization, which is seen as the
spontaneous emergence of order out of primordial chaos. Self-organization can be
explained by the selective retention of invariant or consistent variations, implying
a breaking of the initial symmetry exhibited by randomness. In the case of time,
we start from a random graph connecting primitive "events". Selection on the
basis of consistency eliminates cyclic parts of the graph, so that transitive closure
can transform it into a partial order relation of precedence. Causality is assumed
to be carried by causal "agents" which undergo a more traditional variation and
selection, giving rise to causal laws that are partly contingent, partly necessary.
Keywords: self-organization, cosmology, ontology, time, causality, order.
1. The problem of origins
Without doubt, the most difficult and fundamental problem in cosmology is the origin
of the universe. One reason why this problem is so difficult is that all traditional
physical theories assume the existence of time and causal laws. These theories include
Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, relativity theory, thermodynamics, and
their various combinations, such as relativistic quantum field theories. In all these
theories, the evolution of a system is reduced to the (deterministic or more rarely
stochastic) change of the system's state s(t) according to a given causal law (which is
typically represented by the Schrödinger equation or some variation of it) [Heylighen,
1990b]. The time t here is seen as a real number, which therefore by definition takes
values between minus infinity and plus infinity. The "system" therefore is assumed to
have existed indefinitely. If we apply this same formal representation to the evolution
of the universe, then we can only conclude that this universe cannot have an origin at
any finite time t0, because that would assume that before t0 there was no system that
could evolve, and therefore no previous state that could causally give rise to the
"origin" state s(t0). Yet, the observation by Hubble that the universe is expanding,
when extrapolated backwards, leads to the conclusion that the universe started at a
single point in time, the Big Bang.
The deeper reason for this paradox is that time and causality are part of the
ontology— i.e. the set of a priori postulated entities— that physical theory uses for
representing all phenomena. They therefore cannot be explained from within the
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theory. This assumption of the a priori existence of time and causality is in fact
merely a formalization of our intuition that every moment was preceded by another
moment, and that for every effect there is always a cause. In earlier times, this
paradox could only be resolved by postulating a supernatural origin: God as the
"prime mover" or "uncaused cause" of the universe. This is of course not acceptable
in a scientific theory. Moreover, it merely pushes the difficulty a little further, since
we still cannot explain the origin of God. Present-day cosmology evades the problem
by viewing the origin of the universe as a "singularity", i.e. a point in time where
continuity, causality and natural law break down. However, existing theories by their
very nature cannot tell us anything about the nature or origin of this singularity, and
therefore the explanation remains essentially unsatisfactory.
This problem requires a radical overhaul of existing theoretical frameworks.
Recently, a number of alternative approaches have been proposed that may offer the
beginning of an answer to the origin of time and causality. These include postulating
an imaginary time from which "real" time would emerge [Hawking, 1988; Deltete &
Guy, 1996, Butterfield, Isham & Kensington, 1999], process physics, which sees
space and time self-organizing out of a random information network [Cahill, 2003,
2005; Cahill, Klinger & Kitto, 2000], the emergence of causal sets from a quantum
self-referential automaton [Eakins & Jaroszkiewicz, 2003], and a structural language
for describing the emergence of space-time structure [Heylighen, 1990a]. These
proposals are heterogeneous, based on advanced, highly abstract mathematics, and
difficult to grasp intuitively. They moreover all start from highly questionable
assumptions. As such, they have as yet not made any significant impact on current
thinking about the origin of the universe.
The present paper attempts to approach the problem in a more intuitive,
philosophical manner, instead of immediately jumping to mathematical formalism, as
is common in physical theory. To achieve that, we will look at the emergence of time
and causality as a process of self-organization, albeit a very unusual one in that it
initially takes place outside of time.
2. Generalized self-organization
Models of evolution and complex systems have taught us quite a bit about the
phenomenon of self-organization, which can be defined most simply as the
spontaneous appearance of order out of chaos [Prigogine & Stengers, 1984;
Heylighen, 2001]. Extended to the level of the universe, this harkens back to the old
Greek idea that cosmos emerged from chaos, an idea that predates more recent
metaphysical theories where the cosmos is created by the pre-existing order or
intelligence embodied in God.
Chaos here refers to randomness or disorder, i.e. the absence of any form of
constraint, dependency or structure. Since maximum disorder is featureless and
therefore indistinguishable from emptiness or vacuum, the existence of disorder does
not need to be explained. In fact, modern physical theories conceive the vacuum
precisely as a turbulent, boiling chaos of quantum fluctuations, continuously
producing virtual particles that are so short-lived that they cannot be directly
observed. Moreover, physical theory in principle allows the emergence of stable
matter out of these quantum fluctuations without contradicting the law of energy
conservation:
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in quantum theory, particles can be created out of energy in the form of
particle/antiparticle pairs. But that just raises the question of where the energy came
from. The answer is that the total energy of the universe is exactly zero. The matter in
the universe is made out of positive energy. However, the matter is all attracting itself
by gravity. Two pieces of matter that are close to each other have less energy than the
same two pieces a long way apart, because you have to expend energy to separate
them against the gravitational force that is pulling them together. Thus, in a sense, the
gravitational field has negative energy. In the case of a universe that is approximately
uniform in space, one can show that this negative gravitational energy exactly cancels
the positive energy represented by the matter. So the total energy of the universe is
zero. (Hawking, 1988, p. 129)
What we need to explain further is how such separation of positive and negative
energy can occur, i.e. how the initially homogeneous chaos can differentiate into
distinct spatial regions, particles and fields. Numerous observations of chemical,
physical, biological and sociological processes have shown that some form of order or
organization can indeed spontaneously evolve from disorder, breaking the initial
homogeneity or symmetry. The only ingredients needed for the evolution of order are
random variation, which produces a variety of configurations of the different
elements, and the selection of those configurations that possess some form of intrinsic
stability or invariance. The selection is natural or spontaneous in the sense that
unstable configurations by definition do not last: they are eliminated by further
variation. The stable ones, on the other hand, by definition persist: they are selectively
retained. In general, there exist several stable configurations or "attractors" of the
dynamics. However, random variation makes that the configurations will eventually
end up in a single attractor, excluding the others.
This is the origin of symmetry breaking: initially, all attractor states were
equally possible or probable (homogeneity or symmetry of possible outcomes);
eventually, one has been chosen above all others (breaking of the symmetry). What
forces the symmetry breaking is the instability of the disordered configuration: this
initially homogeneous situation cannot last, and a "decision" needs to be made about
which stable configuration to replace it with. A simple example is a pencil standing
vertically on its tip. This position is very unstable, and the slightest random
perturbation, such as few air molecules more bumping into it from the left rather than
the from right, will push the pencil out of balance so that it starts to fall, in this case
towards the right. It will end up lying flat on the right-hand side, thus breaking the
initial symmetry where it was poised in an exact balance between left and right. More
generally, an initial random fluctuation will normally be amplified by positive
feedback until it pulls the whole system into a particular attractor [Heylighen, 2001].
Perhaps counter-intuitively, more variation or disorder produces faster self-
organization and therefore more order. This is the principle of "order from noise"
[von Foerster, 1960], or "order through fluctuations" [Prigogine & Stengers, 1984;
Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977]. The explanation is simple: more variation means that
more different configurations are explored in a given lapse of time, and therefore the
probability to end up in a stable configuration in that period of time becomes greater.
We may conclude that the emergence of differentiated order from initially
homogeneous disorder is a simple and natural process that requires no further
justification. It implies that we can explain the emergence of order out of chaos
without need to postulate a pre-existing order or designer.
However, this variation-and-selection mechanism cannot as yet be used to
explain the emergence of time, since it assumes processes taking place in time. To
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tackle this problem, we need to "abstract away" the notion of time from the two basic
components of the process of self-organization, thus arriving at the following
generalized notions:
· generalized variation does not require change of a configuration in time,
but can be a static feature. The only thing needed is the presence of a
variety or diversity of configurations. These can be generated by random
variations on a simple "template".
· generalized selection does not require selective retention, where some
configurations are "killed off" or eliminated, while others are allowed to
"survive". We only need a selection criterion that allows certain
configurations, while making others a priori impossible.
The most general selection criterion that I want to propose here is consistency.
According to the American Oxford Dictionary, "consistent" has three, related
meanings:
· "unchanging in achievement or effect over a period of time": this can be seen
as a paraphrase of "stable" or "invariant"
· "compatible or in agreement with something": this can be interpreted as
"fitting" or "adapted". For a system to be stable, it needs to fit in or "agree"
with its environment, i.e. it should avoid potentially destructive conflict.
·  "not containing any logical contradictions": this is the time-independent
meaning that we will focus on here; it can be derived from the second
meaning by noting that the components of a consistent configuration should be
in mutual "agreement".
Consistency in the timeless sense can be seen as a requirement imposed by the law of
contradiction in logic: A and not A cannot both be true. This law is tautological,
which means that it is true by definition. Therefore, it does not need to be justified by
recourse to some deeper law or to some external authority, such as God imposing
laws on nature. The application of this law in generalized self-organization is that it
can be used as a criterion to eliminate configurations that somewhere contain an
inconsistency, i.e. some part or aspect of the configuration is in contradiction with
some other part of aspect. While this requirement may seem obvious when discussing
logical statements, the connection to physical states and self-organization is more
subtle.
One illustration I can think of is de Broglie's historical conception of the
quantized orbits of electrons around a nucleus. In the spirit of wave mechanics (the
precursor of quantum mechanics), these energy eigenstates were seen as closed
waves, since the wave has to travel around the nucleus and then connect with it itself.
The explanation for quantization was that orbits that are not eigenstates cannot exist
because of destructive interference of the electron's wave function with itself. The
selection criterion (being an energy eigenstate, or in wave mechanics: being a
standing wave with an integer number of nodes) selects specific quantized orbits and
eliminates the rest. However, this is not conceived as a process in time, since the non-
quantized orbits do not get eliminated one-by-one: they are intrinsically inconsistent,
and therefore "logically" unrealizable.
Another example is perception, where the visual system selects a coherent
"Gestalt" out of all the possible interpretations of the initial noisy data it receives, and
ignores the interpretations that appear inconsistent [Stadler & Kruse, 1990]. Again,
the alternative interpretations are not eliminated in a temporal sequence; they simply
fail to make sense. Both orbit quantization and Gestalt perception exhibit symmetry
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breaking: from the homogeneous mass of potential states or interpretations, they
select one (or a few), leaving out the rest.
3. The origin of time
Time is in the first place an order relation between events, allowing you to specify
whether an event A came either before or after an event B. Relativity theory has
generalized this intuitive notion of a complete or linear order of time by noting that
sometimes the order of events cannot be determined: when A occurs outside of the
light cone passing through B (which means that it is impossible to send a signal from
B that arrives in A or vice-versa), then the temporal order between A and B is
indeterminate. For some observers, A will appear to be in the future of B, for others in
the past, or in the present. In general, we may say that A and B cannot be ordered
absolutely. Therefore, according to relativity theory the order of time is only partial.
A partial order is actually a very simple and common mathematical structure.
In fact, any arbitrary relation can be formally converted to a partial order by making
the relation transitive [Heylighen, 1990a]. To show how this is done, let us represent
this arbitrary relation by the symbol ? , which can be taken to mean "connects to",
according to some as yet unspecified connection criterion. Adding such a relation to a
set of individual nodes {A, B, C… } turns this set into a network. The nodes can be
interpreted as some as yet unspecified, primitive "events". We will now perform a
transitive closure of this relationship or network. This means that if the links A ? B,
and B ? C both exist, then the link A ? C is added to the network if it did not exist
yet. If it turns out that C ? D also exists, then transitive closure means that in a
second stage A ? D is added as well. This adding of "shortcuts" or "bridges" that
directly connect nodes that were indirectly connected is continued until the network
has become transitive, i. e. until for every X ? Y and Y ? Z, there exist a X ? Z
link. This is a purely formal operation of generalizing the definition of the relation so
that it includes indirect links as well as direct ones. It is similar to the extension from
the relation between people “is parent of” to the transitively closed relation “is
ancestor of”, or from the relation between natural numbers “is successor of” to “is
larger than”.
In any relation or network, there are two types of links: symmetric (meaning
that the link A ? B is accompanied by its inverse B ? A), and antisymmetric
(meaning that the link has no inverse). The combination of transitivity and
antisymmetry defines a partial order relationship: if you consider only the links
without inverse, they impose a clear order on the nodes they link, from "smaller" to
"larger", or from "earlier" to "later". The combination of transitivity and symmetry, on
the other hand, determines an equivalence relationship: if A ? B, and B ? A, then A
and B can be considered "equivalent" with respect to the ordering. If the ordering is
interpreted as time, A and B are simultaneous. So, it appears as if this simple
transitive closure operation has transformed our arbitrary, random network into a
partial order that can be interpreted as an order of time. In other words, we get order
(time) out of chaos (a random network).
This is pretty straightforward. However, complications arise if the original
relation ? (before the transitive closure operation) contains cycles. Imagine a long
sequence of links: A ? B, B ? C, C ? D, …  Y ? Z. Transitive closure means that
you add all the shortcuts: A ? C, B ? D, C ? E, etc. But now you also need to add
shortcuts between the shortcuts: if both A ? C, and C? D are in the network, A ?
D also must be added, and so does A ? E, A ? F, etc. Eventually, the whole
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sequence will be "cut short" by the single link A ? Z. This fits in with our intuition
about time: if A precedes B, B precedes C, …  and Y precedes Z, then A also precedes
Z. But since we started from the assumption that the network is random, the
probability is real that it would also contain the link Z ? A. In that case, we have
found a cycle: the sequence of links starting from A returns to its origin. Applying
again the transitivity rule, A ? Z and Z ? A together imply A ? A. In other words,
A precedes A! This is not grave if we interpret the connection relation ? as "precedes
or is simultaneous with". The links A ? Z, and Z ? A are symmetric, and thus they
belong to the equivalence part of the relationship. The normal interpretation is
therefore one of simultaneity. However, the transitive closure operation implies that
all elements of the sequence A, B, C, D, … , Z now become equivalent or
simultaneous. This is still not necessarily a problem, since it is principle possible to
have many simultaneous events.
The existence of cycles becomes a problem, though, if we make the
assumptions that the initial network is both random— because we want order to
emerge from chaos— and infinite, or at least unrestricted— because we want the
emerging order to represent the infinite extension of time. If we continue to add
random nodes and links to the network, sooner or later a very long sequence of
ordered nodes will, by the addition of a single link going back to an earlier element of
the sequence, turn into a cycle. This cycle, because of the formal operation of
transitive closure that is needed to produce an order relation, will turn into an
equivalence class. This means that the elements of the sequence, however extended,
suddenly all lose their temporal order, and become simultaneous. Simulations of the
growth of random networks [Kaufmann, 1995] clearly show that the addition of links
will sooner or later connect all nodes into a single cluster or equivalence class. In
other words, if we allow the network to grow freely, we will quickly lose our partial
ordering and therefore any notion of time.
The only solution seems to be to get rid of the cycles somehow, i.e. to
formulate a selection criterion functioning outside of time that excludes cycles and
retains only the non-cyclical parts of the random network to constitute the backbone
of time. The criterion of consistency is obviously relevant here because cycles in time
can lead to the well-known paradoxes of the time machine: what happens if I go back
in time before I was born and kill my own father? I have argued earlier [Heylighen,
1990b] that temporal cycles connecting events are either logically inconsistent (A
leads to not A) or trivial (A leads to A). The trivial cycles merely reaffirm what is
already there. The inconsistent ones, on the other, imply that A negates itself and
therefore must be null or void. Therefore, selection for consistency would
automatically eliminate all such cycles. The effect is similar to the destructive
interference undergone by cyclical waves that do not have an integer number of
periods: when the wave comes back to its origin with an amplitude opposite to the one
it started out with, it effectively erases itself.
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The trivial cycles, which do not "self-destroy", on the other hand, are
redundant, and can therefore be safely ignored or reinterpreted as partial orders. One
way to do this, as suggested in Heylighen [1990a], is to apply Feynman's [1949]
interpretation of antiparticles as normal particles moving backwards in time; in other
words, we can in principle reinterpret the "back in time" section of consistent cycles
as antiparticles moving forward in time, thus changing the orientation of the
connections on that section. For example, Fig. 1 shows a simple cycle A ? B, B ? A
in which an electron (e–) moves back in time (left). This is reinterpreted (right) as a
photon giving rise to a particle-antiparticle pair (e+: positron = anti-electron) after
which particle and antiparticle mutually annihilate, producing again a photon. Note
that in analogy with the quantization of closed waves, such a consistent cycle could be
seen as a kind of eigenstate of a hypothetical time reversal operator.
This elimination of cycles leaves us with the non-cyclic parts of the initially
random network of connections between events, and therefore with a partial order
defining time. Moreover, it can be shown that the remaining connections can be
divided in two categories, which can be interpreted respectively as "light-like" (i.e.
representing processes with the speed of light), and "particle-like" (i.e. representing
processes with a speed lower than light) (Heylighen, 1990a,b). The resulting
mathematical structure is equivalent to the causal structure of relativistic space-time
[Kronheimer & Penrose, 1967], which determines the bulk of space-time geometry.
This construction thus not only produces the order of time, but even the fundamental
properties of space in its relativistic interpretation (Heylighen, 1990a,b). The
argument needs to be fleshed out in much more detail, but already suggests a simple
and promising route to a theory of the self-organization of time.
The only additional ingredient we need to recover the full mathematical
structure of relativistic space-time is an observer-independent notion of duration, i.e. a
unit of time that allows us to measure how much time has passed (Heylighen, 1990b).
Given such a unit of time, we immediately get a unit of space or distance for free,
since we can define this spatial unit as the distance covered in a unit of time by a
signal moving with the (invariant) speed of light.
A A
B B
e– e– e+e–
time
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The existence of invariant time units is equivalent to the assumption that it is
possible under certain circumstances for synchronized clocks that are separated and
then brought together again to still be synchronized [Sjödin & Heylighen, 1985],
because all along they have counted with the same time units. In other words, equal
causes (clocks initially showing the same time) produce equal effects (clocks having
advanced independently still show the same time). This is actually a problem of
causality, which will be discussed in the next section.
4. The origin of causal laws
In relativity theory, causality is usually understood to mean that a cause must
necessarily precede its effect. However, this relation of precedence is already fully
covered by our notion of time as a partial order between events, and therefore needs
no additional explanation.
What remains to be explained is causality in the more traditional sense of
"equal causes produce equal effects". This is the sense of causality as a rule or law
that allows us to predict which kind of effect will follow given the characteristics of
the cause. In my analysis of causality [Heylighen, 1989], I have argued that if we
interpret "equal" as "identical" then the principle of causality is tautological, and
therefore needs no further explanation. This interpretation corresponds to what I have
called "microscopic causality". In practice, however, i.e. in the world of macroscopic
observations, when we make predictions we do not assume identical causes, but
similar causes leading to similar effects. This interpretation is the principle of
"macroscopic causality". The sensitive dependence on initial conditions in non-linear
dynamics (the "butterfly effect") and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, however,
both show how similar (macroscopically indistinguishable) causes can lead to
dissimilar (macroscopically distinct) effects [Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Gershenson
& Heylighen, 2004]. Therefore, macroscopic causality is not a logical necessity:
sometimes the assumption is valid, sometimes it is not. The question that remains then
is: why do similar causes often lead to similar effects?
A possible approach is to consider a cause-effect relation as a condition-action
rule, A ? B, describing the transition from A (cause) to B (effect): whenever a
condition A, i.e. a state belonging to particular subset or category A of world states, is
encountered, some agent acts to change this state into a new state, belonging to
category B. This perspective fits in with an ontology of actions [Turchin, 1993],
which sees all change as resulting from a combination of elementary actions
performed by one or more agents. An agent in this perspective could be a particle, a
field, a molecule, or some more complex system, such as an organism. This implies
that causal rules are not absolute or universal, but dependent on the presence of a
particular type of causal agent. The presence of this agent functions as a "background
condition" necessary for the causation to take place [Heylighen, 1999]. For example,
the rule "if a massive object is dropped (cause or condition), it will fall (effect or
action)" implicitly requires the presence of gravitation, and therefore the proximity of
a mass, such as a planet, big enough to produce gravitational forces. The planet's
gravitation here plays the role of the causal agent. In its absence, e.g. in interstellar
space, the causal law does not hold.
Such agents— and therefore the laws they embody— are normally the product
of evolution. This idea may be illustrated by considering the origin of biological laws.
Living organisms all use the same genetic code, which is implemented by the
mechanism of RNA transcription: a particular DNA/RNA triplet is transformed via a
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number of intermediate stages into a particular amino acid by the ribosomes and
transfer-RNA molecules present in the cell. The causal rules governing this
“translation” mechanism together form the genetic code. This genetic code is
universal, i.e. the same triplet is always transformed into the same amino acid: equal
causes produce equal effects. This universality can be explained by the fact that living
organisms on Earth have a common ancestor. From this ancestor, all living cells have
inherited the specific organization of the ribosomes that perform the conversion from
triplet to amino acid. These complexes of RNA and protein were created very long
ago by an evolutionary process of self-organization that took place among the
autocatalytic cycles of chemical reactions that produced the first living cells. Natural
selection has eliminated all variant forms of ribosomes that might have enacted
different codes of translation, and thus fixed the present code. Thus, we can explain
the law-like character of the DNA code by the selective retention and reproduction of
a particular type of ribosomal agents.
Can we generalize such a process of self-organization to explain causal laws
in general? The fundamental problem is to explain why natural laws appear to be the
same in all regions of the universe. The genetic code example suggests that this may
be because all the causal "agents" (which at the lowest level might correspond to
elementary particles and fields) had a common origin during the Big Bang, i.e. they
are all descendants of the same "ancestors". However, those original ancestors are
likely to have come about contingently, and therefore different universes may well
have different laws of nature— e.g. distinguished by the values of their fundamental
constants. Why our universe has these particular laws may then be explained by a
natural selection of universes picking out the "fittest" or most "viable" universes
[Smolin, 1997].
However, the ribosome example suggests that there may have been many
alternative laws, enacted by different collections of particle-like agents, that would
have been just as effective in generating a complex universe that later gave rise to
intelligent life. Biologists have no particular reasons to assume that the present
genetic code is the only possible one. While there are arguments based on chemistry
to show that the present code is more efficient than most other conceivable codes
[Freeland & Hurst, 1998], there is still plenty of freedom in choosing between a large
number of codes that appear equally efficient. Biologists assume that these other
codes have lost the competition with the present code not because they were
intrinsically less fit, but because of contingent events, such as one code being a little
more common in the very beginning, which allowed it to profit more from
exponential growth to outcompete its rival codes. Here we find again the basic
mechanism of symmetry breaking: random, microscopic differences in the initial state
(a few more cells with the present code) are amplified by positive feedback until they
grow into irreversible, macroscopic differences in the final result. The implication is
that there may be a large number of “viable” universes, which all have different laws,
but that not all laws are equally viable.
For example, in cosmology the question is regularly raised why in our
universe there is such a preponderance of matter over antimatter. The laws of physics
as we know them do not exhibit any preference for the one type of matter over the
other one. Therefore, we may assume that during the Big Bang particles of matter and
of antimatter were produced in practically equal amounts. On the other hand, matter
and antimatter particles annihilate each other whenever they interact. This means that
such a homogeneous distribution of particles between matter and antimatter states was
unstable, and could not continue. It has been suggested that an initial imbalance
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between matter and antimatter, which may have been random and tiny, has been
magnified by this violent competition between the two states, resulting in the final
symmetry breaking, where practically all antimatter was eliminated.
Since antimatter particles are still being formed in certain reactions, we know
about the possibility of their existence. However, it is conceivable that the Big Bang
witnessed the creation of huge varieties of other, more "exotic" particles, which not
only have disappeared since, but which are so alien to the remaining particles that we
cannot even recreate them in our particle colliders. Therefore, they are absent in our
theoretical models, even as potential outcomes of reactions. Such particles might have
embodied very different causal laws, exhibiting different parameters such as mass and
charge, and undergoing different types of forces and interactions
Another implication of this hypothesis is that causal laws may not be as
absolute and eternal as physics assumes. If a causal law is “embodied” in a particular
type of agent that has survived natural selection, we may assume it to be relatively
stable. Otherwise, the agent, and with it the law, would already have disappeared. On
the other hand, evolution tells us that no agent is absolutely stable: it is always
possible that the environment changes to such a degree that the original agent no
longer “fits”. This will lead to increased variation and eventually the appearance of
new agents that are better adapted to the new environment, thus outcompeting the old
ones. When we think about basic physical laws, like those governing the interactions
between common elementary particles, such as protons and electrons, it seems
difficult to imagine environments where those particles and the laws they embody
would no longer be stable. But that may simply be a shortcoming of our imagination,
which has no experience whatsoever with totally different physical situations, such as
those that might arise inside a black hole or during the Big Bang.
When discussing the contingency of laws it is important to note that there are
two types of laws:
1) logically necessary laws: these are true tautologically, by definition, such as
1 + 1 = 2 or the law of contradiction in logic
2) contingent laws: these could conceivably be different, such as the values of the
different fundamental constants in physics.
The difference between these two is not always apparent. Some seemingly contingent
laws may in a later stage be reduced to tautologies, which have to be true because of
the way the properties that they relate are defined. The law of energy conservation is
an example of this: at the most fundamental level, energy appears to be defined in
such way that it must be conserved. More precisely, the law of energy conservation,
like all other conservation laws, can be derived mathematically (through Noether’s
theorem) from an assumption of symmetry [Hanca et al. 2004], in this case the
homogeneity of time. This means simply that physical processes are independent of
the particular moment in time in which they occur: postponing the process to a later
moment without changing anything else about the situation will not change the
dynamics that takes place. This assumption of time invariance appears to be true by
definition: the time coordinate of an event is merely a convention, depending on how
we have calibrated our clocks, and should therefore not affect the process itself. In
fact, this could be interpreted as another example of the consistency requirement: to
be consistent our description of a dynamical process should not change if we merely
shift the time coordinate over an arbitrary amount, since time is defined relatively as a
precedence relation, and not absolutely, as a number.
At present, most physicists seem to assume that the values of the fundamental
constants are contingent, and therefore need to be explained by a combination of
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random variation and a selection mechanism such as the Anthropic principle [Carr &
Rees, 1979; Barrow & Tipler, 1988] or cosmological natural selection [Smolin, 1997].
However, we must remain open to the possibility that they are necessary, and
derivable from some as yet not clearly formulated first principles [see e.g Bastin et al.
1979, Bastin & Kilmister, 1995 for an attempt at deriving fundamental constants from
combinatorial principles]. The example of the origin of the genetic code may remind
us that some aspects of a law may be purely the result of chance, while others
represent intrinsic constraints that determine which variants will be selected. That
selection itself may happen in time, e.g. during a sequence of universes reproducing
themselves as envisaged by Smolin (1997), or outside time, by a requirement of
consistency like the one we discussed before or like the one that is implicit in
symmetry-based derivations of laws based on Noether's theorem.
5. Conclusion
The problems of the origin of time and of causality are perhaps the most fundamental
of all scientific problems, since all other scientific concepts and theories presuppose
and therefore depend on the existence of time and causality. It therefore should not
surprise us that as yet no convincing approaches to these problems have been
proposed. However, rather than taking time and causality for granted, as practically
all theories have done until now, the present paper has argued for a further
investigation of these problems.
I have suggested to start from the by now well-documented notion of self-
organization, because this concept proposes a concrete mechanism for the emergence
of order out of chaos. When considering the origin of the universe, chaos should here
be understood in its original, Greek sense, as a total disorder that is so much lacking
in structure that it is equivalent to nothingness. Time and causality, on the other hand,
are characterized by order. For time, this means the partial order relation of
precedence that connects different events while establishing an invariant distinction
between past and future. For causality, the order is in the invariance of cause-effect
relationships, as expressed by the "equal causes have equal effects" maxim.
Invariance can be conceived as stability under certain transformations. Stability can
be explained as the result of a process of variation followed by selection that
spontaneously eliminates unstable variations. Since chaos automatically implies
variation, we only need to explain selection: why are only some of the variations
retained?
In the case of causality, the variations can be conceived as causal agents that
embody different condition-action or cause-effect rules. In the case of basic laws of
physics, the agents are likely to represent elementary particles or fields. Since the
agents interact, in the sense that the effect of the one's action forms an initial
condition or cause for another one's subsequent action, they together form a complex
dynamical system. These systems are known to necessarily self-organize [Ashby,
1962; Heylighen, 2001], in the sense that the overall dynamics settles into an
attractor. This means that certain patterns of actions and agents are amplified by
positive feedback until they come to dominate, suppressing and eventually
eliminating the others, and thus breaking the initial homogeneity or symmetry in
which all variations are equally probable. As yet, we know too little about the
dynamics of such a primordial complex dynamical system to say anything more about
what kind of causal rules might emerge from such a self-organization at the cosmic
scale. However, the general notion of self-organization based on variation and
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selection suggests some general features of the resulting order, such as the fact that it
will be partly contingent, partly predictable, and context-dependent rather than
absolute.
In the case of time, this notion of self-organization needs to be extended in
order to allow variation and selection to take place outside of time. For variation, this
poses no particular problem, since selection can operate equally well on a static
variety of possibilities. For selection, we need to replace the dynamic notion of
stability as a selection criterion by the static notion of consistency. Consistency can be
understood most simply as an application of Aristotle's law of contradiction— which
states that a proposition and its negation cannot both the actual. In the case of time,
consistency allows us to have a partial order of precedence emerge out of a random
graph by eliminating cycles. The connections forming the random graph or network
can be interpreted as elementary actions or processes that lead from one event to
another. These random links and their corresponding nodes (events) form the initial
chaos or variation out of which the order of time is to emerge.
The formal operation of transitive closure transforms a random network into a
relation that is partly a partial order, partly an equivalence relation. The equivalence
relation encompasses all the parts of the graph that are included in cycles. However,
in an infinite random graph, this means in essence the whole graph, implying that no
partially ordered parts are left. Therefore, we need a selection criterion that eliminates
cycles. This can be motivated by generalizing the paradox of the time machine:
temporal cycles that produce actual changes are a priori inconsistent, and therefore
"self-negating", like the cyclic waves that undergo destructive interference with
themselves. Therefore, we can exclude them a priori.
In both cases— the self-organization of time and of causality— the present
description is still very sketchy, applying general principles at a high level of
abstraction, but remaining awfully vague as to what the "agents", "connections" or
"events" precisely are, or what properties they are supposed to have. At this stage of
the investigation, such vagueness is probably unavoidable. However, by proposing a
relatively simple and coherent explanation based on the well-understood concept of
self-organization, the present approach at least provides some steps towards
understanding these fundamental questions. I hope that other researchers may pick up
these threads and weave them into a graceful fabric of understanding.
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Symmetries and symmetry-breakings: the fabric of physical interactions
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Summary. This short note develops some ideas along the lines of the stimulating paper by
Heylighen. It summarizes a theme in several writings with Francis Bailly, downloadable from this
author’s web page. The “geometrization” of time and causality is the common ground of the
analysis hinted here and in Heylighen’s paper. Heylighen adds a logical notion, consistency, in
order to understand a possible origin of the selective process that may have originated this
organization of natural phenomena. We will join our perspectives by hinting to some
gnoseological complexes, common to mathematics and physics, which may shed light on the
issues raised by Heylighen. Note: Francis Bailly passed away recently: his immense experience in
physics has been leading our joint work for many years.
Historically, it is with relativist physics that there occurs a “change of perspective”: we
pass from “causal laws” to the structural organization of space and time, or even from causal
laws to the “legality/normativity of geometric structures”. This understanding of causal laws
by the identification of structural organizations, stems essentially from the intrinsic duality
existing between the characterization of the geometry of the universe and that of energy-
momentum within that universe. By this duality and the putting into effect of the principle of
invariance under the differentiable transformations of space-time, the “forces” are relativized
to the nature of this geometry: they will even appear or disappear according to the geometric
nature of the universe chosen a priori to describe physical behaviors.
Now, it is similar for quantum physics, in gauge theories. Here, gauge groups operate
upon internal variables, such as in the case of relativity, where the choice of local gauges and
their changes enable to define, or conversely, to make disappear, the interactions
characterizing the reciprocal effects of fields upon one another. For example, it is the choice
of the Lorentz gauge which enables to produce the potential for electromagnetic interactions
as correlates to gauge invariances.
Consequently, if one considers that one of the modalities of expression and observation
of the causal processes is to be found in the precise characterization of the forces and fields
“causing” the phenomena observed, then it is apparent that this modality is profoundly thrown
into question by the effects of these transformations. Not that the causal structure itself will as
a result be intrinsically subverted, but the description of its effects is profoundly relativized.
This type of observation therefore leads to having a more elaborate representation of
causality than that resulting from the first intuition stemming from classical behaviors.
Particularly, the causality of contemporary physics seems much more associated to the
manifestation of a formal solidarity of the phenomena between themselves, as well as
between the phenomena and the referential frameworks chosen to describe them, than to an
object's “action” oriented towards another in inert space-time, as classical mechanics could
have accredited the idea. In summary, our strong stand towards a geometrization of causality
may be summarized as follows. Causes become interactions and these interactions themselves
constitute the fabric of the universe of their manifestations, its geometry: modifying this fabric
appears to cause the interactions to change; changing the interactions modifies the fabric.
And now comes another fundamental issue raised by Heylighen. It appears that the
symmetry / symmetry breaking pair is playing for the intelligibility of physics an absolutely
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crucial role. By Noether’s theorems, to which Heylighen refers, transformations in symmetry
correspond invariants (mathematical aspect) or conserved quantities (physical aspect) specific
to the system under consideration and to any systems displaying identical symmetries.
Thus, the symmetry / breaking of symmetry pair thematizes, on the one hand, invariance,
conservation, regularity and equivalence, and on the other, criticality, instability, singularity,
ordering. We have seen in the book quoted below that through the pair’s dialectic, it is an
essential component of the very identity of the scientific object that is presented and
objectivized. Could we go even further and consider that we have thus managed construct this
identity at a level such that cognitive schemas conceived as conditions of possibility for any
construction of objectivity are henceforth mobilized, thus reviving a form of transcendental
approach, in a kantian sense ?
As a matter of fact, there exists a close formal relationship between the abstract properties
of symmetry captured by mathematical group structures and logical structures as fundamental
as the equivalence relation, which is extensively used by Heylighen. At the same time, there
exists a similar formal relationship between the semi-group structure and the logical structure
of the (partial) order relation, to which Heylighen refers in his understanding of time and
causality. Thus, the theoretical analysis of the abstract notions of space and of time
demonstrates that for their formal reconstruction these notions need to mobilize the
mathematical structures of group and of semi-group, respectively. Indeed, regardless of the
number of dimensions considered, the displacement properties, consubstantial to the concept
of space, refer to the determinations of the displacement group, whereas the properties of
irreversibility and of the passing of time refer to the characteristics of the semi-group
(generally, for one parameter).
We then witness the constitution of a pair of abstract complexes which doubtlessly
represents one of the essential bases for any objective interpretation within the processes of
the construction of knowledge: the complexes of <space, group structure, equivalence
relation> on the one hand and of <time, semi-group structure, order relation on the other>.
Epistemologically, this is where Heylighen’s thesis leads, in our opinion. By adding
“consistency” in the logical sense, Heylighen suggests a way to break circularities in the
cyclic structure of equivalence relations and pass by this to order relations, that is to semi-
group and time (“going back” to a node A from which one “moved away” is a form of
opposite movement, a negation ØA, thus incompatible or logically inconsistent – one cannot
have both A and ØA).
Let’s point out once more that the space and time evoked by the gnoseological complexes
above no longer refer to physical entities as such, but rather to the conceptual frameworks
which are meant to enable any physics to manifest itself, that is, to abstract conditions of
possibility and not to effective realizations, thus reactualizing a kantian point of view. Thus,
space and time are no longer considered as “objects” to be studied, but rather as the
conditions of possibility for any sensible experience. In this sense, the symmetries and
breakings of symmetries associated to these complexes appear not only as elements of the
intelligibility of physical reality, but indeed as factors for the scientific constitution of such
reality, including the understanding of causality.
Not only would we simply operationalize space and time (and thus causality), but by
coupling them with the corresponding logical and mathematical determinations (group
structure, equivalence relation, etc.) we refer them to the frameworks of invariance which
make them into reference structures that are mathematically specified, rather than abstract and
vague.
Bailly F., Longo G., (2006) Mathématiques et sciences de la nature. La singularité physique du vivant,
Hermann, Paris, (ongoing translation in English, see http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo).
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Symmetry, Potentiality and Reversibility
Francis  Heylighen
Abstract: This short comment confirms Longo's observation about the importance of symmetries for
understanding space and time, but raises the additional issue of the transition from reversible to
irreversible transformations.
I have little to criticize in Giuseppe Longo's (2010) comment on my paper "The Self-organization of
Time and Causality" (Heylighen, 2010). I can only agree with Longo's emphasis on the duality
symmetry/symmetry breaking as a foundation for our understanding of space and time.
Space, indeed, is characterized in the first place by symmetry, i.e. by the fact that translations
from one point of space to another point can be perfectly reversed. The movement or translation
from a position X to a position Y is the exact mirror image of the translation from Y to X. This
expresses our intuition that space is something that you can freely travel in without making any
irreversible changes, since you can always come back to the same place, i.e. point in space. Time, on
the other hand, is characterized by the opposite: antisymmetry. A causal process leading from an
event A to an event B by definition cannot be reversed: once B occurs, A is irrevocably in the past,
and can no longer be reached from B. This expresses our intuition that it is impossible to travel in
time in any other way than forward. In my paper [Heylighen, 2010], I have tried to explain that
antisymmetry by using the consistency principle to exclude travel back in time from B to A.
This paper only discussed actual events and the actual processes connecting them. However,
in order to recover the (both mathematical and intuitive) structure of space, we need to generalize
from actual movements to potential ones. This may be clarified by expressing an event A in space-
time as a combination of its space and time coordinates: A = (xA, tA). In my travel from event A to
event B, I change my position in space from xA to xB, and my moment in time from tA to tB.
Obviously I cannot go back to tA from here, since by assumption tA < tB. However, I still can travel
back from xB to xA, although I will arrive there at a later time tC > tB. These coordinates are not part
of the construction in my paper. However, they can be conventionally chosen so as to be in accord
with the relativistic structure of space-time that does emerge from the construction.
The reason for choosing space coordinates separate from time coordinates is precisely in
order to model space as a set of potential places: positions that we do not all visit, but that we might
have visited given different initial conditions. Time does not have this property of potentiality or
freedom: you have no choice but to follow the one-dimensional arrow of time, and there are no
points in time that you can decide to skip or to visit earlier or later than determined. The concept of
potential is foundational for all scientific models, and is captured in the basic mechanical concepts of
cinematics (the study of potential movements), configuration space, phase space and state space (the
spaces of all possible configurations, phases or states of the system). While we are inclined to see
ordinary, physical space as something more concrete and “real” than those abstract spaces, because
of our visual and motor intuitions about it, mathematically there is no real difference: ordinary
Euclidean space is merely the state space of a point mass that can move in three dimensions: up-
down, left-right and back-forth.
Once we have formalized the construct of the space of all potential positions or states, we can
start to model processes in a more general way— not as a relation between specific points or events
but as a relation between classes of points or events. For this we conventionally use transformations
or mappings, which map the space onto itself. As Longo points out, the reversible mappings (such as
translations or rotations), which represent the symmetries of space, form an algebraic group, which
expresses the “cinematic” aspect of potential movement. We know however that the actual causal or
dynamical processes are irreversible, and therefore the corresponding mappings should logically
form a semi-group (lacking inverse transformations). The problem, however, is that the causal laws
of classical mechanics (as well as quantum mechanics and most of their derivatives) are intrinsically
reversible in their formulations. The laws of thermodynamics, on the other hand, are intrinsically
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irreversible as they imply a maximization of entropy. Prigogine (1980) has attempted to solve this
paradox by constructing a mathematical transformation of probability distributions that would send
reversible mappings (group) onto irreversible ones (semi-group). While well intended, this formal
approach seems too artificial to tackle the fundamental conceptual problem of the irreversibility of
time.
The issue is complicated even further by the phenomenon of symmetry breaking related by
Longo (2010), which, as I noted in my paper, is characteristic of self-organization, which is itself a
primary irreversible process. However, not all processes in time are characterized by symmetry
breaking, yet all are irreversible at the level of events. In conclusion, the transition from reversible
dynamics that maintain symmetry to irreversible dynamics that either maintain or break symmetries
is a complex but important unsolved issue!
References:
Heylighen F. (2010): “The Self-organization of Time and Causality”, Foundations of Science
Longo G. (2010): “Symmetries and Symmetry-Breakings”, Foundations of Science (this issue).
Prigogine, I., (1980). From being to becoming. Time and complexity in the physical sciences. New
York: Freeman.
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The role of energy conservation and vacuum energy
in the evolution of the universe
Jan M. Greben
CSIR, PO Box 395, Pretoria 0001, South Africa
E-mail: jgreben@csir.co.za
Abstract. We discuss a new theory of the universe in which the vacuum energy is
of classical origin and dominates the energy content of the universe. As usual, the
Einstein equations determine the metric of the universe. However, the scale factor is
controlled by total energy conservation in contrast to the practice in the Robertson-
Walker formulation. This theory naturally leads to an explanation for the Big Bang
and is not plagued by the horizon and cosmological constant problem. It naturally
accommodates the notion of dark energy and proposes a possible explanation for dark
matter. It leads to a dual description of the universe, which is reminiscent of the dual
theory proposed by Milne in 1937. On the one hand one can describe the universe
in terms of the original Einstein coordinates in which the universe is expanding, on
the other hand one can describe it in terms of co-moving coordinates which feature in
measurements. In the latter representation the universe looks stationary and the age
of the universe appears constant.
The paper describes the evolution of this universe. It starts out in a classical state
with perfect symmetry and zero entropy. Due to the vacuum metric the effective
energy density is infinite at the beginning, but diminishes rapidly. Once it reaches the
Planck energy density of elementary particles, the formation of particles can commence.
Because of the quantum nature of creation and annihilation processes spatial and
temporal inhomogeneities appear in the matter distributions, resulting in residual
proton (neutron) and electron densities. Hence, quantum uncertainty plays an essential
role in the creation of a diversified complex universe with increasing entropy. It thus
seems that quantum fluctuations play a role in cosmology similar to that of random
mutations in biology. Other analogies to biological principles, such as recapitulation,
are also discussed.
25 March 2009
Keywords: Dark energy. Dark matter. Classical vacuum energy. Linear expansion
of the universe.
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1. Introduction
In standard quantum mechanics conservation of energy is related to the invariance of
the Lagrangian under space-time translations and is expressed as a divergence equation
for the energy-momentum tensor. In General Relativity (GR) this divergence equation
is replaced by a covariant equation and is equivalent to the Bianchi identities satisfied
by GR [1]. However, in an expanding universe, this symmetry is no longer equivalent
to energy conservation. For example, the popular de Sitter universe violates energy
conservation ([2], p.120).
In view of the importance of the principle of total energy conservation we propose to
impose this principle as a separate condition in GR. For a non-expanding universe this
condition reduces to the usual divergence equation. However, the general consensus is
that the universe is expanding, in which case this principle becomes a separate condition.
It can be imposed by demanding that the spatial integral over the energy component of
the energy-momentum tensor is constant over time. However, in the standard Robertson
Walker (RW) metric this procedure leads to a problem. Given an energy-momentum
tensor, the metric of the universe is fixed by the GR equations. In the usual RW metric,
the expansion is incorporated in the metric via the scale factor, so that the expansion is
fixed by the GR equations. Hence, there is no room for another condition for total energy
conservation as the whole dynamics is already fixed (apart from boundary conditions).
It is thus not surprising that the solution of the GR equations for a universe with a
constant cosmological constant violates energy conservation ([2], p.120). Our solution
to this conundrum is to remove the scale factor from the metric. This means that the
expansion now has to be derived in a different way, and this is done via a scale factor a(t)
fixed by energy conservation. If the universe does not expand, this scale factor reduces
to unity, and the extra condition merely represents a consistency condition for two
equivalent definitions of energy conservation. This formulation ensures that the scale
factor is a truly global function as it is fixed by the total energy, which is a property of
the whole universe. It also means that the metric tensor exclusively serves its natural
function of reflecting the (local) distribution of energy.
For a flat universe with constant vacuum energy density, this new formulation leads
to a linear expansion. This is clearly the simplest possible mode of expansion of the
universe and provides a natural representation of the observed Hubble expansion. It
should be noted that such a simple solution is impossible in the RW metric, as the
linear case represents a singular limit in that framework (only by setting the curvature
k = −1 can one find a linear solution, the so-called Milne universe [2]). The vacuum
energy, which dominates the energy content of the universe in our picture, is easily
identified with the so-called dark energy, both having a pressure-to-density ratio of -1.
Hence, this model automatically incorporates the present consensus that dark energy
dominates the energy content of the universe. In addition to explaining dark energy, the
constant vacuum energy density has many other important consequences and plays a
central role in the dynamics of the universe, as we will demonstrate amply in this paper.
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The original theoretical motivation for constructing a universe with a constant vacuum
energy is that our analyses in quantum field theory (QFT) (see Section 2) suggest that
the vacuum energy has no quantum contributions, in contrast to generally held beliefs.
It is then natural to identify dark energy with a classical vacuum energy, however this
forces a new approach to cosmology, as the conventional solution in this case - the de
Sitter universe - does not feature a big bang singularity.
Current theoretical scenarios often contain an inflationary period at t = 10−35 s.
In our theory an inflationary period is not mandatory, as the vacuum metric leads
to an infinite horizon, so that one of the main motivations for inflation falls away.
This also obviates the need for unknown forces to explain the inflationary epoch, in
particular those forces which derive from QFT vacuum energy and which would be
excluded by our QFT findings. Most scenarios agree that this early period is followed
by a period of linear expansion, moderated by a slight deceleration initially and a slight
acceleration in the current epoch. Hence,the dominant form of the expansion (linear)
is already accounted for in our approach. Phases of deceleration and acceleration can
occur in our model because of known quantum field theoretic processes, such as the
creation and annihilation of particles. The presence of matter and radiation does not
change the essential linear evolution of the universe in our description, in contrast to
universes described by Friedmann-Robertson-Walker(FRW) models, which are vastly
different in radiation - and matter - dominated situations. Hence, the simple vacuum
metric still dominates the universe in the presence of matter and radiation. Another
important difference with the Friedmann models is that in the solution of the Einstein
equations, the localized nature of matter distributions is taken into account. Since our
scale factor is controlled by energy conservation rather than by the Einstein equations,
such a refinement of the cosmological treatment is now feasible. This leads to a unified
treatment of cosmological and local astronomical phenomena. Another consequence of
this improvement is the emergence of a new tentative explanation of dark matter, which
does not require any exotic new particle assumptions.
The evolution of the universe in this theory has rather definite characteristics, with
some of the details still to be developed. Contrary to most popular scenarios, the
universe starts out as a classical system, with an effective energy density proportional
to t−3. The universe with positive and negative time are exact replicas of each other,
answering the question what happens ”prior” to time zero. The cosmological principle
(i.e. the homogeneity and isotropy of the density) is satisfied exactly in this initial
classical period, so that the entropy is zero. After about 5 × 10−24 seconds quantum
field theory becomes effective and the first physical (rather than virtual) particles are
created. The particle physics scale 5 × 10−24 naturally emerges from our formulation
and is expressed in terms of the fundamental cosmological constants. This epoch is
characterized by deflation, as the universe has to contract to supply the energy for
the production of matter. The emergence of physical particles in this epoch also
allows the expression of the subsequent evolution in thermodynamic language. The
particle-creation epoch is characterized by the Planck energy and by a corresponding
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temperature of 1032 0K. In the subsequent epoch particles and anti-particles annihilate,
leaving a residue of protons, neutrons and electrons. This period is accompanied by an
inflationary expansion to counter the loss of energy in the annihilation phase due to the
changing metric. After these processes, the normal Big Bang dynamics sets in which is
again characterized by a linear scale factor.
The uncertain outcome of quantum events plays an essential role in the creative
epoch. Firstly, it is responsible for breaking the symmetry of the matter distribution,
leading to sufficient inhomogeneities for localized matter concentrations to form. In
later epochs this asymmetry will initiate the creation of massive astronomical objects.
In a classical universe this spatial symmetry would be maintained and no concentrations
of matter could possibly emerge. Secondly, we expect the quantum fluctuations to be
responsible for the imbalance between the different particle and anti-particle populations
after the annihilation epoch. Hence, the current universe is a consequence of the physical
laws and historical accidents, caused by the outcome of quantum processes in our world.
Thus, randomness is as much a factor in the evolution of the universe as it is in biological
(mutation) processes. To some extent the principle of the survival of the fittest is carried
in quantum physics by the probability functions. Objects or configurations that form in
the early universe, but then decay and vanish from the universe, appear to play a role
similar to that of unsuccessful species in biology.
2. A universe with constant vacuum energy density
We will assume that the vacuum energy density ² is constant and is a basic property
of Nature. This assumption is equivalent to the presence of a non-zero cosmological
constant and leads to the usual de Sitter solution for the common Robertson-Walker
(RW) metric. The assumption that the vacuum energy density is constant and small
appears in conflict with standard QFT estimates, which quote vacuum energy densities
of between 40 and 120 orders of magnitudes larger than the ”observed” value. This
problem of standard QFT is known as the cosmological constant problem ([3], [4], [5]).
Our hypothesis therefore implies that the vacuum energy does not derive from such
QFT processes. To put it more bluntly: it suggests that the usual QFT derivations
of vacuum processes contain serious flaws. Although this may be a natural conclusion
to draw because of the phenomenal discrepancy between the standard QFT result and
experiment, various practices with vacuum expectation values (vev’s) in QFT have
been so ingrained that the acceptance of this conclusion will require much debate. It
therefore appears opportune to present some consequences of this hypothesis (such as
in cosmology), before engaging in a full debate on its theoretical motivation. Our
hypothesis is based on a study of the role of creation and annihilation operators of
particles and anti-particles in QFT. We found that many vacuum phenomena, such
as the definition of the propagator as a time ordered product, survive under our
reformulated operator algebra. Also, the Casimir effect [6], which is often seen as a
consequence of QFT vacuum energy, can be derived without invoking any vacuum energy
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[7]. We contend that other phenomena, such as the vacuum condensates in QFT [8] have
been misinterpreted, and can possibly be reformulated with an equivalent quantitative
formulation without resorting to the QFT interpretations of the vacuum used presently.
Hence, the purpose of the present study is to derive a realistic cosmological theory
for a constant (classical) vacuum energy density. The fact that the hypothesis avoids
the cosmological constant problem and leads to a very elegant theory which explains
many cosmological phenomena in a simple way, is then seen as a strong endorsement
of the correctness of this hypothesis. We decided to test this hypothesis first in the
cosmological context
Accepting this hypothesis we are now confronted with the standard de Sitter
solution of the GR equations for a non-zero cosmological constant. This solution has
no singular beginning. It also leads to a violation of total energy conservation, as the
expanding vacuum universe will increase its energy content with time [2]. The solution
to this problem is to employ a metric distinct from the usual Robertson-Walker metric.
The proposed solution is a good candidate for the description of the actual universe, as
it features the expected singularity at time t = 0. In addition energy conservation and
the expansion of the universe will be compatible rather than in conflict with each other.
Let us briefly discuss this solution. The vacuum energy is represented by the
following energy-momentum tensor:
Tµν = −²gµν , (1)
where we use the metric - popular in cosmology - with g00 negative, so that ² is positive
for positive vacuum energy. The Einstein equations then read:
Rµν − 1
2
Rgµν = −8piG²gµν . (2)
In view of the observed (approximate) spatial flatness of the universe [9] we try to solve
this equation (2) with a metric tensor that is conformally flat:
gµν = −g(x)ηµν , (3)
where ηµν is the Minkowski metric. In contrast to the Robertson-Walker (RW) metric,
we do not introduce a scale factor in the metric. This raises the question how to account
for the expansion of the universe in the current parametrization. As we will see shortly,
we will account for the expansion without abandoning the Minkowski metric ηµν . Since
the vacuum is expected to be spatially homogeneous, we restrict the dependence of
g(x) to the time coordinate t. We then obtain the following solution of the Einstein
equations:
g(t) =
3
8piG²t2
=
t2s
t2
, (4)
where ts is a characteristic time, which will play an important role in the following.
Hence, the conformally flat metric of this vacuum universe now reads explicitly as
follows:
ds2 =
t2s
t2
(
−dt2 + dx2 + dy2 + dz2
)
. (5)
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This can be contrasted with the usual Robertson-Walker metric where:
ds2 = −dτ 2 + aRW (τ)2(dx2 + dy2 + dz2), (6)
The two representations are mathematically related by the following transformations:
τ = ±ts ln(t/ts) −→ aRW (τ) = exp(∓τ/ts), (7)
where the latter can be recognized as the de Sitter solution. However, the different
choices of the physical variables lead to very different universes. For example, an
expanding de Sitter universe (aRW (τ) = exp(τ/ts) with τ positive and increasing
towards the future) corresponds to a decreasing t in our formulation, and therefore
to a contracting universe. Our definition of the scale factor will accordingly follow a
very different route from that in the RW formulation. It will not be based on the metric
(which is left in its Minkowski form) and rather being based on the demand of energy
conservation. The 1/² dependence of g(t) emphasizes the non-perturbative nature of
this vacuum solution, typical of complex systems. Hence, in a cosmological context it
is incorrect to neglect the small vacuum energy ², or treat it perturbatively. The 1/t2
singularity of the metric at t = 0 makes this vacuum solution a good candidate for the
description of the Big Bang.
An important property of this vacuum solution is that the geodesics represent
either stationary points or test particles that move with the speed of light. Instead, in
an ordinary flat universe (without vacuum energy) any (constant) speeds not exceeding
the velocity of light are allowed [10]. It could thus be argued that the presence of
the (classical) vacuum energy is responsible for both the origin of the velocity of light
and for the apparent stationary nature of astronomical objects in the cosmos. Other
interesting perspectives on the significance of ², or equivalently (if G is constant) the
cosmological constant Λ, are reviewed by Padmanabhan [11]. We quote: ”the innocuous
looking addition of a constant to the matter Lagrangian (which does not does not affect
the dynamics of matter) leads to one of the most fundamental and fascinating problems
of theoretical physics”. What the present author finds particularly interesting is the
suggestion [11] to consider the cosmological constant as a Lagrange multiplier, ensuring
the constancy of the 4-volume of the universe when the metric is varied. Since we will see
that the constancy of the (invariant) volume in the current approach is closely related
to energy conservation, we suspect that there are deeper connections to be resolved.
It is interesting to note that Einstein originally introduced the cosmological constant
to ensure the stationary nature of the universe, while we use it to generate an expanding
universe. However, our analysis will show that from the perspective of a co-moving
observer the universe does look stationary. This result also suggests possible links
between our description and Hoyle’s steady state universe, as the latter also makes
use of a constant cosmological constant (see a paper by McCrea [12]).
In the next section we will demonstrate the origin of the linear expansion of the
universe and the prescription for determining the scale factor.
EDU 2008 p109
The role of energy conservation and vacuum energy in the evolution of the universe 7
3. Energy Conservation in General Relativity
The energy-momentum conservation condition from ordinary quantum mechanics is
generalized in GR by replacing the derivative of the energy-momentum tensor by its
covariant counterpart:
∇µT µν = 0. (8)
This condition is automatically satisfied for a metric satisfying the Einstein equations,
and can be shown to follow from the Bianchi identities [1]. Equation (8) is trivially
satisfied by the vacuum energy density (Eq. (1)). However, in an expanding universe
condition Eq. (8) is not sufficient to guarantee energy conservation. The total energy
content of the vacuum universe is obtained by integrating −T 00 = ² over the invariant
volume:
E =
∫
V
d3x
√
3g ² =
∫
V
d3x
t3s
t3
². (9)
Here 3g is the induced spatial metric, i.e. it is the spatial component of the determinant
of the metric tensor (Ref. [2], p.120), which in our diagonal case equals 3g = g11g22g33.
In order to ensure energy conservation, the spatial volume V in (9) must expand like t3:
V (t) =
t3
t3s
Vs. (10)
The proportionality constant Vs can be interpreted as the invariant volume since:∫
V
d3x
√
3g = Vs, (11)
is constant. This invariant volume also equals the physical volume of the universe at the
characteristic time ts . This volume also features in the expression for the total energy:
²Vs, which therefore is invariant, as it should be. The expansion of the volume of the
universe is best interpreted in terms of a scale factor that rescales distances, especially
since it remains finite if Vs is infinite. Hence, we write:
V (t) = a(t)3Vs, (12)
where the scale factor for the vacuum equals:
a(t) =
t
ts
. (13)
Even after the introduction of matter and radiation, V (t) will still display this cubic time
dependence. In addition, however, Vs will change every time a creation or annihilation
process takes place. Hence, in the real universe a(t) will also have to reflect these QFT
processes. We will come back to this aspect in Section 6.
We note finally that the linear scale factor in (13) is unique to our approach as is
normally forbidden in the RW metric [2]. The only other situation in which a linear scale
factor occurs is in the Milne universe [2]. However, as this universe has zero vacuum
energy and non-zero curvature, it is not related to our universe and is not an acceptable
model of the universe.
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4. The modified metric in the presence of matter
The vacuum universe can be described as an ideal fluid with a pressure-to-density
ratio of -1. This value is in excellent agreement with the Supernova Legacy Survey
(w = −1.023 ± 0.090(stat) ± 0.054(sys) [13] for the dark energy equation of state).
Hence, this strongly suggests that dark energy and vacuum energy are one and the same
thing. Since dark energy appears to dominate the energy content of the universe, by
implication vacuum energy dominates the global dynamics of the real universe. However,
as the presence of matter and radiation is a consequence of QFT processes and make
the universe interesting, our next task is to include these aspects as well. In view
of the dominance of the vacuum energy it seems reasonable to treat the matter and
radiation terms to first order, i.e. to linearize the Einstein field equations within the
non-perturbative vacuum background. This approach has additional advantages, as
it allows us to solve the Einstein equations exactly for the proposed representations
of matter and radiation, and allows us to sidestep certain problems arising from the
quantum nature of these terms.
The usual way to characterize the universe in the presence of matter and radiation
is as an ideal fluid. However, instead of the constant pressure and density appropriate
for a vacuum universe, one must now consider the pressure and density as being time
dependent [14]. In our opinion, even this generalization is not sufficient for the matter
in the universe: an important characteristic of matter is that it is localized, whereas
the perfect fluid description does not take into account any spatial dependence. This
localized nature of matter is true, irrespective of whether matter is in the form of
fermions, planets, stars or galaxies. Astronomical objects are separated by vast empty
areas and the matter distribution is thus far from being locally homogeneous. Neglect
of this spatial dependence of matter is unlikely to provide the correct solution of the
differential Einstein equations, where the spatial derivatives are expected to play a
prominent role. Hence, we propose a matter density representation which emphasizes
this local inhomogeneity:
Tmatterµν (x) = −ρmatter(x)gˆ00δµ0δν0, (14)
where the matter density is represented by
ρmatter(t, ~x) =
∑
i
Mi√
3gˆ(t, ~x)
δ(3)(~x− ~xi). (15)
A similar form for a source term expressed in terms of delta functions accompanied by
a suitable function of the metric, was already suggested by Weinberg ([14], (5.2.13)).
The appearance of the metric in the energy expression is not unexpected: the covariant
condition, Eq.(8), clearly shows that a consistent definition of the energy-momentum
tensor requires a particular dependence on the metric. In fact, the form (14) satisfies the
covariant energy conservation condition (8) to the required order. We also introduced
the new metric gˆµν which accounts for the presence of matter. Since we treat the
corrections to the vacuum metric to first order, we can approximate the exact metric
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in Eqs.(14 ) and (15) in most analyses by the vacuum metric gµν . If we integrate this
density (i.e. −T 00 ) over the whole universe we get the sum of all masses, as desired.
In order to calculate the first order effect of the matter term on the metric we write
the metric tensor as follows:
gˆµν(t, ~x) = g(t)
{
ηµν + h
matter
µν (x)
}
, (16)
where g(t) is given by (4). The inverse metric to first order then equals:
gˆµν(t, ~x) = g(t)−1
{
ηµν − ηµαhmatterαβ (x)ηβν
}
. (17)
The linearized Einstein field equation reads:
− ηλλ∂λ∂λhνµ + ηλλ∂λ∂νhµλ + ηλλ∂λ∂µhλν − ηλλ∂ν∂µ hλλ
+
2
t
(
∂νhµ0 + ∂µh0ν − ∂0hνµ + ηνµηλλ∂λhλ0 − 1
2
ηνµη
λλ∂0hλλ
)
+
6
t2
h00ηνµ
= 16piG
(
Tmatterµν −
1
2
gµνT
matter
)
= 16piGgρmatter
(
δµ0δ0ν +
1
2
ηµν
)
, (18)
where some vacuum terms cancelled out. The solution can be expressed in terms of a
single function h(x):
hmatterµν (x) = δµνh(x), (19)
with:
h(x) = 2Gg
∫
Vˆ
d3x′
ρmatter(t, ~x′)
|~x− ~x′| = 2G
t
ts
∑
i
Mi
1
|~x− ~xi| . (20)
Here the original volume V is replaced by the volume Vˆ , associated with the new state
vector of the universe. This new volume (and hence the corresponding scale factor)
is determined by the demand of global energy conservation, and is not fixed by the
Einstein equations (see Section 6).
The only difference between (20) and the standard result in a flat background metric
is the factor t/ts. This factor counters the expansion of the universe and ensures that
astronomical objects are in stable orbits despite the expansion of the universe. If we
replace the coordinates ~x by co-moving coordinates ~˜x, we get the standard result [14]:
h(x) = 2G
∑
i
Mi
1∣∣∣~˜x− ~˜xi∣∣∣ , (21)
where:
~˜x =
ts
t
~x. (22)
Hence, two related representations are possible of the space-time characteristics
of the universe. The first one is the co-moving representation, which is closest to
our observations, as we cannot directly observe the scale factor t/ts, whereas our
astronomical observations are in agreement with (21). However, we have to use the
original variables and the explicit form (20) in the Einstein equations, since ~x and not
~˜x is the independent variable in those equations. A similar duality occurs with respect
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to the time coordinate and the fourmomentum of particles, as we will discuss in more
detail in Section 9.
Finally, we note that the sum (20) would be infinite for an infinite universe. The
problem is that we have used an instantaneous solution. By imposing causality we can
limit the contributions to
|~x− ~xi | < ct , (23)
when applying (20). In terms of co-moving coordinates condition (23) implies:∣∣∣~˜x− ~˜xi ∣∣∣ < cts . (24)
The average correction to the flat metric is then:
< h(x) >=
3
2
ρm
²
=
3
2
∑
i
Mi
²Vˆs
, (25)
where ρm is the average matter density in the universe. For the definition of the adjusted
invariant volume Vˆs we refer to Section 6.
5. The modified metric in the presence of radiation
As we only consider hµν to first order, we can solve the equations of general relativity
separately for the matter and electro-magnetic contributions in the vacuum background.
The radiation density can be written in the perfect fluid form, as the QFT expression
for the energy density is not localized (photons are represented by plane waves). Taking
account of the metric factors so that the resulting expression satisfies the covariance
condition (8), we arrive at:
T radµν (x) =
1
g
∑
j
p(j)
Vˆ

1 0 0 0
0 1
3
0 0
0 0 1
3
0
0 0 0 1
3
 = g

ρrad 0 0 0
0 prad 0 0
0 0 prad 0
0 0 0 prad
 . (26)
In (26) we included all the photons in the universe at time t. Both p(j) and Vˆ have an
effective time dependence owing to the expansion of the universe: p(j) is complementary
to the spatial Einstein coordinate and thus decreases like 1/t (see Section 9), whereas
Vˆ increases like t3 (see Section 6). Hence, although the explicit time dependence of
T radµν (x) is like t
2, its effective time dependence after accounting for the expansion of the
universe is like t−2. Similarly, ρrad and prad have the explicit time dependence t4, but
after the expansion of the universe is taken into account, its effective time dependence
is constant. In analogy to the co-moving coordinates ~˜x introduced in the matter case
(see (22)), we can introduce momenta as observed by a co-moving observer:
~˜p =
t
ts
~p. (27)
This behaviour will be further discussed in Section 9, in which we discuss the two dual
representations in detail. If we integrate ρrad (or −T 0,rad0 ) over all of space, we get the
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sum over all momenta p(j) at time t, multiplied by t/ts; i.e the sum over all co-moving
momenta. As we will see in Section 6 this implies that the radiative contribution to
the total energy is constant over time, unless creation or annihilation events change the
number and/or nature of the participating photons. Hence, this situation is similar to
the matter case where the energy integral is also constant, as long as the state vector
remains the same.
We can obtain hradµν by solving the first order equation (18) with the electro-magnetic
source term. We find:
hradµν (x) = −8piGt2T radµν (x) . (28)
Because of the effective t−2 time dependence of T radµν (x), h
rad
µν (x) behaves effectively like
a constant. Naturally, when solving for hradµν (x) in the Einstein equations, we must
use the explicit t4 dependence of this function. In other words, the decrease of the
radiation density with time caused by the expansion of the universe is countered by the
t4 dependence, arising from the background vacuum metric. The combination of these
two factors is the cause of the constancy of the effective contribution to the total energy.
The effective constancy of the radiation and matter terms also ensures the continued
basic linear expansion of the universe in the presence of matter and radiation, as we
will demonstrate in Section 6. It should be noted that hradµν has a sign opposite to
that of the matter contribution, because of the minus sign in (28). Thus radiation has
a gravitational effect opposite to that of matter. Because light cannot solidify into a
massive astronomical body these effects are hard to measure, but this opposite sign of
the radiation contribution has a distinct effect on the average metric in the universe.
Just as in the case of matter we can evaluate the average value of hµν in the radiative
case. We find:
< hrad00 (x) >= −3ρrad/² . (29)
The two results, Eq.(25) and Eq.(29), have nearly the same form and can be used to
assess the flatness of the universe. As noted above, matter and radiation have opposite
effects on the metric.
6. Energy Balance and the Expansion of the Universe
After the introduction of matter and radiation the total energy of the universe is given
by:
E =
∫
Vˆ
d3x
√
3gˆ(t, ~x) ²+
∫
Vˆ
d3x
√
3gˆ(t, ~x) ρmatter(x) +
∫
Vˆ
d3x
√
3gˆ(t, ~x) ρrad. (30)
Expanding (30) to first order in hµν , we have:
E = ²Vs = ²
t3s
t3
Vˆ (t) + ²
t3s
t3
3
2
∫
Vˆ
d3x
{
h(x) +
1
3
∑
i
hradii
}
+
∑
i
Mi +
t
ts
∑
i
p(i)
= ²
t3s
t3
Vˆ (t) + ²
t3s
t3
3
2
∫
Vˆ
d3x h(x) +
∑
i
Mi +
t
ts
∑
i
p(i)(1− 3
2
) . (31)
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We now extend (10) to the volume in the presence of radiation and matter:
Vˆ (t) =
t3
t3s
Vˆs , (32)
i.e. we assume that the introduction of matter and radiation only requires a change of
the original invariant volume Vs into Vˆs . Using (32) and (27) we can then show that
all terms in (31) are constant for a given state vector, so that Ansatz (32) is consistent.
Therefore, the volume Vˆs is indeed invariant under the basic linear expansion of the
universe, although it adjusts itself whenever the state vector of the universe changes
if particles are created or destroyed. Using the definition (32) and expression (25) for
< h >, we get:
E = ²Vs =
(
²+ ρm + ρrad +
9
4
ρm − 3
2
ρrad
)
Vˆs . (33)
The last two terms originate from the modifications to the metric after the introduction
of matter and radiation. Conveniently, they have the same form as the original matter
and radiation terms, with only the coefficients being different. If, as is usually assumed,
the matter term dominates over the radiation term, then the new invariant volume Vˆs
is smaller than the original invariant volume Vs.
We can now generalize the scale factor in the presence of matter and radiation:
a(t) =
t
ts
(
Vˆ s
Vs
)1/3
=
(
Vˆ (t)
Vs
)1/3
. (34)
Hence, a change in Vˆs also implies a change in the scale factor. So, in addition to
the linear time dependence, there is a further implicit time dependence, which depends
on the evolving state vector of the universe. Whenever a QFT transition takes place,
and the state vector is changed, the volume Vˆs is also adjusted, and, consequently, the
scale factor. Together this leads to an effective time dependence of the scale factor.
Thus, the creation and/or decay of matter and the creation or absorbtion of radiation
in the universe has rather specific consequences for the acceleration or contraction of
the universe over and above the linear expansion. Since the volume Vˆs is determined
by the energy equation (33), the scale factor is no longer determined by the Einstein
equations as in the FRW case, but rather by total energy conservation. This is an
important difference, which allows us to consider local gravitational effects and effects
of the global expansion together, as the scale factor no longer appears in the metric.
The scale factor is now also a truly cosmological property, as it is the same everywhere
in the universe, being defined in terms of integrals over the whole universe. It may be
hard to accept how a transition at a distinct location can influence the scale factor in
our neighbourhood, especially for an infinite universe. However, if we replace individual
transitions by rates and assume that the universe looks the same everywhere on a large
scale (the cosmological principle), then we can view our visible universe as a finite
representation of the whole universe. The additional time dependence
(
Vˆs/Vs
)1/3
then
becomes continuous and represents the acceleration or deceleration of the universe as
a deviation from the basic linear expansion of the universe. Obviously, this continuous
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time dependence does not feature explicitly in the Einstein equations, although the
solution of these equations at a particular time must use the state vector pertaining to
that particular moment.
One could call (33) the co-moving form of the energy balance equation. If we go
back to the original volume using (32), we obtain:
E = ²Vs =
(
t3s
t3
²+
t3s
t3
ρm +
t3s
t3
ρrad +
9
4
t3s
t3
ρm − 3
2
t3s
t3
ρrad
)
Vˆ (t) . (35)
This form clearly illustrates the high densities in the initial universe and the decreasing
densities with time. It is these time-dependent densities which have to be considered in
descriptions of the evolution of the universe and of the hot Big Bang, because they have
to be compared to QFT processes that do not depend on the expansion of the universe
and therefore play different roles in different epochs.
One question is now whether we can determine the contributions of the matter and
radiation components to the energy balance (33). As stated previously, the unperturbed
vacuum energy (i.e. the first term in (33)) has the same density to pressure ratio
(w = −1, [13]) as dark energy, suggesting that this dark energy can be identified with
the unperturbed vacuum energy. Since the ratio w will change if gˆµν differs considerably
from the vacuum metric gµν , the dominance of dark energy and the observed flatness
of the universe suggest that the average matter and radiation densities ρmatter and ρrad
are small compared to the vacuum energy density ². The current estimates of the
matter content of the universe (about 24% including dark matter, [15]) rely heavily
on the energy balance as formulated in the RW framework ([4], [1]). Hence, these
estimates should be re-examined in the context of the current framework and might
actually be much less certain than usually is assumed. Furthermore, the usual estimate
of the radiation content is based on the decrease of this density owing to the expansion
of the universe and the red shift, and does not take account of the metric factor t4,
which completely compensates for this decrease, leading to a constant ρrad. Hence, the
contribution of radiation to the total energy could well be comparable to the matter
density, rather than merely having the tiny value of 5 × 10−5 quoted in the literature
[16]. It should also be noted that the observed decrease of photon momenta with
time, popularly called the red-shift effect, has a rather different interpretation in our
formulation, as we will see in Section 8. We attribute this to the dual nature of the
vacuum universe and to our role as a co-moving observer therein. So one can expect
that this ”red-shift” effect is compensated for in energy expressions and that it will not
lead to a reduction in the contribution of radiation with the passing of time.
In the standard picture the initial universe experienced a radiation-dominated
phase, followed by the current matter-dominated phase. However, in our picture the
contribution of these phases to the energy balance are more or less constant over time,
owing to the influence of the background metric. Hence, both the dominance of radiation
over matter in the early stages, and the dominance of matter over radiation at the present
time must be re-examined in our approach.
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If these densities are indeed of comparable magnitude then many interesting
scenarios for the evolution of the universe become possible. For example, if:
< hrad00 >= −
3
2
< h > , (36)
or in terms of densities
ρrad =
3
4
ρm , (37)
then the average metric becomes proportional to the flat Minkowski metric, even in the
presence of large matter and radiation densities. Since < hrad00 > increases and < h >
decreases in size, whenever matter is converted into radiation, condition (36) cannot be
satisfied at all times, unless the creation and annihilation processes are in equilibrium.
However, the universe may have been close to this point for most of its existence, in
which case (36) would explain why the universe appears so flat, despite containing a
considerable amount of matter. Clearly, further analyses are required to examine these
possibilities.
Using Eq.(24) it is also possible to calculate the approximate energy content of the
visible universe. We find
Evisible = ²× 4pi
3
t3s =
1
2
(
3
8pi
)1/2 1
²1/2G3/2
≈ 5× 1079 GeV. (38)
where we used the value ² = 4.06 × 10−47 GeV4 derived in Section 9. Again, this
emphasizes the important role of the two fundamental dimensionfull constants of Nature,
² and G. This result also allows one to make a rough estimate of the number of massive
particles in the visible universe: about 1079 protons and the same number of electrons.
Other independent estimates of this number will put further constraints on the value of
² or ts.
7. A possible explanation for dark matter
An important cosmological problem is the nature of dark matter. It may be tempting
to consider the mixed vacuum-matter term in (31) as a dark matter term. Firstly, it is
closely related to the matter distribution and is localized near matter concentrations, on
account of the form of h(x). Secondly, its contribution to the total energy is much larger
than that of the original mass term, as is the case for dark matter by comparison with
ordinary matter. However, since the mixed term does not influence the metric in lowest
order (it being rather a consequence of the metric) it could only have gravitational effects
in higher order. Furthermore, the localization of the equivalent ”mass” it represents is
so weak that it cannot explain the distribution of dark matter near galaxies. Finally,
the enhancement factor 9/4 differs considerably from the usual ratio of dark matter to
ordinary baryonic matter (a factor of about 4.8, see [17]).
We will discuss another interesting possible explanation for dark matter. This
explanation is based on certain second-order effects, which are unique to our approach.
Since we have neglected second order effects up to now, this analysis is somewhat
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tenuous. However, it shows encouraging agreement with some observations. As we
see from Eq.(15), and the integral in Eq.(20), the gravitational potential is inversely
proportional to
√
3gˆ(t, ~x) owing to the form of the matter energy-momentum tensor. In
first order we replaced
√
3gˆ by
√
3g. However, in higher order we would need to consider
the corrected metric factor. For a black hole at the center of a galaxy this would
effectively mean that instead of experiencing the gravitational pull of the real mass M ,
one would experience the reduced effect of the apparent mass Mapp at a distance r:
Mapp(r) =
M
3∏
i=1
{1 + hmatterii (x)}1/2
=
M
(1 + 2GM/r)3/2
, r > RBH , (39)
where RBH is the radius of the black hole. At small distances M
app could be much
smaller than M , whereas at large distances the black hole mass would have its normal
effect as the screening becomes negligible. Since this mass does not correspond to any
visible material, it could represent dark matter. Assuming this to be the case, we can
define the dark matter density by subtracting the observed mass near the black hole
from the effective mass distribution:
4pi
∫ r
0
dr′ r′2 ρdm(r′) =
M
(1 + 2GM/r)3/2
−Mapp(RBH) . (40)
Differentiating with respect to r we obtain for small r and large 2GM/r:
ρdm(r) ∼ r−3/2 r > RBH . (41)
Possible support for this picture comes from analyses of dark matter ([18], [19]), which
also indicate a singular behavior of dark matter density in the center of galaxies. For
example, Krauss and Starkmann [18] find that the dark matter density near the centre
behaves like r−3/2, which is exactly in agreement with our explanation. In addition,
thermal models of galaxy densities [19] give a constant core density for normal matter,
so that our effective mass distribution cannot be interpreted as normal matter. At large
distances we obtain:
ρdm(r) ≈ 3
4pi
GM2
r4
r À RBH , (42)
which gives the required localization near existing galaxies.
A possible objection to this explanation is that a current survey [16] only gives a
black hole contribution of 7× 10−5 to the energy content of the universe, although this
number may be surrounded by uncertainties similar to those around other estimates
in the RW framework. If this number is based on the apparent mass of black holes
as measured in the vicinity of these objects, then a huge screening effect is required
to explain the large dark matter component in terms of black holes. However, as (39)
allows such effects, the true mass of the black holes at the center of galaxies may well
be order of magnitudes greater than is currently assumed. This possibility may also
have an important influence on considerations of the evolution of the early universe,
as enormous black holes are usually considered fatal to the development of galaxies.
This need no longer be the case owing to the screening effects suggested in the current
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framework. Clearly, non-perturbative calculations are required to test this dark matter
theory, as large second order corrections would in turn induce important third or even
high-order terms, which could either moderate or enhance the effect observed in second
order.
8. Description of red shift data and other observables
Let us now discuss a number of astronomical observables. Firstly we discuss the Hubble
constant. This quantity is defined as the relative increase of the scale factor with time
[14], which in our formulation reads:
H(t) =
a˙(t)
a(t)
=
1
t
, (43)
where the last transition follows from Eq.(34) if we ignore the time dependence of Vˆs. As
we will see in the following discussion, one actually measures the inverse of the Hubble
constant, because one detemriens the luminosity distance dL. As a co-moving observer
would measure the co-moving distance (ts/t)dL, the Hubble constant measured would
also be rescaled and would equal (t/ts)1/t = 1/ts. This leads to the pleasing result that
the measured Hubble constant is indeed constant, since ts is constant! So this to some
extent justifies the name Hubble constant. Since Eq.(43) shows that the inverse Hubble
constant represents the age of the universe, we find that for a co-moving observer the
age of the universe is constant and equals ts. Unfortunately, this also implies that the
Hubble constant does not provide us with the actual age of the universe in terms of GR
coordinates t = t0. The value t0 is of importance, since it tells us in which epoch we are
living, as it is expressed in the same representation as the elementary particle properties
(for example the particle physics scale tc derived in the Section 10). In Section 9 we
will discuss how one can get information about the value of t0. It should be noted that
the measurement of the Hubble constant gives information on the (constant) vacuum
energy density ², because of the relationship between ² and ts.
The Hubble constant is determined from supernovae measurements. As shown
below the fit to the Cepheid data suggests a value of ts = 13.8×109 years, corresponding
to H0 = 71 km s
−1Mpc−1. Current best estimates by Freedman et al [20] provide the
value H0 = 72±8 km s−1Mpc−1. The identity of H−10 and the age of the universe in our
theory is in good agreement with observations, as most analyses favour values which are
close together for these two quantities. Although decay processes contribute towards an
acceleration of the expansion, we do not expect such changes to upset this agreement.
In matter dominated FRW universes the age of the universe equals 2
3
H−10 , whereas in
radiation dominated FRW universes it equals 1
2
H−10 , both possibilities differing from
the accepted values of H0 and the age of the universe.
The increase in wavelength of photons originating from distant galaxies or
supernovae, as first observed by Hubble, is known as red shift. This name suggests
that the phenomenon is due to the Doppler effect of receding galaxies. However, as
is well-known [14], the correct explanation should be based on the framework of GR.
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Weinberg [14] gives the standard explanation in terms of the RW metric, leading to the
relationship:
z =
λobs − λ1
λ1
=
aRW (t0)
aRW (t1)
− 1, (44)
where the source is characterized by t1 and λ1, the observer being characterized by t0
and the observed wavelength λobs. Although we do not use the RW representation, we
still get the same final result. Our explanation is based on the dual representation of
space-time, with the observer measuring the wave length in terms of co-moving variables
~˜x and ~˜p.
Firstly, the atomic transition giving rise to the emission of the light is defined by
a characteristic wavelength λ or by a characteristic time interval ∆t, which remain
constant over time. The wave length measured by a co-moving observer at the source
is then:
λsource =
ts
t1
λ , (45)
or alternatively by a time interval ts
t1
∆t. Because of the invariance of the interval
ds = ts
t1
∆t, we will measure the same time interval ts
t1
∆t when the photon finally reaches
our equipment. Hence we will also observe the wave length:
λobserved =
ts
t1
λ , (46)
at our current location at time t0. However, if we measure the same transition at our
terrestrial location, we observe the wave length:
λterrestrial =
ts
t0
λ . (47)
Now, in the standard interpretation ([14], p. 417) the wavelength at the source, λ1, is
supposed to be equal to the wavelength currently measured in a terrestrial laboratory,
which we indicate by λterrestrial. So the unknown λ1 in Eq.(44) is replaced by λterrestrial.
Hence, what one really tests in the red shift analysis is an expression involving λterrestrial,
not the unmeasured λ1. Therefore, we introduce the terrestrial wave length directly into
our expression for z. We are then led to the relationship:
z =
λobserved − λterrestrial
λterrestrial
=
ts
t1
λ− ts
t0
λ
ts
t0
λ
=
t0
t1
− 1 = a(t0)
a(t1)
− 1, (48)
in which the last identity is valid if we ignore the time dependence resulting from the
change in Vˆs. As we see, the final relationship is identical to Eq. (44) derived in [14].
Hence, totally different philosophies can still lead to the same result and consequently
to the same agreement with experiment. The relationships Eq.(45) and Eq.(47), which
involve 1/t, seem to suggest that the wavelength decreases rather than increases with
time. However, this conclusion is wrong: because of the expansion of the universe all
lengths such as x and λ are increasing with time (although this increase is not explicit
in the GR equations), and the indicated time dependence in these equations merely
compensates for this increase to make the effective wave length constant over time.
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In deriving the simple expression t0/t1 − 1 in Eq.(48) we have ignored the time
dependence of h00 in the metric. This is justified by the fact that the contributions of
both matter and radiation to h00 are effectively constant. We would only get deviations
from this identity if creation or decay processes substantially affect the time dependence
of h00.
In order to compare our theory with the Cepheid observations we have to express
the luminosity distance in terms of z. We have [14]:
dL =
a2(t0)
a(t1)
d(t0) , (49)
where the distance d(t0) can be expressed in terms of the time of emission and the time
of observation:
d(t0) = c
t0∫
t1
dt
a(t)
. (50)
Using the vacuum metric and eliminating t1 in favour of z, we have:
dL = cH
−1
0 (z + 1)ln(z + 1) = cH
−1
0 z
(
1 +
1
2
z − 1
6
z2 + · · ·
)
. (51)
This corresponds to a deceleration parameter q0 and to a jerk parameter j0 both of which
are zero (see Visser [21] for a definition of these parameters and the corresponding red
shift formula). Since a co-moving observer will measure ts/t0 dL rather than dL itself,
we still have to multiply this expression by the factor ts/t0. The current notation can
be retained if we understand that H−10 → ts/t0 H−10 = ts.
We considered recent Cepheid data for distance moduli [22], which have to be
corrected by −0.27 according to a recent analysis by the same authors [23]. The best
fit for the vacuum solution is obtained for the value of H0 = 71 km s
−1 Mpc−1,
which corresponds to a measured lifetime of ts = 13.8 billion years. This agrees
well with a recent WMAP analysis by Hinshaw et al. [24], who state that: H0 =
70.5±1.3 km s−1 Mpc−1. In Fig. 1 we show a comparison between the observations and
our vacuum solution result, together with some additional fits. The ratio H0 dL/z is
displayed, rather than dL itself, so as not to obscure the deviations between experiment
and theory at small values of z. The vacuum result fits the data very well. In order to put
this result in perspective, we have also fitted various power expansions of the expression
in brackets in the right-hand-side of Eq. (51). These will allow us to determine the values
for q0 and j0 preferred by the data and give an indication of the uncertainty in these
parameters. The linear fit gives q0 = .038, which is close to the value of zero obtained
in the vacuum solution. The quadratic fit yields q0 = −.63 and j0 = 1.26. The Hubble
parameters for the linear and quadratic fit are 73.0 and 75.9 km s−1Mpc−1, respectively,
both falling outside the range given by Hinshaw et al. [24]. The corresponding ages are
13.4 and 12.9 billion years. We see that the parameters obtained depend quite strongly
on the nature of the fit, casting some doubt on the strength of evidence for a pronounced
acceleration (q0 < 0) in the current universe. As stated above, our model with a linear
expansion already fits the data very well.
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Figure 1. Comparison between Supernovae data ([22], [23]) and various theoretical
descriptions. Plotted are the distance moduli multiplied by H0 (as determined from
our model) and divided by z as a function of the red shift z. Some of the data errors
are shown to illustrate the quality of the data and the fit.
It can be expected that supernovae data at higher values of z will put stronger
constraints on these parameters. The negative q0 in the quadratic fit suggests that
the universe is currently accelerating, whereas the positive jerk parameter suggests that
there might have been a deceleration in the past. This agrees with the detailed statistical
analysis carried out in Refs. ([22], [23]). Clearly, the present theory can explain the
average expansion (linear). Within this theory it is natural to explain a possible current
acceleration by means of the presence of decay processes. The standard decay process
is radiation, as this process transforms matter into radiation. Other - more speculative
- decay processes are possible as well. The decay of WIMP like particles in dark matter
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would contribute towards acceleration. Also, the annihilation of particles by black holes
would be a possible source of acceleration. However, deviations from the linear expansion
may also be attributed to the change in h00 over time, as noted previously. Hence, a
more detailed theoretical analysis is required, in which the role of decay processes in
the current universe is elucidated. Higher order consequences of the abandonment of
the RW formulation on the red-shift formula also have to be examined. In any case, it
is clear that accurate supernovae data will yield strong constraints on the theoretical
description.
Another important issue in cosmology is the horizon problem. The horizon is
defined as the distance a photon traveled since the Big Bang to a particular point in
time [2]. Obviously, this is infinite for the expression (50), as t1 = 0. Since we only
expect virtual photons to exist a finite time after the Big Bang (see Section 10), the
physical horizon is not infinite. However, it is still true that in our description the horizon
is much larger than in the typical FRW models, where the lower limit in the integral
(50) vanishes. Hence there does not appear to be a horizon problem in our approach.
This eliminates the main reason for the introduction of the inflationary hypothesis,
although we predict an inflationary phase naturally in our approach, when particles and
antiparticles were annihilated soon after they were created (see again Section 10).
9. The role of co-moving coordinates and the dual representation of
space-time
As we have seen in previous sections, co-moving observers measure physical quantities in
terms of the coordinates ~˜x and ~˜p. These coordinates are invariant under the expansion
of the universe (naturally they still function as variables in regard to local physical
processes), and make it hard to measure this universal expansion directly. For example,
the gravitational potential given in Eq.(20) remains constant in spite of the expansion
of the universe, if it is expressed in terms of co-moving coordinates ~˜x. We only measure
the expansion indirectly via the red shift observations discussed in the previous section.
These features appear to be especially simple for - and perhaps unique to - the vacuum
metric, on account of the linear nature of the transformations.
The local co-moving representation is concisely given by:
~˜x =
ts
t0
~x, (52)
t˜ =
ts
t0
t , (53)
while the conjugate relationships for the momentum reads:
~˜p =
t0
ts
~p, (54)
E˜ =
t0
ts
E . (55)
So far we have avoided the use of the symbol E˜ for the co-moving energy. The energy
E used in previous equations (e.g. in Section 6) can be identified with the co-moving
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energy if we use the co-variant metric
√−g, rather than 3g, in the relevant energy
integrals. In that case we have to multiply the resulting expression by the factor t0/ts
(or by the global factor t/ts) in order to obtain the standard result, called E in Section
6. We will not discuss the implications of this modification further. Eq.(53) is a local
representation of the global relationship τ = ts ln(t/ts), which was already mentioned
in Eq.(7). We can also replace t0 by t in Eqs.(52, 54 and 55) to make the equations
more global. However, for a local co-moving observer, the given equations are the
relevant ones, since they simply amount to a rescaling of the original coordinates. This
local representation is also natural in the context of the Einstein equations, since the
(temporary) replacement of t by t0 ensures that the time-dependence of ~x, t and p is
not explicit in the Einstein equations.
Under the transformation Eqs.(52 and 53) the metric expression Eq.(5) near t0
reads:
ds2 = −dt˜2 + dx˜2 + dy˜2 + dz˜2. (56)
It is natural that an observer would use a locally flat metric to carry out his observations,
which explains the important role of this co-moving representation in measurements.
The importance of such transformed variables in cosmology had already been recognized
very early on in the development of cosmology. Milne [25] introduced dual variables in
1937, although he did not base himself on a universe with a finite vacuum energy density,
so that he did not have a natural time scale ts. It would be of interest to study the
analogies further, although Milne did not use a relativistic formulation in his analysis.
As stated in the Section 8, one of the results of our particular measuring process
is that the measured Hubble constant equals (t/ts)1/t = 1/ts. Given the value of the
Hubble constant derived in the previous section from supernovae data, we find that the
vacuum energy density acquires the value ² = 3/8piGt2s = 4.06 × 10−47 GeV4. This is
the value used in previous sections of this paper, e.g. in Eq.(38). This value is very
close to the one given by Weinberg ([14], p. 476): 10−29g/cm3, which corresponds to
4.31×10−47 GeV4. Actually, the value quoted by Weinberg represents the critical energy
density of the universe, which must be close to the actual energy density for a universe
that is flat (observations have shown that the geometry of the universe is very close
to being spatially flat [1], [9]). Hence, this critical density should coincide with the
vacuum energy density in a universe dominated by vacuum energy. In our theory there
is nothing critical or accidental about the value of ², as slightly larger or smaller values
would describe the universe equally well. Hence, this is another puzzle (why the critical
and actual energy density are so close at this very moment) that is solved by the current
theory. Carroll gives the rough estimate 10−8erg/cm3 ([2], Eq. (8.162)), corresponding
to 5× 10−47 GeV4, which is also consistent with the current estimate.
The constancy of the age of the universe ts also indicates that an observer could
never reach the beginning of time by moving backward in time (apart from the practical
aspect that the Big Bang defines a direction in time which allows us only to ”move”
forward). This property also is evident if we use the global transformation variable τ
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defined in Eq.(7): τ = ts ln(t/ts). This suggests that t = 0 refers to the infinite past.
As the co-moving variables Eqs.(52, 53, 54 and 55) are essential for our
measurements, the question can now be asked whether the magnitude of the original
variables, as represented by our current time t0, plays any (absolute) role. For example,
in the red shift discussion, only the relative quantity t1/t0 played a role in the definition
of z. However, in Section 10 we will see that different epochs in the evolution of the
universe can be distinguished despite the ”relativity” of the concept of time. Since
properties of particles are expressed in the original time units, as they are independent
of the expansion of the universe, the particle scale represents an independent way of
measuring time. As a consequence, there are ways of inferring t0, provided our particle
models are sufficiently accurate. Since the currently accepted elementary particle models
do not predict the masses of quarks and leptons, and in particular do not relate them to
G and ², we are a long way away from the situation that t0 can be determined accurately.
Nonetheless we will argue in Section 10 that t0 is of the same order of magnitude as ts.
In other words: our current epoch is characterized approximately by the time scale ts
of the vacuum universe.
10. Evolution and Development of a Vacuum Dominated Universe
It is common to consider the first moments after the Big Bang as a period of extreme
complexity, during which particles are compressed into an extremely small space and
carry enormous kinetic energy. This scenario is sketched in many articles and popular
books, e.g. in a recent book by Martin Rees [27]. It also leads to the idea, often heard
these days, that the LHC experiment at CERN will reproduce the early moments of the
Big Bang [28]. Such a densely populated state of the early universe requires a reliable
unified theory of QFT and GR. Since that does not (yet) exist, a reliable picture of this
initial epoch is lacking. Our solution to the GR equations suggests another scenario.
The singularity in the classical vacuum metric implies that the universe started out in
the simple ”classical” vacuum state. The initial density of the universe was so high and
the distance scale so small that physical fermions, which we expect to have a finite -
although extremely small - size, could not form. The creation of real photons, which
is linked to the fermionic processes by the standard model Lagrangian, was likewise
suppressed. Under these circumstances, the quantum fluctuations in the early universe
do not lead to the creation of any physical particles and thus leave the vacuum state
vector of the universe unaffected, as this state will only change once physical particles
have been formed. As a consequence, in this early epoch the state vector of the universe
equals the vacuum state and displays perfect homogeneity and zero entropy. The energy
of this state is given by ² Vs, which at the same time represents the total energy of the
universe at all times and the permanent entry in the right-hand side of Eq. (33).
After the Big Bang the density decreases according to the formula ²t3s/t
3 until the
first particle epoch arrives when the energy density has diminished to such an extent
that it matches the energy density of physical (as opposed to bare or virtual) quarks
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and leptons. The size of strings in the string model is of the order of the Planck
length G1/2. Similarly, we expect the volume of finite elementary particles (which in
our theory are spherical finite objects) to be O(G3/2), with a corresponding energy
density of O(G−2). Our theory of isolated elementary particles is based on non-linear
self-consistent solutions of the field equations of QFT. We intend to publish this work in
the near future. However, for now we just use the hypothesis that the physical particles
are characterized by the Planck length. The creation of particles out of the vacuum
is likely to require a matching of the energy density of the vacuum universe and the
particle energy density. This occurs at a time tc given by:
²
√
3g(tc) = ²
t3s
t3c
= G−2, (57)
leading to:
tc =
(
G
²
)1/6 ( 3
8pi
)1/2
≈ 5× 10−24sec = (125MeV)−1 . (58)
In Eq. (58) we ignored the modification of the metric due to the presence of the created
matter. From Eq.(25) we see that h(x) will rapidly increase with the creation of particles,
in particular as the volume Vˆs will decrease to compensate for the energy increase
resulting from particle formation and from the fact that physical particles now consume
space. Hence, this will extend the creation epoch beyond tc, as we will still satisfy
Eq.(57) for some time after tc, if we replace
3g by 3gˆ and tc by tˆc, where tˆc > tc. Since
the large size of h(x) invalidates perturbative calculations, a more extensive theoretical
investigation is required to describe the later stages of this epoch in detail. Dimensional
considerations indicate that the initial constraints on particle creation have a spatial
nature, so that during this epoch available space must be divided homogeneously, thus,
providing a possible explanation for the homogeneous nature of our universe. This initial
epoch has both developmental and evolutionary aspects to it. The evolutionary label is
best reserved for processes with a degree of randomness (where and when the particles
are created). The quantum fluctuations responsible for these aspects are discussed later
in this section. The developmental aspects cover the fact that the universe expands
(develops) linearly with time and that the states into which it can develop are fixed by
QFT and GR together.
Eq.(58) illustrates how the particle physics scale can arise from the two fundamental
dimensionfull constants of Nature, ² and G, and gives credence to our expectation that a
truly fundamental understanding of elementary particles requires consideration of GR.
Since the equations of motion in QFT do not contain any fundamental dimensional
constants, it is not unexpected that the particle physics scale in QFT only emerges
when QFT is unified with GR. As part of our model of particle creation, we also suggest
that a creation process in QFT mimicks the creation process of particles at the tc epoch
after the Big Bang. Such a mechanism is required in our theory of isolated elementary
particles in order to stabilize the solution. The distortion of space resulting from the
formation of a physical particle of Planck size must counter the collapse of the dressed
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particle to a singular point. This is roughly opposite to the situation of a black hole,
where the metric induces rather than prevents the collapse. The creation terminates
at the time tc and thereby explains the typical creation time of elementary particles.
The annihilation of a particle is the reverse process, again characterized by the same
time tc. Although many aspects of our particle theory are still under development, the
possibility of being able to explain the nature of particles and to give an explanation of
their masses and of their creation and annihilation properties is a very exciting prospect,
indeed.
If these notions are confirmed after further development, we see a phenomenon in
elementary particle physics that reminds us of a mechanism known in biology, namely
that the development of a current entity recapitulates a (series of) historical process(es).
In biology these processes are called ontogeny (the development of an organism) and
phylogeny (ancestor-dependent relationships in a group) and the biogenetic law to which
we refer states that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Haeckel [29]). In the physics
analogy the historical process would be the creation of particles from the vacuum at the
appropriate epoch tc, whereas the current process of creation repeats this process as part
of the full process of particle creation. The epoch at tc is associated with an increase in
entropy and is irreversible, whereas the current physical process of particle creation does
not increase entropy and is reversible (annihilation is the reverse process). Of course,
the analogy with biology is to a large extent symbolic, still apart from the fact that
Haeckel’s law itself has a very limited range of validity in biology and has been severely
criticized [30]. Nonetheless it is gratifying that Nature finds ways of expressing similar
mechanisms under very different circumstances. To emphasize the limitations of this
principle, we note that the annihilation of particles does not have a corresponding epoch
in the development of the universe, unless the universe were to die in a big crunch in
which particles are converted back into vacuum energy. This would require the decrease
of entropy in order to return to a state of zero entropy and would violate thermodynamic
laws.
It should be noted that the derivation of the particle physics scale only is only
valid for our particular vacuum metric, confirming again the unique role of the current
vacuum solution. The result is also contingent on physical elementary particles being
three dimensional (spherical) objects, and therefore cannot be derived in the common
form of string theory. Within our picture the creation epoch starts much later than the
Planck time, which is often considered to be the critical time period for events near the
Big Bang. In this way we have avoided the difficult question of the unification of GR
and QFT at the Planck scale, although this question returns in a more controlled form
in the treatment of elementary particles of size G1/2 and energy density G−2. It should
also be noted that the particle physics scale (ts/t0)× tc, rather than tc, is measured at
present. An accurate model of particle properties will therefore give information on the
ratio ts/t0, and thus on t0. Since tc is of the order of the (currently) measured particle
scale, we conclude that t0 is currently of the same order of magnitude as ts. Hence, we
are living in a time and age t0 characterized by the typical cosmological time unit ts.
EDU 2008 p127
The role of energy conservation and vacuum energy in the evolution of the universe 25
Naturally this is a rather qualitative statement as there is a large difference between
the hadronic and the leptonic scale, making the definition of the particle physics scale
rather uncertain. If we go back to the time t = tc when the first particles were created,
then the measured age of the universe would still be ts. However, the measured particle
properties would be characterized by an interaction time (ts/tc) × tc = ts, which is
comparable to the age of the universe. Hence, the changing factor ts/t0 ensures that the
universe proceeds through different physical epochs.
Since the first creation process of physical particles takes place in a homogenous
vacuum universe, we would expect the created particles to be distributed homogenously,
disturbed only slightly by the quantum fluctuations and randomness of the quantum
processes that created them. It is only through these random processes that we can
break the initial perfect symmetry and form increasingly complex and diverse structures,
allowing an increase in the value of the entropy. Such a creation of entropy is discussed
elsewhere in the literature [26]. Initially the linear expansion of space will be halted -
or even reversed - when the creation of particles increases the mass terms in the energy
balance, an energy increase which has to be matched by a corresponding decrease in
the total vacuum energy, i.e. a decrease in Vˆs. However, after the initial creation of
particles and anti-particles, we would expect an inflationary period, when most of the
particle-anti-particle pairs annihilate. These processes destroy most of the initial mass
energy and the induced matter-vacuum energy, leaving only a small residue of ”particles”
and converting some of the energy into radiation and its associated negative mixed
radiation-vacuum energy. To compensate for this energy loss the universe would have
to expand very rapidly in a short time (an inflationary phase). Clearly, this inflationary
period has an origin and nature quite different from that considered in currently popular
inflationary scenarios. A phase of extremely quick inflation does not seem to be required
in the current theory to explain the uniformity of the temperature distribution in the
universe, as the infinite horizon in our description allows particles to interact over much
larger distances than in the standard picture.
Since the current universe contains only a relatively small percentage of matter,
we would expect that after these violent processes have been essentially completed,
the universe would return to a state in which the vacuum energy dominates and the
expansion is dominated by the linear trend. However, the effective density will still be
huge initially, because of the factor t3s/t
3, as we saw in (35). Hence, we expect that the
usual hot Big Bang phase, which is responsible for primordial nucleosynthesis, can be
derived in the usual way, although further study is required to confirm this in detail.
There are other characteristic epochs in the evolution of the universe which can be
characterized in terms of G and ². For example the epoch that the vacuum energy
equals the particle physics scale is characterized by:
²
√
3g(tN) = ²
t3s
t3N
= t−4c , (59)
leading to a time tN = ²
−7/18G−5/18 ≈ 8 hrs.
EDU 2008 p128
The role of energy conservation and vacuum energy in the evolution of the universe 26
Finally we discuss the observation of early galaxies. In FRW calculations one
usually employs a t2/3 expansion for the early universe. Using this type of time scale,
Bouwens et al [31] conclude from certain Hubble observations that the first galaxies
were formed about 900 Myr after the Big Bang. Similar conclusions were reached by
a Japanese group [32], which found early galaxies dating from 750 Myr after the Big
Bang. By demanding that these events take place with the same value of z as they
do in the analysis by these authors, we find that in our theory the formation of the
early galaxies would take place 1.9 and 1.7 billion years respectively after the Big Bang.
Although the creation and annihilation events in the early universe might modify these
estimates slightly, the net result is that the early galaxies were formed much later than
claimed by the authors above, reducing the mystery of the early formation of galaxies.
11. Summary and Concluding Remarks
We have solved the standard equations of general relativity for the vacuum with a
”classical” vacuum energy density. We have shown that this leads to a Big Bang
solution with an associated linear expansion of the universe, even after the introduction
of matter and radiation. The contributions of matter and radiation to the total energy
and the distortions of the metric are effectively constant under this linear expansion.
Deviations from this basic behaviour, which is controlled by total energy conservation,
can appear through creation and annihilation processes. This model can explain many
crucial observations of the universe without the need to introduce new variants of
the basic theory of general relativity or extensions beyond the Standard Model. In
particular the cosmological constant problem and the horizon problem are absent in
this approach. The evolution of this universe proceeds from a classical beginning with
perfect spatial symmetry and zero entropy to a diverse and complex future thanks to
quantum fluctuations. Although, various details of this picture still have to be worked
out, the initial results are very promising.
The abandonment of the RW formalism necessitates a reassessment of various
properties of the universe, such as its matter and radiation content. Improved
supernovae data will impose strong constraints on the current model and on the nature
and intensity of the decay processes in the universe (mainly radiative processes), as in
our theory, the latter are seen as the cause of the current acceleration of the expansion of
the universe. The explanation we suggest for the observation of ”dark matter” should
also be studied further, since it will be affected by higher order effects that are not
considered in this paper.
Acknowledgments
I thank Zaid Kimmie for the discussion of statistical aspects of the supernovae data and
help in preparing the manuscript.
EDU 2008 p129
The role of energy conservation and vacuum energy in the evolution of the universe 27
References
[1] Copeland E J et al , 2006 Preprint hep-th/0603057
[2] Carroll S, 2004 Spacetime and Geometry, Addison Wesley, New York
[3] Weinberg S, 1989 Rev. Mod. Phys. 61, 1
[4] Carroll S M, 2001 Liv. Rev. Rel. 4, 1
[5] Carroll S, Press W H and Turner E L, 1992 Annu. Rev. Astron. Astrophys. 30, 499
[6] Casimir H B G, 1948 Kon. Ned. Akad. Wetensch. Proc. 51, 793
[7] Jaffe R L, 2005 Phys. Rev. D72, 021301(R)
[8] Gasser J, Leutwyler H, 1982 Phys. Rep. 87, 77-169
[9] Spergel D N et al , 2003 ApJS 148, 175
[10] McVittie G C, 1965 General Relativity and Cosmology, Chapman and Hall
[11] Padmanabhan T, 2003 Physics Reports 380, 235-320
[12] McCrea W H, 1951 Proc. Roy. Soc. A206, 562-575
[13] Astier Pet al , 2006 Astronomy Astrophysics 447, 31
[14] Weinberg S, 1972 Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Application of the general theory of
relativity, John Wiley, New York
[15] Allen S W et al , 2004 Mon. Not. R. Astron. Soc. 353, 457
[16] Fukugita M and Peebles P J E, 2004 ApJ 616, 643
[17] Spergel D N et al , 2006 Preprint astro-ph/0603449 v1
[18] Krauss L M and Starkman G D, 2007 Preprint astro-ph/0702333v1
[19] Navarro J F, Frenk C S and White S D M, 1996 ApJ 462, 563
[20] Freedman W L et al , 2001 ApJ 553, 47
[21] Visser M, 2003 Preprint gr-qc/0309109 v4
[22] Riess A G et al , 2004 ApJ 607, 665
[23] Riess A G et al , 2005 ApJ 627, 579
[24] Hinshaw G et al , 2008 Preprint astro-ph/0803.0732
[25] Milne E A, 1937 Proc. Roy. Soc. A158, 324-348
[26] Prigogine I and Geheniau J, 1986 Proc. Nati. Acad. Sci. 83, 6245
[27] Rees M, 2002 Our Cosmic Habitat, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London
[28] Ledermann L, 2008 What we’ll find inside the atom, Newsweek, September 15, 39-44
[29] Haeckel E, 1992 The Riddle of the Universe Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, ISBN 0-87975-746-9
[30] Gould S J, 1985 Phylogeny and Ontogeny Harvard University Press
[31] Bouwens R J et al , 2006 Nature 443, 189
[32] Iye M et al , 2006 Nature 443, 186.
EDU 2008 p130
Anthropomorphic Quantum Darwinism
as an explanation for Classicality.
Thomas Durt1
Abstract: According to Zurek, the emergence of a classical world from a quantum
substrate could result from a long selection process that privileges the classical
bases according to a principle of optimal information. We investigate the conse-
quences of this principle in a simple case, when the system and the environment
are two interacting scalar particles supposedly in a pure state. We show that
then the classical regime corresponds to a situation for which the entanglement
between the particles (the system and the environment) disappears. We describe
in which circumstances this factorisability condition is fulfilled, in the case that
the particles interact via position-dependent potentials, and also describe in ap-
pendix the tools necessary for understanding our results (entanglement, Bell
inequalities and so on).
Introduction.
Presently, it is still an open question to know whether quantum mechanics is
necessary in order to describe the way that our brain functions2.
Nevertheless, quantum mechanics is astonishingly adequate if we want to de-
scribe the material world in which we live. It is therefore natural to assume
that the way we think has something to do with quantum mechanics. After all,
if our worldview faithfully reflects the external world, it ought to reflect also its
internal properties at the deepest level! For this reason, it is really interesting
and important to reconsider epistemological questions in the light of the most
recent conceptual developments of the quantum theory. A key concept in these
issues is the so-called quantum entanglement.
The term entanglement was first introduced by Schro¨dinger who described this
as the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, “the one that enforces its
entire departure from classical lines of thought” [2]. Bell’s inequalities [3] show
that when two systems are prepared in an entangled state, the knowledge of the
whole cannot be reduced to the knowledge of the parts, and that to some extent
the systems lose their individuality. It is only when systems are not entangled
1TONA Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium. email: thom-
durt@vub.ac.be
2It is even an open question to know whether the non-classical aspects of quantum me-
chanics play a fundamental role in biological processes at all. It is for instance an open
question to know whether or not quantum coherence must be invoked in order to explain
intra-cellular processes. Nothing illustrates better the present situation than this quote of
Eisert and Wiseman[1]: ”When you have excluded the trivial, whatever remains, however
improbable, must be a good topic for a debate”...
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that they behave as separable systems3. So, entanglement reintroduces holism
and interdependence at a fundamental level4 and raises the following question:
is it legitimate to believe in the Cartesian paradigm (the description of the whole
reduces to the description of its parts), when we know that the overwhelming
majority of quantum systems are entangled?
In order to tackle similar questions, that are related to the so-called measure-
ment problem [6], Zurek and coworkers developed in the framework of the de-
coherence approach [7] the idea that maybe, if the world looks5 classical, this is
because during the evolution, decoherence selected in the external (supposedly
quantum) world the islands of stability that correspond to the minimal quantum
(Shannon-von Neumann) entropy [8, 9].
In the present paper, we go a step further and make the hypothesis that these
classical islands (environment induced or EIN superselected [10]) would corre-
spond to the structures that our brain naturally recognizes and identifies, and
this would explain why the way we think is classical.
In the first section we make precise in which aspects our approach coincides with
and departs from the standard decoherence and Quantum Darwinist approaches
and what is our motivation.
In the second section and in appendix, we explain the meaning of relevant
concepts such as quantum entanglement, quantum bits, quantum non-locality
and separability as well as Shannon-von Neumann entropy. We also present
a theorem that establishes that entanglement is the corollary of interaction
(section2.2) in the sense that when two systems interact, they get entangled in
general. The classical situation for which no entanglement is generated during
the interaction is thus exceptional.
In the third section we describe in more detail the environment induced (EIN)
superselection rules approach and we apply it to the simple situation during
which two quantum particles interact through a position-dependent potential,
in the non-relativistic regime. We study then the classical islands that, according
to the EIN selection rule, minimise the entropy of the reduced system, which
means that they correspond to maximally deterministic (minimal uncertainty)
states. They correspond to the classical, entanglement-free interaction regime.
3It can be shown that whenever two distant systems are in an entangled (pure) state,
there exist well-chosen observables such that the associated correlations do not admit a local
realist explanation, which is revealed by the violation of well-chosen Bell’s inequalities [4]. In
appendix (section 5.4) we treat an example in depth and explictly derive Bell’s inequalities
that are violated in that special case.
4Holism is a rather vague concept that possesses several definitions, often mutually ex-
clusive [5]. Here we mean that the quantum theory is holistic in the sense there can be a
relevant difference in the whole without a difference in the parts. We provide in section 5.3 an
illustration of this property: the Bell states are different bipartite states for which the reduced
local states (sections 5.5 and 5.6) are the same. In this approach, entanglement, non-locality
and non-separability are manifestations of holism and Quantum Weirdness, to be opposed in
our view to the classical, Cartesian non-holistic approach in which the knowledge of the whole
reduces to the knowledge of the parts.
5The goal of the decoherence approach is to reconcile the first principles of the quantum
theory, in particular the linearity of the quantum temporal evolution law with an objective
description of the world. In the present context, when we write the world looks classical it
means implicitly that we do not need an observer to let it look classical. As we explain in
section 1, our approach is slightly different: we want to show that the world looks classical
because our eyes are blind to Quantum Weirdness.
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We show that the classical islands are in one to one correspondence with the
three classical paradigms elaborated by physicists before quantum mechanics
existed; these are the droplet or diluted particle model, the test-particle and
the material point approximations (section 3.2).
The results presented in section 3 illustrate to which extent entanglement marks
the departure from our classical preconceptions about the world, in agreement
with Schro¨dinger’s view [2] according to which entanglement is the characteristic
trait of quantum mechanics that enforces its entire departure from classical lines
of thought.
They can be considered as a plausibility argument in favor of our main thesis
according to which we are blind to Quantum Weirdness as a consequence of a
long process of natural selection.
1 About the measurement problem and Quan-
tum Darwinism.
The measurement problem is related to the so-called objectification problem
that in turn is intimately related to the Schro¨dinger cat paradox and, roughly,
could be formulated as follows. Let us assume that we prepare two superposi-
tions of macroscopically distinguishible quantum states (say a living cat state
and a dead cat state). According to the quantum theory, whenever we perform
a measurement that aims at revealing whether the cat is living or dead, one
alternative is realized and the other one is discarded. Besides, if the state of
the system obeys a unitary evolution law (like Schro¨dinger’s equation) both al-
ternatives survive and the system will remain in a superposition state. What
is shown in the decoherence approach is that in good approximation the su-
perposition becomes decoherent due to the interaction with the environment.
What the decoherence approach doesn’t prove is that one alternative is privi-
leged6. In order to show this, some extra-assumptions are required, for instance
that the position is privileged (like in Bohm-de Broglie’s interpretation) or that
many worlds are present (here the world with a living cat and the world with
a dead cat). In the Quantum Darwinist approach (developed in section 3.1), it
is assumed that somehow the objectification process will take place, and that it
6Roland Omne`s for instance who is an active propagandist of the consistent history ap-
proach in which decoherence plays a central role, introduced in one of his books [11] the Rule
5: Physical reality is unique. It evolves in time in such a way that, when actual facts arise
from identical antecedents, they occur randomly and their probabilities are those given by the
theory. In other words, Omne`s must postulate that Reality exists; this is because he realized
that the decoherence approach did not solve the measurement problem; in particular it could
not solve the objectification puzzle so to say: if all alternative quantum possibilities, in a
Schro¨dinger cat like experiment, do survive (with or without coherence that is not the point),
then how is it possible that one of them is privileged and realized (actualized) in particular? In
his review of Omne`s’s book, W. Faris [12] wrote about Rule 5...This statement by itself does
not give a clear picture of the mathematical formulation of actualization. The intent may be
that the notion of fact is external to the theory, so that the rule of actualization is merely
a license to use consistent logic to reason from present brute experience. This is supported
by the assertion: The existence of actual facts can be added to the theory from outside as a
supplementary condition issued from empirical observation. A dead cockroach is a fact; there
is no more to it. This is a long way from the ambitious goal of basing everything on Hilbert
space...
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will occur in a privileged basis, the basis that diagonalizes the reduced density
matrix of the system constituted by the quantum system under interest and the
measuring apparatus. For instance if the murder of the cat is triggered by the
measurement of a quantum two level system, the system under interest is this
two level system, and the cat can be considered as a macroscopic amplifier or
measuring apparatus.
Not every physicists is convinced (this is an euphemism) by Zurek’s arguments
[13], but Quantum Darwinism offers stimulating analogies with the biological
world and with the Darwinian picture of the process of evolution. It are these
features of Quantum Darwinism that stimulated the present work (more pre-
cisely, we were strongly stimulated by the postulated existence of a selection
process that would ultimately lead to the selection of a preferred basis).
Another analogy between biological Darwinism and Quantum Darwinism is that
in the latter the choice of the preferred basis is supposed to obey a principle of
optimisation (similarly, in Darwin’s approach, only the fittest species survive).
At the same time many copies/duplicates of the preferred basis are supposed
to be disseminated throughout the environment which is reminiscent of the
reproduction mechanism of the surviving species.
According to us, Quantum Darwinism contains, like the many world or the
Bohm-de Broglie interpretation a hidden extra-principle that goes beyond the
standard principles of quantum mechanics, which is the Environment Induced
Selection rule (see also section 3.1). This rule tells us that the preferred basis
is related to islands of classicality (section 3.1) that minimise the Shannon-von
Neumann entropy (in other words they minimise uncertainty, section 5.6) of the
reduced state of the system constituted by the quantum system under interest
and the measuring apparatus. We do not believe that this argument is very
conclusive for the following reason:
-the Shannon-von Neumann entropy is related to the distribution of the prob-
ability of occurence of events in the eigen-basis of the reduced state (density
matrix),
-but it does not make sense to talk about objective events and of their proba-
bilitites as far as the measurement problem is not solved7,
-so that, in our view, in the Quantum Darwinist approach, one takes for granted
from the beginning, in a subtle and implicit way, what one wants to prove at
the end (the emergence of objective facts).
In other words, we consider that in last resort the concept of entropy implicitly
refers to an observer although the goal of the Quantum Darwinist approach
is precisely to get rid of the dichotomy observed-observer, so that in our view
the quantum measurement paradox is solved only at the price of introducing a
logical loophole (circularity) somewhere in the reasoning.
It is not our goal to pursue in this direction: we have actually no clear idea about
what is the right interpretation of quantum mechanics (if at least there exists
such a thing, see e.g. the reference [13] where the consistency of the decoherence
approach is scrutinized and criticized in depth...). Nevertheless we shall exploit
7All the interpretational problems of the quantum theory arise because the quantum theory
is a probabilistic theory.
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the idea according to which the preferred basis obeys an optimality principle: as
has been succesfully shown by Zurek, classical islands are related to preferred
bases (section 3.1) in which the gathered information is reproducible, stable,
maximally deterministic and insensitive to the disturbances of the environment.
Our next step is to seriously consider the hypothesis that humans (and pos-
sibly all sufficiently evolved living organisms, like cats for instance) select the
preferred basis according to the Environment Induced Selection rule (section
3.1) because it is the most advantageous strategy in terms of the amount of
stable and useful information that can be extracted from correlations, (the last
idea is present in the Quantum Darwinist approach, the first one is a personal
hypothesis).
At this point one should be very careful, we do not pretend in any way that the
consciousness of the observer plays a role in the collapse process or anything like
that8. No, our goal is rather to explain why our logic is classical although the
logic of the quantum world is obviously non-classical. In other words we address
the question to know why our representation of the world is classical although
we live in a quantum world. Considered from this perspective, our answer
is that maybe throughout eons of evolution, our ancestors (and their cousins,
the ancestors of monkeys, cats, fishes and so on) became gradually blind to
quantum interferences and quantum entanglement, because their manifestations
(the associated correlations) were not useful from an informational point of view.
Our approach does not aim at solving the measurement problem (one still must
postulate the existence of correlations, thus of probabilities between physical
”objective” events, the existence of which is at the core of the measurement
problem). Nevertheless, the novelty of our approach is to postulate that our
sensorial system privileges data that are gathered in the preferred basis. So,
what we retain from the Quantum Darwinist approach is that a preferred basis
”exists”, that it is the basis in which we measure the external world, and that
this basis obeys an optimality principle that results from a (biological in this
case) selection mechanism: the fittest is the best-informed, a reality that prevails
in today’s jungle, maybe more than ever.
In the section 3, we show that in a sense Quantum Weirdness is the rule, because
entanglement, one of the most striking illustrations of Quantum Weirdness, can
be considered to be the corollary of interaction. In simplified terms we can say
that there is in general no interaction without creating entanglement.
Now classical islands precisely correspond to the exceptional situations for which
entanglement is negligibly small. This brings us to the section 4 where we can
find the main novel contribution of the paper. In that section we aim at estab-
lishing the identity between classical islands and our cognitive representation of
8In agreement with Zurek, we do not believe that it is necessary to invoke consciousness in
order to solve the measurement problem so to say to explain how objective, actual facts emerge
from the quantum substrate. As we said before, we do not claim to solve the measurement
problem in our approach. Our thesis is that we select preferentially classical correlations and
that we are blind to Quantum Weirdness, which does never ever mean that consciousness is a
quantum phenomenon or that we need consciousness in order to collapse the wave function.
The correlations that we are talking about are correlations between events, clicks in detectors,
reactions of sensors. Before correlations are treated by our nervous sytem, it is very likely
that the decoherence process is achieved and that the effective collapse of the wave function
already took place.
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what elementary particles are. More precisely we study the regimes in which two
particles interact (by a potential that depends solely on their distance) without
getting entangled. These ”entangled-free” regimes are in one to one correspon-
dence with the classical islands. We show that they also correspond to the
models introduced by classical physicists before the advent of quantum physics
in order to represent elementary particles such as the electron. This observa-
tion is more a plausibility argument than a definitive proof. But it is our main
argument in the favor of our personal interpretation of Quantum Darwinism.
Metaphorically, our interpretation is that our ears are deaf to the quantum
music because it would sound like a cacophony. Similarly we are blind to weird
quantum optical effects because they would be like a very bad quality mirage to
us (no stability, no reproducibility, no useful correlations to exploit). After all,
what we see is for instance not really what the detectors in our eyes perceive,
there is still a huge work of data processing that occurs in the brain (in the case
of vision, the corresponding hardware is not a negligible part of the brain!). We
defend in this paper the thesis that we are blind to quantum effects not only
because of the inadequacy of our receptors but mostly because of the treatment
that we perform with the data gathered by them.
One could argue that at the level of our nervous system, quantum effects are so
tiny that we should not be able perceive them. Our point of view is that it is
not because they are tiny that we should not perceive them but rather that we
do not perceive them because they are not useful9.
2 Entanglement and Interaction.
2.1 The concept of entanglement.
In order to avoid unnecessary technicalities, and with the aim of addressing the
paper to a large, interdisciplinary, audience, we shall restrict ourselves in what
follows to the simplest case: two systems A and B are prepared in a pure quan-
tum state ΨAB . Then the state of the sytem is said to be factorisable (section
5.3) at time t whenever it is the (tensor10) product of pure quantum states of
the subsystems A and B, which means that the following constraint is satisfied:
9Particle physicists attempted to explain why organic molecules are chirally oriented in
terms of the (tiny) energetic advantage that differentiates them from their mirror-molecule.
In last resort this tiny difference of energy would be explained in terms of parity-violation
by weak interactions [14]. We argue that the same effect, of amplification of tiny differences
during millions of years, could explain the emergence of classical perceptions. If there was
an informational advantage in exploiting non-classical quantum features like entanglement, it
is likely that evolved organisms would be able to exploit this advantage. From this point of
view, very primitive organisms, like bacteria would maybe be closer to the quantum world than
we are, and it seems indeed, although no conclusive proof of this idea exists yet, that certain
bacteria optimize their mechanism of harvesting light by exploiting the rich possibilities offered
by the quantum superposition principle [15]. Considered so, the receptors of those bacteria
would exhibit quantum coherence, a fascinating hypothesis.
10The tensor product is represented by the symbol ⊗. It is the right mathematical operation
that is needed when different Hilbert spaces are brought together, for instance the spaces
associated to different particles. One can find a standard definition of Hilbert spaces and
tensor products on the wikipedia website ([16],[17]).
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ΨAB(t) = ψA(t)⊗ψB(t). Otherwise the system is said to be entangled11. As we
show in appendix (section 5.3), when they are in a non-entangled, factorisable,
state, the two sub-systems A and B are statistically independent in the sense
that the average values of any physical quantity associated to the subsystem
A(B) is the same that would be obtained if the system A(B) was prepared in
the state ψA(t)(ψB(t)). Moreover, there are no correlations at all between the
subsystems and they can be considered to be independent.
The four so-called Bell two-qubit12 states [19] are for instance entangled because
as shown in section (5.3) they do not factorize into a product of local qubit states.
They are defined as follows 13 :
|B00〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ)⊗ |+〉BZ + |−〉AZ)⊗ |−〉BZ )
|B01〉 = 1√2 (|−〉AZ)⊗ |+〉BZ + |+〉AZ)⊗ |−〉BZ )
|B10〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ)⊗ |+〉BZ − |−〉AZ)⊗ |−〉BZ )
|B11〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ)⊗ |−〉BZ − |−〉AZ)⊗ |+〉BZ ).
Because the Bell states do not factorize, the local measurements in the distant
regions A and B are not statistically independent, that is to say, the two qubits
exhibit correlations. Moreover those correlations are essentially non-classical in
the sense that they violate Bell’s inequalities which is impossible for correlations
derived from a local realistic model as we also show in appendix (5.4).
2.2 Entanglement and Interaction.
Entanglement between A and B is likely to occur whenever they interact [20]
as shows the following property that we reproduce here without proof [21].
Let us consider two interacting quantum systems A and B. We assume that
the numbers of levels of the A (B) system is finite and equal to dA (db)14, that
the wave-function of the full system is a pure state and obeys the Schro¨dinger
equation:
i~∂tΨAB(t) = HAB(t)ΨAB(t) (1)
where HAB(t), the Hamiltonian of the system, is a self-adjoint operator, that we
assume to be sufficiently regular in time. Then the following property is valid
[21]:
All the product states remain product states during the interaction if and only
if the full Hamiltonian can be factorised as follows:
HAB(t) = HA(t)⊗ IB + IA ⊗HB(t) (2)
11The characterization of entanglement can be generalized when the full state is not pure,
or in the case of multipartite systems that are not bipartite but it is more complicate in this
case [18].
12A qubit is a 2-level quantum system. Examples of physical realisations of qubits are given
in appendix (section 5.1).
13The state |B11〉 is also known as the singlet spin state.
14The Hilbert spaces associated to these systems are thus finite dimensional (of dimensions
dA and dB respectively).
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where Hi acts on the ith system only while Ij is the identity operator on the jth
system (i, j = A,B).
In simple words: there is no interaction without entanglement, which establishes
that entanglement is very likely to occur; for instance, when we see light coming
from a distant star, it is nearly certainly entangled with the atoms that it
encountered underway. Entanglement can also be shown to be present in solid
states, ferro-magnets and so on, and to play a very fundamental role in the
macroscopic world, for instance during phase transitions [22].
3 The decohererence program and the classical
limit.
3.1 Environment induced superselection rules and classi-
cal islands.
The EIN superselection approach was introduced by Zurek in the framework of
the decoherence approach [9, 7, 8, 10]. He postulated that the preferred basis
obeys a principle of optimality that can be formulated in terms of the Shannon-
von Neumann entropy15. More precisely, the EIN selection rule predicts that,
once a system, its environment and their interaction are specified, the classical
islands associated to the system are the states that diagonalize the reduced
density matrix of the system16. When the full state of the system-environment
is pure, these states belong to the Schmidt basis (section 5.5) that diagonalizes
the limit asymptotically reached in time by the system-apparatus bipartite state.
When the environment can be considered as an apparatus, the classical islands
define the so-called pointer basis17, also called sometimes the preferred basis.
Roughly speaking, the EIN selection principle expresses that, during the evolu-
tion, the classical islands that belong to the prefered basis or pointer basis (the
one that minimizes the Shannon-von Neumann entropy [9, 10] of the reduced
15This quantity is defined in appendix (section 5.6). Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty
of a probabilistic distribution. It is worth noting that very often entropy is also considered
to be a measure of information, but that in our approach we consider that the useful infor-
mation increases when entropy decreases. Indeed let us measure the degree of ”certainty” or
determinism assigned to a random variable by the positive quantity C, C= 1 - entropy; in
other words certainty+uncertainty =1. We consider that when a distribution of probability
is very uncertain (flat) it does not contain much useful information. On the contrary when a
probability distribution is peaked it contains a high level of useful information. So when we
use the word information in the paper we implicitly mean ”certain” information or ”informa-
tion useful for deterministic evolution” (=1-entropy), a quantity that increases when entropy
decreases, contrary to most commonly used conventions.
16In appendix we explain that when the measure of entropy is the Shannon-von Neumann
entropy of a density matrix ρ, C is also a measure of the purity or coherence of ρ. Actually
we have shown in ref.[21] that when two coupled oscillators interact through the interaction
Hamiltonian HAB = a
†b + ab† (written in function of the creation and destruction phonon
modes of the oscillators A and B), states that remain factorisable throughout time are de
facto eigenstates of a (b), which means that they are so-called coherent oscillator states for
which it can be shown that Heisenberg uncertainties are minimal.
17“Pointer states can be defined as the ones which become minimally entangled with the
environment in the course of the evolution” (which means here temporal evolution described
by Schro¨dinger’s equation...), quoted from Ref.[23].
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system) are selected preferentially to any other basis. In the quantum Darwinist
approach, the emergence of a classical world that obeys EINselection rules can
be explained following two ways:
A) these rules correspond to maximal (Shannon-von Neumann) ”certainty”
or useful information18; this fits to our own acceptance and interpretation of
Zurek’s Darwinism as we explained in the section 1: it is well plausible that our
brain selects the features of the natural world that are maximally deterministic
and minimally uncertain;
B) Zurek also invokes an argument of structural stability: superposition of
states that would belong to such islands would be destroyed very quickly by
the interaction with the environment which radiates irremediably the coherence
(which is equal in virtue of our definitions to the certainty, so to say to 1-the
Shannon-von Neumann entropy of the reduced density matrix of the system, see
section 5.6)) into the environment [7]. This process is called the decoherence
process and is very effective.
3.2 A toy model for Quantum Darwinism: two interacting
particles.
We applied the Quantum Darwinist approach to a very simple situation during
which the system A and the environment B are two distinguishable particles and
are described by a (pure) scalar wave function that obeys the non-relativistic
Schro¨dinger equation. We also assumed that their interaction potential VAB
is an action a distance that is time-independent and only depends on the dis-
tance between the particles, so that it is invariant under spatial translations (a
Coulombian interaction for instance). This is a standard text-book situation
that was deeply studied, for instance in the framework of scattering theory.
The systems A and B fulfill thus (in the non-relativistic regime) the following
Schro¨dinger equation:
i~∂tΨ(rA, rB , t) = −( ~
2
2mA
∆A +
~2
2mB
∆B)Ψ(rA, rB , t)
+VAB(rA − rB)Ψ(rA, rB , t) (3)
where ∆A(B) is the Laplacian operator in the A(B) coordinates. Let us now
consider that the system A is the quantum system that interests us, and that
the other system is its environment. Actually, the argument is symmetrical as
we shall see so that this choice is a mere convention. In order to identify the
classical islands in this case, we must identify the states that exhibit maximal
coherence or minimal Shannon-von Neumann entropy. We assume here that
the full state is pure, which constitutes an oversimplification, because usually
18The Shannon-von Neumann entropy of a reduced maximally entangled pure bipartite
state, for instance of a Bell state is maximal (equal to 1) and the corresponding certainty
(or useful information) minimal (0) while for a factorisable state the Shannon-von Neumann
entropy of the reduced state is 0 and the certainty is equal to 1 (section 5.6). As a consequence,
factorisable states minimize the Shannon-von Neumann entropy of the reduced states. They
correspond thus to classical islands, in the case that they are stabilized by the interaction
with the environment.
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interaction with an environment destroys coherence. Nevertheless, as we shall
show, one can get interesting insights even in this oversimplified situation.
Without entering into technical details that are presented in appendix (section
5.6), all we need to know at this level is that two systems in a pure state
minimize the Shannon-von Neumann entropy when their state is factorisable or
non-entangled.
Then, the classical islands correspond to the states that initially and during
their interaction as well, remain factorisable (more precisely in a pure factoris-
able state). This constraint can be shown [21] to correspond to what is some-
what called in the litterature the mean field or effective field approximation,
or Hartree approximation [24, 25]. In this regime, particles behave as if they
were discernable, and constituted of a dilute, continuous medium distributed in
space according to the quantum distribution
∣∣ψA(B)(rA(B), t)∣∣2. Then, every-
thing happens as if each particle (A(B)) ”felt” the influence of the other particle
as if it was diluted with a probability distribution equal to the quantum value∣∣Ψ(rB(A))∣∣2. It corresponds also to the concept of droplet or diluted particle19
There are two interesting special cases:
i) When the potential only depends on the relative position rrel = rA − rB
mA << mB , the initial state is factorisable and the B particle is initially at
rest and well localized, it can be shown that the state remains factorisable in
time and occupies thus a classical island. This corresponds to what is called
the test-particle regime (no feedback of A onto B). For instance this is a good
approximation of what happens in the hydrogen atom, where the electron is so
light that it can be considered as a test particle.
ii) Another situation that is of physical interest is the situation of mutual scat-
tering of two well localized wave packets when we can neglect the quantum
extension of the interacting particles. This will occur when the interaction po-
tential VAB is smooth enough and the particles A and B are described by wave
packets the extension of which is small in comparison to the typical lenght of
variation of the potential. It is well known that in this regime, when the de
Broglie wave lenghts of the wave packets are small enough, it is consistent to
approximate quantum wave mechanics by its geometrical limit, which is clas-
sical mechanics. For instance the quantum differential cross sections converge
in the limit of small wave-lenghts to the corresponding classical cross sections.
Ehrenfest’s theorem also predicts that when we can neglect the quantum fluc-
tuations, which is the case here, the average motions are nearly classical and
provide a good approximation to the behaviour of the full wave-packet so that
we can consider it to be a material point. Actually, in this regime, we can in
good approximation replace the interaction potential by the first order term
of its Taylor development around the centers of the wave-packets associated to
the particles A and B so that the evolution equation is in good approximation
19Actually, the diluted particle model corresponds to Schro¨dinger’s own interpretation of the
modulus square of the wave function, before Born’s probabilistic interpretation was adopted by
quantum physicists. The droplet picture is reminiscent of pre-quantum models of the electron
that were developed by classical physicists such as Poincare´, Abraham, Laue, Langevin and
others at the beginning of the 20th century. In this approach |ψ|2 represents the charge density
and as a consequence of Maxwell’s laws, each particle ”feels” the Coulomb potential averaged
on the distribution of the other particle.
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separable into the coordinates rA, rB [21] and we have that, when Ψ(rA, rBt =
0) = ψA(rA, t = 0)) ⊗ ψB(rB , t = 0) = ψA(rA, t = 0)) · ψB(rB , t = 0), then, at
time t, Ψ(rA, rB , t) ≈ ψA(rA, t) · ψB(rB , t) We shall discuss in the conclusion
the relevance of this result.
4 Conclusions and discussion.
The Quantum Darwinist approach sheds a new light on the emergence of clas-
sical logics and of our classical preconceptions about the world. The distinction
between internal and external world, the Cartesian prejudice according to which
the whole can be reduced to the sum of its parts and the appearance of preferred
representation bases such as the position is seen here as the result of a very long
evolution and would correspond to the most useful way of extracting stable and
useful information from the quantum correlations.
We conjectured in the present paper that our difficulties and resistances for
conceiving ”entanglement” are due to the fact that millions of years of evolution
modelled our vision of the world, leading us to become blind to aspects of it
that are not advantageous from the point of view of the acquisition of useful
information.
We showed that in a simplified situation (two particles that ”feel” each other
via an interaction potential), the EIN-selected classical islands are regions of the
Hilbert space where the mean or effective field approximation (or Hartree ap-
proximation in the static case) is valid. In this regime, the interaction factorises
into the sum of two effective potentials that act separately on both particles,
and express the average influence due to the presence of the other particle.
In that regime, it also makes sense to consider the particles, in accordance with
classical logics, not as a whole but as separate objects.
Our analysis confirms that our approach is well-founded in an undirect man-
ner; indeed we show that the regime in which two particles interact without
getting entangled possesses two extreme cases: the point particle regime (that
corresponds to the classical material point description of matter) and the di-
luted matter approach (that corresponds to fluido-dynamics). The test-particle
regime, where the heavy particle is treated like a material point, and the light
particle as a diluted distribution, is intermediate between these two extreme
cases20. These ways of conceiving and describing matter are so deeply imbedded
in our every-day representation of the physical world that it is nearly impossi-
ble to find an alternative representation for particles and atoms in our mental
repertory. This explains according to us why it took such a long time for quan-
tum physicists to realize the implications of the EPR paradox (30 years) and of
the concept of entanglement. Even today, a well-trained quantum physicist can
20There are two interesting limits that are special cases of the Hartree regime (the test-
particle and material points limit). The Hartree regime corresponds to the droplet model; the
test-particle and material points limits correspond to the test-particle concept and to classical
mechanics. The Hartree regime is the most general regime in which entanglement is negligible.
The limit cases are obtained by neglecting the extension of one droplet, the one associated to
the massive particle (the other particle appears then to behave as a test-particle) and of both
particles (classical limit).
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merely hope, at best, to reach a mathematical intuition of the phenomenon and
entanglement remains a very counter-intuitive property.
It is interesting to note that somewhat similar conclusions could be drawned
from the study of wave propagation, which is intimately related to propagation
of information at the classical level, in other words of communication, another
aspect of information21.
A very interesting study was indeed performed at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury concerning the concept of dimension (see ref.[27] and references therein): in
a space-time of 1+1 or 3+1 dimensions wave propagation ruled by d’Alembert’s
equation obeys Huygens principle22, that can be translated into informational
terms [28]: the state of the image reproduces accurately the state of the source
(after a time delay proportional to the distance between image and source). It is
this property that allows us to obtain a fidel representation of the external world
by using sensitive receptors such as our ears and our eyes. Also here one could
invert the reasoning and assume that maybe the conventional 3+1 representa-
tion of space-time was privileged because it is informationally advantageous to
do so. It could be that other physical phenomena that are characterised by
other dimensions coexist but that we are blind to them simply because they are
informationally deprived of interest and of sense23.
Let us for instance excite a 2-dimensional vibrating membrane such as a drum
skin by hitting at its centre. One can show that the signal at the edge at a given
time is a convolution of the signal that was imposed at the centre of the skin
in the past. The difference with what occurs in 1 and 3 dimensions is that the
time-interval on which the convolution is taken has a non-negligible extension.
Therefore correlations between the centre of the resonating membrane and the
extremities are diluted and get lost, in close analogy to what happens during
the decoherence process.
It is extremely difficult for us to imagine the properties of a 4-dimensional space,
which can be seen as a plausibility argument in the favor of a selection by our
brain and sensors of a dimension (3) that optimizes the amount of useful infor-
mation (in this case that optimizes efficient communication). A 2-dimensional
space, a plane, is easy to visualize because, in our approach, it can be seen as a
projection of the 3-dimensional space that we are supposed to live in.
Another promising direction of research was suggested by Nicolas Lori during the
refereeing process of the paper. It concerns the possibility that certain ancient
civilisations developed concepts similar to entanglement and inter-connectedness
at an higher level than ours. This kind of research is outside of the scope of
our paper, but it is worth noting that this observation could be brought in
connection with the last part of footnote 9.
21Claude Shannon wrote hereabout ”The fundamental problem of communication is that of
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point”
in his famous paper A mathematical theory of communication [26].
22Actually this is so in space-time of dimension d+1, where d is an odd and positive integer.
23We are conscious that unfortunately this type of reasoning is not deprived of some degree
of circularity, what is illustrated by the sentence The world has 3 dimensions because we listen
to music. Therefore the best arguments that we can produce in their favor are plausibility
arguments. This was precisely the scope of our paper (section 3), in the framework of Quantum
Darwinism.
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Before ending the paper it is good to recall what the paper is about or rather
what it is not about. We do not pretend to solve the measurement problem
or the objectification problem. We do not pretend to settle definitively and
unambiguously the question about where the collapse process (effective or not)
would take place (in the brain or at the level of our physical sensors, or even
before that in the external world, during a decoherence process). We claim that
as the result of a natural selection process that privilegges the best-informed we
became gradually blind to entanglement, but we are not categoric about where
the blindness occurs: it could occur at the level of our sensors, or during the data
treatment that occurs in the brain or at both levels simultaneously...The history
of Quantum Mechanics has shown that one can survive without answering to
all fundamental questions and paradoxes generated by the theory. In our view
mystery and knowledge are to some extent complementary and undissociable.
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5 Appendix: Entanglement and non-local cor-
relations.
5.1 Qubits.
A qubit consists of a two-level quantum system [29]. This is the simplest con-
ceivable quantum system, because a one-level system would always remain in the
same quantum state, and it would be eternally static, which does not present any
interest from a physical point of view since physical theories are mainly focused
on transformations. The state of a two-level quantum system is described, in
the case of pure states, by a ray of a two-dimensional Hilbert space. There exists
several ways to realize such systems, for instance, the qubit could be assigned to
degrees of freedom such as light polarization of a given electro-magnetic mode,
electronic, nucleic or atomic spin 1/2, energy of an orbital electron experimen-
tally confined to a pair of energy levels, and so on. In what follows, we shall most
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Figure 1: Stern-Gerlach spin measurement device.
often assume that the qubit system of interest is a spin-1/2 particle. Let us then
denote |+〉Z and |−〉Z the spin up and down states relatively to a conventional
direction of reference Z. An arbitrary qubit state can always be expressed as a
superposition of the basis states of the form α|+〉Z + β|−〉Z where α and β are
two normalized complex amplitudes: |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. In analogy with classical
logic, we are free to associate with each of the basis states a conventional binary
value yes-no or 0-1, for instance according to the assignment
|+〉Z ↔ 0↔ yes,
|−〉Z ↔ 1↔ no.
Although in classical logic the value of a classical bit is either 0 or 1, a quantum
bit or qubit can in general be prepared in a superposition state of the form α|0〉+
β|1〉 which offers more formal flexibility than in the classical case. Of course,
during a measurement process, the outcomes are dichotomic. For instance, if
we measure thanks to a Stern-Gerlach apparatus the projection of the spin
along the Z direction, the probabilities of the two possible outcomes spin up
and down are respectively equal to |α|2 and |β|2. Despite of the fact that the
distribution of the measurement outcomes is dichotomic, the evolution of the
qubits, between the initial preparation and the final measurement, obeys the
superposition principle.
5.2 Two-qubit systems.
Let us now consider two spin 1/2 particles A and B that are localized in far
away regions of space. Let us measure with Stern-Gerlach devices their spin
projection along Z, we get four possible outcomes:
upA-upB ,
upA-downB ,
downA-upB
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and downA-downB .
These outcomes correspond to the states
|+〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ ,
|+〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ ,
|−〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ
and |−〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ .
The most general two-qubit state is superposition of those 4 states:
|Ψ〉 = α|+〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ+β|+〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ+γ|−〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ+δ|−〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ .
5.3 Factorisable versus entangled states.
A state that can be written as follows:
|Ψ〉 = (αA|+〉AZ + βA|−〉AZ)⊗ (αB |+〉BZ + βB |−〉BZ )
is said to be factorisable. For such states, the outcomes of local measurements
in the A and B region are independent. Indeed, local observables are of the type
OA ⊗ Id.B (Id.A ⊗OB) so that
〈i|AZ ⊗ 〈j|BZOA.OB |i〉AZ ⊗ |j〉BZ=〈i|AZ ⊗ 〈j|BZOA ⊗ OB |i〉AZ ⊗ |j〉BZ = 〈i|AZOA|i〉AZ ⊗
〈j|BZOB |j〉BZ , which means that outcomes of local measurements are statistically
independent.
By definition: non-factorisable states are said to be entangled.
The so-called Bell states [19] are massively used in the machinery of Quantum
Information [29], they provide a generic example of maximally entangled states.
They are in 1-1 correspondence with the well-known Pauli spin operators:
σ0 = |+〉Z〈+|Z + |−〉Z〈−|Z ↔ |B00〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ + |−〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ )
σx = |+〉Z〈−|Z + |−〉Z〈+|Z ↔ |B01〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ + |−〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ )
σy = i|+〉Z〈−|Z − i|−〉Z〈+|Z ↔ |B10〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ − |−〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ )
σz = |+〉Z〈+|Z − |−〉Z〈−|Z ↔ |B10〉 = 1√2 (|+〉AZ ⊗ |+〉BZ − |−〉AZ ⊗ |−〉BZ )
Bell states are not factorisable; for instance if |B00〉 would factorize then
αA.αB=βA.βB=
√
1
2 and α
A.βB= βA.αB=0;
Obviously such a system of equations has no solution because it implies that
αA.αB .βA.βB=
√
1
2 .
√
1
2=
1
2 and α
A.βB .βA.αB=0.0 = 0 so that finally 1/2 = 0,
a logical contradiction, which shows the non-factorisable or entangled nature of
the Bell states.
To the contrary of factorisable states, when composite systems are prepared in
entangled states, the distributions of outcomes observed during local observa-
tions are no longer statistically independent.
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For instance, let us assume that the qubit systems A and B are prepared in the
Bell state |B00〉 and let us measure the spin projection along ~nA in the region A
and the spin projection along ~nB in the region B (with n
A/B
x = sinθA/B , n
A/B
y =
0, nA/Bz = cosθA/B). In order to evaluate the corresponding distribution of
outcomes, we can make use of the spinorial transformation law
|+〉~n = cos θ2e
−iφ
2 |+〉Z+sin θ2e
+iφ
2 |−〉Z and |−〉~n = − sin θ2e
−iφ
2 |+〉Z+cos θ2e
+iφ
2 |−〉Z ,
where θ and φ are the polar angles associated to the direction ~n (here φA =
φB = 0), so that the Bell state |B00〉 transforms as follows:
|B00〉 =
√
1
2
(cos
(θA − θB)
2
|+〉A~n ⊗ |+〉B~n
−sin (θA − θB)
2
|+〉A~n ⊗ |−〉B~n
+sin
(θA − θB)
2
|−〉A~n ⊗ |+〉B~n
+cos
(θA − θB)
2
|−〉A~n ⊗ |−〉B~n ).
Making use of Born’s transition rule, the probability that after the preparation
of the Bell state |B00〉 the outcomes of the spin measurements in A and B are
found to be up-up is equal to |〈B00 |(|+〉A~n ⊗ |+〉B~n )|2 so to say to 12cos2 (θA−θB)2 .
Similarly the probability of (upA, downB) is 12sin
2 (θA−θB)
2 , the probability of
(downA, upB) is 12sin
2 (θA−θB)
2 , and the probability of (downA, downB) is
1
2cos
2 (θA−θB)
2 .
In particular, when local quantization axes are parallel: (θA − θB=0), we get
perfect correlations:
P (upA, upB) = P (downA, downB) = 1/2
P (downA, upB) = P (upA, downB) = 0.
Obviously there is no longer statistical independence; otherwise we would get
P (upA, upB).P (downA, downB)=1/2.1/2=P (downA, upB).P (upA, downB) = 0.0
so that finally 1/4 = 0, a logical contradiction.
We shall show in the next section that correlations exhibited by entangled sys-
tems have no classical counterpart.
5.4 Bell’s inequalities.
Let us consider a situation a` la Bell [3] during which a pair of qubits is prepared
in the entangled state |B00〉. A Stern-Gerlach measurement is performed along
the direction ~nA in the region A and another Stern-Gerlach measurement is
performed simultaneously along the direction ~nB in the distant region B (see
fig.124).
24This is a schematic representation, in the case that the the particles are emitted along
opposite directions along the Y axis, with the source in-between the regions A and B, that
we did not represent on the picture in order not to overload the representation.
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Figure 2: Bell-like measurement on a bipartite spin entangled system.
As we noted before, whenever the directions ~nA and ~nB are parallel, the out-
comes are maximally correlated in the sense that the probability that the out-
comes observed in the A and B regions are different is equal to 0. We thus face
a situation in which we could in principle predict the outcome that is observed
during a measurement in one of the regions, simply by performing the same
measurement in the other region. By itself, this situation has nothing special:
it could occur that making use of maximal correlations, a classical observer can
infer with absolute certainty the validity of certain properties without testing
them directly.
What is puzzling is that what quantum mechanics says about the value of
the local spin is that it could be up with probability 50 percent and down
with probability 50 percent, and that the formalism gives the feeling that the
transition does not occur before the measurement process occurs.
It would mean that we ”create” the value of the spin only when we look at it,
a rather counter-intuitive result. Intuitively, we are likely to think that our ob-
servation only reveals pre-existing properties, since this is so, as far as we know,
at the classical level. This is particularly obvious when A and B are separated
by a space-like distance because, even if one accepts that the measurement in-
fluences the system under observation, it is difficult to understand how this
influence would occur instantaneously, thus faster than the speed of light. Our
classical intuition thus suggests the existence of pre-existing properties- and this
is essentially the reasoning held by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen [30] in 1935-
that the value of the spin pre-existed before the measurement process. If this
is so, we are led to infer from the EPR reasoning that some deterministic ”ele-
ment of reality” is present but then this information is hidden and lost at the
level of the quantum formalism, because the prediction of quantum mechanics
is simply that each possible outcome (up or down) is observed with probability
fifty percent, a purely indeterministic prediction.
The reasoning of EPR did not go much further than this; their final remark
was that, given that a hidden determinism is present and that such a hidden
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determinism is not present at the level of the quantum formalism, the quantum
theory is not complete and ought to be completed by a (hidden) deterministic
or local realistic hidden variable theory (HVT).
In 1965, John Bell went further [3, 31] and showed that the existence of hid-
den determinism is incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics.
We shall reproduce here the essence of his reasoning, and, following Ref.[32]
(see also references about Pseudo-telepathy in ref.[33]), we shall enhance the
dramatic character of the result by assuming that two persons, Alice and Bob,
make use of the results of the Stern-Gerlach measurements on the qubits A
and B respectively in order to simulate a ”telepathic” relationship. During this
”performance”, Alice and Bob are located in far away regions; for instance, Al-
ice is on earth while Bob is located inside an interplanetary rocket, more or less
one lighthour away from earth. Both are kept in isolated, high-security, cells
and are not allowed to communicate with each other. Every hour, a guardian
A enters Alice’s cell and asks a question that is chosen at random among three
possible questions α, β and γ. For instance the questions could be:
α: Are you thirsty?
β: Are you tired?
γ: Are you happy?
Exactly at the same time, (which means in this precise case simultaneously
relatively to (an inertial frame comoving with the center of mass of) the solar
system), a guardian B enters Bob’s cell and asks a question that is chosen at
random, and independently on the choice performed by the guardian A, among
the selection α, β and γ. We also assume that the experiment is repeated many
many times, hour after hour, in order to establish a relevant statistics of the
correlations between Alice and Bob’s answers.
Another rule of the game is that each time they are presented with a question,
Alice and Bob must answer at once and have two possible answers: Yes and No.
Let us now assume that Alice and Bob make use of a quantum device in order to
answer the questions: they share a pair of qubit states prepared in the entangled
state |B00〉, and in order to answer the questions α, β, or γ, they measure thanks
to a Stern-Gerlach device the spin of the qubit in their possession along the
directions θα = 0, φα = 0; θβ = 2pi/3, φβ = 0; or θγ = 4pi/3, φγ = 0.
Because of the perfect correlations exhibited by the Bell state |B00〉, whenever
Alice and Bob are asked simultaneously the same question they will provide
exactly the same answer, which tends to simulate a telepathic communication
between them.
The first reaction, confronted with such a situation, would be to make the
rational hypothesis according to which Alice and Bob possibly cheat by sharing
a same list on which they have written in advance all possible answers to the
three questions, at all times. Before they answer, they would consult the list
and answer accordingly. This is nothing else, in the present context, than EPR’s
hypothesis.
John Bell [3] went further by showing that if such a list existed, the correlations
ought to obey certain constraints (inequalities), and that those inequalities are
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violated by the quantum correlations, which renders impossible the existence of a
list of pre-existing outcomes; in other words, the violation of Bell’s inequalities
denies the possibility of explaining quantum correlations by a local realistic
HVT.
In the present case, it is easy to derive such an inequality, following the approach
of Ref.[34] and making use of a property that was baptised by mathematicians
under the name of pigeonhole’s principle. The idea is simple: let us assume that
three pigeons plan to spend the night in the holes of a cliff; if there are only
two holes then certainly at least two pigeons will have to sleep in the same hole.
This kind of reasoning is used for instance to show that within a population of
106 persons, at least two persons will have exactly the same number of hair.
Now, there are three questions and two answers so that, in virtue of the pigeon-
hole principle, two questions will share the same answer and we can write the
equality:
P (αA = βB ∨ βA = γB ∨ γA = αB) = 1, (4)
where ∨ expresses the logical disjunction (”or”) and the equality symbolically
means that two questions have the same answer, for instance αA = βB means
that the measured values of the spins along the directions αA and βB are the
same (either both up or both down). Now, it is well-known that the probability
of the disjunction of two or more properties is less than or equal to the sum of
their probabilities so that we can write the Bell-like inequality
P (αA = βB) + P (βA = γB) + P (γA = αB) ≥ 1. (5)
This inequality is violated by quantum correlations because P (αA = βB) +
P (βA = γB) + P (γA = αB)= P (αA = βB = up) + P (βA = γB = up) + P (γA =
αB = up)+ P (αA = βB = down) + P (βA = γB = down)+P (γA = αB = down)
=6. 12cos
2(pi/3) = 3/4. It is not true that 3/4 ≥ 1 and the inequality is violated.
Of course there are other logical explanations of the correlations: it could be
that Alice and Bob secretly communicate, but as their distance is of the order
of one light-hour and that they must answer at once (within say one second),
they have to communicate more or less 3600 times faster than light.
Actually a similar situation was experimentally implemented in the surroundings
of Geneva: instead of one light-hour the distance was ten kilometers and instead
of one second the duration was of the order of 10 picoseconds. This imposes the
experimental limits according to which, if Alice and Bob cheat and communicate
in secret, they must do it 7.106 times faster [35, 36] than light. In the literature,
this (hypothetical) phenomenon is called non-locality, and is reminiscent of the
mysterious Newtonian action-at-a-distance.
5.5 About the Shannon-von Neumann entropy and the
bi-orthogonal (Schmidt) decomposition.
One can show [37, 38]) that when a bipartite system is prepared in the (pure)
state |Ψ〉AB = ∑d−1i,j=0 αij |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B (where |i〉A and |j〉B are states from or-
thonormalized reference bases) everything happens ”from A’s point of view” as
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if he had prepared his system in the state described by the effective or reduced
density matrix ρA =
∑d−1
i,i′=0
∑d−1
j=0 α
∗
ijαi′j |i′〉A〈i|A.
Now, it can be shown that the reduced density matrix has all the properties of
density matrices (its trace is equal to one, it is a self-adjoint operator with a
positive spectrum) so that we can find at least one basis in which it gets diagonal-
ized, that we shall label by tilde indices (|˜i〉A): |Ψ〉AB = ∑d−1i,j=0 α˜ij |˜i〉A⊗|j〉B=∑d−1
i=0 |˜i〉A⊗(
∑
j=0 α˜ij |j〉B) =
∑d−1
i=0 αi |˜i〉A⊗|˜i〉B where we introduced the nota-
tion αi |˜i〉B =
∑
j=0 α˜ij |j〉B , with αi a normalization factor. The states |˜i〉B are
necessarily orthogonal, otherwise they would generate off-diagonal interference
terms in the reduced density matrix, which may not occur because the basis
states |˜i〉A diagonalize the reduced density matrix of A’s subsystem.
This proves that we can always write a bipartite pure state |Ψ〉AB in the so-
called bi-orthogonal form [39]:
|Ψ〉AB = ∑d−1i=0 αi |˜i〉A ⊗ |˜i〉B , where the states |˜i〉A (B) are orthonormalized.
This form is called bi-orthogonal because the matrix αij is in general a non-
diagonal matrix. It is only when the full state is expressed in the product of
the bases composed by the states that diagonalize the reduced density matrices
that the amplitudes-matrix becomes diagonal: α˜ij = αiδi,j .
When the state is expressed in its biorthogonal form, it is easy to analyze the
degree of entanglement of the two subsystems. One can quantitatively estimate
the degree of entanglement by counting the number of coefficients αi that differ
from zero (this is called the Schmidt number). The Shannon entropy of the
probability distribution |αi|2, which is also equal to the Shannon-von Neumann
entropy of the reduced density matrix of A or B’s subsystem (section 5.6),
provides a more quantitatively precise parameter in order to estimate their
degree of entanglement (it is equal to 0 for factorizable states, in which case
the biorthogonal decomposition contains only one factor, and equal to 1 when
the state is maximally entangled so to say when |αi|2 = 1/d,∀i). It is easy to
check that Bell states are maximally entangled, which corresponds to a density
matrix proportional to the identity operator. Such a density matrix is said to
be totally incoherent because in all conceivable interference experiments it will
always exhibit a flat interference pattern (of ”visibility” equal to 0).
Actually the purity or coherence which is equal to 1-the Shannon-von Neumann
entropy of a reduced density matrix measures the degree of anisotropy exhib-
ited by the corresponding state in the Hilbert space. When a state is pure it
determines a preferred orientation (or ray) in the Hilbert space. An incoherent
state is, from this point of view, totally isotropic and indeed the probability of
transition of such a state to any pure state is constant and equal to 1/d. This
explains why such states always exhibit totally flat interference patterns.
5.6 Entanglement, non-separability and loss of identity.
Another aspect of entanglement is its ”fusional” nature which we consider to
be a manifestation of quantum holism. Bell’s analysis of the nature of quantum
correlations shows that, in contradiction with the Cartesian paradigm, when two
systems are prepared in an entangled state, the knowledge of the whole cannot
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be reduced to the knowledge of the parts, and that to some extent the systems
lose their individuality. It is only when their joint wave-function is factorizable
that they are separable25. A very interesting uncertainty (complementarity [40])
relation characterizes the entanglement of a pair of quantum systems prepared
in a pure state: the entanglement of the whole system (that measures its degree
of inseparability) is equal to the Shannon-von Neumann entropy of the reduced
system, which is also a ngeative measure of the coherence of the system. This
relation is expressed by the equality E(A−B) = 1− C(A) = 1− C(B), where
C(A(B)) = 1 + Tr(ρA(B)logdρA(B)), the Shannon-von Neumann coherence of
the subsystem A (B) which measures the degree of purity or coherence of their
reduced state, as well as the degree of certainty associated to this state, while
E(A−B) is, in the case of pure states, a ”good” measure of the entanglement
between the subsystemsA andB. In simple terms, the irreducibility of the whole
to the parts (or entanglement between them) increases when the Shannon-von
Neumann measure of the ”certainty” of the parts (or their ”purity” or degree
of ”coherence”) decreases and vice versa. For instance, when the state of the
full system is pure and factorizable, their entanglement is equal to 0 and the
reduced system is a pure state with a minimal Shannon-von Neumann entropy
equal to 0 (maximal coherence equal to 1). When the full system is prepared
in a Bell state, their entanglement is maximal and equal to 1 and the reduced
system is a totally incoherent density matrix proportional to the identity, with
a maximal Shannon-von Neumann entropy equal to 1 (minimal coherence equal
to 0). This complementarity relation can be generalized when the full state is
not pure, but the situation is more involved in this case [41, 42], among others
because there exists no simple measure of the entanglement of two subsystems
when the system is prepared in a mixed state [42].
If metaphorically we transfer this idea to human relationships, it could be trans-
lated (in a very free way, because there is no direct counterpart for the concept
of quantum purity at the human level) by something like the ”fusional nature of
entanglement”: when A and B are strongly entangled, they lose to some extent
their individuality. We mean that the coherence of the parts decreases, and the
coherence or purity is seen here as a measure of the independence (singularity)
relatively to the rest of the world. This fusional nature is contagious to some ex-
tent (the friends of my friends are my friends) because it can be shown that two
systems C and D can become entangled although they never interacted directly
and remain spatially separated, provided they get entangled (through interac-
tion for instance [21, 20]) with subsystems that are entangled (this is called
entanglement swapping-see e.g. ref.[33] and references therein). For instance,
regions that are separated by huge distances in the galaxy [43] can be shown to
become entangled because they both interact with the cosmic background radi-
ation which presents a non-negligible degree of spatial entanglement. Another
related property is monogamy: fusional relations are often exclusive, which pos-
sesses a quantum counterpart the so-called quantum monogamy [44, 37].
25As we mentioned before, whenever two distant systems are in an entangled (pure) state,
it has been shown [4] that there exist well-chosen observables such that the associated cor-
relations do not admit a local realist’s explanation, which is revealed by the violation of
well-chosen Bell’s inequalities.
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Abstract
During the refereeing procedure of Anthropomorphic Quantum Darwinism by 
Thomas  Durt,  it became  apparent  in  the  dialogue  between  him  and  me  that  the 
definition of information in Physics is something about which not all authors agreed. 
This text aims at describing the concepts associated to information that are accepted as 
the standard in the Physics world community.
Introduction
The purpose of this text is to provide a brief description of what are the concepts 
of information that are accepted as the standard in the Physics world community, which 
does not mean that all Physicists agree with such definitions but simply that a majority 
does. The purpose of a standard is to develop concepts in a clear and non-ambiguous 
enough way for a large community (of physicists in this case) to be able to disagree 
based on the substance of the arguments instead of disagreeing on the definition of the 
words.  This  text  resulted  from  my  refereeing  the  Anthropomorphic  Quantum 
Darwinism article by Thomas Durt, and it will be especially focused on the relation 
between information and the meaning of Shannon/von Neumann entropy (henceforth 
referred to as Shannon entropy).  
By discussing with me the issues proposed in his work Thomas Durt was able to 
find expressions and statements that were able to represent his scientific thought using 
word-definitions  that  agree  with  the  standard  definitions  of  the  words  “entropy”, 
“information” and “negentropy”.  Because we are analyzing the standard accepted usage 
of  words,  the  definitions  appearing  Wikipedia  will  be  a  major  source  of  support. 
Although Wikipedia might have incorrect terms here and there, its widespread usage 
makes it the de facto standard for the meaning of words.
Entropy and Information
Acccording to  the Wikipedia,  "Shannon entropy is  a  measure  of  the average 
information content"   [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(Information_theory)] and 
"The negentropy, also negative entropy or syntropy, of a living system is the entropy 
that it exports to keep its own entropy low; it lies at the intersection of entropy and life.
The concept and phrase "negative entropy" were introduced by Erwin
Schrödinger  in  his  1943  popular-science  book  What  is  life?  Later,  Léon  Brillouin 
shortened the phrase to negentropy, to express it  in a more "positive" way: a living 
system imports negentropy and stores it." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negentropy]. In 
short, entropy=<information> and negentropy=-entropy. 
According to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_entropy], we have that: 
“In fact, in the view of Jaynes (1957), thermodynamics should be seen as an application 
of Shannon's information theory: the thermodynamic entropy is interpreted as being an 
estimate of the amount of further Shannon information needed to define the detailed 
microscopic state of the system, that remains uncommunicated by a description solely in 
terms of the macroscopic variables of classical thermodynamics. In short, the Shannon 
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entropy defines the average amount of information in the system that we do not have 
about the system unless we observe in detail the molecules of the system.”
There area few things that need to be clarified about the relation between these 
terms. The first is that entropy is always the total (or averaged) amount of information 
in a system. The entropy of the system is the amount of information in a system, of 
which the observer can perceive only a small portion. So, as the information in a system 
grows so does your ignorance about that system grows, as we typically cannot make the 
information extraction process keep up with the information growing process.
 In what regards information, there are two ways of looking at it. In one way the 
entropy of the system is the average of the information we do not have, so from the 
perspective of the observer: E_{system}=-<I_{observer}>.  From the perspective of the 
system the  entropy  expresses  the  amount  of  information  the  system has  (using  the 
classical perspective where information exists regardless of the observation); meaning 
that:  E_{system}=<I_{system}>.  I prefer the second way of expressing it, as it does 
not mix the observer with the system. 
The amount of information in a system is called the Shannon entropy, and is also 
referred to as self-information. In Wikipedia it is stated that "self-information is also 
sometimes used as a synonym of entropy, i.e. the expected value of self-information in 
the  first  sense  (the  mutual  information of  the  system with  itself)”.  "In  information 
theory, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. The 
term by itself in this context usually refers to the Shannon entropy, which quantifies, in 
the sense of an expected value, the information contained in a message, usually in units 
such as bits. Equivalently, the Shannon entropy is a measure of the average information 
content one is missing when one does not know the value of the random variable." The 
uncertainty  associated  to  a  random  variable  is  resolved  by  the  appearance  of  the 
information  about  the random variable.  The relation  between the entropy  S and the 
Shannon entropy H is: S=ln(2)KBH. Where KB is Boltzmann’s constant and ln stands for 
the natural logarithm, meaning that to 1 bit of Shannon entropy corresponds 0.9572 ×  
10-23 J  K-1.  If  pi is  the probability  of a state  i,  then the expression for the Shannon 
entropy is: H=-Σi pi log2 pi .   
Information in Quantum Mechanics
Again using Wikipedia, we can read that "entropy is simply that portion of the 
(classical) physical information contained in a system of interest whose identity (as
opposed to amount) is unknown (from the point of view of a particular knower). This 
informal characterization corresponds to both von Neumann's formal definition of the 
entropy of a mixed quantum state, as well as Claude Shannon's definition of the entropy 
of a probability distribution over classical signal states or messages (see information
entropy)." In the "Von_Neumann_entropy" entry in Wikipedia, it is stated that:
"Given the density matrix ρ , von Neumann defined the entropy as S(ρ)=-Tr(ρ lnρ)
which is a proper extension of the Gibbs entropy (and the Shannon entropy) to the 
quantum case."  Actually,  it  is  a  proper  extension  of  the  Shannon entropy,  with  the 
connection to the entropy requiring the multiplication of an extra ln(2)KB term
Two works that I consider essential in understanding quantum information are:
Brukner, C., Zeilinger. 2002. Inadequacy of the Shannon Information in
Quantum mechanics. arXiv:quant-ph/0006087 v3 5 Apr 2002.
Which states:
"We suggest that it is therefore natural to require that
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the total information content in a system in the case of
quantum systems is sum of the individual amounts of
information over a complete set of m mutually complementary
observables. As already mentioned above, for a
spin-1/2 particle these are three spin projections along
orthogonal directions. If we define the information gain
in an individual measurement by the Shannon measure
the total information encoded in the three spin components
is given by
Htotal := H1(p+x , p-x ) + H2(p+y , p-y ) + H3(p+z , p-z )."
Timpson, C. G. 2003. On a Supposed Conceptual Inadequacy of the
Shannon Information in Quantum mechanics. Studies In History and
Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics
Volume 34, Issue 3, September 2003, Pages 441-468.
Which states:
"Another way of thinking about the Shannon information is as a measure
of the amount of information that we expect to gain on performing a
probabilistic experiment. The Shannon measure is a measure of the
uncertainty of a probability distribution as well as a measure of
information."
In both manuscripts the entropy and information are considered to be identical 
up to a scale (as it occurs in the classical case), but while in Timpson the agreement 
with Shannon entropy is like in the classical case; it is a bit more elaborate in Brukner& 
Zeilinger. The consensus seems to be that Timpson’s argument is stronger, but I will lay 
claim for neither one.
Acknowledgements: Thanks are due to Alex Blin for his helpful comments.
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Competing definitions of Information
versus Entropy in Physics
By Thomas Durt, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel.
Abstract:
As was mentioned by Nicolas Lori in his commentary, the definition of Information in
Physics is something about which not all authors agreed. According to physicists like
me Information decreases when Entropy increases (so entropy would be a negative
measure of information), while many physicists, seemingly the majority of them, are
convinced of the contrary (even in the camp of Quantum Information Theoreticians).
In this reply I reproduce, and make more precise, some of my arguments, that
appeared here and there in my paper, in order to clarify the presentation of my
personal point of view on the subject.
Entropy and Information.
Entropy is one among several possible measures of the uncertainty of a probabilistic
distribution. It is worth noting that very often entropy is also considered to be a measure of
information, but that in my approach it is natural to consider that the useful information
increases when entropy decreases. Indeed let us measure the degree of “certainty” or the
degree of “determinism” assigned to a random variable by the positive quantity C,
 C= 1 - entropy; entropy is then assumed to represent the degree of uncertainty of the
distribution of the random variable.
 By definition, in this approach, certainty+uncertainty =1 which means that entropy is a
negative measure of certainty.
Moreover, my choice to associate entropy with uncertainty means that I do consider that
when a distribution of probability is very uncertain it does not contain much useful
information.
On the contrary when a probability distribution is peaked it contains a high level of useful
information.
So when I use the word information in my paper I implicitly mean “certain” information (=1-
entropy), a quantity that increases when entropy decreases, contrary to most commonly used
conventions…
In quantum mechanics, the more standard measure of entropy of a density matrix Rho is the
Shannon-von Neuman entropy, in which case C is also, by definition, a measure of the purity
or coherence of  Rho.
A very interesting uncertainty (complementarity) relation characterizes the entanglement of a
pair of quantum systems prepared in a pure state: the entanglement of the whole system (that
measures its degree of inseparability) is equal to the Shannon-von Neumann entropy of the
reduced system, which is also a negative measure of the coherence of the system. This
relation is expressed by the equalities
E(A -B) = 1 - C(A) = 1 - C(B),
where C(A(B)) = 1 + Tr(A(B)logdA(B))= the Shannon-von Neumann coherence of the
subsystem A (B) which measures the degree of purity or coherence of their reduced state, as
well as the degree of certainty associated to this state, while E(A - B) is, in the case of pure
states, a “good” measure of the entanglement between the subsystems A and B. In simple
terms, the irreducibility of the whole to the parts (or entanglement between them) increases
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when the Shannon-von Neumann measure of the “certainty” of the parts (or their “purity” or
degree of “coherence”) decreases and vice versa.
 For instance, when the state of the full system is pure and factorizable, their entanglement is
equal to 0 and the reduced system is a pure state with a minimal Shannon-von Neumann
entropy equal to 0 (maximal coherence equal to 1). When the full system is prepared in a Bell
state, their entanglement is maximal and equal to 1 and the reduced system is a totally
incoherent density matrix proportional to the identity, with a maximal Shannon-von Neumann
entropy equal to 1 (minimal coherence equal to 0). This complementarity relation can be
generalized when the full state is not pure, but the situation is more involved in this case,
among others because there exists no simple measure of the entanglement of two subsystems
when the system is prepared in a mixed state.
If metaphorically we transfer this idea to human relationships, it could be translated (in a very
free way, because there is no direct counterpart for the concept of quantum purity at the
human level) by something like the “fusional nature of entanglement”: when A and B are
strongly entangled, they lose to some extent their individuality. We mean that the coherence
of the parts decreases, and the coherence or purity is seen here as a measure of the
independence (singularity relatively to the rest of the world).
This fusional nature is contagious to some extent (the friends of my friends are my friends)
because it can be shown that two systems C and D can become entangled although they never
interacted directly and remain spatially separated, provided they get entangled (through
interaction for instance) with subsystems that are entangled (this is called entanglement
swapping).
 For instance, regions that are separated by huge distances in the galaxy can be shown to
become entangled because they both interact with the cosmic background radiation which
presents a non-negligible degree of spatial entanglement.
Another related property is monogamy: fusional relations are often exclusive, which
possesses a quantum counterpart the so-called quantum monogamy of entanglement, a
property according to which if A and B are strongly entangled there is few room left for
entanglement with the rest of the world (or with a third party C).
Final remark:
Ambiguities also appear when we consider the so-called Kolmogorov complexity
(also known as descriptive complexity, Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity, stochastic
complexity, algorithmic entropy, or program-size complexity) of an object: a random
series of bits possesses maximal complexity according to the definition of algorithmic
complexity, but it is also natural to consider that the corresponding amount of
information is minimal because it is maximally ‘’uncertain’’.
There is no way to escape this kind of paradoxes according to me because they are
related to antagonistic acceptances of the concept of probability.
If we are interested in characterizing a noisy communication channel via the
measure of the entropy of the distribution of correctly and wrongly transmitted
results, as is often the case in quantum cryptography for instance, this entropy is an
increasing function of the ‘’error rate’’ so that the rate of correctly transmitted
information increases when entropy decreases.
 In other contexts one is free to consider impredictability as a richness offered by a
system in which case it makes sense to assume that information is a monotonously
increasing function of entropy. In this approach, a message in which only one letter is
used is devoided of information, while in the case that two letters appear (0 amd 1 for
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instance), if the frequency of appearance of each letter differs from ½ (this is what
we get by tossing a biased coin), one can conceive that the signal could be
compressed because there is redundancy in its encoding.
Considered so (and this is the standard approach), a biased distribution of 0’s and
1’s (a random binary distribution for instance) which is maximally entropic would also
possess the highest degree of information because it cannot be compressed. This
view is legitimate if we realize that a low entropic series of random bits (that we could
obtain by tossing a strongly  unbiased coin for instance a coin that will fall on the
head face with probability 99 percent) can be compressed and replaced by a quite
shorter signal. It will require less bits to encode the series than for a random one,
and it is common to consider that when a message is long it contains much
information.
Let us consider another example, the full trajectory of a satellite around Earth, which
is univoquely determined by 6 real numbers, the initial position and velocity of the
satellite-in the Newtnian picture.
In the standard approach one would say that the full trajectory is nearly devoided of
information (in the sense of computational complexity) because it is redundant: the
position and velocity at any time contain in germ the full trajectory.
In our approach we consider that it is the contrary because randomness is like noise
and, in our view, noise doen’t contain information at all.
On the contrary, a deterministic series (like the series of positions occupied by the
satellite throughout time) possesses a high degree of certainty and predictability, so
that it could be potentially used for encoding information in a fidel and reproducible
way.
Viewed so we consider that regularities are the message, and not chaos, even if by
doing so we risk to be relegated to a minority.
Obviously in our approach the “informational degree’’ refers to the unambiguity of the
message (it measures to which degree a physically encoded message ‘’makes
sense’’). In the standard approach ‘’information’’ refers rather to the length of the
message. It is not amazing that these approaches contradict each other because
they express radically different points of view…
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Application of Quantum Darwinism to Cosmic Inflation:
an example of the limits imposed in Aristotelian logic by information-based approach
to Go¨del’s incompleteness
Nicola´s F. Lori
IBILI, Universidade de Coimbra, 3000-354 Coimbra, Portugal∗
Alex H. Blin
Departamento de F´ısica, Universidade de Coimbra, 3004-516 Coimbra, Portugal†
Go¨del’s incompleteness applies to any system with recursively enumerable axioms and rules of
inference. Chaitin’s approach to Go¨del’s incompleteness relates the incompleteness to the amount
of information contained in the axioms. Zurek’s quantum Darwinism attempts the physical descrip-
tion of the universe using information as one of its major components. The capacity of Quantum
Darwinism to describe quantum measurement in great detail without requiring ad-hoc non-unitary
evolution makes it a good candidate for describing the transition from quantum to classical. A
baby-universe diffusion model of cosmic inflation is analyzed using quantum Darwinism. In this
model cosmic inflation can be approximated as Brownian motion of a quantum field, and quantum
Darwinism implies that molecular interaction during Brownian motion will make the quantum field
decohere. The quantum Darwinism approach to decoherence in the baby-universe cosmic-inflation
model yields the decoherence times of the baby-universes. The result is the equation relating the
baby-universe’s decoherence time with the Hubble parameter, and that the decoherence time is
considerably shorter than the cosmic inflation period.
PACS numbers: 98.80.-k, 03.65.Ud, 98.80.Qc, 05.40.Jc
I. INTRODUCTION
Linde’s approach to the Big Bang [1] indicates that the creation of a universe from ”nothing” occurs in a Brownian-
motion-like process (Brownian motion and diffusion are used in this work as being equivalent terms). Zurek’s quantum
Darwinism approach to quantum mechanics indicates that Brownian motion can be related to decoherence [2]. It
would therefore be expected that quantum Darwinism is related to decoherence during cosmic inflation.
There is no disagreement in the physics community on the experimental evidence that quantum systems exist in
a multitude of states, with only a portion of those states being observable. The approaches in physics differ in what
happens to the non-observed states and in the process by which the states become observed states. Examples of two
different points of view are the works of Linde and Zurek.
The approach by Linde proposes that the universe follows a deterministic evolution about which we can only
observe partial aspects of the multiple possible occurrences that are deterministically created. The approach by
Zurek proposes that the deterministic evolution of the universe is constrained by a Darwinian extinction of some
of the possible evolution paths of the system. The approaches by Linde and Zurek agree in what is observed, but
they disagree about what happens to the non-observed states. In the case of quantum gravity effects during cosmic
inflation those differences may be relevant.
The mathematical representation of quantum Darwinism requires a way of including extinction in a mathematical
formalism. Using Chaitin’s approach to Go¨del’s incompleteness [3] we propose in the Appendix a separation between
two ways of representing mathematical axiomatic systems. The formal axiomatic systems (FAS) which is a system
where the consistency of the axioms is preserved, meaning that no proposition can be both true and not true; and the
Darwinian axiomatic system (DAS) where some true propositions lead to false propositions (which become extinct)
and so the DAS is not consistent but complete. The DAS is complete for there are no true propositions that are
not obtained from true propositions; all propositions have parent propositions that need to be true for otherwise
they become extinct. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems showed that a non-trivial axiomatic system cannot be both
complete and consistent [3, 18]; the FAS is the choice for consistency and the DAS is the choice for completeness.
∗Electronic address: nflori@fmed.uc.pt
†Electronic address: alex@fis.uc.pt
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This work mostly uses the works of Linde [1] and Zurek [2]; other approaches considered are Chaitin’s use of
information in mathematics [3], Wheeler’s concept of ‘it for bit’ [4], Rovelli’s relational approach to quantum gravity
[5], Smolin’s relation between quantum mechanics and quantum gravity [6], and Guth’s approach to cosmic inflation
[7].
Although other approaches to decoherence during cosmic inflation have been developed [8–14], our approach differs
in that it is based on quantum Darwinism’s interpretation of the decoherence caused by the interaction through
molecules in Brownian motion [2]. This is a good parallel with the baby-universes in Brownian motion [1] because
also in that case the major source of decoherence is the interaction between baby-universes. The issue of the medium
surrounding the molecules is not relevant for this model of decoherence because it is the other molecules that are the
environment.
The remainder of the present article is structured as follows. The next five sections discuss the underlying theory:
Introduction to Quantum Measurement; Introduction to Quantum Darwinism; Relation between Quantum Darwinism
and Quantum Diffusion; Diffusion in Cosmic Inflation; Effects of a Quantum Darwinism Approach to Cosmic Inflation.
The calculations at the end of each subsection are then presented in the section on Results, with their relations
highlighted. The section entitled Discussion and Summary describes the possible implications of the results obtained
and highlights the principal results.
II. INTRODUCTION TO QUANTUM MEASUREMENT
Quantum Darwinism [2, 17] is an approach to quantum measurement that is strongly based on Wheeler’s “it-for-bit”
approach [4] and so it has parallels with both information theory and computation. The classical technical definition
of the amount of information was provided by Shannon’s information entropy and stated that if the sending device
has a probability Pj of sending message j from a set of N messages, then the information transmitted when one
message is chosen from the set is, in units of bits [3],
H = − log2 Pj . (1)
For a brief description of quantum Darwinism it is helpful to resort to a short description of the limitations of
non-Darwinian quantum mechanics, the limitations that quantum Darwinism addresses. In quantum mechanics the
universe is separable into 3 parts: I. System S, II. Apparatus A, III. Environment E. The evolution of quantum
systems occurs according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. Entanglement between system and apparatus can be modeled
by unitary Schro¨dinger evolution. Von Neumann [15] proposed a non-unitary selection of the preferred basis,
|ΨSA〉 〈ΨSA| →
∑
k
|ak|2 |sk〉 〈sk| |Ak〉 〈Ak| = ρSA . (2)
and also proposed the non-unitary “collapse” succeeding the occurrence of a unique outcome to be a different event
from the selection of the preferred basis. For example, the occurrence of state 17:∑
k
|ak|2 |sk〉 〈sk| |Ak〉 〈Ak| → |a17|2 |s17〉 〈s17| |A17〉 〈A17| . (3)
Zurek [2, 17] proposed an approach to entanglement which is unitary and as un-arbitrary as possible, using the envi-
ronment. The use of the environment implies abandoning the closed-system assumption [17], requiring the following
alteration:
|ΨSA〉 |e0〉 =
(∑
k
ak |sk〉 |Ak〉
)
|e0〉 →
∑
k
ak |sk〉 |Ak〉 |ek〉 = |ΨSAE〉 . (4)
The selection of the preferred basis is obtained using unitary evolution by assuming |〈ek |el〉|2 = δkl and tracing over
the environment [17],
ρSA = TrE |ΨSAE〉 〈ΨSAE | =
∑
k
|ak|2 |sk〉 〈sk| |Ak〉 〈Ak| . (5)
The preferred basis is defined by the set of states that the apparatus can adopt, and do not interact with the
environment; and thus, only interact with the system. The apparatus adopts one of the pointer states after it makes
a measurement. For this set of pointer states to exist it is necessary that the apparatus be entangled with the
2
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environment. Entanglement is a non-classical quantum behavior where two parts of the universe that have interacted
at a certain point in time have to be described with reference to each other even if they are now separated in space,
as long as they remain entangled. The above explanations of quantum measurement do not clarify the meaning of
tracing over the environment, and the non-unitary “collapse” is not really explained. Quantum Darwinism addresses
both issues successfully [2, 19].
III. INTRODUCTION TO QUANTUM DARWINISM
In quantum Darwinism, the following statements are considered to be valid: (a) The universe consists of systems.
(b) A pure (meaning completely known) state of a system can be represented by a normalized vector in Hilbert
space H. (c) A composite pure state of several systems is a vector in the tensor product of the constituent Hilbert
spaces. (d) States evolve in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation i~|ψ˙〉 = H|ψ〉 where H is Hermitian. In
quantum Darwinism no “collapse” postulate is needed. An assumption by von Neumann [15] and others is that the
observers acquire information about the quantum system from the quantum system, but that is (almost) never the
case. The distinction between direct and indirect observation might seem inconsequential as a simple extension of
the von Neumann chain, but the use of the point of view of the observer in quantum Darwinism makes it possible to
obtain the “collapse” [17, 19].
In quantum Darwinism there is “no information without representation”, meaning that the information is always
about a state that survived, and as a consequence being represented in the Hilbert space H. Preferred pointer states
selected through entanglement define what is being stored in the environment. The “information amount” in quantum
systems is defined using the density matrix ρ and is based on ref. [17].
Environment-assisted invariance (envariance) is a quantum symmetry exhibited by the states of entangled quantum
systems. The SA system is from now simply represented by S to simplify notation. The joint state of system S
entangled (but no longer interacting) with an environment E can always be described by a Schmidt basis if the
environment is made big enough (even if the initial joint state is mixed). As the environment no longer interacts
with the system, probabilities of various states of the system cannot be – on physical grounds – influenced by such
purification. Such purification is assumed to be either unnecessary or already carried out:
|ΨSE〉 =
K∑
k
ak |sk〉 |ek〉 . (6)
Envariance refers to the existence of unitary transformations U S acting on S alone that alter |ΨSE〉 non-trivially and
whose effect can be canceled by the action of a unitary operation UE acting on E alone,
UE (US |ΨSE〉) = |ΨSE〉 , (7)
or, in more detail,
[1S ⊗ uE ] ([uS ⊗ 1E ] |ΨSE〉) = |ΨSE〉 . (8)
All envariant unitary transformations have the eigenstates that coincide with the Schmidt expansion and are given
by
uS =
K∑
k
eiφk |sk〉 〈sk| . (9)
The corresponding operator in the environment is
uE =
K∑
k
ei(φk+2pilk) |ek〉 〈ek| (10)
with lk integer. Properties of global states are envariant iff they are functions of the phases of the Schmidt coefficient.
To regard phases as unimportant and absorb them using the Schmidt expansion is a dangerous over-simplification as
phases do matter.
The classical-approach prejudice that the information about the system is synonymous with its state and the
presence of that information is physically irrelevant for that state is maybe based on the Aristotelian logic (a.k.a. binary
3
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logic and 2-state logic) assumption that thinking of the object is identical to the object existing. This assumption
in not shared by the Buddhist logic approach [23]. The Buddhist logic (a.k.a. 4-state logic) approach has many
parallels to the mathematical constructivist approach. In Buddhist logic the statement “A is B” can be denied by
the Aristotelian denial “A is not-B”, but it can also be denied using “A not-is B”. In the “not-is” what is denied is
the capacity of “A” to be “B”, instead of affirming that “A” is “not-B”. The fourth statement is “A not-is not-B”
which is different from the statement “A is B” [23]. Completeness implies that all propositions are, and consistency
implies that all propositions are either true or false. Buddhist logic allows for extending logic to approaches that
are neither complete nor consistent. The states of classical objects are absolute (the state of an object is), while in
quantum theory there are situations –entanglement- where the state of the object is relative. In general relativity
there can only be envariance if the environment includes the whole universe (Newton’s bucket comes to mind). It is
the non-absolute nature of existence that invites the abandonment of Aristotelian logic in favour of Buddhists logic
as a first step, but not as a complete step (Figure 1).
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FIG. 1: In Aristotelian (2-state) logic the two possibilities are “A is B” and “A is not-B”. In Buddhist (4-state) logic the four
states are “A is B”, “A is not-B”, “A not-is B”, and “A not-is not-B”. In quantum Existentialism there is an “almost continuous”
transition between “is” and “not-is”, and between “B” and “not-B”; the “envariance” enables to cancel the alteration of the
“is” (or “not-is”) of “B” caused by UB by the action of a Unot−B acting on “not-B”.
The mathematical requirement of completeness implies that all propositions obtained by the rules of deduction
are true [3], which requires complete/global access to the states of the system. The mathematical requirement
of consistency implies that a state cannot simultaneously be and not be; in quantum Darwinism only “pointer”
states are like that [2]. Global states are measured when observations focus on the “system+environment”, and
“pointer” states are obtained when the focus is on the system to the detriment of the environment. Observing the
“system+environment” and observing the system are complementary approaches, analogous to the complementarity of
measuring position and momentum. Thus quantum Darwinism makes a direct connection between Chaitin’s approach
to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [3] on one hand and quantum complementarity on the other.
IV. RELATION BETWEEN QUANTUM DARWINISM AND DIFFUSION
In molecular Brownian motion, the Brownian motion of quantum states implies decoherence. The quantum Brow-
nian motion model used here consists of an environment E made of a collection of harmonic oscillators of position qn ,
mass mn , frequency wn , and coupling constant cn , interacting with a system S of mass M, position x, and harmonic
potential V(x)= 12MW
2 x2 . The total Lagrangian is [20]
L (x, qn) =
M
2
[
x˙2 −W 2x2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LS
+
∑
n
mn
2
[
q˙2n − w2n
[
qn − cnx
mnw2n
]2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LSE
. (11)
The Lagrangian component LSE takes into account the renormalization of the potential energy. Let us denote k as
the Boltzmann constant and T as the temperature. If the thermal energy kT is higher than all other relevant energy
scales, including the energy content of the initial state and energy cutoff in the spectral density of the environment
C(v), then the master equation for the density matrix ρS of an initially environment-independent system S depends
4
EDU 2008 p163
on the position y of another molecule, the renormalized Hamiltonian Hren and on
γ =
2
MW
∫ ∞
0
dl
∫ ∞
0
dvC (v) sin (Wl) sin (vl) (12)
in the following way [20]:
ρ˙S = − i~ [Hren, ρS ]− γ[x− y]
[
∂
∂x
− ∂
∂y
]
ρS − 2MγkT~2 [x− y]
2ρS . (13)
In this high T case the master equation is independent of V(x). The relaxation time is γ−1 and the decoherence time
is [16, 17]:
τD = γ−1
[ ~√
2MkT
x− y
]2
. (14)
The Wigner quasi-distribution representation Z of the high temperature density matrix master equation (Eq. (13))
is [20]:
Z˙ = − p
M
∂
∂x
[Z] +
∂V
∂x
Z + 2γ
∂
∂p
[pZ] + 2γMkT
∂2
∂p2
[Z] . (15)
The minimum uncertainty Wigner quasi-distribution for a phase space localized wave-packet is [20]:
Z (x0, x, p0,p) =
1
pi~
exp
−
 x− x0√
~
2MW
2 −
 p− p0√
~MW
2
2
 . (16)
If there are two wave packets separated by ∆x, with average location x and average momentum p, then the joint
Wigner quasi-distribution is equal to averaging the two localized Wigner distribution expressions plus a non-classical
interference term equal to [20]
Wint ≈
1
pi~
cos
(
∆x
~
p
)
exp
−
 x√
~
2MW
2 −
 p√
~MW
2
2
 . (17)
Joining the diffusion coefficient expression [16, 20]
D =
kT
γM
(18)
with the decoherence time definition of Eq. (14) yields a relation between decoherence time and diffusion coefficient,
τD =
D
2
[
~
kT [x− y]
]2
. (19)
From Einstein’s diffusion equation we know that 〈(x(t) − x(0))2〉 = 2Dt for a single molecule. Consider now two
molecules. Let t{x,y} be the time interval since the last collision of two molecules which collided at the point x0 = y0
and which are now at the positions x and y, respectively. Using the statistical independence of the two molecules,
〈xy〉 = 〈x〉〈y〉 and noting that 〈x〉 = 〈y〉 = x0, the expression becomes 〈(x−y)2〉 = 4Dt{x,y}. This is an expression for
the average behavior of a pair of molecules. A corresponding expression for the particular behavior of two molecules
can be written as (x− y)2 = 4D{x,y}t{x,y} where D{x,y} is a coefficient valid for that particular event. If the medium
the molecules inhabit is fairly homogeneous, or if the molecules can be assumed to typically occupy similar parts of
the medium for a similar amount of time, then D{x,y} ' D. With this, Eq. (19) can be rewritten as
τD =
1
8t{x,y}
[
~
kT
]2
. (20)
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V. DIFFUSION IN COSMIC INFLATION
The purpose of this section is to describe how cosmic inflation relates to Brownian motion. It is not intended to
present a thorough description of cosmic inflation. In the present description of cosmic inflation there are multiple
Big Bang occurrences, and in each of these occurrences baby-universes are created [1]. One of the baby-universes is
our own universe. In order to describe cosmic inflation it is helpful to explain what is being inflated. The behavior
of spacetime is characterized by the relation between differences in time and differences in spatial location, and can
be represented by the behavior of a single characteristic time varying scale parameter a which appears in the line
element which is characteristic of spacetime. The Hubble parameter is the fractional change of a with time: H = 1a
da
dt .
Inflation describes the early epoch period of rapid growth of a. During inflation H is approximately constant at a value
roughly of the order H ∼= 1034s−1 which makes a approximately proportional to eHt. Inflation comes to an end when
H begins to decrease rapidly. The energy stored in the vacuum-like state is then transformed into thermal energy, and
the universe becomes extremely hot. From that point onward, its evolution is described by the hot universe theory.
To correctly describe Brownian behavior during cosmic inflation, it is convenient to distinguish between two horizons:
the particle horizon and the event horizon. The particle horizon delimits what an observer at a time t can observe
assuming the capacity to detect even the weakest signals. The event horizon delimits the part of the universe from
which we can ever (up to some maximal time tmax ) receive information about events taking place now (at time t).
The particle and event horizons are in a certain sense complementary. In an exponentially expanding universe, the
radius of the event horizon is equal to cH−1 where c is the speed of light in vacuum. In an exponentially expanding
universe, any two points that are more than a distance cH−1 apart will move away from each other faster than c,
meaning that those two points will never observe each other. They might belong to the same baby-universe if they
come from the same Big Bang, but the points will lie beyond each other’s particle horizons.
As described in Ref. [1], cosmic inflation leads to the creation of multiple baby-universes one of them our own.
Some of those universes will have physical behaviors very different from the behavior of our universe, but we will now
consider the behavior of quantum fluctuations in the cosmic inflation model. The scalar inflaton field ϕ (sometimes
identified with the Higgs field, although this is controversial) is represented as [1]
ϕ (x, t) = (2pi)−
3
2
∫
d3p
[
a+p ψp (t) e
ipx + a−p ψ
∗
p (t) e
−ipx] . (21)
The (2pi)−
3
2 term is simply a normalization factor,
∫
d3p is the integration over all possible values of the momentum,
a+p creates a field with momentum p parameter with a probability modulated by ψp (t) and propagating in spacetime
as the wave eipx, and a−p destroys that same field.
The first cosmic inflation models considered that ϕ was a classical field (meaning non-quantum). The way a
quantum system becomes classical is through the process of decoherence. As described in the previous section, the
process of decoherence has strong similarities to Brownian motion. Ref. [1] describes the similarity of the behavior of
ϕ during cosmic inflation and Brownian motion.
As it is typical in Brownian motion, the diffusion of the field ϕ can be described by the probability distribution
P (ϕ, t) of finding the field ϕ at that point in instant t. In Eq. 7.3.17 of Ref. [1] it is found that
∂P (ϕ, t)
∂t
= D
∂2P (ϕ, t)
∂ϕ2
. (22)
Using Eq. (22), Ref. [1] shows that
〈ϕ2〉 = 2Dt (23)
as is expected in diffusion processes (Eq. 7.3.12 in Ref. [1]) and that
D =
H3
8pi2c2
. (24)
VI. QUANTUM DARWINISM APPROACH TO COSMIC INFLATION
The way a quantum system becomes classical is through the process of decoherence. According to quantum
Darwinism, in the high temperature limit of quantum Brownian motion, the decoherence is caused by the molecular
interaction. After the Big Bang and during cosmic inflation the temperature is extremely high, so it is possible that
6
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the Brownian process of the baby-universe before and during the cosmic inflation described in Ref. [1] entails the
extinction of the non-decohered universe states.
The Big Bang proposes to describe the creation of an observable universe from ”nothing”, and so a Darwinian
perspective of it (such as the approach used here which is based in quantum Darwinism) will have a FAS-component
that is a lot smaller than its DAS component and so it would be very Darwinian (see Appendix). A Darwinian evolution
is a Brownian evolution where extinction might occur; and so this study of the relation between decoherence (extinction
of some quantum states) and diffusion (Brownian motion) of baby-universes is a study of Darwinian processes occurring
during cosmic inflation.
Solving the diffusion equation (22) during cosmic inflation, one obtains the probability for creation of a universe with
a certain vacuum energy. Summing over all topologically disconnected configurations of just-created universes enables
one to obtain the probability for creating universes with a certain cosmological constant value [1], causing Linde to
write that although “it is often supposed that the basic goal of theoretical physics is to find exactly what Lagrangian
or Hamiltonian correctly describes our entire world. . . . one could well ask . . . if the concept of an observer may play
an important role not just in discussions of the various characteristics of our universe, but in the very laws by which
it is governed.” The answer proposed here to Linde’s question is that if the quantum Darwinism approach is applied
to cosmic inflation, then the laws of physics are themselves the result of a Darwinian evolution of quantum systems.
VII. RESULTS
We use Eq. (20) to generalize the results obtained for molecules in quantum Brownian motion to baby-universes
undergoing Brownian motion during cosmic inflation. The decoherence time τD is then a time duration referring to
two baby-universes, with t being the time since they last interacted (typically the last time they were at the same
place would be at the beginning of the Big Bang). The decoherence time is obtained as:
τD =
1
8t
[
~
kT
]2
. (25)
The difference in the approaches by Linde and by Zurek, which can be linked to the differences between the axiomatic
systems FAS and DAS (see Appendix), implies different outcomes for the non-observed states. The FAS/Linde
approach considers that the outcomes incompatible with the observed outcome exist in different multi-verses, while
the DAS/Zurek approach considers the outcomes incompatible with the observed outcome to have become non-
existent. In Zurek’s approach information-transmission is what enables existence [20], while in quantum gravity
existence (expressed as the number of quantum particles) is observer dependent and thus can only be understood as
a relational concept [1, 5].
The representation of cosmic inflation using a diffusion process in a de Sitter space allows to consider thermal
equilibrium with [1, 21]
T =
~H
k
(26)
so that Eq. (25) becomes
τD =
1
8t
[
1
H
]2
. (27)
This result implies that during the duration of cosmic inflation, the decoherence time is much smaller than the cosmic
inflation duration. In cosmic inflation, there is a growth by typically at least a factor of e60, starting at t = 10−35s
and ending at t = 10−32s, so that ∆t is about 10−32s. Therefore, since H∆t = 60, the Hubble parameter H is about
1034s−1. Decoherence occurs when the time t reaches τD, so t = τD in Eq.(27) yields t ' 10−34s−1, a time well before
the end of inflation.
So even if the baby-universes were in a quantum coherent state at the beginning of inflation, they would decohere
after a small fraction of the duration of cosmic inflation. The present result agrees with Martineau’s observation [11]
that decoherence is extremely effective during inflation, but we reach that conclusion more easily. The approach to
“decoherence during Brownian motion” used by Zurek considers that the effect of zero-point vacuum fluctuations is
neglected. Kiefer et al. [14] propose that the inclusion of zero-point vacuum fluctuations makes decoherence still
effective but no longer complete, meaning that a significant part of primordial correlations remains up to the present
moment.
7
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VIII. DISCUSSION
Obtaining values for the decoherence time requires knowledge of the value of the Hubble parameter before and
during inflation. Values of the Hubble parameter have a large range, and the measurement of its value is a topic
of current research [1]. The existence of baby-universes is also a not yet established observational fact [1]. Thus,
obtaining experimental proof of Eq. (25) and Eq. (27) is not yet possible. But if baby-universes exist, and if more
information is obtained about the time-dynamics of the Hubble parameter, the relation between Hubble parameter
and decoherence time expressed in Eq. (25) and Eq. (27) would be likely to become useful.
A characteristic of biological Darwinism is the existence of a first cell. The approach to cosmic inflation described
in Ref. [22] indicates that the inflating region of spacetime must have a past boundary. This implies that it is not
possible to use cosmic inflation as a mechanism for avoiding the occurrence of a primordial Big Bang for which it
is not possible to define a time preceding it. The work in Ref. [22] does not refute the possibility that there were
other Big Bangs before the most recent one; but it shows that even if there existed other Big Bangs before, there
must have necessarily occurred a primordial Big Bang that started from “nothing” or very close to “nothing”. The
past boundary marks the transition from a zero amount of information situation (the “nothing” state) to one where
information exists (the “something” state).
In this work a relation between Quantum Darwinism and HAS is presented (see Appendix). The smaller the amount
of information in the beginning/axiomatic state of the HAS, the more the HAS will behave as a DAS as opposed to a
FAS. The Quantum Darwinism treatment of the Big Bang would therefore correspond to a process that is extremely
DAS-like, and would be even more DAS-like for the Big Bang where the past boundary occurred.
IX. CONCLUSION
The measurement described in Eq. (25) and Eq. (27) obtains what the physical constants (and laws) will be for a
certain baby-universe by a Darwinian extinction of the other possible values. That the measurement occurring during
cosmic inflation is the selector of the physical constants is already proposed in section 10 of Ref. [1], but the approach
proposed here is different in that it proposes the Darwinian extinction of the non-obtained quantum alternatives that
are not moving away at a speed faster than c.
To summarize, an expression was obtained for the time after which different previously entangled baby-universes
would decohere.
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APPENDIX: FORMAL AND DARWINIAN AXIOMATIC SYSTEMS
The random extinction of information in quantum Darwinism contrasts with the preservation of information in
Hilbert’s formal axiomatic systems (FAS) [3]. The FAS is a deterministic system where the consistency of the axioms
is preserved, meaning that no proposition can be both true and not true; and the logic in the FAS obtains true
propositions from true propositions. In Darwinian approaches (e.g. quantum Darwinism) if survival is identified
with truth, then some true propositions lead to false propositions (which become extinct) and so Darwinism is not
consistent. However, in Darwinism there are no true propositions that are not obtained from true propositions (all
entities have parent entities that need to be true since they gave offspring); meaning Darwinism is necessarily complete.
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems showed that a non-trivial FAS cannot be both complete and consistent [3, 18].
An axiomatic system made to be complete and not consistent would have validly inferred propositions being both
true and not-true. A way of dealing with this difficulty would be to validate propositions not by the valid application
of inference rules, but by using a proof-checking algorithm that would eliminate propositions that are inconsistent
within themselves. Such a process of selecting valid propositions is called here a Darwinian axiomatic system (DAS).
The FAS and the DAS are the two extreme ways of dealing with Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, respectively the
consistent and the complete forms. It is possible to conceive an hybrid axiomatic system (HAS) between the FAS and
the DAS. A FAS is constituted by alphabet, grammar, axioms, rules of inference, and a proof-checking algorithm.
In the FAS approach to mathematics, one starts with axioms considered as self-evident and built using the alphabet
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and the grammar; then the rules of inference are applied to the axioms and all the theorems (logical inferences of the
axioms) are obtained. A proof-checking algorithm checks if a proof follows all the rules by doing reverse inference
starting from the proof’s result and checking if what is obtained are the axioms. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems
showed that a non-trivial FAS cannot be both complete and consistent [3, 18].
Axioms in FAS are typically made to be consistent so that the FAS is consistent, but a FAS cannot be both
consistent and complete. Zurek’s quantum Darwinism is an attempt to balance the consistency of the Schro¨dinger-
Copenhagen approach with the completeness of the Wheeler-Multiverse approach [24]. The approach proposed here
is that quantum Darwinism is a HAS that has successfully mixed the FAS-like Schro¨dinger-Copenhagen approach
with the completeness characteristic of the Wheeler-Multiverse approach. Moreover, we also propose that quantum
Darwinism looks very much like a DAS when no amount of information is being preserved from the past. The physical
situation that most closely resembles the creation of information from ”nothing” (state of zero amount of information)
is the Big Bang, which is why we chose to first apply the concept of the dichotomy between the FAS and DAS in the
context of the Big Bang.
To Chaitin’s information-based Go¨del incompleteness conclusion [3] that real numbers are non-computable with
probability 1, quantum Darwinism answers through a discrete universe. In mathematical randomness [3] the value of
a random variable is only known by running a computer, and in quantum Darwinism the value of a random quantum
variable only occurs if the interaction in an experiment is strong enough [19]. The quantum randomness [17, 19]
concept is identical to the mathematical randomness [2] concept if the quantum systems’ existence is enabled through
their transmission of information, which occurs in quantum Darwinism. The existence’s dependence on information
is the part of the Existentialist philosophical structure added by quantum Darwinism [17].
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems propose to describe the difficulties of creating a mathematical formalism from
”nothing”, i.e. from limit of zero information, using Hibert’s FAS [3, 18], which is a deterministic approach. Quantum
Darwinism proposes to address the creation of classical reality from a quantum reality, using a Darwinian approach.
The deterministic/FAS/consistent and the Darwinian/DAS/complete approach to creation can be considered as the
two extreme approaches of dealing with Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems.
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Abstract
Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related
and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and
theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper
suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle
hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both
particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals with brains. Accordingly, this ranking
is called “the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the
configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the
cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word
organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition
defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than
metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a
specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the
state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization.
The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss “life as we do not know it”.
The paper ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples.
Keywords: Artificial life, biology, evolution, exobiology, natural sciences, particle hierarchy,
philosophy, Big History
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2I. Introduction
In a chronological overview of developments, Popa (2003) presents about 100 definitions of life,
meanwhile demonstrating that no consensus exists. Many classical definitions include long lists of
properties, such as program, improvisation, compartmentalization, energy, regeneration,
adaptability and seclusion (Koshand Jr. 2002) or adaptation, homeostasis, organization, growth,
behavior and reproduction (Wikipedia: Life). Most properties in such lists are facultative; it is still
possible to consider an organism a form of life when it does not grow, reproduce, show behavior,
etc. The inclusion of facultative aspects is a source of lasting difficulty in reaching consensus on a
definition of life. Because of the seeming hopelessness of the situation, certain scientists have
adopted a pragmatic/pessimistic viewpoint. Emmeche (1997) christened this viewpoint the
“standard view on the definition of life”. He suggests that life cannot be defined, that its definition
is not important for biology, that only living processes may be defined and that life is so complex
that it cannot be reduced to physics. Others have warned that a comprehensive definition of life is
too general and of little scientific use (e.g. van der Steen 1997).
In their search for a definition, other scientists have focused on properties that are absolutely
necessary to consider an entity life. In this context Maturana & Varela (1980, p. 78) have
proposed the concept of autopoiesis (which means “self making”). They use the following
definition: “An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their
interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes
(relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in
which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such
a network.” Special about the autopoietic process is, that it is “closed in the sense that it is
entirely specified by itself (Varela 1979 p. 25)”.
The concept of autopoiesis has increasingly become a source of inspiration for discussions in the
artificial life community about how to define life (Bullock et al., 2008). Reducing the number of
obligatory traits defining life to just one, autopoiesis is a rather abstract concept. People have
sought, therefore, to describe some of the processes that underlie autopoiesis more specifically.
An example of such a description is a triad of properties defining cellular life: container (cell
membrane), metabolism (autocatalysis) and genetic program (e.g. Bedau 2007).
These descriptions, however, have not resulted in a consensus definition of life. This has led
Cleland & Chyba (2002, 2007) to suggest that a broader context, a “theory of life”, is required. In
line with a broader framework, life may be regarded as a special realization of the evolution of
material complexity. According to Munson and York (2003), considering life in a general
evolutionary context requires arranging “all of the phenomena of nature in a more or less linear,
continuous sequence of classes and then to describe events occurring in the class of more
complex phenomena in terms of events in the classes of less complex phenomena.. “. An
important property of such a hierarchy would be that “… an increase in complexity is coupled with
the emergence of new characteristics …  suggesting that the hierarchical arrangement of nature
and the sciences is correlated with the temporal order of evolution”. Similar views for integrating
material complexity and the evolution of life can be found, for example, in the work of Teilhard de
Chardin (1966, 1969), von Bertalanffy (1968), Pagels (1985), Maynard Smith & Szathmáry (1995,
1999) and Kurzweil (1999).
In contribution to these discussions, the present author has published an evolution hierarchy for
all “particles”. The latter hierarchy uses the generic word “operator” to address both physical (e.g.
quark, atom, and molecule) and biological particles (e.g. prokaryote cell, eukaryote cell, and
multicellular). The word operator emphasizes the autonomous activity of the entities involved,
which “operate” in a given environment without losing their individual organization. The
hierarchical ranking of all operators is called the “operator hierarchy” (see Figure I)(Jagers op
Akkerhuis and van Straalen 1999, Jagers op Akkerhuis 2001, Jagers op Akkerhuis 2008 and the
author’s website www.hypercycle.nl). Because the operator hierarchy is important for the
definition of life proposed below, the outlines of this theory are summarized in the following lines
The operator hierarchy ranks operators according to the occurrence of a circular pattern, such as
that which connects the beginning and end of a process or structure. Circularity causes a closed
organizational state, also referred to as “closure” (for discussions of closure see, for example,
Heylighen 1990, Chandler and Van de Vijver 2000). Because closure causes a discrete
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3“quantum” of organization (e.g. Turchin 1977, 1995 and Heylighen 1991), the operator becomes
an “individual entity”, a “whole” or a “particle”, while still retaining its construction of smaller
elements. Closure thus defines the operator‘s complexity level and sequential closures imply a
higher complexity level. An operator‘s closure is the cause of its existence and typical for its
complexity. This implies that complexity is not measured in terms of the number of genes,
functional traits or organs of an organism, but in a very abstract way, in terms of the number of
closures. Upon losing its closure, the organization of the operator falls back to that of the
preceding operator. The actual shape of a closure can differ. Biological examples of closure are
the cell membrane and the circle of catalytic reactions allowing the cell to maintain its chemical
machinery. It is essential for a strict ranking that a lower-level and a higher-level operator always
differ by exactly one closure level. The single closure (eukaryotic cell) or a parallel pair of
closures (autocatalysis plus membrane of the cell) that define the next level are referred to as
“first-next possible closure(s)”. A consequent use of first-next possible closures allows physical
and biological operators to be ranked according to the “operator hierarchy” (Figure I).  The
operator hierarchy includes quarks, hadrons, atoms, molecules, prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic
cells, multicellulars (e.g. plants, fungi) and “animals”, the latter representing an example of the
operators that possess a neural network with interface and that are called “memons” in the
operator hierarchy.
Due to its focus on closure, the operator hierarchy represents an idealization because it excludes
potential transition states in between two closures. For example, several hundreds of metal atoms
may be required before a functional Fermi sea transforms a collection of single atoms into a metal
grid. Also, the emergence of multicellularity (discussed in detail in §III below) may require a
colonial, multicellular state in between the single cell and the multicellular operator. The above
shows that transition states form natural intermediate phases in the emergence of closures. The
operator hierarchy does not include these transition states, however, because its hierarchical
ranking is exclusively based on entities that already show first-next possible closure.
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Figure 1: Using the operator hierarchy to define life and organisms. Arrows indicate how closures
create operators (more information can be found in Jagers op Akkerhuis 2008, and the author’s
website www.hypercycle.nl).
The main reason for writing this paper, and adding yet another definition of life to the listings, is
that the operator hierarchy offers several advantages in solving definition problems. First, the
definitions of the operators are generally applicable because they focus on the essences of
organization. For example, demanding autocatalysis leaves open which specific catalysts will
perform the process. Second, the use of first-next possible closures ensures a critical filtering of
only obligatory properties from property lists. Finally, the use of the operator hierarchy makes it
easy to develop a hierarchy-based definition of life. In other words, the operator hierarchy offers a
novel path for structuring and simplifying discussions about which entities are life.
The following paragraphs discuss different aspects of existing definitions of life and examine new
ways to define the organism, living and death. At the end, a test of the practical value of the
present definitions for the solving of a range of classical problems, such as a virus, a flame, a car,
a mule and a mitochondrion, will be presented.
II. Defining life and the organism
Before discussing the use of the operator hierarchy for defining life, living and the organism, it is
important to note that when talking about definitions, care should be taken that “a definition is a
series of superimposed language filters and only the definiendum (the term to be defined) can
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5penetrate it” (Oliver and Perry 2006). Problems may arise when the words used for the
definiendum and for the filter have a broad meaning or have different meanings in different
contexts. It is thus useful to elaborate on the current context for “life” before continuing.
“Life” has different meanings in different contexts. For example, people refer to the period
between birth and death as their life (this is the best day of my life) even though lifetime would be
more correct. In addition, the experience of “being alive”, or “living”, also carries the label of life
(to have a good life). Other uses of life holistically refer to the importance of selective interactions
in ecosystems that over generations lead to better-adapted life forms (the evolution of life). Ruiz-
Mirazo et al. (2004) have proposed a definition of the latter type. They state that life is “a complex
collective network made out of self-reproducing autonomous agents whose basic organization is
instructed by material records generated through the evolutionary-historical process of that
collective network”. In philosophy, life is sometimes considered a graded concept for being
because all what is, is alive in the measure wherein it is (Jeuken 1975). Due to the contextual
dependence of these and other interpretations, it is improbable that a general definition of life can
be constructed. Van der Steen (1997) indicates that even if such an overly general definition
existed, it would probably be difficult to applie it to specific situations.
To avoid problems with generality and multiple interpretations of concepts, the present study
adopts a limited viewpoint, presuming a one-to-one relationship between a definition of life and a
specific material complexity. In this context, life is an abstract group property shared by certain
configurations of matter.
The operator hierarchy offers a context for a general matter-based definition of life. Focusing on
all operators showing a complexity that exceeds a certain minimum level, the hierarchy suggests
a definition of life sensu lato as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses
a complexity equal to or even higher than the cellular operator. Only the prokaryote cell, the
eukaryote cell, the prokaryote and eukaryote multicellular, the hardwired memon and the potential
higher-level operators fit this definition (Figure 1). In addition to this general definition, various
specific definitions are possible by focusing on operators that lay between a lower and an upper
closure level. An example of a specific definition is one describing cellular life (e.g. algae, plants
and fungi) as: matter showing the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a minimum
complexity of the cellular operator and the maximum complexity of a multicellular operator. The
latter includes only the cell, the eukaryotic cell, the prokaryotic and the eukaryotic multicellular. It
is possible to choose any of these approaches for defining living as: the dynamics of an operator
that satisfies the definition of life.
The above approach results in a strictly individual based definition of life as a group property of
certain operators. This definition has the advantage, that it offers a solid basis for defining the
creation of offspring. Subsequently, the evolution of life can be dealt with as an emergent process
occurring in any system with interactions between individual living entities that lead to differential
survival of variable offspring, produced either without or with recombination of parental
information.
The organism is the key ontological unit of biology (Etxeberria 2004, Korzeniewski 2004) and is
also referred to as a “living individual”. Understanding the latter requires insight into what is
“living”, and what is an “individual”. By defining “living” as the dynamics of those operators that
satisfy the definition of life, the operator hierarchy uses operators instead of individuals because
operators define a being or an individual more strictly than the Latin concept of individuum. The
word individuum stands for an “indivisible physical unit representing a single entity”. This
definition leaves a great deal of room for choice of the elements that form the physical unit and for
the rules that determine indivisibility. These indeterminacies may be the reason for the discussion
about whether certain life forms are organisms. Townsend et al. (2008) use the phrase “unitary
organism” to indicate the individual organism. However, certain jellyfish, for example, the
Portuguese Man O” War (Physalia physalis), look like individuals, but consist of differentiated
individuals, each with its proper neural network (e.g. Tinbergen 1946). In the operator hierarchy,
the latter jellyfish are colonies, not organisms, because each contributing individual has its proper
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of the neural interfaces of the individuals.
The operator hierarchy now suggests a way to create congruency between the definition of life
and the definition of the organism by accepting as organisms only entities that fit the operator-
based definition of life. For example, using the general definition of life, only the cells, the
eukaryotic cells, the prokaryotic and eukaryotic multicellulars and the memons are organisms.
III. Levels of life
a. The cell. The most important properties of the cell are the autocatalytic set of enzymes and the
membrane. The autocatalytic set shows reproduction as a set. Every molecule in the set
catalyzes a reaction that produces some other molecule in the set until any last reaction product
closes the cycle. In different ways, reproduction as a set is part of various theories about the
origin of life (e.g. Rosen 1958, 1973, 1991, Eigen 1971, Gánti 1971, Eigen and Schuster 1979,
Kauffman 1986, 1993, Bro 1997, Kunin 2000, Hazen 2001, Martin and Russell 2002, Hengeveld
and Fedonkin 2007).
Autocatalysis demands that a cell can potentially autonomously sustain its catalytic closure.
Accordingly, if a cell allocates a part of its autocatalytic closure to another cell, the cell is no
longer an operator. An example of the latter is the mitochondrion. It is generally accepted that
mitochondria started the interaction with their host cells as autonomous endosymbiontic ?-
proteobacteria. Over many generations, these bacteria transferred more than 90 percent of their
catalytic control to their host (Allen 1993, Berg and Kurland 2000, Searcy 2003, Capps et al.
2003, Lane 2005). The loss of the potential of autocatalysis implies that mitochondria have
become a special kind of organelle.
In addition to autocatalysis, the operator hierarchy demands an interface because a set of
autocatalytic enzymes only gains the physical individuality that allows its maintenance when it
functions in a limited space, the limits being part of the system. The integration of autocatalysis
and the membrane is part of various important theories, for example, the theories of autopoiesis
(Varela 1979) and of interactors (Hull 1981).
b. The eukaryote cell. A single cell has two dimensions for creating a next closure. One is to
create cooperation between cells, which leads to multicellularity. The other is to create an
additional closure mediating the hypercyclic functioning of the cell in the form of the nucleus.
Interestingly, it is quite likely that the most important complexity boundary in cell biology, that
between prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells, thanks its existence to the energy boost and genetic
enrichment offered by endosymbionts. With respect to the emergence of eukaryotic cells, theories
roughly divide along two major lines depending on whether the nucleus or the endosymbionts
emerged first. In addition to other aspects, support for the nucleus-first hypothesis comes from
allegedly primitive eukaryotes that show a nucleus without harboring endosymbionts. Genetic
analyses (Rivera 1998) and observations of endosymbiont traces (Clark 1995), however, suggest
that the “primitive eukaryotes” are recent developments that lost their endosymbionts in a process
of evolutionary specialization. The endosymbiont hypothesis advocates that a merger between a
methanogenic bacterium that was member of the archaea and an ?-proteobacterial
endosymbiont created the eukaryotic cell (Martin and Russel 2002). Subsequent transmission of
genes for membrane creation from the endosymbiont to the host allowed it to produce
membranes that formed the basis for the engulfment of the nucleus. Whatever the actual path
taken by evolution, the operator hierarchy focuses on the occurrence of closure involving both
structural and functional aspects of the host cell, resulting in an internal interface for the
autocatalytic set and the mediation of its functioning. Even though endosymbionts may become
obligatorily integrated in the functioning of their host cell by the transfer of part of their genetic
regulation to the host cell, they do not mediate the functioning of the autocatalytic set of the host
nor form an interface for its functioning. For this reason the operator hierarchy does not regard
endosymbiosis, but the nucleus as the relevant closure that defines the limit between prokaryotes
and eukaryotes.
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the above definition, an organism? In the operator hierarchy, multicellularity involves a structural
and a functional component represented by structural attachment of cells and an obligatory
recurrent pattern of functional interactions between them. As such, it is possible to define a
multicellular operator (a multicellular organism sensu stricto) as: a construction of mutually
adhering cells showing obligatorily recurrent interactions based on the same interaction type, that
has the potential of maintaining its functioning as a unit and that does not show memic structure.
Multicellularity has developed independently in many branches of the phylogenetic tree (reviews
by, for example, Bonner 1998, Kaiser 2001, Grosberg and Strathmann 2007) presumably
because it is associated with a range of evolutionary advantages. Multicellularity increases
mobility and access to resources, and reduces predation, and finally yet importantly, the cells in
genetically uniform multicellulars share the same genes and do not have to compete with each
other for reproduction. Willensdorfer (2008) indicates that the alleviation of reproductive
competition allows for a division of labor because “cells can specialize on non-reproductive
(somatic) tasks and peacefully die since their genes are passed on by genetically identical
reproductive cells which benefited from the somatic functions”.
In some cases a multicellular organism results from the aggregation of individually dwelling
unicellulars (for example, true slime molds, Ciliates and Myxobacteria). More generally, a
multicellular organism develops when daughter cells cohere after cell division. A simple,
temporary form of multicellular life is present in slime molds. Here, genetically-different,
individually-dwelling cells aggregate and bind using membrane proteins to form a colonial state in
which the cells intercellularly communicate by diffusion. At a certain moment, obligatory
interactions between cells lead to the formation of irreversible cell differentiation producing a
reproductive structure. During this state, the slime mold cells are temporarily a multicellular
organism.
With the evolutionary development of plasma connections, advanced multicellular life became
possible. Plasma connections allow efficient and rapid intercellular communication, involving
electrical signals, chemical signals and nutrient transport (Mackie et al. 1984, Peracchia and
Benos 2000, Nicholson 2003, Panchin 2005). Plasma connections have evolved in several
lineages of multicellulars. Plasma connections between animal cells depend on gap junctions,
between plant cells on plasmodesmata, in blue-green algae on microdesmata, and in certain
fungi or in developing insect eggs on incomplete cell walls. The evolution of gap junctions some
700 million years ago coincided with an explosion of multicellular life forms.
Multicellular organisms may go through life stages that are not multicellular. For example, sexual
reproduction involves single-celled egg and semen. Furthermore, during the two-, four- and early
eight-cell stages most vertebrate embryos have loosely attached cells without obligatory
dependency. Accordingly, they represent a colony. When separated from the colony, the cells
show a normal development. Early separation of embryonic cells is the reason why identical twins
exist. Embryo cells in the early stages can even mix with another embryo‘s cells of the same age
and develop into a normally functioning organism, called a chimera, in which some organs and
tissues belong to a different genotype than others. A definition of life should, therefore, respect
that an organism‘s cells may differ in genotype. From the late eight-cell stage, the development of
gap-junctions marks the emergence of regulation as a unit, which makes the cellular colony a
multicellular.
The realization of a multicellular‘s potential for maintenance depends on prevailing conditions. For
example, a tree twig that is stuck in the ground may become a tree again if the weather is not too
warm, too cold, or too dry, etc. and if the twig has the genetic potential for regeneration and is
large enough, in good condition, etc.. Whether the twig is an organism depends on its potential to
show all dynamics required for being a multicellular operator. This potential is in principle gene-
based, but it depends on the condition of the phenotype and the environment for its realization.
Sometimes two multicellular organisms show symbiosis, such as plants living in close association
with mycorrhiza fungi in their roots. As the fungus and the plant already are multicellular on
forehand, a plant with mycorrhiza represents an interaction between two multicellular organisms.
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The underlying assumption may be that all organisms consist of cells and that, for this reason, the
definition of the living properties of cells will automatically cover other, more complex
organizations. According to the operator hierarchy, this reasoning is incomplete because, with
respect to artificial intelligence, it unsatisfactorily excludes technical life a priori . The reason is
that the fundamental construction of the brain is not principally different when built from cellular
neurons, technical neurons (small hardware acting as a neuron) or programmed neurons (virtual
devices modeled to act as neurons). Even though all organisms on earth currently consist of cells
or show neural networks that consist of cells, the fact that technical memons may, one day, have
a brain structure similar to cellular memons implies that a general definition of life must consider
the possibility of technical memons.
Memons show a neuron network and a sensory interface. The basic neuron-units have been
named categorizing and learning modules or CALMs and allow for a recurrent network of CALMs
(Murre, Phaf and Wolters 1992, Happel 1997). The interface includes sensors that allow the
memon to perceive its body and environment, and effectors that allow it to move the cellular
vehicle it resides in. The interface and vehicle co-evolved during the evolution of neural networks.
In principle, it is possible to construct a functional memon from any kind of technical hardware
that provides the required neural architecture. This is the reason that the study of neural networks
in biology shows a fundamental overlap with research on technical artificial intelligence. The
recognition that memons show a recurrent network of CALMs surrounded by an interface allows
Siamese twins with separate brains to be classified as two memons sharing the same vehicle and
showing in this vehicle a partial overlap of their interfaces.
IV. No life, no reproduction
According to some authors (e.g. the Von Neumann & Burks, 1966) reproduction is a pre-requisite
for life. Like the chicken and the egg problem, it can also be said that life is a pre-requisite for
reproduction. Clearly, any decision on this matter critically depends on the context that is used to
define life. If the operator hierarchy is used, the least complex life form is the prokaryotic cellular
operator. Two arguments currently suggest that life is a pre-requisite for reproduction. The first
states that even though all other organisms originate from the first cell by reproduction, the first
cell itself had an inorganic origin. The emergence of the first cell thus shows that life does not
obligatorily result from reproduction. The second argument posits that organisms do not need to
show reproduction, i.e., producing offspring, to comply with the operator-based definition of life;
The operator-based definition demands that organisms show two closures: autocatalysis and a
membrane. Autocatalysis can be regarded as reproduction without creating offspring. As Jagers
op Akkerhuis (2001) pointed out, autocatalysis implies that a cell autonomously creates a
structural copy of its information, a process that is called “structural (auto-) copying of
information”. Before answering the question of whether the structural (auto-)copying of the cell‘s
information means that it must reproduce, it is important to detail the concept of information. For
the latter, I suggest applying Checkland and Scholes (1990) definition of information to the
autocatalytic set. These authors have defined information as data with a meaning in a context. In
line with this reasoning, Kauffman (1993) proposed that, by selecting the autocatalytic process as
the context, every catalytic molecule becomes a data-unit with a catalytic meaning (the “purpose”
mentioned by Kauffman 1993, p.388) and represents a part of the information of the autocatalytic
process. Following one round of autocatalysis, or more rounds to account for the loss of enzymes
over time, the cell contains copies of all of its information. At that moment, it has autonomously
performed structural copying of information and fulfills all the requirements of the operator
hierarchy, even when it does not produce an offspring. Based on this reasoning, the capacity of
autocatalytic maintenance is an obligatory requirement for cellular life and reproduction is a
possible consequence.
The above implies that it is not relevant for a general definition of life to distinguish between life
forms with or without replication, as Ruiz-Mirazo et al. (2004) has suggested. The latter authors
distinguish “proto-life stages” that do not show a phenotype-genotype decoupling (soma with
genes) from “real life” with genes. In line with the operator hierarchy based definitions, Morales
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that we could not tell whether something is alive unless we also know that it is the product of
Darwinian evolution.” The operator-based definition considers life as a prerequisite for
reproduction instead of reproduction as a prerequisite for life. Consequently, worker bees, mules,
infertile individuals and other non-reproducing organisms and/or phenotypes are life. This point of
view also solves problems that may arise when demanding that memons be able to reproduce as
a prerequisite for recognizing them as life forms. In fact, none of the cellular memons living today
shows reproduction, at least not reproduction of their neural network structure determining their
closure. The things they pass on during reproduction are the genes of their cells, allowing the
development of a multicellular organism with a neural network, capable of learning but devoid of
inherited neural information other than reflexes.
V. Life holding its breath
The above chapter shows that reproduction is not a prerequisite of life but a possible
consequence of it. Going one step further, it can also be concluded that metabolism is not a
prerequisite for life. Many taxa such as bacteria, protozoa, plants, invertebrates and vertebrates
have developmental stages showing natural inactivity (seeds, spores) or reversible inactivation
when submitted to desiccation, frost, oxygen depletion, etc. The inactive state carries the name of
anabiosis, after the process of coming to life again (for a review of “viable lifelessness” concepts,
see Keilin 1959). Another type of reversible inactivity showing marked similarity with anabiosis is
the state of neural inactivity in memons following anesthesia. An anesthetic that blocks the
transmission of signals between neurons while leaving the remaining metabolic activity of the
neurons intact causes a reversible absence of neural activity that corresponds to an anabiotic
state of the memon.
Even in the early days of the biological sciences, scholars discussed whether dried or frozen
anabiotic stages are alive at a very slow pace, or whether they are truly static states of matter. In
1860, the famous Société de Biologie in Paris wrote a lengthy report on this subject (Broca 1860-
1861). Quite importantly, this report concluded that the potential to revive an anabiotic stage is an
inherent aspect of the organization of the material of which the object consists and that it is
equally persistent as the molecular state of the matter forming the system. In short, the Société
de Biologie found that “la vie, c”est l”organisation en action”. Additional support for this conclusion
came from Becquerel (1950, 1951) who subjected anabiotic stages to a temperature 0.01 degree
above absolute zero, a temperature at which no chemical processes can occur, even not very
slowly. Becquerel demonstrated that structure alone is enough to allow revival at normal
temperatures. Anabiosis from absolute zero or complete desiccation has led to the conclusion
that “The concept of life as applied to an organism in the state of anabiosis (cryptobiosis)
becomes synonymous with that of the structure, which supports all the components of its catalytic
systems” (Keilin 1959), or that “life is a property of matter in a certain structure” (Jeuken 1975).
With respect to the question of: what certain structure?, the operator hierarchy suggests that all
operators with a complexity similar to or higher than the cell answer this question.
VI. Life as we do not know it
Considerations about “life as we do not know it” depend on assumptions. As a context for such
assumptions, the operator hierarchy offers two advantages. First, the operator hierarchy has its
basis in the general principle of first-next possible closure. Second, the rigid internal structure of
the operator hierarchy offers a unique guide for assumptions about life that we do not yet know .
Based on the general principle of first-next possible closure, the operator hierarchy shows a strict
sequential ranking of the operators. Assuming that closures act as an absolute constraint on all
operator construction, the operator hierarchy then has universal validity. Support for the latter
assumption comes from the observation that, as far as we know, all operators with a complexity
that is equal to or lower than the molecules seem to have a universal existence. If this universality
extends to the biotic operators, the material organization of higher-level operators, such as cells
and memons, may then possibly be found in the entire universe. Such universality would
significantly assist in the search for exobiotic life forms because alien life may show similar
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organization to the life we do know, at least with respect to the first-next possible closures
involved. The demand of closure still leaves a good deal of freedom for the physical realization of
operators. On other planets, different molecular processes may form the basis of the
autocatalysis and interface of the first cells. Similarly, the operator hierarchy poses no limits to the
actual shape, color, weight, etc. of exobiotic multicellular organisms. Furthermore, even though
the presence of neural networks may be required for memic organization throughout the universe,
the operator hierarchy does not restrict the kind of elements producing these networks, or the
details of the neural network structure other than demanding hypercyclicity and interface.
The rigid internal structure of the operator hierarchy allows predictions about the construction of
life forms that have not yet evolved on Earth. Of course, any discussion of this subject involves
speculation, but the operator hierarchy may well offer a unique starting point for such a
discussion. In an earlier publication (Jagers op Akkerhuis 2001), I have indicated various future
operator types with a higher complexity than the cellular hardwired memon. To minimize the
aspect of speculation, I would like to discuss here only the memon immediately above the cellular
hardwired memon (see fig. I), the so-called “softwired memon”. According to the operator
hierarchy, this type of memon should be able to copy information structurally. This means that the
organism should be able to copy all of its information by copying the structure of its neural
network. At a lower level in the hierarchy, cells do this by copying their genetic molecules.
Softwired memons can also do this. They are based on a virtual neural network that resides in
computer memory arrays. During their operation softwired memons continuously track all their
neurons, neural connections, connection strengths and interactions with the interface. It is
therefore only a small step for softwired memons to read and reproduce all the knowledge in their
neural network by copying these arrays. On these grounds, it may be deduced that softwired
memons (or still higher complexity memons) form the easiest way to satisfy the demands of the
operator hierarchy for the autonomous, structural copying of information. The operator hierarchy
suggests therefore that life as we do not know it will take the shape of technical memons.
The above reasoning shows that the operator hierarchy offers clear criteria with respect to
different forms of “artificial life”. The acceptance of an artificial entity as life is only possible when
it shows all of the required properties of an operator. Referring to the difference between strong
artificial life and weak artificial life, which do and do not consider a-life entities as genuine life,
respectively, it would be fully in line with the present reasoning to consider as genuine life all a-life
entities that fulfill the requirements for being an operator.
VII. On life and death
Given the present focus on states of matter, it is quite simple to define dead matter as: all
operators that do not fit the general definition of life. It is more difficult, however, to define death.
Given the current point of view, death represents a state in which an organism has lost its
closure. The use of closure in this definition helps prevent that “… . the properties of an organism
as a whole [would be confused] with the properties of the parts that constitute it” (Morales 1998).
However, organisms also loose their closure during transitions that are part of life cycles and that
are not associated with the organism’s death. For example, the closure of the organism is lost
and a new closure gained when the zygote exchanges its unicellular organization for the
multicellular state of the embryo and when the multicellular embryo develops to a memic state. Is
it possible to specify the loss of closure during death in a way that excludes closure losses during
life cycles?
With respect to the above question of how to exclude the loss of closure during transitions in life
cycles when defining death, the general process of deterioration offers a solution. During their
lives, organisms deteriorate because of injury and ageing. The loss of closure marking death is
always associated with the organism‘s irreversible deterioration. Demanding irreversible
deterioration, therefore, helps to prevent that one would be tempted to consider, for example, a
caterpillar as having died, when its tissues are reorganized during the transition via the pupae to
a butterfly. Accordingly, it is possible to describe death as: the state in which an organism has lost
its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization.
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Using the above definition, death may occur in either an early or late phase of the deterioration
process, and following the death of multicellulars, a short or long period may pass until the
organism‘s body parts become dead matter. The latter has its cause in the hierarchical
construction of multicellular organisms. Accordingly, the loss of the highest closure implies a
classification of the remaining body as an operator showing the first-next lower closure.
Death depends on the loss of closure. To illustrate the contribution of this statement to the
analysis of death, the death of a memon can be used. Due to the memon‘s strongly integrated
organization, death may occur at various levels that affect other levels. For example, the
multicellular regulation may be the first to collapse due to the loss of liver functions.  After a
certain period, this will cause failure of neural functioning, the latter marking the memon‘s death
In another situation, the neural functions may be lost first, and the memon is the first to die,
dragging its body with it in its fall. However, sometimes enough neural activity may remain for a
vegetative functioning of the memon‘s body as a multicellular unit. The vegetative state cannot
maintain itself autonomously (in principle, a requirement for a multicellular organism) but it may
continue given the right medical care. If this care is withdrawn, the multicellular body will start
deteriorating after which the cells in the organs and tissues will start dying at different rates. At a
certain point, the multicellular closure is lost, and separately surviving cells have become the next
level operators to die. Physiological differences between cells now determine the period during
which they can survive in the increasingly hostile habitat of the dead memon, which is cooling
below the normal operating temperature of cells and which shows many adverse chemical
changes such as the lowering of oxygen levels, the release of decay products of dead cells, etc.
Shortly after the memon‘s death, it is possible to take intact body-parts, organs and cells from its
body and sustain their functioning following transplantation to a favorable environment. For
example, the offspring of cells from the cervix of Henrietta Lane are still cultured as He La cells in
many laboratories.
VIII. The inutility of property lists
The above arguments and examples have explored the possibilities of using the operator
hierarchy for creating coherent definitions of life, the organism, living and death. However, how
should the outcome be evaluated? Have the present attempts led to definitions that could be
generally accepted in the field? A way of evaluating this that has become rather popular is to
check the results against lists of preset criteria. Those who want to evaluate the present approach
in this way may want to examine the following lists of criteria.
Morales (1998) has published a list of properties for a definition of life that includes the following
criteria: 1. Sufficiency (Does the definition separate living entities from non-living ones?), 2.
Common usage (simple classification of easy examples), 3. Extensibility (Does the definition deal
with difficult cases, such as viruses, mules, fire, Gaia, extraterrestrial life and robots?), 4.
Simplicity (few ifs, buts, ands, etc.) and 5. Objectivity (Criteria are so simple that everyone applies
them with the same result). Emmeche (1997) offers another criteria list  for a definition of life that
includes the following: 1. The definition should be general enough  to encompass all possible life
forms. (The definition should not only focus on life as we know it.), 2. It should be coherent with
measured facts about life, (It should not oppose obvious facts.), 3. It should have a conceptual
organizing elegance. (It can organize a large part of the field of knowledge within biology and
crystallize our experience with living systems into a clear structure, a kind of schematic
representation that summarizes and gives further structure to the field.), 4. The definition should
be specific enough to distinguish life from obviously non-living systems. Emmeche (1997)
furthermore states that a definition “should cover the fundamental, general properties of life in the
scientific sense”. Korzeniewski (2005) has also proposed a list of criteria for a cybernetic
definition of life, and Poundstone (1984) has extracted further criteria for life from the work of von
Neumann & Burks (1966). Oliver and Perry (2006) have suggested a list more or less similar to
that of Emmeche (1997) focusing specifically on properties of a good definition.
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With respect to the use of criteria lists, I agree with other authors (Maturana and Varela 1980, van
der Steen 1997) that it is not necessarily an advantage if a theory performs well or a
disadvantage if a theory performs poorly according to a list of criteria; an approach‘s value does
not necessarily correspond to its performance in these types of checklists. The match depends on
the similarity in major goals and paradigms and the creator‘s influence on the selection and
definition of criteria in a given list. In addition, the selection of “favorable” lists can lead to false
positives.
For the above reasons, I am convinced that it is only possible to evaluate the currently proposed
definitions “the hard way”, i.e., by critically examining the internal consistency and transparency of
their logic. In this respect, the present approach has the advantage of a fundamental bottom-up
construction. It starts with defining elementary building blocks, the operators, and their
hierarchical ranking in the operator hierarchy. To recognize and rank the operators, the operator
hierarchy uses first-next possible closures. In the resulting hierarchy, the definition of every
higher-level operator depends, in an iterative way, on a lower-level “ancestor” until a lowest-level
ancestral system is reached, which is presumably the group of elementary particles that
according to the superstring theory may have a common basic structure. The result is a strict,
coherent and general framework that is open to falsification: the operator hierarchy.
Subsequently, the operator hierarchy offers a fundament to define a range of secondary
phenomena, such as life, the organism, living and death. Because of the reference to the
operator hierarchy, the present definitions are short, logical statements that show a high
specificity with respect to whether a certain entity satisfies the definition (list of examples in the
following §).
IX. Testing the definition of life
When using the operator hierarchy as a context for a definition, it is easy to conclude that viruses,
prions, memes or replicating computer programs are not forms of live. Both a virus with a
surrounding mantle and a viral strand of DNA or RNA are not operators, thus not life. Prions are
molecules, thus not life. Memes, such as texts and melodies, are pieces of coding that memons
can decode and replicate (Dawkins 1976). Accordingly, memes are not operators, thus not life.
Ray (1991) has created computer programs that can replicate themselves onto free computer
space, show mutation, and modify and compete for the available space in a virtual world called
Tierra. Since its start, this virtual “ecosystem” has seen the evolution of a range of different
computer programs. In the same way as molecular viruses depend on cells, the programs in
Tierra depend on a computer to copy and track their structure. Accordingly, they are not
operators, thus not life. Sims (1994) has used genetic algorithms for evolving virtual computer
creatures with body parts and a neural network with interface. The simulation of these animal-
models allows virtual movement such as finding and grasping virtual food items. Sims’s
programmed creatures may possess hypercyclic neural networks and on these grounds show
similarity to softwired memons. According to the operator hierarchy, a softwired memon should
autonomously be able to copy its information structurally. Although I am not an expert in this field,
it seems to me that Sims’s organisms do not themselves keep track of their arrays with
information about their interface and neurons, neural connections, and connection strengths, and
that they do not autonomously organize their maintenance. Assuming that the latter
interpretations are correct, Sims’s computer animals are not yet life.
The use of the present definition also allows the effortless rejection of other systems that are not
operators and sometimes receive the predicate of “borderline situations”, such as flames,
whirlwinds, crystals, cars, etc. Technical, computer based memons, however, such as robots, can
be operators when they show the required structure.
To summarize the practical applicability of the present definition of life, I include a list of the
examples that were discussed in the text and supplement them with some additional cases. The
examples in this list form three groups depending on whether the entities involved are operators
or not, and whether they show a complexity that equals or exceeds that of the cellular operator. In
the text below I use the concept of “interaction system” (e.g. Jagers op Akkerhuis 2008) for all
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systems that are not operators because the interactions of their parts do not create a first-next
possible, new, closure type.
Group A. Systems that are not life because they are not an operator
1. An entire virus particle with external envelope (represents a simple interaction system)
2. A computer virus based on strings of computer code
3. A flame
4. A tornado
5. A crystal
6. A car
7. A bee colony (The colony is an interaction system, and the bees are organisms.)
8. A cellular colony not showing the requirements of multicellularity (The individual cells are
organisms and thus represent life.)
9. A colony of physically connected cellular memons (as long as the individuals lack the
required memic closure)
10. A robot (as long as it is a non-memic technical machine)
11. Computer simulations of organism (including memons) that depend on external
“orchestration”
12. A cutting/slip of a plant that cannot potentially show autonomous maintenance given the
right conditions (It lacks the closure required for multicellularity.)
13. A separate organ, such as a liver or leg (not potentially capable of autonomous
maintenance)
14. Endobiontic bacteria having lost genes that are obligatory for autonomous maintenance.
The transfer to the genome of the host of DNA coding for enzymes required in
autonomous maintenance implies a partitioning of the aucatalytic closure between the
endobiont and its host,. Because of this, the endobiont is no longer an autonomous
organism but has become a special kind of organelle.
Group B. Systems that are operators but that are not life because their complexity is lower than
that of the cellular operator
1. A prion
2. Self-replicating DNA/RNA particles (catalyze their own copying in a solution containing
the right building materials)
3. A DNA or RNA string of a virus that is copied in a cell
Group C. Operators representing life
1. A cutting/slip or other plant part that can potentially maintain itself given favorable
environmental conditions
2. Anabiotic organisms (The fact that they are dried, frozen, etc. does not take their required
closure away.)
3. Fully anaesthetized animal supported in its functioning by a mechanical heart-lung
support and showing no neural activity (This can be regarded as a form of memic
anabiosis with the potency become active again.)
4. A computer memon or other technical memon (a memic robot)
5. An artificial cellular operator constructed by humans
6. A exobiotic cellular operator with another chemistry than that found on earth
7. Sterile or otherwise non-reproducing organism (e.g. a mule, worker bee, sterile
individuals)
8. Endoparasites or endosymbiontic unicellular organisms living in cells and still possessing
the full potential of autocatalysis
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X. In conclusion
1. Overviews of the definitions of life from the last 150 years show that no consensus definition on
life exists. In the light of the continuous failure to reach consensus on this subject, certain
scientists have adopted a practical viewpoint, accepting, for example, the use of property
checklists for identifying living systems. Others have advocated that the need for a generally
accepted definition remains acute. Amongst the proposals for solving the problem is the
suggestion to construct a broader context, a “theory of life” before continuing with attempts to
define of life.
2. Inspired by the latter suggestion, the present paper invokes a classification of the generalized
particle concept, called the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy has several advantages for
defining life: first, it offers a general context for including and differentiating between life and non-
life, and second, it offers the unique possibility to extrapolate existing trends in the evolution of
material complexity and to use these as a guide for discussions about “life as we do not know it”.
3. In close association with the reviewed literature, the use of the operator hierarchy allowed the
following definitions to be suggested:
A. From the viewpoint of the evolution of material complexity, life is: matter with the
configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to or even higher
than the cellular operator.
B. Living describes the dynamics of an operator that satisfies the definition of life.
C. The definition of unitary organisms can take the form of: the operators that fit the
definition of life.
D. A multicellular organism (the cellular operator showing the multi-state) is: a construction
of mutually adhering cells showing obligatorily recurrent interactions based on
the same interaction type, that has the potential of maintaining its functioning as a
unit and that does not show memic structure
E. Dead matter applies to all operators that do not fit the definition of life.
F. Death is: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible
deterioration of its organization.
4. From the discussion of examples in the literature, it was concluded that the present set of
definitions easily distinguishes life and non-life regardless of whether this is tested using the
“obvious examples”, the “borderline cases” or “life as we do not know it”. This suggests that the
present approach may well offer a practical step forward on the path towards a consensus
definition for the states of matter representing “life”.
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The issue of "closure" in Jagers op Akkerhuis's operator theory
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Abstract
Attempts to define life should focus on the transition from molecules to cells and the
“closure”  aspects of this event. Rather than classifying existing objects into living and non-
living entities I believe the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life
can take place, that is, the how the closure in Jagers op Akkerhuis's hierarchical classification
of operators, comes about.
In this issue of Foundations of Science Jagers op Akkerhuis (2009) proposes a definition of
life based on his earlier theory of operators. A great variety of objects fall into the category of
operator, and by introducing this term Jagers op Akkerhuis was able to draw a parallel
between elementary particles, molecules, cells and multicellular organisms. The common
denominator of these operators is their autonomous activity and maintenance of a specific
structure. Consequently, operators were classified in a logical and hierarchical system which
emphasizes the commonalities across what is normally called non-life (atoms, molecules) and
life (cells, organisms). One very attractive aspect of the classification is that it joins the
objects traditionally studied by physicists, chemists and biologists into one overarching
system. Obviously, the hierarchy crosses the traditional border between life and non-life, so it
should be possible to develop a definition of life from the operator theory. This is what Jagers
op Akkerhuis attempt to do in the present paper. However, I believe he misses the point.
 In the operator hierarchy, successive levels of complexity are separated by "closure
events", e.g. when going from from hadrons to atoms, from molecules to cells and from
multicellular eukaryotes to memic organisms. One of these closure events actually defines the
origin of life: the transition from molecules to cells. Death, as defined by Jagers op
Akkerhuis, is the loss of this closure, a fall-back from cells to molecules. There is another
important transition, the origin of self consciousness, a closure event that accompanies the
highest level of complexity in the classification of operators. Life with this level of
complexity (maybe call it "hyper-life"?) is included in Jagers op Akkerhuis's definition of
life.
 Another interesting aspect of the operator system is that it is strictly hierarchical, that is,
every operator can be classified on a more or less linear scale and the big leaps forward are
punctuated by closures on that scale. This aspect of the system is reminiscent of the "Great
Chain of Being", or scala naturae, which was the dominating view of life for many centuries.
In evolutionary biology, it is now recognized that pathways can split and run in parallel,
maybe even achieving similar closures independently from each other. I am not sure how this
aspect fits into the operator classification of Jagers op Akkerhuis.
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 To define life in terms of the operator theory I believe the focus should be on the
transition from molecules to cells and the closure aspects of this event. In other words, the
closure of operating systems defines life better than the classification of operators. However,
Jagers op Akkerhuis seems to add another seemingly hopeless definition of life to the nearly
100 already existing. Classifying what is life and what is not is, I believe, a rather trivial
exercise. Everybody knows that a flame is not life, and it only becomes a problem when you
spend too many words on it. Rather than classifying things into living and non-living entities
I believe the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life can take place,
that is the how the closure in Jagers op Akkerhuis's hierarchical classification of operators,
comes about.
 The issue of closure is intimately linked to that of emergence. Both concept recognize
that the characteristic properties of a living system cannot be reduced to its component parts
only, but also depend on the way in which the components are organized in a network. The
properties that arise from interactions between components are said to be "emergent".
Emergent properties are not shared by the components, they "appear" when many
components start interacting in a sufficiently complex way.
 The concept of emergence plays an important role in genomics, the science that studies
the structure and function of a genome (Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006). After about a decade
of genome sequencing, scientists started to realize that the genome sequence itself does not
define the organism. The human genome turned out to contain no more than 24.000 genes,
much less than the earlier assumed 124.000. This raised the question how it could be possible
that such a complicated organism as a human being could be built with so few genes.
Obviously the pattern of gene and protein interaction defines human nature much more than
the genes and proteins themselves. A new branch of biology was defined, systems biology,
which was specifically geared towards the analysis of interacting networks, using
mathematical models (Ideker et al. 2000).
 Schrödinger (1944), in discussing the question "What is life?" foresaw a new principle,
not alien to physics, but based on physical laws, or a new type of physical laws, prevailing
inside the organism. These are the kind of laws that systems biology is after. The operator
classification of Jagers op Akkerhuis is an important step because it emphasizes the
continuity between physical systems and biological systems. However, the challenge of
defining life is not in classification but in understanding the closure phenomenon by which
life emerged from non-life.
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1Definitions of life are not only unnecessary,
but they can do harm to understanding
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Abstract: In my response to the paper by Jagers op Akkerhuis, I object against giving
definitions of life, since they bias anything that follows. As we don’t know how life
originated, authors characterise life using criteria derived from present-day properties,
thus emphasising widely different ones, which gives bias to their further analysis. This
makes their results dependent on their initial suppositions, which introduces circularity in
their reasoning.
In his paper, Jagers op Akkerhuis (this volume) refers to a list of almost 100 different
definitions subsequently having been given in the literature to the phenomenon of life as
we know it. These definitions may even have a more general application or meaning than
that concerning life on earth only. That is, also to some form of life as we don’t know it,
even though we don’t know it. Like other authors, he feels that all this activity messed
things up. Thus, Jagers op Akkerhuis mentions authors emphasizing “ the seeming
hopelessness of the situation” , some of them adopting “ a pragmatic/pessimistic
viewpoint” . Others would have suggested “ that life cannot be defined, that its definition
is not important for biology” , or that “ a comprehensive definition of life is too general
and of little scientific use” . Finally, only “ living processes may be defined”  which
“ cannot be reduced to physics” .
      His theory based on the criterion of hierarchically arranged operators would tidy up
this mess a little. I feel, though, that the introduction of his own definition “ life may be
regarded as a special realization of the evolution of material complexity”  brings the 98
existing definitions even closer to 100. Worse, this theory and definition will confuse our
biological issues even more by their circularity of reasoning. They are circular because
his operator concept “ emphasizes the autonomous activity of the entities involved,
which “ operate”  in a given environment without losing their individual organization” .
How do we distinguish the autonomy of processes in early living systems or even in
present-day molecular biological ones from those of non-living processes? Also, activity,
operation, and organisation are concepts connected with living systems and their
functioning. Furthermore, individual organisation smells of one of the criteria on which
some earlier definitions have been based. Thus, recognising something as living depends
on criteria derived from known, recent living systems; a bean is a bean because it is
bean-shaped.
      When, as a beginning ecologist, I was studying ground beetles, and later as a
biogeographer, I never felt any need for a definition of life. Then, such a definition was
clearly useless. More recently, being concerned with questions about the origin of life,
that is concerned with processes ultimately having resulted in a beetle as a living
system, I came to realise that most, if not all, of these definitions were designed
particularly within this context of the origination of living systems. However, we don’t
need to define the moon to understand its origin either. Yet, they not only seem useless,
they are even harmful. Adopting certain criteria on which to base the one or the other
definition, authors easily force themselves to look into the wrong direction. Or even at
the wrong biogenetic phase, too late in the development of life. For example, not only is
“ organisation”  difficult to delineate objectively at a molecular level, and this without
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2circularity, but depending on a subjectively chosen threshold level, it easily excludes
initial phases from analysis, however significant these could have been. Continuing along
such a misdirected road is fruitless.
      Thus, the criteria used, such as a certain level of organisation, are always derived
from present-day life forms, from processes or structures that may not have existed in
the early biogenetic phases. One criterion, as one of many examples, points at
macromolecules, although these will have developed from earlier oligomers (see, for a
clear example, Eck and Dayhoff, 1966). Another, widely applied criterion derives from
the present prevalence of carbon as a principal biochemical constituent. Yet, carbon
forms very stable molecules, as do its neighbours in the Periodic System, nitrogen and
oxygen, for example. They are difficult both to form as well as to break down again,
which is therefore usually done by enzymes. These enzymes, plus the enzymatic
apparatus they together form, must have developed earlier, before carbon could have
been taken on board biochemically (see Hengeveld and Fedonkin, 2007). Moreover, in
their turn, individual enzymes are often very complex macromolecules, which not only
must have been derived evolutionarily from more primitive ones, but they have to be
formed by and operate within an intricate biochemical apparatus in which DNA is pivotal.
Yet, DNA itself requires the operation of a very complex system of repair enzymes, etc.,
plus the mediation of spliceosomes and ribosomes for the final construction of those
enzymatic macromolecules. Clearly, carbon as an element must have been inserted into
the biochemistry only at a later, evolutionarily more highly developed stage of
biogenesis.
      Personally, I prefer to abstain from using definitions in this context. This differs from
asking what requirement is needed to form a molecular bond, of a system of molecules,
etc., any form of organisation, biological or non-biological. This puts the problem within
the thermodynamic realm. A basic requirement, one that can be met by several
properties, therefore differs from a property, physical, chemical, biological, or socio-
economic; instead, it defines both the process and the shape of molecules taking part in
it (Hengeveld, 2007). It defines the properties. It’s the resulting processes happening
and developing which are of interest, for the understanding of which a definition of life is
irrelevant. It does not add anything.
      Formulating the study of biogenesis in terms of processes happening and developing
precludes the design of definitions, which are more likely to be applied to static or stable
situations. And which are, already for that reason only, to be shunned. Defining life is
not a part of our scientific endeavour.
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Explaining the origin of life is not enough for a definition of life.
Reaction of Gerard Jagers op Akkerhuis to the comments and questions of Rob
Hengeveld and Nico van Straalen.
Abstract: The comments focus on a presumed circular reasoning in the operator
hierarchy and the necessity of understanding life’s origin for defining life. Below it is
shown that its layered structure prevents the operator hierarchy from circular definitions.
It is argued that the origin of life is an insufficient basis for a definition of life that
includes multicellular and neural network organisms.
I thank the commentators for their reactions, both positive and negative, giving me the
opportunity to elucidate some important aspects of the presented theory.
As Van Straalen indicates, the operator hierarchy offers valuable innovations: Firstly, the
hierarchy ‘…  joins the objects traditionally studied by physicists, chemists and biologists
into one overarching system.’ Secondly, ‘...it is strictly hierarchical’. I think that precisely
these two aspects make the operator hierarchy a unique tool for defining life in a way that
simultaneously addresses all the different organizational levels of living entities, e.g.
prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells, pro- and eukaryotic multicellulars and neural network
organisms, including future ones based on technical neural networks.
Further reactions of the commentators indicate that, probably due to the novelty of the
operator theory, certain aspects require further explanation. I will discuss some
essentialities in the following lines.
Hengeveld criticizes an asserted circularity in reasoning, in the sense that living operators
are defined by means of concepts, which are derived from living systems. The confusion
on this point results from my explanation in the paper. There I indicate that the name
operator originates from the operating (in a very general sense) of individual entities. It
may be reassuring to Hengeveld that the origin of the name ‘operator’ shows no direct
relationship with the definition of the operators as system types. The entire set of all
operators is defined as follows: based on the presumed existence of a lowest complexity
operator, every system that belongs to the operator hierarchy resides at exactly one higher
closure level than its preceding-level operator. Every closure level is defined by the
occurrence of one or two first-next possible closures. Although this is a recursive
definition in the sense that every operator in principle depends on its preceding-level
operator, its hierarchical architecture precludes circularity of reasoning.
Hengeveld furthermore states in a general way that definitions of life ‘are always derived
from present day life forms, from processes or structures that may not have existed in the
early biogenetic phase’. This general criticism does not apply to the operator hierarchy.
The reason is that both abiotic and biotic operators are all defined using first-next
possible closure. In fact, the operator theory turns the argumentation of Hengeveld upside
down, hypothesizing that limited possibilities for reaching first-next possible closure
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have acted as a blue-print for the essential construction properties we recognize in abiotic
elements and organisms.
I agree wholeheartedly with both Hengevelds’ and Van Straalens’ argumentation that we
need to increase our understanding of the processes that have caused life. I strongly
support the search for bootstrapping mechanisms allowing simple system states/elements
to autonomously create more complex system states/elements (e.g. Conrad 1982, Martin
& Russell 2003, Hengeveld 2007). In fact, every closure step in the operator hierarchy is
the product of a specific (the first-next possible) bootstrapping mechanism. With respect
to specifying the closure types resulting from such bootstrapping mechanisms, I consider
concise and general definitions as indispensible tools, being helpful (instead of harmful!)
in our search for the essences of the evolution of matter. Thus when Hengeveld advocates
that he prefers ’…  to abstain from using definitions in this context.’ I find his viewpoint
surprising for two reasons. The first reason is that even a very thorough understanding of
specific reaction mechanisms will not automatically result in a general definition of a
meta-aspect such as the type of material organization defining living entities. The second
reason is that I think that accurate definitions are simply a way to improve the precision
and communication of science: sloppy definitions lead to the development of sloppy
theory and a lack of definitions leads to no science at all.
Referring to a demand for a mechanistic focus when defining life, Van Straalen states
that ‘the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life can take place’
as this can explain how the classification of operators comes about. Also in his last
sentence Van Straalen writes that ‘… , the challenge of defining life is not in classification
but in understanding the closure phenomenon by which life emerged from non-life’. Both
statements being true, it is nevertheless impossible to construct an overarching theory
such as the operator hierarchy if one limits his view to the mechanisms explaining one
single step involved.
The warm interest of Hengeveld and Van Straalen for mechanisms that could explain the
origin of life is understandable, because it frustrates the scientific community that science
is not yet able to de novo synthesize life, not even in the form of a primitive cell. This
general focus on the construction of life seems, however, to have caused a tunnel vision
with respect the definition of life. Imagine that we would be able to explain the cell, and
even construct it, would this then mean that we would have a proper definition of life in
all its forms, including multicellular organisms and neural network organisms? The
answer is a clear NO. If everything that is based on living cells would be life, then a
donor organ and a fresh, raw steak would also be life. Moreover, any technical being,
however intelligent, could never be called life, because it is not based on cells. This
proves that a focus on cells alone is not enough. We need to broaden the scope and define
all levels of organization associated with higher forms of life. It is my personal
conviction that, for the latter goal, the operator hierarchy offers a unique and
unprecedented tool.
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Abstract
In the present paper I develop a model of the evolutionary process associated to the
widespread although controversial notion of a prevailing trend of increasing
complexity over time. The model builds on a coupling of evolution to individual
developmental programs and introduces an integrated view of evolution implying that
human culture and science form a continuous extension of organic evolution. It is
formed as a mathematical model that has made possible a quantitative estimation in
relative terms of the growth of complexity. This estimation is accomplished by means
of computer simulations the result of which indicates a strong acceleration of
complexity all the way from the appearance of multicellular organisms up to modern
man.
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2Complexity
Complexity is an intriguing and widely discussed concept. The problem with this
concept is that it is an immeasurable quantity and that discussions therefore are based
mainly on intuitive notions. Besides, there is no definition generally agreed on. There
is a comprehensive literature on complexity and I will open my paper by discussing
some selected contributions to this literature.
John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry begin their salient book The Major
Transitions in Evolution with the following statements that could equally well serve
as a declaration of the aim of the present paper :
Living organisms are highly complex…  . This book is about how and why this
complexity has increased in the course of evolution. …  Our thesis is that the
increase has depended on a small number of major transitions…  (Maynard Smith
et al. 1995 p. 3).
Of special value for the present discussion is the fact that these authors include the
evolution of the human language as one of the major transitions, a notion that I will
develop in more detail later in this paper.
Increasing complexity is suggested to be one of several possible forms of large-scale
evolutionary trends that may result either from driving forces or from passive
diffusion in bounded spaces (McShea 1994). In his books, Life’s Grandeur (Gould,
1996) and The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Gould, 2002), the late Stephen Jay
Gould builds on McShea’s idea of a lower boundary from which the trend has only
one possible direction. Gould develops this idea in the form of the metaphor of the
left wall illustrated by the “drunkard’s walk”. When the drunkard staggers on a
sidewalk with the wall of the bar on his left side, he will by purely statistical reasons
tumble more and more to the right. In this sense, Gould supports a purely passive
diffusion as ground for the trend. For the present discussion it is of value to find
support for the notion of a pervasive trend towards increasing complexity but it is not
necessary to specify the suggested distinctions between possible causes of the trend.
Gould draws a couple of diagrams to clarify the discussion (Gould, 1996, p. 171). In
the first of these he illustrates the frequency of occurrence of species versus
complexity for the Precambrian epoch in which bacteria, the only living creatures at
this time, form a pile near the left wall. In the second diagram he illustrates the
situation for present time with the same axes demonstrating how life has been spread
out over a wide range of complexity in a skewed distribution. Most species are found
at low complexity like bacteria whereas species with higher complexity are found in
successively decreasing abundance. He illustrates a series of species spread out over
the dimension of complexity including bacteria, trilobites, fish, dinosaurs, apes and
humans in this order. Needless to say, this series also shows the temporal order in
which the exemplified species have come into being, a conclusion that also Gould
admits in concluding that
In popular description of evolution, …  we have presented the history of life as a
sequence of increasing complexity, with an initial chapter on unicellular
organisms and a final chapter on the evolution of hominids. I do not deny that
such a device captures something about evolution. That is, the sequence of
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3bacterium, jelly-fish, trilobite, eurypterid, fish, dinosaur, mammoth and human
does, I suppose, expresses “the temporal history of the most complex creature” in
a rough and rather anthropomorphic perspective (Gould, 2002, p. 897).
I have chosen to discuss Gould’s views on complexity because Gould, despite his
generally acknowledged scepticism regarding the application of the concept of
complexity to evolution, accepts increasing complexity at least in a descriptive sense.
Furthermore, Gould extends his survey of the evolutionary process to include the
human species, which, as we will see, is given an important role in the present
investigation.
There are however many other authors that are less sceptical than Gould. Thus
Heylighen (1999) observes that the directions in which complexity increases are
generally preferred and Adami and co-authors (Adami et al. 2000) develop a Maxwell
Demon mechanism that “is at work during all phases of evolution and provides the
driving force towards ever increasing complexity in the natural world”. Emmeche
(1997) gives a philosophical review of the many difficulties related to the lack of a
stringent definition of complexity. Increasing complexity is generally associated to an
acceleration of the evolutionary process, a notion suggested to be generalized to the
entire universe as well to technological development. (For an overview, see Smart
2008).
There is an emerging branch of science called evodevo in which relations between the
developmental and evolutionary processes are studied, mainly confined to
morphological traits. One of the representatives of this field maintains that “when
comparisons are made between very different levels of complexity, the pattern that
emerges is broadly recapitulatory, although only in a very imprecise way, in the sense
of recapitulating levels of complexity rather than precise morphological details”
(Arthur 2002).
These examples of authors in the field of complexity thus make me encouraged in my
intension to investigate the growth evolutionary complexity and in this endeavour
make use of the relationship between the developmental and evolutionary processes.
Development and evolution
As a point of departure for the present discussion I call attention to the fact that
biological as well as cultural evolution are formed as results of continuous
modifications in the developmental programs of living organisms including human
beings. Additionally, modern genetics has shown that genes for specific traits in many
cases are preserved over long periods of time and that the evolutionary modifications
to a certain extent are formed by hox genes triggering the temporal onset of the action
of specific genes. This, in my view, explains the intriguing observation that vestiges
of earlier developmental programs can be observed in the embryogenesis of present-
day individuals, an observation that has been subject to enduring and partly
bewildering discussions focused on the idea of recapitulation (For a survey of
recapitulation, see Gould 1977).
EDU 2008 p195
4The interpretations of the observed vestiges have mostly been restricted to
morphological features within the field of biology. When also cultural features of the
human species are included in the analysis, a conspicuous pattern is appearing that
only to a minor extent is built on morphological features. This pattern is formed by
the observation of a temporal relationship between the evolutionary history and the
developmental process of a modern individual human being and is made visible by
means of a diagram (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Individual development versus evolution in the lineage of man. The horizontal axis gives
evolutionary time measured backwards from the present point of time. The vertical axis shows the
individual age. Please note that both scales are logarithmic. References to the traits that are included in
the diagram are given in my earlier publication of the pattern (Ekstig 1994). This version of the diagram
was published in Ekstig (2007). The Critical Point is of mathematical nature and not part of the
empirical basis.
I have chosen not to show the uncertainties in the positioning of the points in the
diagram, uncertainties that stretch out in the horizontal as well as in the vertical
dimensions. If displayed in the diagram, these uncertainties seem to be smaller for
morphological traits than for the more recent, this feature being a consequence of the
logarithmic construction of the scales. In spite of this consideration, a conspicuous
pattern emerges, namely that the points form a straight line and this feature must be
regarded as remarkable when the great span of time covered by the diagram is taken
into account. Before an interpretation of the pattern will be suggested a descriptive
mathematical analysis is carried out.
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5The equation of straight line is
ln to = C1 –C2 ln tp (1)
where to and tp denote the developmental (ontogenetic) and evolutionary
(phylogenetic) age, respectively. The value of constants are determined by the line
yielding C1 = 5.12 and C2 = 0.39.
An essential feature of the diagram is that both time scales are logarithmic. Due to this
logarithmic form, the present moment of time is not included. Another characterizing
feature of the horizontal time scale is that it is directed backwards. An inherent feature
of such a scale it is that, as time proceeds, the position of each particular event will be
displaced to the left and, due to the fact that the time scale is logarithmic, the quantity
of this displacement as seen in the diagram is smaller for older traits than for more
recent. Such an unlinear displacement is incompatible with an assumption that the
linearity of the line would be a general feature and not just an accidental coincidence
of the present time. However, the linearity is preserved over time if it is assumed that
the points simultaneously are displaced downwards, i.e. towards earlier developmental
appearance, at a pace that is determined by the value of the derivative a of Eq. (1),
called acceleration:
a = dto /dtp = – C2 to /tp (2)
Such a regular displacement of developmental traits can be seen as the result of an
appropriate shortening of all preceding stages, a shortening called condensation. I have
shown (Ekstig 1985) that such a condensation, depicted q, is given by the simple
formula
q = – (C2 +1) /tp (3)
implying that the value of condensation of each stage is determined by merely one
parameter, the phylogenetic age of the trait, in such a way that it is inversely
proportional to the duration of its action on the stage. Generally speaking, the formula
implies that the rate of condensation will decrease with time which is intuitively
sensible since the more a stage is shortened the more difficult it must be to shorten it
still more. In this way the linear pattern is explained as a consequence of a continuous
and regular shortening of developmental stages, i.e. condensation.
Acceleration and condensation are introduced in the context of heterochronic
mechanisms that together with terminal addition are reviewed by Gould (1977) and
Mc Kinney and McNamara (1991). The present model allows for a more precise
determination of values of acceleration and condensation as exemplified by the
following examples.
The value of acceleration for the embryonic period of heart formation is – 5 x 10–11
that means a displacement of a few days in 100 million years and the value of its
condensation is – 3 x 10–9 per year that means a shortening of 3% over 10 million
years. The second example is oral language the value of acceleration of which is – 2 x
10–5 that means a displacement of 7 days per millennium.  Its value of condensation is
– 3.5 x 10–5 per year corresponding to a shortening of 3.5 % per millennium. As to the
period of acquisition of Newtonian science the value of acceleration is – 0.023 that
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6corresponds to a displacement of approximate 1 year in every 40 years whereas its
condensation is 5% per decade. As acceleration can be seen as caused by
condensation, I will hereafter restrict the discussion mainly to condensation.
Morphological traits are very old, yet vestiges of them are still, quite remarkably,
visible in the early part of the human embryo. This implies that they are assembled in
the lower left part of the diagram and the pattern in the diagram would not be
discernible if the analysis of evolution were restricted merely to the morphological
realm.
The present model is in concordance with the widespread intuitive notion of an
accelerating evolutionary process and the consequential decreasing intervals between
the additions of evolutionary novelties. Such an accelerating course is in the present
model coupled to the developmental process and the linkage is formed by the process
of condensation that thus implies a vital concept at the analysis of the diagram of
Figure 1. Truly remarkable is the regularity at which condensation is working over the
so different evolutionary processes as those of the biological, cultural, and scientific
realms. Therefore, our next step will be to analyze the applicability of this common
principle in these areas. But first a short discussion of a particular point on the line.
The Critical Point
There is one point in the diagram that is determined by means of extrapolation of the
line as determined by empirical data. This is the point on the line at which the unit of
time has the same length on both axes, which is the same as to say that the absolute
value of the derivative equals 1. I have called this point The Critical Point and its
coordinates can easily be calculated by means of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for a = – 1.
The result is found to be to =  52 years and tp =  20 years. These data can be
interpreted in the following way. 20 years ago, at age 52, the human being under study
caught up with the evolutionary process but later on this grew faster than he was able
to follow. This person is a modern scientists and the reason why a scientist is given
such a key role in this context is that the last points displayed in the diagram are the
points for the acquisition of elementary mathematics, a route followed and extended
by modern scientists. As a consequence of the data found for the Critical Point, the age
of this scientist is 72. It should be noticed that the calculated figures are results of an
idealized mathematical model and should not be taken too far. Individual variations
are indeed very large. Many scientists are quite young when they start to contribute to
their field of research and may be active at the front for several decades. On the other
hand, most people do not at all participate in the scientific enterprise.
Common principles within biology, culture and science
A conspicuous feature of the diagram of Figure 1 is that it is constructed on an
evolutionary time scale that runs backwards. This means that evolution is represented
in a historic, retrospective perspective and as a point of departure for this perspective,
mankind’s present position is chosen. In his historic survey of biological life on the
EDU 2008 p198
7Earth, Dawkins (2004) uses this, what he calls hindsight, perspective. In the present
paper, I will extend Dawkins’ analysis to include human culture as well and, like
Dawkins, I will follow the human lineage but with the point of departure in today’s
scientific culture. I maintain that it is fully legitimate to base the analysis of the
evolutionary process on such a retrospective perspective without presupposing that
evolution would have been aimed towards us, or that there would be a predetermined
plan for evolution.
Another striking feature of the diagram is that the morphological and cultural parts of
the evolutionary process are unified by a common pattern and it is therefore necessary
to discuss the legitimacy of such a model. Thus, in spite of the fact that one may
regard culture as being of a different nature as compared to biology one may also
acknowledge common basic principles. As Dennett (1995 p. 343) points out, evolution
occurs whenever there is variation, heredity and differential fitness. The following
table clarifies and supports the application of these principles also to the field of
culture in which science is included as a separate part.
Biology Culture Science
Heredity Copying Imitation Teaching and learning
Variation Mutations Human creativity Human creativity
Differential fitness Natural selection, Sexual selection, Selection on behalf of
sexual selection Self-reinforcing observations and
selection experiments
Table 1. Common evolutionary principles within biology, culture and science.
Another common principle of the evolutionary processes of biology, culture and
science is condensation, as demonstrated by means of the mathematical analysis of the
linear pattern in the diagram of Figure 1, and I will analyze the application of this
principle to each one of the three processes. Moreover, also terminal addition is a
mechanism that can be recognized in all these processes.
In the realm of biology, Stearns (1992) has demonstrated that the shortening of
developmental stages can be seen as a result of a ubiquitous selection pressure coming
about by the fact that it is reproductively advantageous to develop a short maturation
period. As he points out such a shortening is advantageous because a shortened
generation period gives a demographic effect. In addition, a shorter maturation period
is advantageous because the time of predator exposition before maturation is
minimized.
It is well-known that all species have preserved a common stock of genes over long
evolutionary periods during which their expressions are trigged by hox genes, in this
way amongst other things giving rise to speciation. However, the effect of
condensation seems rather to be to gradually shorten the expression of separate genes
in embryogenesis by building them more efficiently.
There is another simultaneously acting process implying that condensation does not
normally result in an overall shortening of the maturation period. Novel evolutionary
traits may be reproductively advantageous to an extent that overrules the effect of
condensation. Such terminal additions are independent of and superimposed on
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8condensation and therefore the fact that for instance humans have a longer maturation
period than chimpanzees does not contradict the action of condensation. Without
condensation the human maturation period would have been still longer.
Unfortunately, gradual changes of embryogenesis during the evolutionary history are
not sufficiently well known to ascertain the effect of condensation during
morphological evolution. It is possible that the rapidly expanding research in the field
of genetics might be able to shed some light on this problem.
In the realm of culture, I will concentrate on the acquisition of verbal language
because it is common knowledge that language is the preeminent feature of man that
takes a great part of our neocortex into utilization. Thus, as I already have pointed out,
Maynard Smith and co-author (1995) have included language in their survey of major
evolutionary transitions. Blackmore (1999) has emphasized that imitation is a central
agent in the acquisition of language. She argues that imitation is specific to humans,
primarily a method applied by children at the acquisition of their mother tongue.
Furthermore, she applies sexual selection in the context. An “important decision is
whom to mate with, and again the answer should be the best imitators, because they
will provide you with children who are more likely to be good imitators. …  As
imitation improves, more new skills are invented and spread, and these in turn create
more pressure to be able to copy them. “ (ibid. p. 77)
Especially regarding the application of condensation in this context, I would like to
add the following reasoning. There is, and certainly always has been, a great variation
in verbal competence in human populations. Parents that happen to have a better than
average verbal talent also bring this talent to their children and when these children are
developing into parents to the next generation of children the verbal talent is still more
reinforced. Furthermore as Blackmore points out, because imitators tend to imitate the
most skilled precedents, children of all kinds of parents are expected to acquire verbal
ability at gradually earlier age. In this way one can talk about a self-reinforcing
positive feedback mechanism that gradually shortens verbal developmental stages. In
addition, the verbal talent makes the quality of the brain visible and can be sees as an
ornament in connection to sexual selection. And, as is well known, sexual selection
tends to give rise to a run away process that in this context can be seen as contributing
to the positive feedback mechanism.
In our modern time, I think, the suggested process can be extended to education itself.
Parents with good education certainly appreciate this feature and are therefore urgent
to give good education to their children as well with the same self-reinforcing result as
that concerning language acquisition. Such an enhanced education means that children
not only acquire verbal skilfulness at gradually earlier age but that also the acquisition
of many abstract and scientific concepts is enhanced.
Many parts of the cultural and scientific realms of evolution are formed by cumulative
additions. It is for instance impossible to imagine a written language to appear before
verbal language or algebra to be developed before arithmetic. This is so in the
evolutionary as well as in the developmental process. In this respect written language
was added terminally during the epoch of language evolution as algebra was in the
history of mathematics. Therefore the concept of terminal addition is applicable in the
cultural and scientific realms.
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9Finally, as to the realm of science, one may regard science education as an intentional
activity that, at least during the last hundred years, has substantially improved its
pedagogical methods, resulting in a rapid enhancement of learning. This means,
especially regarding the highly cumulative learning of mathematics, that pupils learn
specific stages in gradually less time and at earlier age. In other words, condensation
and acceleration are at work. Also, I think that there is an intentional selection of
curriculum stuff in order to speed up learning. Thus for instance, pupils need no longer
to learn the square root algorithm. However, even if the individual stages of scientific
knowledge are shortened and displaced towards earlier age, the overall time of science
education is prolonged due to the continuous addition of novel knowledge to the end
of curricula. This then can be regarded as a form of terminal addition.
The courses of elementary school mathematics are by and large followed by modern
scientists and must therefore be considered as an essential foundation of the scientific
culture. However, stages in the history of science, except those of mathematics, are not
in general reflected in the order of acquisition by young persons and therefore, science
on the whole is not included in the model.
In summing up, I conclude that there are fundamental common principles that support
the notion of evolution as not just a biological phenomenon but also applicable to the
realms of culture and science. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the principles of
condensation and terminal addition are present in all three realms of this extended
evolutionary process.
Preliminaries of the method for estimation of complexity
In addition to the principles included in Table 1, some other additional principles are
decisive for the present method to estimate the growth of complexity in evolution.
These principles imply
1. that morphological and at least some parts of the cultural and scientific
evolution are manifestations of continuous modifications in developmental
programs;
2. that many evolutionary novelties are added as terminal additions to the
developmental programs of embryos, children and young people;
3. that many embryonic traits expressed by a specific gene have preserved their
level of complexity from their first appearance;
4. that the levels of complexity assigned to stages in the cultural history actually
are levels of complexity in individual human beings preserved over historic
time.
5. that the coupling between the developmental and evolutionary processes as
manifested in the observed pattern in the diagram of Figure 1 forms the basis
of the present method for an estimation of the growth of complexity in
evolution.
6. that the present model is applicable only to those cultural manifestations that
are preserved as identifiable stages during the developmental growth.
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1. This point can be seen as a reformulation of a law of recapitulation in a reversed
mode – it is the gradual modifications in the developmental courses of all creatures
that ever have existed that lie behind the abstract notion of evolution.
2. There has been an enduring dispute in the literature, restricted to morphological
traits exclusively, whether all evolutionary novelties are added at the ends of
ontogenies as terminal additions (for an overview, see for instance Gould 1977, Mc
Kinney and McNamara 1991). However, the morphological part of the diagram covers
a minor part of the diagram and a change in the ontogenetic order of the acquisition of
traits in this part of the line would not disturb the general feature of the pattern.
Actually, the morphological part of the diagram can be regarded as one single point
from which the line has its point of departure. Therefore the discussion in the literature
on the multitude of heterochronic mechanisms (Mc Kinney and McNamara 1991) are
by and large not applicable in the present context. The only concepts applied are
acceleration, condensation and terminal additions.
3. Genes express themselves as traits during embryogenesis and are, as I already have
emphasized, to a large extent preserved during the evolutionary process. A
fundamental assumption for the present model is that many developmental traits
expressed by specific, essentially unchanged genes have preserved their level of
complexity from their first appearance. This assumption forms a basic prerequisite for
the estimation of complexity in the field of morphological evolution and implies that
when we are estimating complexity in the evolutionary process, we are actually just
comparing levels of complexity in stages in different individual organisms living at
great time separation.
4. Another fundamental assumption for the present model is that the complexity of the
cultural or scientific stages that we are observing in a present-day individual, say the
ability of verbal language or the proficiency to make arithmetic calculations, are
reminiscences of the levels of complexity that were achieved, nota bene, by individual
human beings, when these traits once upon a time arose in our history.
5. Condensation acts on individual organisms including human beings, implying that
its developmental stages are shortened. Such a condensation is expressed in
consecutive sequences of individuals and therefore forms a mechanism for the
evolutionary process. When these sequences of individual organisms are extended
over the entire process of evolution (at least since the Cambrium Explosion), the effect
of condensation has displaced many traits to appear very early in the embryonic phase
of living animals. Thus, condensation connects the evolutionary course to the
developmental process, a coupling manifested as the regular pattern in the diagram of
Figure 1.  As we will see, it is this very pattern that makes possible the estimation of
the growth of complexity in the evolutionary process.
6. It must be emphasized that the pattern observed in the diagram is based only on
traits in the lineage of man and on a few specific stages in the cultural history of the
western society. This means that, as to the field of biology, there are many clades, for
instance insects, that do not form part of the line and thus are not included in the
present method. As to the field of culture, the multitude of cultural forms demonstrate
that human culture is much more rich in expressions than as indicated by the diagram.
There are, to say the least, an immense amount of other human cultural expressions.
Amongst these one may mention agriculture, religion, artistic creation, music,
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literature, politics, warfare, and technology; some of these cultural expressions
displaying substantially increased levels of complexity during the course of time.
These cultural manifestations are primarily seen in adult activities and their historic
evolution is by and large not reflected in children’s somatic or mental development.
Nor have they been subject to condensation. If attempted to be shown in the diagram
of Figure 1, they would be stretched out horizontally in the upper part of the diagram,
i.e. in the adult part of the developmental dimension. Therefore, applicable to the
present model are only those cultural manifestations that are preserved as identifiable
stages during the developmental growth.
In considering the breadth and depth of all human cultural manifestations including
those not used in the present estimation of complexity we may conclude that human
culture is more complex than anything other species may bring to the table in form of
possible cultural manifestations. This conclusion, I maintain, can be drawn without
chauvinism.
In summing up, I have argued that amongst the multitude of species only those
forming our ancestral line are applicable for the estimation of complexity. Likewise,
amongst the enormous multitude of all human cultural manifestations only a few are
used, namely those the historic evolution of which is recognized in the developmental
course of a modern child. This limited applicability of the present model must of
course be considered when it comes to the conclusions that may be drawn as to the
growth of complexity in evolution.
As I have emphasized, all the applied features, whether morphological, cultural or
scientific, have been subject to condensation. The reason why condensation is
maintained to be such an inescapable condition is that, as demonstrated in the
mathematical analysis of the straight line in the diagram of Figure 1, it lies behind the
linearity of the line, which, as we will see, has turned out making possible an
estimation of the growth of complexity. The method for this estimation will now be
introduced.
Complexity versus time
As we have seen, Gould accepted, though reluctantly, the idea of a continuously
increasing level of complexity throughout the history of evolution. He draws a
sequence of species including fish, dinosaurs, apes and humans on an axis of
increasing complexity (Gould 1996, p. 171). The distinguishing characteristics of these
organisms may be associated to the points in the diagram of Figure 1 marked vertebral
column, lungs, cortical neurons and oral language, respectively. I therefore conclude
that I’m actually supported by Gould in my interpretation of the line in the diagram as
representing increasing complexity. I have in this context preferred to refer to Gould
since he is known as a most ardent opponent to the application of complexity to
evolution, and this fact, I think, strengthens my point.
The position of each point in the diagram of Figure 1 is determined by two time
coordinates, one for evolution and one for development. These two time coordinates
for each trait will now be represented on a common linear time axis stretching
backwards from the present point of time, giving rise to a sequence of pairs of time
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coordinates. The evolutionary coordinates are already adapted for such a negative time
scale whereas the developmental coordinates have to be recalculated to give the time
elapsed since the actual age was reached by a present-day human being.
Next, I want to distribute these pairs of points in a diagram displaying complexity on
its vertical axis, a crucial procedure at the shaping of a diagram of complexity versus
time considering the fact that complexity is an immeasurable quantity. To that end,
one must keep in mind that every pair of points on the common time axis originates
from the same point on the line in the diagram of Figure 1, thus representing the same
degree of complexity as I already have emphasized. These pairs of points will then
form two separate series of points, one for evolution and one for the individual’s life
history. The next step is to distribute these points on the dimension of complexity.
As one immediately can see, the diagram of Figure 1 indicates that the intervals
between major evolutionary transitions are shortening, a process associated to an
acceleration of the evolutionary process. (Please note that the meaning of the term
acceleration in this context differs from its use above as a heterochronic term.)
Actually, acceleration is subject to intensive studies and considered to be a universal
characteristic of all evolutionary processes, thus also including cosmological and
technological evolution. This view is discussed at length by John Smart (2008) and,
especially concerning technological evolution, by Ray Kurzweil (2005). The problem
with such an interpretation of the concept of acceleration is that there is need of an
entity that is assumed to be accelerating. It seems however to be a more or less tacit
assumption that this entity is complexity. Furthermore, since the traits under
observation are cumulative, it is reasonable to assume the evolutionary increase of
complexity to follow an exponential course. This assumption forms the first step at the
construction of a diagram over complexity versus time.
Since the developmental coordinates are linked to the evolutionary coordinates by the
straight line of Figure 1, any assumption of the form of the evolutionary trajectory will
give a consequential form of the developmental trajectory at the shaping of the
complexity diagram. The method for the construction of this diagram is therefore to
choose a form of the evolutionary trajectory that gives the most sensible form of the
developmental curve.
It turns out that the assumption of an exponential form of the evolutionary curve will
give the developmental curve a shape wearing a rough semblance of a logarithmic
function. These forms of the curves are illustrated in Figure 2. The logarithmic form of
the individual curve is sensible since it is common knowledge that the intervals
between changes in the individual growth are relatively short in the embryonic period
and gradually grow longer with age. Furthermore, it turns out that the two curves
coincide at one point where they have the same direction. This point is recognized as
the Critical Point.
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Figure 2. A principal draft of complexity versus time on a linear time scale. The curves are formed by
the pairs of time coordinates of each point in the diagram of Figure 1, each such pair having the same
degree of complexity.
It is interesting to generalize the notion of the Critical Point to earlier epochs of human
history and to other species. Corresponding developmental curves may be drawn in the
same principal way for all human individuals and all individual animals in history. All
these curves would have a similar form as the individual’s life history as shown in
Figure 2 but placed on their proper temporal position on the time scale. Furthermore,
only some of these curves would reach the evolutionary curve at their corresponding
Critical Point but never transcending it. Thus, the evolutionary curve could be seen as
the envelop of all living creatures. The slope of these individual curves might be
different, corresponding to the different lengths of life histories. Thus for instance,
elephants, in spite of having longer lives, would not be more complex than humans.
But the slope of their individual curve in this diagram would be less steep thus
reaching their Critical Point at a higher age. This general picture of the evolutionary
process is in concordance with the notion of evolution as being the result of
continuous modifications in individual life histories as I have already emphasized.
Returning now to the construction of a diagram over complexity versus time, the first
step of the method is to adopt a form of the evolutionary curve, which here is
hypothesized to be an exponential curve. For every point of time, tp, on this curve the
corresponding developmental date to is calculated according to Eq. (1). Then the date
of this developmental trait on the time axis is calculated, taken into account that to
denotes the age of an individual of age 72. This procedure will give a diagram of the
principal shape as illustrated in Figure 2.
It must be emphasized that this diagram is just of principal form in order to clarify the
method used to build up a more quantitative diagram. Such a quantitative construction
is most readily performed by means of computer simulations. An example of such a
computer simulation is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. A computer simulation of complexity of the evolutionary (upper series) and the
developmental (lower series) processes for the last 100 years. The evolutionary series is tentatively
formed by segments of exponential functions with different bases between 1.0000001 and 1.0002. The
values of complexity of the developmental series are the same as those for the corresponding points in
the evolutionary series. The temporal coordinates of the developmental process are calculated by
means of the formula for the straight line in the diagram of Figure 1. The scale on the vertical axis is
relative. The evolutionary series stretches to the left far out of the frame. As an example, the date for
the onset of the vertebral column 600 million years ago is to be found on this time axis some 600 km to
the left with a complexity value of about 10-26 , a value of complexity given to the lowest point on the
developmental curve. These simulations are performed by means an MS Excel program available on
my homepage (http://www.did.uu.se/ekstig/ ) where the results of other entrance values are
demonstrated as well. The program is open for examinations of alternative simulations.
In the diagram of Figure 3 the last hundred years of the evolutionary process is shown
on a linear time scale, since this is the part of interest for comparison with the
developmental process of a modern human being. The temporal coordinates of the
developmental process are calculated by means of Eq. (1) for chosen coordinates on
the evolutionary scale. This means that the lower part of the developmental curve is
based on the empirically determined points on the line in the diagram of Figure 1
whereas the higher part of the curve is based on an extrapolation of the empirical
points in the diagram of Figure 1 in accordance with Eq. (1). The scale on the vertical
axis is relative.
The time axis shows past time in the negative direction. Complexity is calculated as
points on the negative tail of an exponential function (or a similar curve), therefore
giving a relative value of complexity ranging between 0 and 1.
Trials with different bases of the exponential function give the following results. A
base of 1,0002 implies that the first half of the embryonic period shows very small
growth of complexity that seems unrealistic. A larger base gives a still more apparent
similar feature. If the base on the other hand is chosen to be 1,0000001 the fetus
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reaches 90 % of maximal complexity already at birth that also seems unrealistic. A
smaller base gives a still more apparent similar feature.
The result of these simulations shows that no sole exponential function will give a
realistic picture of the individual growth of complexity. However, there is actually no
reason to expect evolution to follow such a simple model. The simulations make
possible an examination of the growth of complexity in the evolutionary process
following different rules at different periods. Such a method lies behind the diagram
of Figure 3 in which the base of the exponential function at the early evolutionary
epochs is 1,0000001 to increase step by step to reach 1,0002 for the last 400 years.
According to my subjective judgment, these values give a realistic form of the
individual growth curve. These simulations indicate that evolutionary complexity is
growing faster in its latest phase than an exponential function that fits the early
epochs and that it is growing slower in its early epochs than an exponential function
fitting the latest phase.
Kurzweil (2005 pp. 491 - 496) discusses the application of a double exponential
function, i.e. an exponential function of the form W = exp (k1 exp ( k2 t)), in his studies
of the evolution of knowledge. Simulations with such a function are here performed
analogously to the above calculations. It turns out that even by means of this function
it is impossible to find a combination of the two constant in the double exponential
function that gives a sensible form of the developmental curve. The conclusion is
that, although growing more rapidly than a simple exponential function, the
integrated evolutionary processes of morphological, cultural and scientific evolution
cannot be accounted for by a double exponential function.
In another simulation the evolutionary complexity was calculated as the sum of two
exponential functions with different bases. In this way a rather good trajectory of the
individual growth was achieved. This simulation supports the previous conclusion
that no sole exponential function can give a sensible trajectory of the growth of
developmental complexity.
It should be noted that the linear time axis stretches out to the left. The oldest traits in
the diagram of Figure 1, formed 600 million years ago, is in the diagram of Figure 3
placed some 600 km to the left. It is instructive here to give some values of
complexity for points of time that are not seen in the diagram of Figure 3.
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 Time before present Individual age  Relative value
(years ago) (years from conception) of complexity
3700 million 0.03 10–161
600 million 0.06 10–26
6 million 0.38 0.16
1 million 0.76  (birth) 0.30
25000 3.2 0.52
1200  10 0.80
400  16 0.92
100 28 0.98
20 52 0.99
Table 2. Some relative values of complexity as given by the simulation program.
The extremely small values of complexity for the early epochs of the history of life
demonstrate the wide range of complexity characterizing evolution although in the
present arrangement compressed to the interval between 0 and 1. Especially, the table
illustrates the rapid increase of complexity for more recent epochs. Thus, it shows an
increase of complexity of about 30% all the way from the origin of life up to one
million years ago, a point of time of about the appearance of man. Furthermore, the
simulation indicates that as much as 8% of the total complexity is accomplished during
the last 400 years, the scientific epoch, and that 2% is achieved during the last 100
years. Thus the calculations demonstrate, as far as complexity is concerned, the great
significance of the appearance of culture and science (about 70%) as compared to the
morphological evolution (about 30%) of the body of man. It should be remembered
that these values of complexity are applicable only to the lineage of man and to
cultural expressions restricted as previously discussed.
Of course, this limitation of applicability of the method means that the values of
complexity obtained are only a part of the total complexity that has grown in the
course of the evolution of life and in the large variety of human cultures. The relative
values obtained by means the present method must thus only be interpreted in relation
to the method used for their calculation and to their limited range of applicability but,
on the other hand, the method used indicates a way to receive a quantitative estimation
of complexity in the evolutionary process of special significance for the human
species, the human culture, and the scientific civilization.
Applications
Gould’s conundrum, apparently shared by many other researchers, seems to be to
bring together two seemingly contradictory observations. He didn’t see any tendency
of progress in discrete species but, on the other hand, he couldn’t deny that the history
of life on the whole exhibits increasing complexity. In the same vein, Maynard Smith
and his co-author state that even if progress is not a universal law of evolution,
common sense does suggest that at least some lineages have become more complex
(Maynard Smith et al. 1995 p. 5).
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The additional complexity found in the human species sets apart humans from other
animals. This does not imply that all other organisms are arranged in a single
ascending line behind us. Rather, the present model suggests a visualization of
evolution as a branching tree in which most species show little increase of complexity
or none at all but that consecutive species may display increasing complexity.
Therefore, the history of life by and large exhibits increasing complexity as Gould
himself concludes from the observation that species that have come into existence late
in the evolutionary process exhibit a greater level of complexity than those that have
appeared earlier. Especially, in the last million years a superior level of complexity is
accomplished by the human species and furthermore, the human species is unique
inasmuch as it shows a steady trend of increasing complexity whereas most other
discrete species by and large show no tendency of such an increased complexity. In
this way, I maintain, Gould’s conundrum is resolved.
It is a spread notion also to regard technological evolution as an extension of organic
and cultural evolution, a notion of which Kurzweil (2005) is a strong representative.
He points out that each paradigm develops through three faces in an S-shaped curve
and that evolution, both in its biological and technological expression, evolves
through a series of such curves forming a soft stair-like curve. Kurzweil emphasizes
that evolution follows an accelerating pace and that in our own time this pace has
reached an unprecedented rate, a view in concordance with the present model.
However, when technological evolution, as Kurzweil anticipates, transcends
biological evolution the present model reaches its limit of applicability since this type
of evolutionary process is not coupled to the individual developmental process.
Further applications of the present model to future evolution are discussed in Ekstig
(2007).
A principal difference between morphological and cultural evolution is that as soon as
a species is split, no reunion is possible whereas different cultures carry out far-
reaching influences on one another. In our own days, the rapidly increasing efficiency
of communication between societies and between individuals all over the world
presumably contributes strongly to the rapid growth of the complexity in a world-
wide cultural evolution. However, these contributions to complexity are mostly
expressed in fields of culture that are not part of the present method.
As can be seen in the references discussed in the introductory paragraph, it is
suggested that evolution has a direction, and that such a direction is built on the
hitherto prevailing trend of increasing complexity. According to the present model, a
continued increase of complexity is coupled to gradual condensation of
developmental stages. However, the condensation of embryonic stages is so small that
it has only theoretical interest. In contrast, condensation of mental stages is more
substantial. It builds on an enhancement of education all the way from the upbringing
of infants to the scientific education of adolescents and adults (Ekstig 2004). It is a
most alarming piece of evidence, though, that today’s school pupils in many western
countries exhibit less ambition to learn the basic concepts of mathematics, science,
and engineering and as a result the long-lasting trend of accelerating biological and
cultural evolution coupled to condensation of developmental stages now may be at
risk. Therefore, I would in the present context like to emphasize the crucially
important task of enhancing mathematical and scientific education at all levels.
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Conclusion
I have in the present model given a wide view over the evolutionary process in the
lineage of man ever since the formation of multicellular organisms and up to present
time. The model implies that the cultural and scientific parts of human evolution fit
into the preceding biological evolution in a common pattern, suggested to be the
result of an extensive regularity of the process of condensation. This wide-ranging
regularity of condensation is found to be the consequence of the fact that the value of
condensation of each stage is inversely proportional to the duration of its action on the
stage.
The model is focused on the growth of complexity and, in spite of the fact that
complexity is an immeasurable quantity, the model has made possible an estimation
of the relative values of complexity all over the history of biological and cultural
evolution in the lineage of man. The method for these estimations is restricted to traits
that can be identified in the developmental as well as in the evolutionary processes.
Therefore, many expressions of evolution, especially in its cultural realm, are not
contributing to the values of complexity obtained by the method.
The result indicates that the value of complexity has grown in a strongly accelerating
pace throughout the history of human biological and cultural evolution. In spite of the
limitation in the applicability of many cultural manifestations, the result indicates that
mankind’s contribution to complexity during the last million years is greater that what
has been accomplished during the long preceding history of man’s biological
evolution.
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1Does species evolution follow scale laws ?
First applications of the Scale Relativity Theory to
Fossil and Living-beings 
Jean Chaline1
Abstract
We have demonstrated, using the Cantor dust method, that the statistical
distribution of appearance and disappearance of rodents species (Arvicolid
rodent radiation in Europe) follows power laws strengthening the evidence for a
fractal structure set. Self-similar laws have been used as model for the
description of a huge number of biological systems. With Nottale we have
shown that log-periodic behaviors of acceleration or deceleration can be applied
to branching macroevolution, to the time sequences of major evolutionary leaps
(global life tree, sauropod and theropod dinosaurs postural structures, North
American fossil equids, rodents, primates and echinoderms clades and human
ontogeny). The Scale-Relativity Theory has others biological applications from
linear with fractal behavior to non-linear and from classical mechanics to
quantum mechanics.
Keywords : speciation, extinction, macroevolution, scale relativity, log-periodic laws
1. First demonstration of power-laws in fossil living-beings evolution
1.1. Introduction
The part that chance plays in evolution is a much debated issue (Monod,
1970; Grassé, 1978; Dawkins, 1986). While chance clearly is involved in the
living world at many levels, e.g. in the formation of gametes, fertilization and
the choice of mates, it is not yet really known to what extent chance is involved
in speciation, microevolution, extinction, and macroevolution. We have sought
to find out whether the events that punctuate the fossil record adopt a random
logic or whether they involve fractal dynamics implying the existence of power
laws ?
As non-linear structures and scale laws had been discovered in Earth
sciences (Allègre et al., 1982 ; Dubois and Cheminée, 1988, 1993), it was
interesting to test this approach in paleontology. The idea was dared : can
                                                 
1 Laboratoires de Biogéosciences (UMR CNRS 5561) et de Paléobiodiversité et Préhistoire de
l'EPHE, Université de Bourgogne, Centre des Sciences de la Terre, 6 Bd. Gabriel and 143 av.
V. Hugo, 21000 Dijon, France. (+33380573546 ; jean.chaline@orange.fr).
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2species evolution had a fractal behavior as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions ?
The very high quality of Eurasian Arvicolid rodent data occurring within a well
calibrated climato-stratigraphic record provides good basis for such an analysis.
1.2. The arvicolid data
Voles and lemmings, which make up the Arvicolid family, have a holarctic
distribution. Lineages within the group can be traced from the Pleistocene to the
Recent without great difficulty. Biological, genetical, morphological and
palaeontological data have made it possible to specify kinship among lineages.
Arvicolids are abundantly fossilized in owl pellets and in beds which lie close
together both in time (ranging from hundreds to thousands of years, often dated
by physical methods) and in space throughout Eurasia. Paleontological data
calibrated by physical dating (Chaline and Laurin, 1986; Chaline, 1987) have
served to establish the chronology of speciation (speciation or First Appearance
Datum: FAD) and extinction (extinction or Last Appearance Datum: LAD)
events used in this study.
Voles appeared in the fossil record 5.00-4.5 Myr ago and are abundant in
Pliocene and Quaternary sediments. There are 140 lineages and 37 distinct
genera. A hundred species survive (Honacki et al., 1982; Chaline et al., 1999).
Over 5 Myr 52 new lineages appeared in Eurasia (FAD) by cladogenesis or
allopatric speciation, while 34 lineages disappear (LAD). Some specific lineages
display gradual evolution where the authors have distinguished each
evolutionary step in the chronomorphocline by specific names, or diachrons
(Chaline and Laurin, 1986. These phyletic species are excluded from the
inventory of FAD, which only correspond to the appearance of new species by
cladogenesis. All appearances of species by allopatric speciation necessarily
correspond to a punctuation on the geological scale, because they occur in such
small populations in such confined areas that they have statistically no chance of
being fossilized. FAD and LAD can be considered as biological events because
they occur instantaneously on the geological scale, like other geological events
(e.g. volcanic eruptions) which are amenable to point-process analysis.
Thus, the arvicolid radiation is one of the best known (Chaline, 1987;
Fejfar and Heinrich, 1990; Korth, 1994 ; Chaline et al., 1999) and provides an
opportunity to analyze the anatomy of a radiation (Chaline and Brunet-Lecomte,
1992). Arvicolids form a homogeneous group. The average life expectancy of
species is less than 1 million years and the speciation and extinction dates of
species are known to within 100.000 years. We have confined our investigations
to Eurasia. The plot of species variety versus time highlights three phases in the
radiation : a multiplication in the number of species between 4.4 and 2.3 Myr is
followed by stabilization between 2.3 and 0.7 Myr and new multiplication
between 0.7 and the present (Fig. 1 ; table 1).
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3Fig. 1. Species appearances and extinction. The European Arvicolid radiation in
the Quaternary. Distribution of the number of species over time. The first phase
between 5 and 3 Myr corresponds to an exponential multiplication of species. A
second stabilising phase occurs between 3 and 0.7 Myr. A third phase between
0.7 Myr and the Present Day shows a new exponential multiplication. Diagram
showing the variation in species diversity (N species), the number of
appearances (FAD: 52 lineages) and extinctions (LAD: 34 lineages) related to
the broad Plio-Pleistocene climatic phases cold (Menapien, Eburonien and cold
Reuverien) and warm phases (Cromerian, Waaline, Tiglien and warm
Reuverien). It is obvious that the major phases of extinction do not take place
during cold phases but during the warm or temperate phases which follow them.
(after Chaline and Brunet-Lecomte (1992).
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4AGES
in Myrs
N FAD N LAD SPECIES
RICHNESS
0.15 3 0 22
0.25 1 3 21
0.35 3 2 22
0.45 2 1 19
0.55 3 0 17
0.65 0 3 16
0.75 7 0 16
0.85 0 2 11
0.95 0 0 11
1.25 4 4 13
1.75 6 0 10
2.25 5 11 15
2.75 6 2 12
3.25 8 5 11
3.75 3 0 3
4.25 1 1 1
Table 1. Arvicolid data in Europe. Ages, N FAD (First Appearance Datum or
speciation), N LAD (Last Appearance Datum or extinction), N species (after
Chaline and Brunet-Lecomte, 1992).
Randomness and non-random testings, the survivorship curve test, on the
basis of which van Valen (1973) proposed the Red Queen's Hypothesis and a
Poisson distribution test for randomness, and the Cantor dust model and the
Stationary model for non-random tests.
1.3. The survivorship curve and the Red Queen's hypothesis
Randomness can be tested by several models, including survivorship
models. These generally apply to large samples (several hundred) designed to
investigate the longevity of species. Survival time must not be confused with the
rate of speciation and extinction over a given unit of time. The scale of the
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5analysis in terms of systematics may involve species, genera or families and in
terms of time may range from 100.000 to 1 or even 10 million years. Depending
on the scales used, the appearance or extinction of a species will not have the
same causes or the same signification. The method consists in plotting the
proportion of species that survive for given time intervals. The use of a
logarithmic ordinate means that "the slope of the curve at any age is
proportional to the probability of extinction at that age" (van Valen, 1973: p. 1).
van Valen, testing more than 25.000 taxa, concludes "almost uniform linearity
for extinct taxa except for effects attributable to sampling error". "For living
taxa linearity of the distribution requires both constant extinction and constant
origination" (Van Valen 1973: p. 7). Van Valen attributes the deviations from
linearity to sampling error and to exceptional events such as massive extinction
at the end of the Permian. This model suggests that the physical environment
plays no role in the appearance and extinction of species and that only biotic
factors are involved in a wholly inside story.
The survivorship test curve for the Arvicolid radiation data does not fit the
random model well (for graph and calculations see Dubois et al., 1992). Despite
a highly significant correlation coefficient (r = 0.93), a linear model is not
sufficient to account for the relation between the two variables, as is attested by
the non-random distribution of residuals versus species duration.
Chaline and Laurin (1986) had demonstrated that the evolution of the
Mimomys occitanus - ostramosensis vole lineage between 4.4 and 1.5 Myr was
partly controlled by climatic changes. They seem to be linked to climatic
fluctuations which act as stimuli speeding up or slowing down the rate of
phyletic gradualism occurring in this lineage. The adaptive response is either
different (progressive cement development or gradual hypsodonty increase)
during similar climatic conditions, or identical (hypsodonty increase) for distinct
climates (cold or warm). Thus, climatic factors are clearly involved, but
indirectly, at one remove. If the radiation data are placed in the Plio-Pleistocene
climatic context, it can be seen that disappearances, or extinctions, do not occur
during cold phases but mainly during warm or temperate crises, suggesting a
climatic control factor. These data are in conflict with the Red Queen's
Hypothesis. It is clear that external factors are active.
1.4. Poisson distribution test of intervals between FAD
Randomness implies the existence of a limiting distribution but also means
the absence of correlations. A further confusion seems to stem from the
recognition (Arnéodo and Sornette, 1984; Sornette and Arnéodo, 1984) that
passing all the usual statistical tests is not the sign of "true" randomness since
certain completely deterministic systems have been successfully put through all
the tests. Passing all tests of randomness does not preclude a system from
possessing low dimensional deterministic dynamics. Let us be more precise
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6about the main origin of randomness. The apparent randomness in a given
sequence of numbers obtained from dynamic change of a system may result
essentially from two types of dynamics2. Coming back to our time series, let us
first examine the distribution of time intervals between two successive
speciations (FAD) or extinctions (LAD). For intervals longer than 50.000 years,
the evidence of a non linear is quite clear. This observation is fundamental
because it excludes, in our opinion, any exponential, Poisson or gamma
distribution. Conversely the bi-log graph seems to provide a fairly good linear
fit, suggesting a power law distribution. The previous test provides a strong
argument for the deterministic behavior of the dynamic system (in the physicists'
sense of dynamic systems, no other meanings should be given to dynamic)
which generates the time series. To find out more about this determinism we
have used more appropriate tests and compare the results obtained from both
FAD and LAD series. For this type of data either a fractal approach by Cantor
dust analysis or a first return map could have been used. The approximation on
the short intervals suggested that the return map would be strongly polluted
along the main bisector (see Sornette et al., 1991; Dubois and Cheminée, 1993).
In order to strengthen our argument about the evidence for fractal structures, we
shall also compute the information dimension for comparison with the similarity
dimension as provided by our Cantor dust analysis.
                                                 
2 In the first type, systems are characterized by many degrees of freedom and they may
develop random dynamics as a result of the complexity created by the superposition and
coupling of changes in each degree of freedom (e.g. Brownian molecules, Johnson electrical
noise due to thermal excitation of the motion of electrons). In these cases a Markovian
process may adequately describe changes in the system over time and (any observable)
changes in a physical variable cannot be distinguished from those in a suitable random
process. Randomness is thus linked to the large number of degrees of freedom. In the second
type, the dynamics of the system have only a few degrees of freedom only but may present
highly complex behavior. This involves deterministic chaos (Bergé et al., 1984; Sornette et
al., 1991; Dubois, 1995). Let us recall the main properties of these systems: (a) sensitive
dependence upon initial conditions, (b) reinjection of the trajectories (in the phase space) in a
closed domain by non-linear processes, (c) fractal dimension (in the phase space) of this
geometrical object, the attractor. This second type is very important and extends the concept
of determinism to a very broad domain which was previously considered to involve
randomness. Time sequences of such low dimensional dynamic systems have been closely
studied and it was realized that, when sufficiently chaotic, their dynamics are
indistinguishable from truly random processes. The result is that time sequences of
deterministically chaotic systems are found to pass all tests of randomness and thus qualify as
completely random. Thus a major breakthrough in non-linear dynamics has been to reduce the
huge array of systems that were thought to be random by means of techniques for quantifying
the number of degrees of freedom. To highlight the deterministic nature of subsets with a
finite number of degrees of freedom (often even small numbers - 2, 3, 4, etc.) we separate
them from those with a larger number and that are still (for how long?) thought of as random
(and so unpredictable).
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71.5. Test of the stationary model
In contrast to the "Red Queen's Hypothesis" which claims that extinction
rates remain constant within groups regardless of physical changes in the
environment (Law of constant extinction or random model), the Stationary
model proposed by Stenseth and Maynard-Smith (1984) predicts that evolution
will cease with the absence of abiotic parameters. In constant environments the
Stationary model predicts zero rate of change in biomes, while in periodically
disturbed environments, e.g. under Pleistocene climatic fluctuations,
appearances and extinctions of species are one response to the perturbations
(Benton, 1985). It seems clear that climatic fluctuations play a role, at least for
extinctions. As climatic fluctuations modify the paleogeography of species, it
should be noted that they induce faunal shifts and isolation within species and
are also favorable periods for speciation.
1.6. The Cantor dust method:  fractal set in Arvicolids
The Cantor dust method was used for the first time in paleontology (Dubois
et al., 1992) in order to analyze of the Arvicolid radiation irrefutably shows that
the distribution of speciation and extinction events is fractal, i.e. that it depends
on several factors resulting in a deterministically chaotic pattern. The FAD
series of tests performed by computing Similarity, Correlation and Information
dimensions confirms that the results are coherent. Appearance (FAD) and
disappearance (LAD) phenomena that are one of the major aspects of the
evolution of biodiversity stem from the interaction of internal and external
coercions. Internal coercions include gene mutations and their expression,
especially in development and morphogenesis. External contingencies refer to
climatic environmental parameters of temperature, humidity, plant and animal
context (Hokr, 1951) and to geological, or cosmic events; factors which
introduce contingency into evolution.
EDU 2008 p218
8Figure 2. The graphs Log xi versus Log ti for the three time series: FAD (a) (-5
Myr-0), the slope of the least square regression line is v = 0.2292 ± 0.0412 and
D = 1- v = 0.7708 + 0.0412; FAD (b) (-1 Myr - 0), D = 0.6782 ± 0.0506; LAD (-
5 Myr - 0), D = 0.5397 ± 0.0529 (after Dubois et al., 1992).
FAD and LAD data show that the two phenomena are not constrained in
the same way (Fig.2). LAD data show a stronger tendency to clustering, which
may be interpreted as the outcome of a marked, major impact of external
coercions. In the present state of knowledge, it seems to us that this factor is
above all climatic and environmental.
In fact, it can be seen from the Arvicolid data (Chaline, 1987) that during
the same climatic sequences some species remain in stasis (species in
equilibrium), whereas others evolve gradually and yet others disappear (species
in disequilibrium) (Chaline and Laurin, 1986). Climatic parameters may
underlie the disappearances, as it has already been noted that they seem to occur
in warm or temperate phases following major cold spells. This observation has
been confirmed by the works of Graham and Lundelius (1984), Graham (1985)
and Graham and Mead (1987) on variations in diversity specific to mammal
associations in North America during the last Ice Age, showing that more
species disappear at the start of the post-glacial re-warming, seemingly after the
break up of plant and animal communities. Climatic warming occurs rapidly on
the geological scale and causes potentially fatal disequilibrium between species
and their environments. In contrast, climatic cooling, which is far slower on the
.
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9geological scale, allows species to acclimatize either by following geographical
shifts in nutritive plant areas (case of lemmings and voles in Siberia) or by
evolving in terms of morphology, ecology or ethology. During cold phases,
there was a reduction in seasonal variation accompanied by a fall in average
summer temperatures and a rise in average winter temperatures which allowed
highly diverse communities to develop in areas that were limited by the spread
of continental glaciers. Conversely, during warming, there was an increase in
seasonal variations which destroyed existing biomes and produced new ones.
This explains the fact that the coercions on extinctions are stronger than
those on speciations perhaps also because of the rapid warming subsequent to
the end of glaciation. Appearances of new species are out of phase in time
possibly because of the appearance of new ecological niches and the time
species need to give rise to new species. New developments in theoretical
ecology have shown that chaos may play a role in reducing the probability of
extinction (Allen et al., 1993).
Moreover, as it is difficult to separate biotic from abiotic factors in
extinction and speciation rates, our method suggests an overlapping Red
Queen/Stationary model, depending on circumstances. In fact these models
depend on several other factors, for example whether species are in ecological
equilibrium or disequilibrium with their environment and whether groups
display great or small genetic variability.
There seems, therefore, to be an overall logic behind speciations and
extinctions in the living world. The extension of this type of analysis will very
likely permit better evaluations of the impact of external coercions on evolution.
The result is highly important for evolutionary theory in that it reduces, or
changes the role played by chance in what used to seem highly random
processes. The appearance and extinction of species clearly obeys fractal
dynamics.
1.7. Others fractal patterns in paleontological data
The problem of the existence of fractal structures in the fossil record is
largely discussed since this first approach, and the many works arrive to
sometimes contradictory conclusions. Minelli et al., (1991) have shown that the
genera distribution within the life classification follows a power-law. Plotnick
and McKinney (1993), have demonstrated self-organization evidence in planktic
foraminiferal evolution. The same year, Hanski et al., (1993) explains that the
boreal rodents population oscillations regulated by mustelid predators leads to a
chaotic system. Patterson and Fowler (1996) have shown that originations and
extinctions in planktics foraminifers follows also power-laws and that
extinctions were more constrained; a result comforting our rodent results. The
self-similarity of extinction statistics in the fossil record described by Solé et al.,
(1997) indicate a non-linear answer of biosphere to environment perturbations as
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a major cause of extinctions, a scenario contradicted by Kirchner et Weil (1998)
who do not observe fractal structure in the statistics of extinctions. Burlando
(1990, 1993) shows that the living-being system and radiations present an auto-
similarity and that the geometry of evolution was fractal. Verrecchia (1996)
demonstrated, that stromatolithes present a fractal structure (D = 1.73) and that
stromatolithe growth may be simulated by Limited Diffusion Aggregation
models (DLA systems) showing variations of growth from dendritic to moss-
like. Many others have discussed of problems of self-organized criticality, auto-
similarity and extinctions in the evolution of some groups (Plotnick and
Sepkovski, 2001; Newman, 1996 ; Newman, and Eble, 1999a & b ; Bak, 1996 ;
Kauffman, 1993 ; Bornholdt, 2003 ; Bornholdt and Sneppen, 1998 ; Sneppen et
al., 1995 ; Sibani et al., 1998). We can now consider that the fractal pattern of
evolutionary phenomena (speciations, radiations and extinctions) was clearly
established at the end of the nineties.
Numerous books about fractal structures in nature were published by
Mandelbrot (1977, 1982), Dubois (1995), Sapoval (1997) and many others. But
all these works were purely descriptive, showing the universality of fractals, but
they present no theory explaining why the fractals?
Nottale since the eighties has developed his new Theory of Scale Relativity
(SRT) explaining origin and the distribution of fractals in nature resolutions (see
Nottale’s article).
2. Applications of the theory of scale relativity to fossil and living beings
2.1. Linear cases with fractal behavior
It has been shown that toward the small scale one gets a scale invariant law
with constant fractal dimension, while the explicit scale-dependence is lost at
larger scales. Self-similar laws have been used as models for the description of a
huge number of biological systems. Many examples of fractal structures were
demonstrated within living-being hierarchical organization, from the simplest to
the most complex: DNA sequences containing noncoding material3, ADN
coiling up in chromosomes, neuronshape, blood vessels network of lungs and
kidneys, mammalian lungs (Schlesinger and West, 1991), branching patterns of
retinal vessels, bifurcations viscorous fingering of the flow of hydrochloric acid
in the mucus gel layer protecting epithelium and stomach against acidification
(Buldyrev et al., 1994) and self digestion, bird’s feathers, bacterial colonies
showing analogies with the inorganic growth model called diffusion limited
aggregation (DLA), root systems, branching of trees and plants (ferns, black
                                                 
3 The lack of long-range correlations in coding region seems to be a necessary condition for
functional biologically active proteins (Buldyrev et al., 1994).
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elder and cauliflowers). Many aquatic mollusks present fractal fatures pattern on
their shells. For instance, the shells of Conus thalasiarchus and Olivia porphyria
show a Sierpinski triangle pattern which can be now simulated (Fowler et al.,
1992). Boettiger et al. (2008) have found that the neurosecretory system of
aquatic mollusks generates their diversity of shell structures and pigmentation
patterns. The anatomical and physiological basis of this model sets it apart from
other models for shape and pattern. The model reproduces all known shell
shapes and patterns, and accurately predicts how the pattern alters in response to
environmental disruption and subsequent repair. They have shown that all the
patterns emerge from combinations of three types of bifurcations: Turing
instabilities giving raise to stable bands perpendicular to the growing hedge and
Hopf bifurcations, and wave propagation and collisions producing zig-zag
stripes. In Olivia porphyria the pattern is created by a reverse wave. At larger
ecological scales size distribution of plants supporting insects are related to the
fractal distribution of the leaves, diffusive spread of populations growth with the
shape of a smooth disc becoming increasingly rough, bird vigilant behavior.
Such phenomena have been also described in ion channels in cell membranes,
the human heartbeat disease, certain malignancies, sudden cardiac death,
epilepsy, fetal syndrome, human language, and many others, etc. The systems
displaying power laws and fractal structures are largely widespread in nature.
One reason is certainly the fact that they increase organ surface providing better
function, a characteristic certainly maximized by natural selection.
2.2. From fractal to log-periodic laws
The above results suggested that paleobiological data must be quantized
and analyzed at distinct scales by new non-linear methods. For instance, the
renormalization group approach (Nauenberg, 1975 ; Jona-Lasinio, 1975)
predicts that solutions of renormalization equations concerning initially
only « quantum field theory » and applied to statistical physics to « phase
transition phenomena » and « critical phenomena », lead both to power law
scale behavior and log-periodic corrections of such behavior. Moreover, the
critical behavior is a priori symmetrical around the critical value of the variable
under consideration. Under the proximity of critical time, the system became
instable and fractal, and shows precursor events of an accelerated rate leading to
critical time, specific of the system. After the critical time, the system displays
replical events in a decelerating manner. It must be noted that the application of
acceleration to life evolution has been anticipated by Meyer (1947, 1954)
naturally without any possible adequate calculations. Both log-periodic
accelerations before the critical point ("precursors") and decelerations after it
("replicas") are expected (Fig.3), and they have been confirmed for spatial
structures and temporal structures, in earthquakes (Sornette D. and Sammis C.G
1995) and stock market crashes (Sornette et al., 1996; Sornette, 2003). Among
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corrections to scale invariance, log-periodic laws may thus play a very important
role in many domains, not only confined to physics, but also to Earth, life and
human sciences (probabilist deterministic and predictive laws).
Sornette’s work on « discrete scale invariance » (1998) led Nottale to
consider the tree of life as a real tree, but with a temporal fractal structure rather
than a spatial one. The jumps between species involve bifurcations allowing to
liken the general evolutionary process to a "tree of life" where "branch" lengths
represent time intervals between major events. The question raised is whether
this tree can be described by a mathematical structure, at least at a statistical
level.
2.3. Log-periodic behavior
By analogy with real trees, we have tested as a first approximation the
simplest possible law, i.e. a self-similar tree (Chaline et al., 1999a). Such a law4
corresponds to discrete scale-invariance and log-periodic acceleration or
deceleration, characterized by a critical point of convergence Tc which varies
with the lineage in question (Fig. 3).
These studies are purely chronological analysis which does not take into
account the nature of events, but they provide us with a beginning of predictivity
interpreted as the dates of the peaks of probability for an event to happen.
We have analyzed the time sequences of major evolutionary leaps at
various scales, from the scale of the global life tree (appearances of prokaryotes,
eukaryotes, multicellulars, exoskeletons, tetrapody, homeothermy and
viviparity), to the scales of large clades (orders and families) such as sauropod
and theropod dinosaurs postural structures, North American fossil equids,
rodents, primates and echinoderms clades. Finally, considering the relationships
between phylogeny and ontogeny, it was interesting to verify whether the log-
periodic law was also applied to the various stage of human ontogeny.
                                                 
4 This law [TN  = Tc + (T0 - Tc ) (g)–n ] is dependent on only two parameters, g (scale ratio
between successive time intervals) and Tc, which of course have no reason a priori to be
constant for the entire tree of life. Note that g is not expected to be an absolute parameter,
since it depends on the density of events chosen, i.e. on the adopted threshold in the choice of
their importance (namely, if the number of events is doubled, g is replaced by √g). Only a
maximal value of g, corresponding to the very major events, could possibly have a meaning.
On the contrary, the value of Tc is expected to be a characteristic of a given lineage, and
therefore not to depend (within error bars) on such a choice.
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Figure 3. Log-periodic law. Log-periodic accelerations (precursors) occur before
the critical point and decelerations after it (replicas) (after Dubois and Chaline,
2006).
2.3.1. Primates bauplans
Delattre and Fenart (1954, 1956, 1960) showed that cranial ontogenesis of
higher apes and humans is characterized by varying degrees of occipital flexion,
on the one hand, and prognathism on the other hand depending on genus and
bipedalism. One fundamental discovery is that of a growth phenomenon in
which three-dimensional organization of basicranio-facial architecture is
controlled by the processes of flexure at the base of the skull. This affects the
morphogenesis of the two components of the face, the maxilla and the mandible
(Deshayes, 1986, 1988, 1991 ; Dambricourt Malassé and Deshayes, 1992).
These major stages of cranio-facial contraction are a well known phenomenon in
Primates, alternatively termed flexure of the skull base or occipital shift
(Deniker, 1885; Anthony, 1952), fundamental ontogenies5 (Dambricourt-
Malassé, 1987, 1988, 1996). Dambricourt-Malassé and Deshayes (1992)
discovered and proved that the cranio-facial contraction is an embryonic
phenomenon which is clearly visible in the mandible and that the living and
fossil lower jaws retain the range of contraction. The fundamental bauplan is
fixed at a very early stage of the embryonic development. The contraction
process starts very early in ontogeny and is contemporaneous with
organogenesis. Such structures are determined by Hox genes and are defined in
scope and duration by embryogenesis which represents the first eight weeks
                                                 
5 Dambricourt-Malassé (1987) introduces the term of fundamental ontogeny covering a set of
populations belonging to one or more species, or even to one or more genera, dispersed in
time and space, but united by a common ancestral ontogenetic bauplan. It is a set of
individual ontogenetic designs that develop from a common embryonic plan.
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after fertilization for humans and a little less in other primates. The
chondrocranium and splanchnocranium retain the imprint through to adulthood
bauplan in turn is rapidly diversified, by speciation, into as many species as
there are ecological niches available.
After comparison of Recent mandibles recording the contraction stages,
Dambricourt Malassé et al. (1999) distinguish at least five distinctive
organizational groups of mandibles related to different cranial morphological
plans among extant and fossil primates. These skull bauplans can be identified
from the increasing intensity of embryonic cranio-facial contraction and increase
of cranial capacity, respectively as follows:
(1) prosimians (strepsirrhines and Tarsius) (plus adapiform) ;
(2) monkey apes: platyrrhines, cercopithecoids and hylobatids (plus
Propliopithecidae) ;
(3) great apes (gorilla, chimpanzee, and orang utan) (plus Dryopithecidae) ;
(4) earliest Homo ;
(5) Homo sapiens.
After Dambricourt, it is the embryonic amplitude of cranio-facial
contraction that differs between the various primates and not the nature of the
process itself. Craniofacial contraction and cranial capacity are minimal in both
fossil (adapiform) and extant prosimians, more substantial in simians or
monkeys (cercopithecids), even more pronounced in great apes (Pongo, Gorilla,
Pan) and australopithecines (Australopithecus and Paranthropus). Conversely,
it is maximal in humans particularly in Homo neanderthalensis and Homo
sapiens, and is sustained to a late stage, or even to adulthood. The basicranio-
facial bauplan of gorilla, orang utan, and chimpanzee, despite nearly 20 millions
years of evolutionary divergence, are built to the same ontogenetic design
termed the "great ape" as opposed to the "monkey" or "australopithecine" skull
plans. Comparison of the fundamental ontogeny of the « great apes » and of
« Australopithecus » shows that it is the fundamental ontogeny and the common
organogenesis of the great ape species that has been restructured and dynamized.
The transition from the "Great Ape" skull plan to the "Australopithecine" skull
plan is characterized by occipital rotation, facial contraction and expansion of
the upper cranial vault, with the foramen magnum at the skull base moving to a
more horizontal position. The transition from the "Australopithecine" skull plan
to the "Homo" skull plan is reflected by tilting and forward movement of the
foramen magnum, posterior extension of the skull, facial contraction and
broadening of the frontal bone definitively separating the bregma  and
stephanion , a clear characteristic of the genus Homo. Recent geometric
morphometrics studies on the skull have shown that the modern human form is
not significantly different from the earlier forms of the genus Homo and thus the
Homo sapiens bauplan cannot be retain (Chaline et al., 1998). The figure 4
emphasizes the overall craniofacial contraction that occurred in leaps and
entailed re-shaping of the skull outline and the tilting of the foramen magnum.
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Figure 4. These simplified outlines of the three skull plans identified in the
sagittal plane recapitulate the morphological changes observed between Great
Apes plan, Australopithecine plan, Homo and Homo sapiens plan (Procrustes
methods). 1. Craniofacial contraction ; 2. Uppervault by extension; 3. Tilting of
the foramen magnum (after Chaline et al., 1998).
From great apes to modern man numerous heterochronies of development
(hypermorphosis, hypomorphosis and post-displacements) have occurred during
ontogeny (Chaline et al., 1998), allowing (1) the acquisition of permanent
bipedalism of Australopithecus and Homo, (2) the increased cranial capacity of
primitive forms of Homo (habilis, ergaster, rudolfensis, erectus, heidelbergensis
and neanderthalensis) and (3) the disappearance of simian characters associated
with renewed increase in cranial capacity in Homo sapiens.
The jumps between species (Chaline et al., 1993) involve bifurcations
allowing us to liken the general evolutionary process to a tree of life where
branch lengths represent time intervals between major events. The question
raised is whether this tree can be described by a mathematical structure, at least
at a statistical level. By analogy with real trees, we test as a first approximation
the simplest possible law, i.e. a self-similar tree.
Homo plan
Great Ape planAustralopithecine plan
Homo sapiens
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Data: Dambricourt et al., 1999; Chaline, 1998. The skull bauplans appearances
are respectively as follows (Fig.5):
(1) Prosimians (strepsirrhines and Tarsius) (plus adapiform) (-65 Myr);
(2) Monkey apes: platyrrhines, cercopithecoids and hylobatids (plus
Propliopithecidae) (-40 Myr);
(3) Great apes (gorilla, chimpanzee, and orang utan) (plus Dryopithecidae)
bauplan (-20 Myr);
(4) Earliest Homo bauplan (-2 Myr) including Homo sapiens within the Homo
bauplan (-0.18 ± 0.03 Myr).
Figure. 5. Phylogeny of embryonic basicranial-facial contraction in Primates
(after Dambricourt et al., 1999).
Results: Chaline et al., 1999b. Tc = 2.1 ± 1.0 Myr ; g = 1.76 ± 0.01; tst  = 110,
P<0.0001 (N = 14 events, including the "global" tree) (Fig.6).
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Figure 6. Comparison of dates of major events in primate evolution (dots) and a
log-periodic law of ratio g = 1.73 and critical time Tc = + 2.3 Myr. The ring
marks the date for the next evolutionary event for the lineage as predicted by the
law (after Chaline et al., 1999).
Some colleagues have recently suggested that other events (actually minor
ones) should also be taken into account for this lineage, leading to the following
dates: -65, -53, -40, -35, -25, -20, -17, -10, -7, -5, -3.5, -2, -0.18. The statistical
analysis gives: Tc = 5.8 ± 4.0 Myr; g = 1.23 ± 0.01; tst  = 57, P<0.001 (N = 13
events). The result is still significant, and, moreover, the critical date agrees
within error bars (to less than 1s) with our previous determination. This
confirms that Tc is characteristic of the lineage beyond the choice of the events.
On the contrary the value of g, which depends on the density of dates, is not
conserved, as expected. The fitting law which is applied to time intervals is a wo
parameters function (Tc and g) so that only three events are needed to determine
theses parameters. Although these analyses concern only the chronology of
events corresponding to the dates of the peaks of probability for an event to
happen, independently of their nature, the log-periodic law permits a certain
predictivity. The retroprediction of an important date, at -10 Myr, correspond to
the estimated date expected from genetic distances and phylogenetic studies of
appearance of the common Homo-Pan-Gorilla ancestor. This ancestor has not
been yet discovered in the fossil record.
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2.3.2. Fossil  North American Equids
Data: Devillers in Chaline, 1990. Hyracotherium : -54 ± 5 Myr. ; Mesohippus : -
38 ± 5 Myr. ; Miohippus  : -31 ± 5 Myr. ; Parahippus : -24 ± 4 Myr. ;
Archeohippus : -19 ± 3 Myr. ; Hipparion : -15 ± 3 Myr. ; Protohipus : -11 ± 2
Myr.;  Nannipus : -9 ± 3 Myr). ; Plesippus : - 6 ± 2 Myr. ; Equus : -2 ± 1 Myr.
Results: Chaline et al., 1999b. Tc = -1.0 ± 2.0 Myr ; g = 1.32 ± 0.01; tst  = 99,
P<0.001 (N = 16 events, including the "global" tree). The Tc at the present time
means that North American Equids have reached this time boundary. In fact
Equids disappear effectively from North America 8.000 years ago, being
reintroduced by the Spanish conquest (Fig.7).
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Figure 7. Appearance dates of North American equid genera compared with a
log-periodic law with Tc  = 0 and g = 1.32 (like colored dots are in ratio 1.73 to
be compared with the equivalent diagrams for primates and general evolution)
(after Chaline et al., 1999).
2.3.3. Rodents
Data: Hartenberger, 1998. In the case of rodents, half of all mammals, the
analysis is different from the other lineages, since it is made on their whole
arborescence.
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Results: Chaline et al., 1999b. On Fig. 8 is plotted the histogram of the
distribution of the 61 dates of appearance of rodent families. Well-defined peaks
can be identified in this distribution. It is on these peaks that we perform our
analysis. However, some uncertainties remains, in particular concerning the
large peak after the date of first apparition of the lineage. Three different
interpretations are considered. The mean value (-50 Myr) of the first peak has
been used. This yields a critical date Tc = 12 ± 6 Myr in the future. One can also
singularize the latest date, yielding: (-56 Myr, -45 Myr, -34 Myr, -26 Myr, -18
Myr, -12 Myr, -7 Myr, -2 Myr). One obtains: Tc = + 7 ± 3 Myr; g = 1.32 ± 0.01;
tst  = 78, P<0.001 (N = 15 events, including ancestors in the "global" tree). But a
closer scrutiny of the data suggests that the spurt of branching (that correspond
to the sub-peaks inside the main first peak in Fig. 9) that followed the group's
first appearance actually decelerates. This would be in agreement with the
interpretation of these structures in temrs of critical phenomena. We find that the
deceleration is issued from a critical point at Tc = -62 Myr ± 5 Myrs, which
agrees with the date estimated for the group's first appearance. Once this initial
deceleration is allowed for, the following dates (-34 Myr, -26 Myr, -18 Myr, -12
Myr, -7 Myr, -2 Myr) exhibit highly significant acceleration toward Tc = 27 ±10
Myr (tst = 98, P < 10-4).
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Fig. 8. Histogram of the distribution of the dates of appearance of families in the
arborescence of the order of rodents. These data include only a subfraction of
the events after -12 Myr, so that the amplitude of the last peaks is
underestimated and has been extrapolated (dotted line) (after Nottale et al.,
2000).
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Figure 9. Fit of density peaks in distribution of rodent species appearances
against a log-periodic law with Tc = +12 Myr and g = 1.32 (after Chaline et al.,
1999)
2.3.4. Sauropod dinosaurs
Data: Wilson and Sereno (1998) have identified five well-defined major events
in the evolution of their principal postural changes at the higher-level
phylogeny: Prosauropoda/Sauropoda bifurcation: -230 Myr;
Vulcanodon/Eusauropoda bifurcation: -204 Myr; Neosauropoda: -182 Myrs;
Titanosauriforms: -167 Myr; Titanosauria: -156 Myr.
Results: Chaline et al., 1999b. These events exhibit a marked log-periodic
acceleration toward: Tc = -128 ± 10 Myr ; g = 1.41 ± 0.01; tst = 122, P<0.001
(N = 10 events, including ancestors from the "global" tree) (Fig.10).
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Figure 10. Fit of dates of main evolutionary leaps for sauropods against a log-
periodic law with Tc = -139 Myr and g = 1.5 (after Chaline et al., 1999).
2.3.5. Theropod dinosaurs
Data: Sereno, 1999. One can identify from the data of Sereno the following
main events in the evolution of Theropods: -227 Myr; -187 Myr; -160 Myr; -150
Myr; -145 Myr.
Results: Chaline et al., 1999b. There is a significant acceleration toward: Tc = -
139 ± 4 Myr; g = 2.02 ± 0.02; tst = 69, P<0.001 (N = 10 events, including
ancestors down to the origin of life).
This supports the existence of a log-periodic acceleration for the whole
group of Saurischia (Sauropods and Theropods). On the contrary, an analysis of
the other large dinosaur group, Ornithischia, has given no statistically
significant structure. This could indicate, either that the log-periodicity is not
universal in the tree of life and characterizes only some particular lineages, or
that the data are uncompleted for this group.
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2.3.6. Echinoderms
Data: David et Mooi, 1999. Seven major events that punctuate their evolution
happen at the following dates, according to David and Mooi: (1) appearance of
echinoderms (Arkarua) at the end of Precambrian in Ediacara fauna: -560-570
Myr (Vendian); (2) skeleton origin in Stromatocystites -526 Myr ; (3) theca and
stem appearances in Burgess fauna : -520 Myr ; (4) Bifurcation between
Asterozoairs/ Urchins/holothuries -490 Myr (Ordovician) ; (5) Echinids sensu
stricto -430 Myr (Silurian) ; (6) Reduction of the test to 20 plates columns
instead of 40 to 60: -355 Myr (Lower Carboniferous)  ; (7) (Irregular Urchins: -
180 Myr (Toarcian) ;
Results: The critical phenomena approach to evolutionary process leads to
expect not only acceleration toward a crisis date, but also deceleration from it.
The echinoderm group supports this view. Processing of this data shows that this
group decelerate from a critical date Tc = -575 ± 25 Myr (see Fig.11). The
graphic is in agreement with the description in terms of critical phenomena with
a critical point at the date of the group first appearance. This epoch identifies,
within error bars, with the first appearance (datum around -570 Myrs. We find:
Tc = -575 ± 25 Myrs; g = 1.67 ± 0.02; tst  = 58, P<0.003 (N = 5 events).
The two innovations occurring in echinoderms at -526 Myr (skeleton
appearance in Stromatocystites) and at -520 Myr (theca and stem appearances in
Burgess fauna) are interesting. These events are distinct and fundamental from a
cladistic point of view leading to two clades, two bifurcations (arrow). But from
an evolutionary point of view, they show that two innovations could appear
during the same probability peak. What means such a result from a genetical
point of view, as the rate of mutations are globally constant? Does it means that
the mutations of bauplans (Hox genes) appear more probably during these
probability peaks following the event log-periodic distribution of the inferred
group? Why? How? Following which kind of mechanism?
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Figure 11. Comparison of the dates of the main events of the evolution of
echinoderms with a log-periodic law of critical date Tc = -575 Myr and scale
ratio g = 1.67 (figure a). Figure b shows the estimation of the critical date
through the optimization of the Student's t variable (P = 2 x 10-3) (after Nottale
et al., 2000).
2.3.7. Global life tree
Data: Delsemme, 1994. From the origin of life to viviparity: Origin of life / first
Prokaryotes : -3.500 ± 400 Myr; Eukaryotes : -1.750 ± 250 Myr. ;
Multicellulars : -1.000 ± 100 Myr. ; Vertebrates : -570 ± 30 Myr. ; exoskeleton :
-380 ± 30 Myr. ; homeothermy : -220 ± 20 Myr. ; viviparity : -120 ± 20 Myr.
Results: These events exhibit a significant acceleration: Tc = -32 ± 60 Myr ; g =
1.83 ± 0.03; tst  = 36, P<0.003 (N = 7 events) (Fig. 12).
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Figure 12. The dates of major evolutionary events of seven lineages (common
evolution from life origin to viviparity, Theropod and Sauropod Dinosaurs,
Rodents, Equids, Primates including Hominids and Echinoderms) are plotted  as
black points in terms of log (Tc-T), and compared with the values from their
corresponding log-periodic models (computed with their best-fit parameters).
The adjusted critical time Tc and scale ratio g are indicated for each lineage
(excluding here ancestors of the "global" tree). The result is still significant, and,
moreover, the critical date agrees within error bars (to less than 1 s) with our
previous determination. This confirms that Tc is characteristic of the lineage
beyond the choice of the events. On the contrary the value of g which depends
on the density of dates is not conserved as expected (after Nottale et al., 2002).
2.3.7. Human ontogeny
As a significant log-periodic acceleration was found at different scales for
global life evolution and considering the relationships between phylogeny and
ontogeny, it appeared very interesting to verify whether such a law could also be
applied to the scale of ontogeny.
Data: Cash, O’Rahily, 1972 and Larsen, 1996. The data corresponding to the
pre-birth period (266 days or 38 weeks) is accepted as a general consensus
among embryologists. For the post-birth development we integrated the main
stages of child psychomotricity changes even though it is more difficult to
define a precise age for the major leaps because of the great inter-individual
variability (Encha-Razavi and Escudier, 2001 ; Moore, and Persaud, 1998 ;
Bourrillon, 2000 ; Arthuis et al., 1998).
Results: Cash et al., 2002 demonstrate that the log-periodic law describing
critical phenomena may be also applied to ontogenetical stages. We observe a
significant deceleration starting from fecundation day (Tc) and this day may be
retropredict at 2 or 7 hours, using posteriors events (Fig.13).
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Figure 13. Decimal logarithm log Tn of human ontogeny data related to their
rank n, showing a deceleration with a scale ratio g = 1.71 ± 0.01. The vertical
size of the point gives the confidence interval for the dates (after Cash et al.,
2002).
2.3.8. Discussion
In each case we find that a log-periodic law provides a satisfactory fit for
the distribution of dates, with different values of the critical date Tc and of the
scale ratio g for different lineages. The obtained behavior may be depending on
the lineage and on the time scale. The results are found to be statistically
significant. We give in what follows the adopted dates (in Myr before present)
for the major jumps of the studied lineages. The error bars are typically dT/T ≈
10% or less, i.e., dlog(Tc-T) ≈ 0.04. Since we are interested here in pure
chronology, if several events occur at the same date (within uncertainties), they
are counted as one. Then we give the result of the least-square fit of the log-
periodic model and the associated Student variable with its corresponding
probability to be obtained by chance. For each lineage we include in the analysis
the common ancestors down to the origin of life, except for Echinoderms and
Human ontogeny which show deceleration instead of acceleration. The obtained
parameter values are compatible with those given in Fig.12, which result from a
fit that does not include the ancestors of the lineage.
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In all these cases chronology has been quantified and the discontinuous
appearance of clades follows a log-periodic law with a middle scale report of
1.73. In each case we find that these data are consistent with a log-periodic law
of acceleration (for most lineages) or of deceleration (for echinoderms and
human ontogeny) to a high level of statistical significance. Such a law is
characterized by a critical epoch of convergence Tc specific to the lineage under
consideration and that can be interpreted, in the acceleration case, as the end of
that lineage's capacity to evolve ? Thus, as a consequence, that means there may
be a limited time-life for each specific group, depending on Tc and contingency
events (climatic, biologic or cosmic phenomena) leading to extinction.
It is interesting to note that for echinoderms, the deceleration law permits
the retropredictivity of echinoderms appearance at -575 ± 25 Myr, this epoch
identifing, within error bars, with the first appearance datum around -570 Myr.
For human ontogeny, the retropredictivity of fecundation time is of 2 hours !
Let us end this contribution by discussing possible biases and uncertainties
in our analysis. There is a "perspective" bias, linked to the fact that observational
data are fossil records only observed at the present epoch. This bias can manifest
itself in two ways. First, the uncertainty on the dates increases with the date
itself, so that we expect that dT/T be about constant, which could lead to alog-
periodic behavior. We have discussed this bias and we have shown that it cannot
account for the observed structure. The additional information given here and in
that one observes also decelerations reinforce this conclusion. A second possible
form of this bias [Sornette, private communication] could be an increasing
number of missing events in fossil records for increasing dates in the past.
Against such an interpretation, one can recall that the quality of the fossil
records, concerning in particular their completeness, has been recently
reaffirmed by Kidwell and Flessa (1996). Moreover, the number of missing
links needed to compensate for the acceleration seems to be unreasonably large
(the interval between major events goes from billion years at the beginning of
life to million years now). In addition, the bias about the choice of dates, in
particular in defining, which characters are considered to be major ones, has
been analyzed here. The solution to this problem lies in the observation that, if
the acceleration (or deceleration) is real and intrinsic to the lineage under study,
its occurrence and the date of convergence Tc ought not to be dependent (within
errors) on the limit applied as to the choice of which events count as important
ones. However, there is nothing intrinsic about the scale factor g between
intervals, as it decreases as the number of events allowed for increases. We have
been able to test this stability of the critical date with the data for which we
considered several possible choices (rodents, sauropods) as well as with choices
suggested by other workers (primates). We conclude that this uncertainty cannot
explain the observed law, which therefore seems to be a genuine one. However,
while log-periodic accelerations or decelerations have been detected in the
majority of lineages so far investigated, the question of whether this behavior is
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systematic or not remains opened (cf. the general tree for dinosaurs published by
Sereno, 1999). Analysis of the values of the critical date for the various lineages
leads us to interpret it, in the case of an acceleration, as a limit of the
evolutionary capacity of the corresponding group. When a deceleration has been
detected, it starts from the apparition date of the lineage. One possible
interpretation is that it concerns memory phenomena, each level of organization
being built on previous levels with no possibility of backward leaps, meaning
the irreversibility of phenomena. « As ontogeny creates phylogeny » (Garstang,
1922), the two phenomena obey to the same coercions such as cell
differentiation, tissue and organ building. This example is a good illustration of
the expression of such a memory phenomenon at each scale of organization of
living-being, from microevolution to macroevolution, demonstrating the unity of
life evolution.
Let us finally stress the fact that the existence of such a law does not mean
that the role of chance in evolution is reduced, but instead that randomness and
contingency may occur within a framework which may itself be structured (in a
partly statistical way).
The tests were extended to economic crisis /no-crisis patterns in Western
Europe economic system and in pre-Columbian civilizations (Nottale et al.,
2000 ; Grou et al., 2004), world economy dynamics (Johansen et Sornette,
2001), as well as earthquakes (Sornette and Sammis, 1995), stock market
crashes (Sornette, 2003), jazz history, monastic orders appearances and even
chemical elements discoveries (Brissaud, in Nottale et al., 2009). These results
reinforce the universality of the log-periodic model in the description of
evolutionary branching phenomena during temporal crisis as much in the
inorganic world as in the organic one.
How to explain these fractal structures at many level of a hierarchical
organization and patterns of living beings, the log-periodic distribution of
clades, critical time for living being groups announcing and explaining why
groups have a beginning and an end ? Answers are to be found in the scale
relativity theory (SRT) as shown by Nottale  and  in some other representations.
In this context, let us quote the work by Queiros-Conde which describes the
« tree of life » as a sort of temporal turbulent flow. A geometrical description («
entropic-skins theory ») introduced in the field of turbulence (Queiros-Conde,
1999) to describe the phenomenon of intermittency can help to visualize the
meaning of g and Tc. The tree of life is assumed to be a multi-scale tree evolving
in a three-dimensional embedding space but the scale is a time interval Dt. To be
consistent with the log-periodical law, it is shown that the tree can not be simply
fractal but should be the dynamical result of the superposition of an infinite
number of fractal sets (« skins ») having fractal dimension noted Dp varying
from the dimension d  (d = 3 if the phenomenon is occuring in a three-
dimensional space as it is assumed for « tree of life ») of embedding space to a
minimum dimension D∞ which characterizes the most intermittent events i.e. the
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ones which display the highest tendency to clustering. For each skin (which
corresponds to an event occuring at age Tp), the scale-entropy is defined  by
Sp(Dt)=ln(Dt/Dt0)Dp where Dt0  is the largest  time-interval occuring in the
system. The author then introduces a scale-entropy flux fp(Dt)=[Sp(Dt)-
Sp+1(Dt)]/(Tp-Tp+1). Entropic-skins approach assumes that the scale-entropy flux
fp(Dt) does not depend on the skin (i.e. on the level in the hierarchical structure)
and remains constant through the tree.
It leads to (Dp-Dp+1)/(DpDp)=(Tp-Tp+1)/(Tp-1-Tp)=g with g=1/g, an equality
which links fractal dimensions Dp and dates Tp. It is then easily derived g = (Df-
D∞)/(d-D∞). By defining a threshold indicating the existence of a clustered
structure compared with an homogeneous system presenting no clustered
structure (i.e. Df = d = 3), the « active part » of the tree of life which can be
characterized by a fractal dimension D1 = Df (Df<d) is introduced. An analytical
determination of g is possible through entropic-skins geometry described in
Queiros-Conde (2000). In this derivation, it is assumed that Df = 2 which means
that life is a space-filling process : biosphere is in fact mainly a two-dimensional
sheet. The crest dimension D∞, assuming a phenomenological argument of space
distribution, is the dimension of the Cantor set i.e. D∞ = ln2/ln3. It then leads to g
= ln(32/2)/ln(33/3)≈0.58 which means g≈1.724 very close to the measured mean
value of g (g = 1.73). The geometrical model of « entropic-skins » associated to
a turbulent structure for the tree of life certainly displays interesting features
which would deserve to be developed.
2.7. Conclusions
The scale relativity theory can open new perspectives in evolution. Can we
expect a scale relativity theory for living-beings evolution? The applications of
scale-relativity theory to living-beings appear as a promising new way of
research providing some suggestions or explanations. Among them, SRT
explains fractal structures (corals, plants, trees etc…) as increasing the surface
possibilities from DNA to biosphere, certainly maximized by natural selection.
SRT explains also the log-periodicity of the life-tree with critical times and as a
consequence, a limited time-life for each specific group following natural
selection and contingency after the occurrence of Tc. The existence of such a
law does not mean that the role of chance in evolution is reduced, but instead
that randomness and contingency may occur within a « framework » which may
itself be structured in a partly statistical way. Many questions are opened with
this new approach. Does SR determines preferentially more or less DNA
mutations, mutation rates within log-periodic probability peaks or not ?,
developmental biology (Hox genes control: EVO-DEVO) and epigenesis which
are not directly linked to these processes and play a major role in structuration?
Species evolution (EVO-DEVO) may be only a component of a more general
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theory of scale relativity of the universe (SR-EVO-DEVO). It is an interesting
and very promising program to be discussed for biology and paleontology.
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ABSTRACT
I distinguish Nature from the World. I also distinguish development from evolution.
Development is progressive change and can be modeled as part of Nature, using a specification
hierarchy.  I have proposed a ‘canonical developmental trajectory’ of dissipative structures with
the stages defined thermodynamically and informationally.  I consider some thermodynamic
aspects of the Big Bang, leading to a proposal for reviving final cause. This model imposes a
‘hylozooic’ kind of interpretation upon Nature, as all emergent features at higher levels would
have been vaguely and episodically present primitively in the lower integrative levels, and were
stabilized materially with the developmental emergence of new levels. The specification
hierarchy’s form is that of a tree, with its trunk in its lowest level, and so this hierarchy is
appropriate for modeling an expanding system like the Universe.  It is consistent with this model
of differentiation during Big Bang development to view emerging branch tips as having been
entrained by multiple finalities because of the top-down integration of the various levels of
organization by the higher levels.
KEYWORDS: Big Bang, causality, development, multiple worlds, Nature, specification
hierarchy, thermodynamics, vagueness
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I attempt a summary of a developmental perspective I have been constructing for
two decades as a kind of ‘treaty’ among several disciplines.  Beginning with some conceptual
clarifications, I distinguish ‘Nature’, our scientific construct, from the World.  Nature is our map
or operating manual for the World.  Nature embodies logic as its basic framework, and its
embodiments are typically found in, e.g., inscriptions, diagrams, tables, models, equations, laws,
universal constants and classifications. Nature is the subject of studies in the philosophy of
nature (natural philosophy), as in this paper.  It is mediated by languages, while the World is
mediated to us through (what in Nature we know as) our biology (Uexküll, 1926). The World is
experienced and phenomenal, but is not ‘known’ (Snowdon, 2008).  My favorite example of this
is that, while we may ride a bicycle, we do not ‘know’ (cannot describe) how we do it.  I will as
well propose a logically founded model in set theory format of ‘general development’, which is
posited to be universal for dissipative structures as they are conceived in Nature.  Of course, set
theory cannot model dynamical change.  I use this format to parse sequences of developmental
stages, following the usage  (as Normentafeln) in biology.  I will also, in this way of describing
stages of development, outline a ‘canonical developmental trajectory’ characteristic of
dissipative structures. I acknowledge evolution in passing.  As a cue to the reader, I note that my
perspective is that of natural philosophy as developed out of beginnings made by the early
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (e.g., Esposito, 1977; Salthe, 1993).  What is relevant here is
that Schelling first proposed a developmental view of the natural world.
MODES OF CHANGE
Generalized from their long usage in biology, I distinguish development from evolution, as
general modes of change (Salthe, 1993). Development is progressive change, while evolution is
expressed in the effects of accumulating marks acquired from contingent encounters.
Developments, interpreted as constitutive of the kinds of systems showing them, can be modeled
as parts of Nature.  Well known examples that I would place as developments are the ‘main
sequence’ of stars, embryonic development, and ecological succession.  Developments are like
Goodman’s (1976) ‘scripts’, but inferred from scientific investigations rather than by creative
action.  Evolution (more generally, individuation) occurs continually during the development of
any material system, building in historically acquired information, leading to increasing
dimensions of uniqueness in particular phenomena. One very important kind of particular
phenomenon in science is the biological species.  A species’ storage of historically acquired
information is held in the genomes of the cells of its parts, as well as in material configurations
in cell structures.  At its own scale each species is unique; while at their scales, its parts (e.g.,
organisms) differentiate increasingly as they recover from perturbations during development,
becoming ever more intensively unique.
     With regard to evolution, given the need perceived in Nature for systemic mutual fittingness,
some phenomena will inevitably not be as well suited to persist in their surroundings as others,
and these get recycled more rapidly than those more ‘fitting’ or ‘better adapted’. This fact of
differential persistence has been elaborately constructed as competition in our Western cultural
ideology, and is highly developed in neoDarwinian evolutionary biology, where it plays out as
competition between genotypes for representation in future generations of a population (e.g.,
Ewens, 2004).  But this is a small aspect of the ‘big picture’ of change in Nature.  A simplest
kind of example of selection would be the self-organizing choice of a drainage channel from
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among several possibilities by a high altitude water reservoir as it develops from glacier to lake
(Salthe and Fuhrman, 2005).  All actual phenomena have been individuated by evolution. This
paper, however, is concerned with development.
DEVELOPMENT
Development proceeds from relatively vague beginnings toward ever more specified particulars.
It is logically a process of refinement via the differential promotion of potential informational
constraints, followed by the subsequent fixation of some of them.  Informational constraints are
sites or regions that might assume more than one configuration. After choosing among
possibilities, they express information. As development continues, an early informational
constraint can become the site for the emergence of others.  Stages of development can be
conveniently represented using set theoretic format, as:
{ stage 1  { stage 2  { stage 3 }}}
Stage 2 develops out of Stage 1, and Stage 3 from Stage 2.  Stage 2 is necessarily immanent,
along with other possibilities, in Stage 1.  More developed stages are in this model logically
refinements of earlier stages, by way of having acquired further information. That is, an early
stage anlagen will be only roughly -- vaguely -- adumbrated. It will be preserved in development,
but increasingly altered downstream in a way that would require more information to describe.
     Guidance by this hierarchical format (see details below) imposes a certain logical structure
upon development which helps to guide our thinking about it.  An important example of this
guidance is the stricture that nothing totally new appears during development; instead some of
the vague tendencies in a given stage become ever more definitely embodied in further stages,
emerging ever more definitively. This perspective runs counter to the currently favored
perspective that genuinely new things do appear in the world.  Novelty in the present view can be
initiated by way of perturbations from outside, or by internal excursions, during a developing
system’s individuation. These may become integrated into an emerging system during its
development and homeostasis.  For example, in the development of an organism, congenital
perturbations of an embryo can result in abnormalities that become smoothly integrated into the
living individual (Reid, 2007).  These individuating modifications of a developmental trajectory
are almost always of minor import compared with typical developmental patterns.  When they
are more important, the developing system is likely to fail. Historical impacts always do
frequently perturb a surviving developing system to some, relatively minor, degree.
      The imposition of this model upon development, including its broader application to the
development of the universe, is a major departure of this paper.  The logic is developed thus:  the
quintessential example of development can be found in embryonic development.  What I have
said above can be derived from observing this particular case.  The extension of this model to
dissipative structures in general is effected by looking for more generally applicable descriptors,
like thermodynamic and information theoretic ones.  There are few developmental tendencies
that can be said to be universal.  As an example, I have proposed (Salthe, 1993) a ‘canonical
developmental trajectory’ of dissipative structures running from immaturity through maturity (in
more well integrated systems) to senescence, with these stages defined thermodynamically and
Informationally, as shown in Table 1.  Extension further to the universe as a whole is of course
speculative, but is encouraged by the developmental sequences of, for example, stars (e.g.,
Chaisson, 2001),
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______________________________________________________________
IMMATURE STAGE
     Relatively high energy density (per unit mass) flow rate
     Relatively small size and/or gross mattergy throughput
     Rate of acquisition of informational constraints relatively high, along with high growth rate
     Internal stability relatively low (it is changing fast), but dynamical stability (persistence) is high
     Homeorhetic stability to same-scale perturbations relatively high
MATURE STAGE (only in relatively very stable systems)
     Declining energy density flow rate is still sufficient for recovery from perturbations
     Size and gross throughput is typical for the kind of system
     Form is definitive for the kind of system
     Internal stability adequate for system persistence
     Homeostatic stability to same-scale perturbations adequate for recovery
SENESCENT STAGE
     Energy density flow rate gradually dropping below functional requirements
     Gross mattergy throughput high but its increase is decelerating
     Form increasingly accumulates deforming marks as a result of encounters, as part of individuation
     Internal stability of system becoming high to the point of inflexibility
     Homeostatic stability to same-scale perturbations declining
TABLE 1: Thermodynamic and informational criteria of the developmental stages of dissipative
structures. See Salthe (1989, 1993) for more details and citations.
____________________________________________________
    A developing system builds in informational constraints, and fixes many of them in the
manifest information of definite form, upon which further constraints may emerge (Brooks and
Wiley, 1988).  Abiotic developments (as in tornadoes) never get to be very highly specified;
internally stored informational constraints, such as are held in the genetic apparatus of living
systems, is required for that.  I would suggest that, if we propose a system that does not develop
from immaturity to senescence, that this would not be a bonafide material system, but possibly
part of one instead.  Thus, for example, the biological population might better be viewed as part
of an ecosystem (Damuth, 1985), where development has been successfully proposed as the
process of ecological succession (Holling, e.g., 1986; Ulanowicz, e.g., 1997). The same may be
said of the biological species (Simpson, 1953), except that the larger scale material dissipative
structure that it would be part of has not, I think, yet been identified, since a species’ areographic
extent, or the migrations of its parts, could place it as a component of more than one biome.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSE
I make a materialist interpretation of the Big Bang theory (e.g., Chaisson, 2001; Turner, 2007;
Lineweaver and Egan, 2008).  Accelerated Universal expansion of space leads to the
precipitation of matter, which initiates gravitation and the clumping of masses. Based on
Einstein’s physical intuition that led to the ‘equivalence principle’ (Einstein, 1907), gravitation
can be postulated to be a kind of obverse of accelerated expansion, leaving matter ‘behind’ as
space-time expands.  Acceleration is required here in order to understand why matter was unable
to stay in equilibrium with expanding space (Nicolis, 1986).  Assuming that the universe is a
thermodynamically isolated system, my own further interpretation follows. The process of
expansion continues to produce an increasingly disequilibrated universe, wherein develop, from
the masses in some locales, forms, and from the forms in yet fewer places, organizations, moving
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the Universe ever further from thermodynamic equilibrium. I conjecture that continued
development of increasingly complicated systems depends upon the continuation of Universal
expansion.  In an ‘equal and opposite’ reaction to these disequilibrating processes, the Second
Law of thermodynamics emerges globally, scaled to the rate of Universal expansion.  At present
this imposes locally the necessity for significant entropy production in connection with any
energy dissipation (Prigogine, 1955). Consequently, when dissipation is harnessed to effective
work, that work is rarely better than around 50% energy efficient (Odum, 1983; Turner, 2000).
Urgency, striving and haste make work even less energy efficient (Carnot, 1824). These facts can
lead to a resuscitation of final cause in physics since entropy production is the way that non-
equilibrium locales can promote Universal thermodynamic equilibration.
  Causality
I have proposed reviving the Aristotelian causal analysis (e.g., Matthen, 1989) as being helpful
for dealing with complex systems (Salthe, e.g., 1985, 1993, 2005). Complexity involves a
number of factors, including local interactions and transactions of numerous differently capable
elements of varying kind and scale as components of a system (e.g., Salthe, 2006,b), as well as
historicity and vagueness.  The Aristotelian causal categories help somewhat to tease apart some
of this complexity by allocating different modes of causation.  In my analysis (2006,a), material
cause is susceptibility; formal cause is the ‘set-up’. Susceptibility refers to the readiness of a
locale or a material to undergo the kind of change being modeled, while the set-up refers to the
organization of initial and boundary conditions impinging upon that locale or material. Together
these synchronic categories establish the locale of relevant or investigated events, as well as the
propensities (Popper, 1990) of occurrences of various events.  Efficient cause is a forcing or
push, getting the change going; final cause is the pull of ‘why’ anything happens.  A lightning
strike makes a convenient example, with a local buildup of electrical energy gradient as charge
separation between clouds or between clouds and the ground, based on the formal cause of large
scale local dynamical and structural configurations, with the push given by some perturbation
after the system has reached a threshold of instability, and with finality found in the pull of the
Second Law of thermodynamics (again, assuming that the universe is a thermodynamically
isolated system).
     Of course, finality has been banished from natural science for some centuries now (e.g.,
Weber, 1908), largely I believe because of that discourse’s entrainment by pragmatic
applications, where human intentionality trumps other possible entrainments. To enforce this
interdiction, finality has usually been said to imply forbidden religious connotations. The science
informed by this opinion was/is a science of conceptually simple, if technically complicated,
experimental constructions. These are focused upon setting up formal arrangements that could
produce desired kinds of results when initiated by an experimenter’s -- or some ‘natural’ --
forcing.  But now that we are becoming buried in complexity, we may need any tool we can find.
Ecologists have already begun tentatively using these causal categories (e.g., Patten et al, 1976;
Ulanowicz, 1997). Computer simulations would be an ideal medium for exploring the relations
between the Aristotelian causal categories in various applications.
     I use final causation in order to explain a major factor in our lives and economy -- the
relatively poor energy efficiency of effective work -- otherwise left unexplained as to ‘why’ it
must be the case.  To understand this one needs to understand that the Second Law of
thermodynamics is a final cause of all events and occasions insofar as they are mediated by
energy flows.  Whatever happens, including work, happens as an aspect of the dissipation of
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metastable energy gradients (e.g., Schneider and Kay, 1994) in a universe far from
thermodynamic equilibrium.  Work is linked to this dissipation of energy gradients, and mediates
some relatively small portion of that energy (the ‘exergy’) into action and/or products of lesser
energy amount than that dissipated from the tapped gradients. Because the energy efficiency of
work is so poor, it is possible to see that any work is undertaken in order to move the universe
closer to thermodynamic equilibrium.  If work efficiency could be much greater, this view would
be untenable.  Since it cannot (Odum, 1983), this understanding seems obligatory, even if not
fully explanatory regarding any given work done, which would be associated with various
biological, personal and sociocultural finalities. I feel that denying this surprising view would be
tantamount to claiming omniscience -- that is to say, claiming to know of a counter example
hidden away in some obscure corner of the universe. In order to explore this further I will parse
finality throughout Nature, for which I need to use a hierarchy format.
  Synoptic View of Embodiment Within Universal Development
I use the Specification Hierarchy format (Salthe, 1993, 2002, 2006,b) to make a fully global
representation of any unique particular.  For example:
{physical dynamics {material connectivities {biological activities {individual action {sociopolitical projects}}}}}
            with {lower level {higher level}} and {more generally distributed {more particular}}; the
brackets have the  same meaning as in set theory
Thus:
                   {dissipative structure {living system {animal {human {myself}}}}}
      (I do not here distinguish natural kinds from individuals, as natural kinds are categories
resulting from unrelated analysis)
The levels here are ‘integrative levels’ (Salthe, 1988), or ontological levels (Poli, 1998). They
have been constructed during the progress of Western science, as the subjects of different
investigations. As noted already in the ‘unity of the sciences’ perspective (Neurath et al, 1955-
1969) lower levels give rise to and subsume all higher ones, but as well, we now realize that
higher ones integrate and harness all lower ones under their own rules locally.  Thus, consider:
                            {entropy production {free energy decline {work}}}
Here each level entrains at least one finality, with lower level, physical, finalities present as
relatively weak entrainments locally compared to higher-level ones.  But they are continuously in
place, whereas higher level entrainments are episodic, and different ones may cancel each other
out.  As an example of the pervasiveness of the Second Law in our own lives, we might note our
tendency to fidget in many ways when more important work is not at hand.  Thus, activity of any
kind in the non-equilibrium situation is (whatever else of greater import to us it might be) a local
contribution to Second Law finality -- in the service of the equilibration of our
thermodynamically isolated, currently disequilibrated Universe.
     As I mentioned earlier, another aspect of this hierarchical model is that it can have a
diachronic interpretation as development (Salthe, 1993). This is based on the fact that higher
levels are logically refinements of lower level possibilities, with the general developmental
process then being:
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                   {vaguer -> {more definite -> {more mechanistic}}} (the arrows representing change)
For the earth, this could be represented as
                   {geosphere -> {biosphere -> {noosphere}}} (Vernadsky, 1944, 1986)
In application to the Universe, this pattern would proceed at different rates in the different
ontological levels.  Thus, the material/chemical level would have reached a mechanistic stage
with the establishment of the relations shown in the Periodic Table, while the biological level did
not reach that stage until much later, with the genetic code and associated apparatus.  Continuing
this trend, some believe that we are engaged in constructing a noosphere, which would be the
mechanization of human culture.
      One way of imagining this developmental process is to focus on the lowest physical level, the
quark-gluon plasma.  In the early universe there would have been a virtually unlimited number of
degrees of freedom for any particle in regard to its position and momentum.  After the origin of
atoms, many degrees of freedom for many of these particles would have become frozen out.
With the further emergence of molecules, the degrees of freedom of these same fundamental
particles would have become even further restricted, and so on (Salthe, 2009).
     This model imposes a ‘hylozooic’ kind of interpretation upon Nature, somewhat like that of
Charles Peirce (CP, 6.32-33).  Nothing totally new can appear after the initial expansion of
the primal singularity.  And so all emergent features that appear later at higher integrative levels
would have been implicit during earlier developmental stages. One could say that these later
emergents are somewhat like the ‘high grade actual occasions’ of Whitehead (1929),
precipitating within the local society of ‘actual occasions’, thereby pointing to another ‘take’ on
development as here understood. In this view the past is present in any current individual or
occasion.  In the present interpretation, these would initially have been only vaguely and
episodically present as sketched in the lower integrative levels, but would have become
stabilized materially with the developmental emergence of emerging higher integrative levels.
This would have occurred globally during development of the earth, but is also repeated locally
during the development of, e.g., a living thing like myself.  In this development, particles that
had become ‘captured’ by atoms, became / become further restricted in their motions when these
atoms are incorporated into molecules which are parts of cells, most of whose physical degrees
of freedom are almost reduced to nothing within an organism.  Their ‘universal’ degrees of
freedom have then become restricted to being consequences of organismic motion (if any).
     Thus, the configuration of fundamental particles within my body at this moment will have
occurred transiently many times in the primal quark-gluon plasma after it had reached a certain
volume.  More colorfully, I will have had a ‘ghostly’ presence almost since the beginning of the
universe, and have been ‘lucky’ to have become embodied at last! There is thus, in this sense,
‘nothing new under the sun’, but some things have become increasingly more definite as the
universe continued to expand.  This is a weakly deterministic philosophical position.  On the one
hand, our ‘ghostly’ representation in the quark-gluon plasma will have been unstable, episodic,
and without the higher level details that would need to be acquired through historical adventures
as the universe developed.  On the other hand, those historical adventures might have eliminated
the possibility of continued materialization of any particulate lower level template.  Thus, while
nothing completely new – i.e., not fostered by an ancestral particulate template -- can appear, not
all such potential templates get to be fostered by any given unfolding history.
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     Some will argue that a new species of sparrow, a new crime, or a new poem are examples of
genuine newness. Note that I hold that all possibilities for any potential universal development to
have been present in vague form initially, and that only some get to become more definite during
universal development. This 'becoming more definite' involves what many take to be genuinely
new things.  Each new species or poem may seem 'new' before our eyes, but this level of
newness is trivial in the universal -- and in the developmental -- perspective.  Each is
developmentally a restriction on what was possible before that emergence.  Consider language.
Having chosen English we can say an unlimited number of things, but we cannot express certain
larger moods accessible, say, in French (Salthe, 2000), and which may have been conveyable in
the ancestral common language.
     The above perspective can be played off against the idea emphasizing that every actual
occasion would be unique in the higher integrative levels, signaling a radical indeterminacy in
the world (Elsasser, 1969; Ulanowicz, 2007).  Anticipating the future, as in the predictive mode
of science, there would seem to be an immense number of different higher level configurations
potentially emergent at any future locale in a future moment. Thus, whatever happens at these
higher integrative levels (biological, sociocultural) would be something completely new, and
emergent at these levels.  But at the lower, physico-chemical levels, any configuration whatever
will have been rehearsed many times.  Looking the other way, back from what has occurred,
historicity, even at the higher levels, will have narrowed the possibilities gradually, by way of
concatenated contingencies as the present moment was unfolding.  Whatever actually occurs will
have been prefigured at the lower integrative levels and gradually prepared for at the higher
levels.  Present configurations at the higher integrative levels therefore imply -- that is, material
implication or conceptual subordination -- that which gave rise to them.  This looking backward
(note also the ‘anthropic principle’, whether ‘strong’ or ‘weak’) is a mode of finality, and
narrates how I, the current observer, came to be here in this world.
   The Logic of Multiple Worlds
Multiple worlds are implicit in the specification hierarchy model because its form is that of a
tree, with its trunk in its lowest level -- in the present application that would be the physical
integrative level.  Inasmuch as I am here assuming that this refers to our known physics, I am not
appealing here to particular models of ‘multiple universes’ imagined by some cosmologists.  A
subsumptive hierarchy is plainly appropriate for modeling an expanding system like the
Universe, which, in the developmental model used here, then can become occupied by ever
more, ever more definite, locales. Even if no new matter continues to appear in the expanding
universe, the continual incorporation of historical information at every gravitating material locale
would result in the emergence of increasingly more individuated phenomena.  Every emerging
locale acquires its own unique configurations and conformational possibilities.  Shown in the
hierarchies above are only single branches of this hierarchy, where the lower levels would be
shared by increasingly more possible branch tips that are not being represented.  Thus. e.g., there
could logically be some other kinds of dissipative structures coordinate with living ones. These
would not be abiotic ones like eddies and tornadoes because those represent the grounds from
which living dissipative structures emerged, and so they are relatively lower level, and therefore
not coordinate with the living.  Other possibilities would also not be mechanical ones like
automated factories, because these are fostered by socioeconomic systems and so are relatively
higher level to, and so again not coordinate with, the living.
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     It seems most likely that in any given world only a few of the immense number of vague
tendencies in the primal quark-gluon plasma would get to become stabilized in that world.  This
would be especially true of those entrained into the highly individuated systems emergent in the
highest integrative levels. It would be consistent with this model of differentiation during the
development of the Big Bang to view emerging branch tips in the hierarchy as having been
entrained by multiple finalities. That is, we might reasonably consider every actual occasion to
be the locus of several finalities.
   Integration
I think it important to end this essay by emphasizing the top-down integration of the various
levels of organization (e.g., Greenberg and Tobach, 1988) in the specification hierarchy model.
This aspect is perhaps the major message, as yet little noted, from the continuing development of
the unity of the sciences perspective.  On the template of:
    {physical universe {material locales {biological forms {sociocultural organizations}}}}
We can consider the relations among:
                          {dynamics {location {form {functional individuality}}}}
Consider the interpenetration of these levels in any high enough grade of actual occasion. There
can be no activity at any level that is not actually physical dynamics fostered by entropy
production.  And there can be no location that is not mediated by gravitating matter and chemical
affordances.  As well, all human inventions are ‘inhabited’ by the human form, as, e.g., a pile
driver represents the human arm. For a currently actively pursued example, biological form and
function is largely constrained by scale (Bonner, 2006; Brown and West; 2000, Sims et al, 2008;
West et al, 2001).  Nevertheless, as long as they exist, individual higher level entities, each
instituting their own formal and final causes, harness all lower levels locally into colluding to
promote them by way of providing material causes for them from one moment to the next.
Individuals continually integrate all of nature into their own embodiment (Polanyi, 1968) until
they disperse, when they are recycled.  As a thought experiment, we might try to imagine a world
without particular, history-mediated individual phenomena.  We find, I think, that we must go
back to something like the primal quark-gluon plasma before this becomes possible.  From a
‘pansemiotic’ perspective (Salthe, 2008), the emergence of higher integrative levels can be seen
to have pulled the universe into ever more particular meanings.
CONCLUSION
This developmental perspective is advanced in order to be posed against the currently
fashionable pan-historicism, and yet historicity does play a role. One take-home message would
be that if we are to try to anticipate newly emerging events and occasions, we need to develop
techniques to assess vague tendencies while they are becoming liminal and beginning to emerge
(Salthe, 2004).  In connection with this, acting on Charles Peirce’s (1905) suggestion to develop
a ‘logic of vagueness’, is long overdue.
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ABSTRACT:  So far, the sciences of complexity have received less attention from philosophers
than from scientists. Responding to Salthe’s model of evolution, I focus on its metaphysical
implications, asking whether the implications of his canonical developmental trajectory (CDT)
must be as materialist as his own reading proposes.
KEY WORDS: causation, complex systems, emergence, evolution, materialism, reduction,
(1) Salthe offers his model as a treaty among several disciplines. Regarding the natural sciences,
I would say that his model is more like an offer they can’t refuse. Given the embodiment of the
CDT at different levels of physical organization (physics, chemistry, biology), its
interdisciplinary consilience seems (in my view) to be decisive.
     On the other hand, metaphysicians might read the CDT in contrasting ways. In that case,
Salthe’s offer of a “materialist interpretation of the Big Bang theory” would be an offer that non-
materialists could refuse. In fact, several features of Salthe’s view appear to invite other
metaphysical interpretations. On the basis of Salthe’s argument, I conclude (a) that his anti-
reductionism softens his materialism; and (b) that his own interpretation of the CDT allows, if
not invites, emergentist alternatives to materialism.
(2) Resisting reductive materialism
     Modern materialists typically contrast themselves with traditional or modern idealists by
claiming that the basic stuff of the world is matter, not mind. Consistent with that view, Salthe’s
view of evolution begins with physics.
      But even if materialism is a convenient place to begin an evolutionary theory, it may not be
the only place where the CDT leads. The question is whether Salthe so complicates his
materialism that the name becomes dispensable.
     Salthe complicates his materialism, for instance, by turning his model against the reductive
materialism of the gene-centrists. From Monod (1972) to Dawkins (1976), biological atomists
have accorded explanatory and causal privilege to the invariance of the gene, a privilege that is
supposed to justify making genes the unit of selection, making gene-proliferation the “ultimate
utility function” of evolution, and making phenotypes mere vehicles for gene-proliferation.
Against that view, complex systems theories like Salthe’s show that the invariance of self-
organizing processes is causally prior to the invariance of genes.
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     First, the functional invariance of dissipative structures is found in physical systems simpler
than living systems (storms, chemical clocks, icicles). Second, without a self-organizing system
to reproduce, genes have no function at all. Third, invariance at the level of organic development
may be immune to genetic differences that only become causally active under the right
circumstances (e.g., many genetic effects are interactive with other genes). In these ways, the
functional invariance of the organism precedes the material invariance of the gene by creating
the systemic context in which genes are able to play their determining role.
     Against the gene-centrist tendency to assign evolutionary agency to the lowest possible level,
Salthe acknowledges how the higher functions “harness all lower levels locally into colluding”
with those higher functions. This returns genes to their proper role as instruments for phenotype
functions rather than rendering phenotypes the tools of genes.
     If systemic determinacy precedes genetic determinacy, it also increases in evolutionary
influence as organisms evolve higher level steering capacities. By evolving the capacity for
culture, humans have raised foresight to new levels, inventing a post-material, purely
informational form of evolution. As evolution proceeds, in other words, causation becomes less
liable to materialist reduction. But if evolution can evolve a non-material form of evolution, what
happens to materialism as a foundation? Might not materialism give way to semiotics as an
ultimate framework?
(3) Causal ambiguities
     To the extent that Salthe’s systemic model of evolutionary causation resists reduction to
material atoms and physical forces, it allows emergent evolutionary causation and perhaps
ontological dualisms. True, explanations of evolution from simple to complex systems may seem
at first to privilege atoms and physical forces. But even on the ground floor, Salthe’s model
accepts formal and final causation as equally fundamental, as his reading of the Second Law
shows. If the Second Law is a version of final causation, then there is nothing more fundamental
than that. But if formal and final causes (systemic causation) are as fundamental as material and
efficient causes (atoms and physical forces), Salthe’s initial materialism may be taken as a
heuristic starting point.
     According to some contemporary materialists, the shibboleth of Salthe’s materialism may be
his commitment to two principles that might be called the total novelty denial and the principle
of continuity: “nothing totally new appears during development.” This is so because “all
emergent features at higher levels would have been vaguely and episodically present primitively
in the lower integrative levels.” This principle echoes Peirce’s ontological principle of
continuity, and it resembles Daniel Dennett’s (1995, Ch. 3) argument against mentalistic dualism
(appeals to explanatory “skyhooks”). According to Dennett, evolutionary appeals to mental
causes are unnecessary because evolution exhibits an unbroken continuity of material
mechanisms (“cranes”). But if the principle of continuity truly rendered intrusions of total
novelty impossible at any given temporal point, it does not rule the gradual emergence of real
novelty in the long run, which could conceivably include non-material properties. The claim of
emergent dualism is not that the emergence of novelty is discontinuous, but only that real novelty
can eventually be identified by its contrast with what came before.
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(4) Metaphysical ambiguity
     In light of these considerations, it would appear that while Salthe’s materialism makes a
convenient starting point for explaining the CDT, it finally proves dispensable. The evolution of
complexity may begin with chunks of matter, but even on the ground floor the formal and final
aspects of systemic evolution are as causally fundamental as the material aspects. This may
suggest to some that Salthe’s evolutionary model at least reconstructs materialism, and perhaps
invites non-materialistic readings of evolution.
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Abstract: This commentary addresses the question of the meaning of critique in relation to
objectivism or dogmatism. Inspired by Kant's critical philosophy and Husserl's
phenomenology, it defines the first in terms of conditionality, the second in terms of
oppositionality. It works out an application on the basis of Salthe's paper on development and
evolution, where competition is criticized in oppositional, more than in conditional terms.
 In “What is philosophy?”, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the space of Western
philosophy opened by the Greeks is intrinsically a space of competition: the “friends” of
wisdom are in the first place peers competing for the highest wisdom, for truth, for pure
thinking. As such, they can no longer wish to equal the figure of the Wise. On the contrary,
they must agree to bury precisely him, turning their focal attention and rivalry to “die Sache”,
the thing or the object. Modern science is a continuation of the Greek project: it operates
within the very same space of competition between peers and attempts to victoriously
constitute stable and reliable, objective, knowledge. However, since Modernity the quest for
objectivity has more and more turned into a form of objectivism or dogmatism, according to
which science has the exclusive rights to describe and explain the things as they are in
themselves, and in which the question of the constitution of objectivity largely disappears out
of sight.1
 In "Development (and Evolution) of the Universe" Salthe is critical about the idea of
competition. His focus is in particular on evolutionary theory, that narrows down the idea of
change in Nature to differential persistence, "where it plays out as competition between
genotypes for representation in future generations of a population". (p. 3) Salthe seems to
agree with Deleuze and Guattari in underlining that differential persistence has been
elaborately constructed as competition in our Western thinking. He even speaks of "our
Western cultural ideology" (p. 3) in this regard. To him, however, competition is only a small
part of the big picture of change in Nature; it needs nuance and supplementation. His proposal
calls for a more “phenomenological” acknowledgment of the World, an acknowledgment of
that which is experienced and phenomenal, beyond that which can be objectified into a Nature
that functions as an operating manual for the World. His developmental viewpoint is inspired,
so he states, by Schelling.
 We won't challenge the value and necessity of critical accounts of objectivist discourses
and of the role competition plays in them. But what is it to be critical? More precisely, what
can it mean to be critical with regard to objectivism or dogmatism? Kant was the first
philosopher in Modernity to have introduced the idea of Critique. He pointed out in his
Critique of Pure Reason that the objectivity of scientific knowledge is not the result of an
object in itself in some sense out there in nature and as such dictating appropriate ways of
apprehension. Objectivity is on the contrary the result of a very specific questioning activity
1 Edmund Husserl has described this process and its potentially devastating consequences in The Crisis of the
European Sciences.
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that gives rise to objects that have a validity only within the range of that activity. If
universality and necessity are to be related to scientific knowledge it is because the
questioning subject succeeded in constituting the answering potentiality of nature as a point of
invariance, of exactness, of necessity and universality. The contingent perspective of the
questioner is the possibility of any objectivity: it is from within that contingent perspective
that objectivity witnesses of the possibility of a stabilized, non-contingent, necessary relation
between questions and answers.
 In this regard, there seems to be something paradoxical about Stan Salthe's critical
discourse. At first sight, it is a critique on the idea of competition. But at closer inspection,
there are a number of elements that suggest that Salthe's thinking is operating within the very
competitive space it criticizes. For instance, his proposal to distinguish Nature from the
World, the one being an operating manual, symbolic and mediated, the other referring to the
phenomenal, to what is not 'known' symbolically, indicates a kind of dualism between,
roughly, language and biology, between the symbolic order and the body. What remains
unquestioned here is the possibility or the conditionality of this opposition. Wouldn't a critical
questioning of that aspect be crucial in an understanding of change in Nature, certainly when
a complex viewpoint is envisaged? Because indeed, if there is complexity, involving local
interactions at various levels and with various elements, as well as historicity and vagueness
(pp. 6-7), to assume that there are two different "orders of being" such as Nature and World is
certainly not evident. In his effort to criticize the one-sidedness of evolutionary theory – that
we identify here as objectivism – what Salthe seems to do, is to defend the opposite viewpoint
– subjectivism. This can remind us of Schelling's reaction to Kant: romanticism as a response
to a position (wrongly) perceived as objectivism.
 What is it then, to be critical? As Kant has shown, critique is not a matter of
oppositionality, it is a matter of conditionality. Not A versus –A, but the possibility of that
distinction is the heart of the matter. Kant's viewpoint is different from the nostalgic,
romantic, dream of getting out of, or supplementing, the very space within which all thinking
can take place. The main reason is that the sensitively and conceptually engaged subject is an
intrinsic part, co-constitutive, of that thinking space. No way to get out of this human
condition and fly high up to the godly heaven, neither so in living praxis, nor in symbolic
discourse. Salthe's statement “(… ) now that we are becoming buried in complexity, we may
need any tool we can find” (p. 7) suggests that there was a time of less complexity, a human
condition in which things could be ruled more simply and more adequately. His idea that
"Nothing totally new can appear after the initial expansion of the primal singularity. And so
all emergent features that appear later at higher integrative levels would have been implicit
during earlier developmental stages” (p. 9, italics original) goes in the same direction. From
which point of view is it possible to say that something is totally new? Isn't it the case that the
distinction between new and not-new  is only possible from within the primal singularity?
Salthe seems to underscore here the idea that the constraint is the possibility – it is from
within the expansion of the primal singularity that things have to be grasped – but meanwhile,
it is not clear in what kind of historicity his own discourse is to be situated. Current
configurations are only gradual evolutionary diminishments, specifications,
individualisations. Salthe states that this is a mode of finality, which I agree with. But he
seems to refrain from questioning his own perspective in making this statement, and to that
extent, we might wonder whether he is not faithful to the classical scientific operation of
excluding teleology from the scientific practice. It is true that the ideology of Western science
has put much effort in excluding final cause. It is part of its objectivist development,
excluding the perspective of constitution of objective knowledge, to focus solely on the object
as it is in itself. In objectivism, the questioning activity, and thus the teleological
implementation of subjectivity and objectivity, can no longer have a place, except then for
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heuristic or pragmatic purposes, where, as Salthe correctly notes, “human intentionality
trumps other possible entrainments” (7). Teleology might then be excluded from science, it
does return in a most uncritical form, namely in the unquestioned subjective capacity to know,
to be directed upon, the capacity of intentionality, entirely and exclusively concentrated in the
human, conscious, subject. I am in favour of putting the question of final cause back on the
scientific agenda, but I doubt that Aristotle will do the job, as the configuration of
objectivism, in dichotomous opposition to subjectivity, was not at all present at his time,
neither epistemologically, nor ontologically. I believe that philosophers like Kant and Husserl
are more adequate to deal with that topic, in as far as they attempt to give a place to the idea
of teleology as "a place amidst other places", as well as in their focus on the need to take up,
as philosophers, as scientists – "friends of wisdom" –, the present, experienced and lived,
moment as part of a more encompassing whole. That movement of "taking up" is what
introduces human beings into history, as part of a history of a certain kind. It is what
constitutes history as a history. And isn't it there, in that singularised history, that new
singularities can emerge?
Deleuze, G.; Guattari, F., (1996) What is philosophy, Columbia University Press, July 15, 256
pages.
Edmund Husserl, (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology – An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press).
Kant, I. (1997). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Trans.) Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (First published 1787)
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MATERIALISM:  REPLIES TO COMMENTS FROM READERS
Stanley N. Salthe
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Abstract: The canonical developmental trajectory, as represented in this paper is both
conservative and emergentist.  Emerging modes of existence, as new informational constraints,
require the material continuation of prior modes upon which they are launched.  Informational
constraints are material configurations.  The paper is not meant to be a direct critique of existing
views within science, but an oblique one presented as an alternative, developmental model.
Keywords:  critique, emergence, information, materialism
Reply to Fairlamb
I agree with almost all of what Fairlamb ascribes to my thinking.  So I will pick out a few points
where there might be more disagreement.  I will answer by the numbers.
(1) I would say that my understanding of CDT is necessarily emergentist.  This indeed is one
meaning of the brackets that I use; a contained class is not just a mere member of the containing
class.  Something has changed (in fact, been added) -- in my view, that is the stability of higher-
level configurations, which, on materialist grounds, had to have been fleetingly present from the
beginning. These stabilized configurations could be labeled ‘functional invariances’.
(2) My sense of materialism, which entails emergentism, is that more generally present aspects
of Nature (e.g., the physical world) have given rise to the more highly developed aspects.  What
is new is only the stability of configurations of the more general properties within the higher
properties.  As well, these configurations do not, in my view, open up new possibilities more
than they close off some that must have been available prior to the emergence of a new
integrative level.  That is, while I have an emergentist metaphysics, it is a materially closed one,
devolving from an increasing burden of informational constraints as the world develops.
(3) The emergence of newly stabilized configurations should, I believe, be viewed as the
emergence of (levels of) information from the physical world, moving the system of
interpretance --> interpreter into an ever more explicitly semiotic position with respect to the rest
of Nature.  My views are ‘pansemiotic’, whereby I infer that explicit semiosis in contemporary
systems must have had precursors -- all the way back.  Thus, it might be said that semiosis
emerged gradually from a primal proto-semiosis implicit (immanent?) in the earliest post-
inflation universe.  I would think that any materialist, or evolutionist, must assume some such
position.
(4) There is a duality at work in my metaphysical perspective -- because nothing happens in a
vacuum.  The emergence of a new level would need to be have been entrained by way of some
still higher level environmental configurations, which have been imposing boundary conditions
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upon the ground from which the new emerges.  This brings in my commitment to an expanding
universe.  If, e.g., in some locales life has emerged, then those locales necessarily must have had
certain environmental affordances (formal causes) allowing the production of dissipative
structures, and the argument would be similar for each level. It is universal expansion that
produces those environments, and that keeps modifying them as the expansion proceeds.  This
duality (in effect, the material / formal causal pair) could be viewed as denying my materialist
credentials.  I don’t think, however, that requiring boundary conditions is the same as erecting
skyhooks. Rock bottom, for example, even the simplest equations cannot be solved without
manifest values for their constant parameters. I am unconcerned whether some would find deities
lurking in the values of equations.
Reply to Van de Vijver
Vandevijver correctly interprets my paper as being situated outside the reigning perspectives of
natural science.  But she takes my effort to be a critique, while I, instead, view it as a supplement
to the reigning approaches.  I do make an implied criticism of the usual historicism in connection
with evolution. This was supposed to be signaled by my dismissal of ‘evolution’ from
consideration in the paper (in the very year that its ‘messenger’, Darwin, is being lauded!).  This
snubbing is based in my generalization of the terms ‘evolution’ and ’development’ as proposed
in my 1993 book, which was founded on usages current within biology.  In this generalization
(evolution is synonymous with individuation) only development associates with particular
knowable, describable, and therefore predictable changes, which would be aspects of the ‘matter’
making up our construct (as I call it), ‘Nature’.
The supposed objectivity of science, as raised already by Kant, and as revived in the postmodern
critique of natural science, is correctly characterized by Vandevijver as “contingent”.  This
means that what I refer to as ‘Nature’ has no broadly implicated objectivity.  This would be the
case even if natural science was not overtly a key element in our culture’s technological pursuits.
My construction of the developmental viewpoint from scientific findings has been a procedure of
‘confirmation’ -- that aspect of science whereby hypotheses are constructed -- rather than an
attempt at ‘testing’, whereby hypotheses are falsified (or not).  The act of confirming is a creative
(yes, it might be ‘Romantic’) searching, while testing is a kind of elaborate critique.  Testing
may be contingently ‘objective’, in a limited sense, inasmuch as there is a lot at stake, while the
process of confirmation is driven in large part by esthetic intuition.
The body of my paper, then, is not devoted to a critique of evolutionary theory (which is barely
mentioned in passing), but to an elaboration of what may be delivered by the developmental
perspective.  My opposition here to dealing with evolution has nothing to do with (Darwinian)
evolutionary theory, which I have addressed elsewhere.  It has to do simply with the fact that, as
individuation, nothing much can be said about evolution -- it just happens.  The conceptual
action within Nature takes place in models of development (as well as of homeostasis), one of
which I try to characterize in my paper.
Vandevijver also asks why I did not devote some time to justifying the purported dualism of
Nature and The World.  I think this would really be the topic of yet another paper -- one that I
should perhaps have produced before this.  Reflecting again the postmodern perspective, it seems
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clear to me that all cultures and languages are contingent, while the World confronting them,
whatever it may be, can be taken to be potentially the same everywhere.  ‘A map is not the
territory’ -- and reflects as much the interests and investments of the society making it as it does
the world being portrayed. Thus, I am contributing to our culture’s perspective on The World by
offering a view of development using facts elucidated by its scientific activities.  My hope is that,
having recently been confronted explicitly with the complexity of the world in comparison with
its investigative tools, that ‘objective’ science might be open to considering the developmental
perspective to be worth explicitly critiquing.
S.N. Salthe: 1993, Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change In Biology. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
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POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE QUANTUM THEORY OF
GRAVITY
An Introduction to the Meduso-Anthropic Principle
by Louis Crane, math department, KSU crane@math.ksu.edu
Abstract: If we assume that the constants of nature fluctuate near
the singularity when a black hole forms (assuming, also, that physical
black holes really do form singularities) then a process of evolution
of universes becomes possible. We explore the implications of such a
process for the origin of life, interstellar travel, and the human future.
In his excellent book The Life Of The Cosmos [1], Lee Smolin
has proposed that if the quantum theory of gravity has two special
features the universe would fine tune itself.
Specifically, he proposes 1. that the quantum theory softens the
singularity which forms in a Kerr-Newmann black hole, for example,
if we perturb it, so that the new universe on the other side of it
will really form. He then proposes 2. that the constants of nature
might fluctuate in such a process, so that the new universe would have
slightly different physics in it. In the absence of a quantum theory of
gravity, of course, both of these suggestions are speculative.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see what would result from such
a process. Universes with peculiar fine tuned values of the coupling
constants would have many more “daughter” universes, so that fine
tuning, instead of an improbable accident, would be highly probable.
Professor Smolin proposes this as an explanation of the fine tuning
evident in our universe, which leads to the possibility of life. In this
view, life and intelligence are biproducts of the very special physics
necessary to provide surface chemistry and radiating stars in order
to produce many generations of black holes.
Philosophically, then, life and even intelligent life are accidents.
I do not intend to repeat Professor Smolin’s argument in this note.
Rather, I wish to propose a modification of his reasoning which seems
practically necessary in the framework of his conjectures, but which
changes their philosophical implications immensely.
I have called this modified version the meduso-anthropic principle,
after a stage in the life cycle of the jellyfish. The reason for this
metaphor will be explained in time.
In addition, I want to point out in this note that within the ap-
proach to quantizing gravity which I proposed in my paper “Topolog-
ical Quantum Field Theory as The Key to Quantum Gravity [2],” the
second conjecture which Professor Smolin makes, i.e. that coupling
constants might fluctuate when the topology of spacetime changes,
becomes much more plausible. This is because I propose a quantum
1
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theory in which the coupling constant is part of the state of the uni-
verse. If this approach were extended to gravity coupled to matter,
the coupling constants of the matter fields would have a similar role.
One could try to compute topology changing amplitudes from them
via the state sum methods in my paper. I do not yet see how to
do this, but there are some suggestive possibilities in the underlying
algebraic picture.
The question whether the real quantum theory of gravity has the
right features to make this picture work will no doubt remain open
for a considerable time. Nevertheless, let us explore the implications.
MAN IN THE LOOP
The conjecture which I believe modifies Professor Smolin’s con-
clusions is the following:
SUCCESSFUL ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATIONSWILL
EVENTUALLY CREATE BLACK HOLES.
The synthesis of this with Smolin’s two conjectures is what I call
the meduso-anthropic principle. Before exploring the implications,
let us consider the plausibility of this conjecture.
SUBCONJECTURE 1: SUCCESSFUL ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
CIVILIZATIONS WILL EVENTUALLYWANT TO MAKE BLACK
HOLES
and
SUBCONJECTURE 2: SUCCESSFUL INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZA-
TIONS WILL EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE BLACK
HOLES.
It is fairly clear, at least, that the conjecture follows from the
two subconjectures. (This paper is not on the mathematical level of
rigor).
Let us first consider subconjecture 1. There are two reasons to
want to make black holes. One might want to make a few for scientific
purposes. Indeed, barring major surprizes in physics they are the
ultimate high energy phenomenon. If it came within the reach of a
technological civilization to build them, certainly the scientists in it
would want to do so.
The second motivation for creating black holes is much more com-
pelling. The hydrogen supply of the universe is slowly being ex-
hausted. At some point in the future, any civilization will face the
possibility of perishing from a lack of free energy, In principle, black
holes could provide a permanent solution to this problem, since they
can convert matter into energy via the Hawking radiation forever and
2
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with perfect efficiency. (They are also the perfect waste disposal for
similar reasons). In order to make this practical, it would be neces-
sary to have very small and very hot black holes, and to be able to
“feed” and manage them very carefully. However difficult this prob-
lem finally is, our descendants in a few hundred billion years will have
no alternative if they want to go on living.
There is another reason to want to make artificial black holes,
which would act in a much shorter time scale. They would allow
us to have access to much greater energy densities than any other
technology we can currently forsee. This would make it possible to
design a starship which could carry humans This is discussed in my
recent paper [3].
Now let us consider the second subconjecture. The main difficulty
in creating a black hole is cramming a lot of mass-energy in a small
space.
Nature solves this problem by cramming a lot of nuclear matter
into the center of a large star. This is completely inadequate for our
purposes, since the resulting black holes are much too big, and hence
much too cold to be of use. Also, it is hard to imagine a civilization
doing such a thing.
Fortunately, there is an approach which could produce much higher
densities, and hence much smaller holes.
In this approach, one simply creates a huge sphere of converging
lasers and fires them simultaneously at a central point. Since light
is composed of bosons, there is no Pauli exclusion principle to over-
come, and the bursts of photons could all occupy a very small space
simultaneously, creating a black hole of a temperature corresponding
to the frequency of the light. (The term “successful’ in the conjecture
has to be taken on such a scale. Still, a hundred billion years is a long
time).
The critical length in such an apparatus is the wavelength of the
light used. If our descendents can build nuclear lasers which lase in
hard gamma, then a spherical converging laser the size of a small as-
teroid would suffice to produce very small hot black holes. Of course,
gamma interferometry would be necessary to keep it focussed. None
of this is beyond what could plausibly be done in a few centuries.
This poses subtle relativity questions, as well as extremely obvious
engineering ones. Nonetheless, I believe that it demonstrates some
degree of plausibility for my second subconjecture.
The notion of a successful civilization here is considerably beyond
contemporary standards. As investigated in [3],a machine to build
useful black holes could be constructed using only a small part of the
output of our sun. Space based materials and a large fleet of robots
would be necessary.
3
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONJECTURES
If both Smolin’s two conjectures and mine are true, then the fine
tuning of physical constants would not stop with physics which pro-
duced stars and gas clouds which cool. Rather, the selection would
continue until physics evolved which resulted in successful civiliza-
tions, with a very exacting definition of success. In the limit as the
number of generations of daughter universes increases, this would
be true even if we only make the weaker assumption that successful
civilizations make a few black holes as experiments. This would in-
crease the average number of daughter universes in universes with
successful civilizations, even if by a small fraction. Each such uni-
verse would have more daughters, until, after many generations, in-
telligences would be present in almost all universes. The effect would
be much more rapid if black holes as energy sources turn out to be
practical.
The philosophical implications of such a process are very deep.
Although it has been generally believed by people with a scientific
frame of mind that human life and history take place within the rule
of physical law, it has generally been assumed that the relationship
between the specific laws of physics and human events was complex
and accidental. This has, in fact placed science in conflict with the
otherwise dominant currents of Western (and by no means only West-
ern) thought.
Indeed, it has been the belief of most philosophers, and a surpriz-
ing number of important scientists, that humanity had some funda-
mental role in the universe, and that mind was more than an acci-
dental attribute of organized matter.
If the combination of hypotheses described above is correct, a
richer connection between mind and matter appears in a surprizing
way. Almost all universes would produce successful intelligence, be-
cause their detailed structure would be fine tuned by a long process in
which intelligences had reproduced universes over and over; a process
with the closest analogy with the passage of millions of generations
which has honed life forms to an almost unimaginable perfection.
If the combination of hypotheses which I am giving the name of
meduso-anthropic is correct, the relationship of civilization to envi-
ronment would entail a thousand improbable coincidences with favor-
able outcomes. Historical events would skirt innumerable disasters
and find an improbable path to success. The relationship of humanity
to the universe would have an organic quality.
It is now possible to explain the metaphor I have chosen in the
title meduso-anthropic. It refers to a stage in the development of the
animals in the phylum which includes the jellyfish and coral. These
4
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animals have two phases of life, medusid and polyp. Medusids pro-
duce polyps, which produce medusids. It is sometimes even difficult
to recognize that the two stages represent a single species. Analog-
ically, intelligences are the medusids, and black holes/universes are
the polyps of a single evolutionary process.
The idea of an organic fine tuning of the relationship of life to
nature seems improbable as long as one listens to the voice of scientific
common sense. The minute one examines any part of natural history
as our understanding of it is growing, experience begins to drown out
common sense.
A SUMMATION
It is certainly impossible to claim that the quantum theory of
gravity has reached a stage where these ideas can be validated. On
the other hand, it could reach such a stage in fairly short order, if we
are lucky.
Nevertheless this much seems clear. The laws of Physics which
only operate at very high energies can nevertheless have profound
implications for what we see around us. They have the possibility of
changing our understanding of ourselves and our world in ways we
cannot yet imagine. The fact that machines at Planck scale energies
are not yet in the cards does not mean that quantum gravity is of no
concern to us.
For myself, I intend to return to my four dimensional state sums
with greatly increased ardor, in the hope that something like the
meduso-anthropic principle might emerge from them.
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Two purposes of black hole production
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Abstract:  Crane emits the speculative conjecture that intelligent civilizations 
might  want  and be able  to  produce  black  holes  in  the  very far  future.  He 
implicitly suggests two purposes of this enterprise: (i) energy production and 
(ii) universe production.  We discuss those two options. The commentary is 
obviously highly speculative and should be read accordingly.
Crane's  note  dates  back  from  1994,  and  is  to  our  knowledge  the  first 
suggestion to extend Lee Smolin's  Cosmological  Natural  Selection (Smolin 
1992)  by  including  intelligent  civilization.  Since  then,  other  authors  have 
developed  this  idea  further  (Harrison  1995;  Gardner  2000;  Gardner  2003; 
Baláz 2005; Smart 2008; Stewart 2009; Vidal 2008; 2009).  Philosophically, 
we believe that Crane's speculations are highly valuable, since they concern 
foundamental problems of  the very far future of civilizations. 
(1) Crane suggests "a quantum theory in which the coupling constant is part of 
the state of the universe". Is this model still topical? If so, it is not clear to me, 
to  which  coupling  constant  it  is  referred  to  (all  of  them?).  I  emitted  the 
proposition  that  as  physics  progresses,  fine-tuning  arguments  would  be 
reduced to  initial  conditions  of  a  cosmological  model  (Vidal  2009,  in  this 
volume). If the coupling constants are indeed part of the state of the universe, 
does it support this proposition?
(2) In this paper, intelligent civilizations are hypothesized to use black holes 
for two distinct purposes:
(i) energy production and waste disposal (page 2)
(ii) produce one or several universes (page 4)
(3) Crane claims that "any civilization will face the possibility of perishing 
from a lack  of  free  energy".  At  the  scale  of  the  universe,  this  problem is 
known as the thermodynamical death or heat death of the universe (see e.g. 
Adams and Laughlin 1997).  Crane suggests that "black holes could provide a 
permanent solution to this problem", via Hawking radiation. This is of course 
a very interesting suggestion, since it would allow intelligent civilization to 
continue indefinitely in this universe. 
(4) However, on an extremely long term, my intuition that this would not 
provide a permanent solution. Indeed, even if a civilization is able to produce 
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black holes as we produce microprocessors today, one certainly needs a lot of 
energy to produce black holes (the two approaches developed page 3 certainly 
need a lot of energy input). Where do we find this energy in a dying universe? 
(5) Now let  us  assume a perfect  efficiency of  black  holes  as  matter  to 
energy  conversion,  and  thus  no  need  to  make  new  black  holes.  Are 
indefinitely renewable energy cycles really possible? If so, how? Wouldn't it 
be  like  trying  to  produce  a  perpetual  motion  machine,  which  is  clearly 
impossible? 
(6) Furthermore,  if  purpose  (i)  really  works,  why  would  intelligent 
civilization  bother  producing a  new universe  (ii),  as  suggested  later  in  the 
paper? 
(7) It is not clear to me if and why the same kinds of black holes would 
generate a source of energy, and/or a new universe. 
(8) For (i), it is argued that "very small and very hot black holes" (page 2) 
would be suitable. 
(9) Similarly, what would be the characteristics of a black hole for the purpose 
of producing a new universe (ii)? Here are a few possibilities I can think of:
(a) Intelligent civilization produces the appropriate black hole itself. 
(b) Intelligent civilization uses the black hole produced at the death of a 
large star.
(c) Intelligent civilization uses the supermassive black hole at the centre 
of a galaxy.
(d) Intelligent civilization uses the whole universe as a black hole. Here, 
there are two possible variations.
(d1) The first  is  natural,  if  the "Big Crunch" (or oscillating) 
scenario  is  finally  favoured.  This  option  is  however  not 
favoured  by  current  cosmological  models  of  accelerating 
expansion. 
(d2) The second is then artificial, if intelligent civilization can 
have a global influence on universe's expansion and provokes 
an artificial "Big Crunch".
What arguments and counter arguments do support or refute one or several of 
these speculative possibilities? Or maybe are there yet other possibilities? 
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Abstract:  In the years  since I  first  thought  of the possibility  of producing 
artificial black holes, my focus on it has shifted from the role of life in the 
universe to a practical  suggestion for the middle-term future,  which I think of 
as on the order of a few centuries.
I think I need to apologise a bit for my paper. I am a mathematical physicist by 
choice,  and only a  philosophe “malgré  lui”.  The paper  was  written  for  an 
audience  of  relativists,  and  only  very  sketchy.  I  am overwhelmed  by  the 
implications of  the idea and I only turned back to it after 14 years because it 
gradually attracted attention. I shall try to supply some background here, by 
commenting on Vidal's nine points. 
(1) The coupling constants of nature include the strengths of the forces and the 
masses of the fundamental particles.  Physicists do not know how to predict 
their values, they are put in to the equations by hand. Attempts to explain them 
from a more fundamental theory have not succeeded.
The values of the constants are peculiar,  there are enormous differences in 
magnitude. The universe would be completely different if their values were 
changed by a small amount.  For example, the existence of stars which shine 
for billions of years depends on a delicate balance between electromagnetic 
and nuclear forces. Nucleii are almost stable, but not quite.
Another  example  is  a  delicate  resonance  in  nuclear  physics  discovered  bt 
Gamow. It means that stars produce a large amount of carbon (see Smolin's 
book).
These phenomena are well known to physicists under the term fine tuning.
Now it is generally believed that the particles and forces we see are not truly 
fundamental, they are the result of symmetry breaking as the universe cooled. 
This is the basis of the standard model of particle physics.
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So we could imagine that as the spacetime near a black hole singularity heated 
and  then  cooled  once  past  the  singularity  the  state  of  the  vacuum  could 
fluctuate. This means the peculiar conditions that form life would be the result 
of the outcome of events near the initial singularity of a universe.
I still do not know how to couple gravity to matter in a quantum theory, so I 
still cant say if this turns out to work or not.
(2)  I  do  not  really  agree  with  the  two  black  holes  production  purposes 
distinguished  by  Vidal.  For  me,  production  of   new  universes  is  only  a 
byproduct. I am not convinced that altruistic motives have ever played much 
of a role in human history other than as excuses.  I think advanced civilisations 
will make small black holes in order to have their vast energy output available, 
and to go to the stars.  If they result  in the creation of new universes,  that 
explains the overall evolutionary success of fine tuned universes, but not the 
motivation of  the creators.
(3) My thinking on this point has shifted, due to the profound energy problems 
our  civilisation  has  come  to  face,  and  the  understanding  of   the  great 
difficulties in human space travel which have emerged.
I now see the creation of artificial black holes as an important matter for the 
next few centuries.  Once we get over the hill of creating the generator (a laser 
the  size  of  a  small  asteroid),  we  will  have  energy  resources  no  other 
development based on known physics could approach. I think it is the only 
feasible way to make a stardrive (see Crane, Westmoreland 2010 for details). 
My discussion of the extreme future now seems naïve to me.
(4) As I explain in  (Crane, Westmoreland 2010),  a black hole can be fed 
ordinary matter as fast as it radiates, thus turning it to energy. We could use 
already created black holes to charge a generator, thus turning dust into black 
holes ad infinitum. This does not really go on forever. We run out of matter 
someday. But its a very long time. 
(5) This has nothing to do with perpetual motion. The black hole is converting 
matter which is fed into it into energy.  Forget the “forever” business. Im sorry 
I ever said it.
(6) The new universes are not accessible to us. They remain forever in our 
future. That is general relativity for you. We do not “bother” making them, 
they form as  a  result  of  the  singularity  in  maximally  extended  black  hole 
solutions.  (That  may  or  may  not  be  physically  real,  its  debated  among 
relativists.  I dont know if the meduso anthropic principle really works or not, 
it  depends  on  subtle  issues  in  general  relativity.)  We have  no  purpose  in 
making them except possibly a quasireligious one.
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(7) Black holes dont really have “kinds”. The no-hair theorem says they only 
have mass=size, angular momentum and charge. If the interpretation of the 
maximal extensions of the solutions is physical, new universes always appear 
when they form,  one per black hole  for stationary,  a sequence for rotating 
ones. Size doesnt matter.
A large number of black holes would produce more baby universes than a 
small number.
(8) The Hawking radiation is negligible except for very small black holes, that 
would be unlikely to occur in nature, but which would be easier to produce 
artificially, since they do need  as much energy to produce.
(9) The black holes in b, c, and d are of no use for power production or star 
travel.  They are  too  cold.  They automatically  produce  new universes,  and 
nothing  we  do  affects  the  process.  They  therefore  cannot  enter  into  an 
evolutionary  process  in  which  we  play  a  role.  We  only  affect  things  by 
changing the number of black holes in our universe. I have not worried about 
the “big crunch.”  It  looks improbable.  The proposal to create  a black hole 
generator would take a labor force as large as the one that built the pyramids, 
and last as long as the construction of the cathedrals. In order to sustain such 
an effort, perhaps something like a religious motivation might be necessary. 
The meduso-anthropic principle connects intelligence into the formation of the 
universe  and  makes  us  part  of  the  process.  It  therefore  has  a  strange 
resemblance to Spinoza's version of God as identical to self-creating nature. It 
may be that in order to meet the enormous challenge of constructing black 
hole technology, civilisation will need to undergo a spiritual transformation, in 
which  religion  and science  fuse.  I  admit  I  find  this  an attractive  prospect, 
although I am not inclined to attempt to start it.  
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Abstract: 
In this philosophical paper, we explore computational and biological analogies to 
address the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. We first clarify what it  means for 
physical  constants  or  initial  conditions  to  be  fine-tuned.  We review important 
distinctions such as the dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the 
classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we explore how two 
great  analogies,  computational  and  biological,  can  give  new insights  into  our 
problem. This paper includes a preliminary study to examine the two analogies. 
Importantly, analogies are both useful and fundamental cognitive tools, but can 
also be misused or misinterpreted.  The idea that our universe might be modelled 
as  a  computational  entity is  analysed,  and  we discuss  the  distinction  between 
physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic information theory. Smolin 
introduced  the  theory  of  "Cosmological  Natural  Selection"  with  a  biological 
analogy in mind. We examine an extension of this analogy involving intelligent 
life.  We discuss if and how this extension could be legitimated. 
Keywords:  origin  of  the  universe,  fine-tuning,  physical  constants,  initial  conditions, 
computational universe, biological universe, role of intelligent life, cosmological natural selection, 
cosmological artificial selection, artificial cosmogenesis.
Contents
0 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................2
1 Physical constants and initial conditions.........................................................................................3
2 Analogies for scientific purposes.....................................................................................................8
3 The computational universe...........................................................................................................10
4 The biological universe..................................................................................................................16
5 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................20
6 Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................21
7 References.....................................................................................................................................21
1
EDU 2008 p280
0 Introduction1
After  Leibniz  famously  wrote  "why  is  there  something  rather  than 
nothing?" he then qualified this by writing: "Also, given that things have to exist, 
we must be able to give a reason why they have to exist  as they are and not 
otherwise."  (Leibniz  1714,  para.  7).  Trying  nowadays  to  tackle  this  age  old 
metaphysical question, we have to take into account the progress that science has 
made.  Both the emerging sciences of complexity and cosmology can help this 
philosophical  enterprise.  Modern  science  can  successfully  connect  the  general 
physico-chemical cosmological evolution with biological and cultural evolution 
(e.g. Chaisson 2001; De Duve 1995). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that 
science is an effective method in enabling us to understand the whole evolution of 
our  universe.  The  problem of  harmony in  the  cosmos  has  thus  shifted  to  its 
beginning : why did the universe start with these initial conditions and laws, and 
not others? 
The belief in God allowed western thinkers to understand why the "Laws 
of  Nature"  are  as  they  are  and  not  otherwise.  Scientific  activity  ultimately 
consisted of discovering the “Laws of Nature” set up by God. However, now that 
many scientists no longer believe in God, there is a lack of explanation in the 
origin of the “Laws of Nature” (Davies 1998).
Why is our universe as it  is,  and not different? This question is a very 
much debated issue, at the intersection of cosmology, theology and philosophy. In 
modern terms, it is known as the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. It states that if  
a number of parameters, both constants in physics and initial parameters in big-
bang models had been slightly different, no life or, more generally, no complexity  
would have emerged (Barrow and Tipler 1986; Davies 1982; 2008; Ellis 1993; 
Leslie 1989; 1998; Rees 2000; Hogan 2000; Barrow et al. 2008). The standard 
models  of  particle  physics  and  cosmology  require  31  free  parameters  to  be 
specified (Tegmark et al. 2006). It is a main challenge of modern physics to build 
stronger theories able to reduce this number. 
As Leslie (1989) reminds us, the argument that the universe is fine tuned is 
not  based on the  assumption  that  there  is  a  fine-tuner.  It  only means  that  the 
emergence of life or complexity is sensitive to many different slight changes in 
our physical and cosmological models. 
The literature around this issue can be divided into two main classes of 
solutions: “God” or “Multiverse”. Either it is God who created the Universe with 
all its parameters fit for life and intelligence; or there is a huge number of other 
universes with different parameters,  so that it is very probable that there is one 
containing life and intelligence. The fact that it is the one we happen to inhabit is 
1 This paper was commented by Greben (2009) and Vaas (2009). In (Vidal 2009a) I respond to 
these comments and criticisms (this EDU2008 volume).
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an observational selection effect  which thus makes fine-tuning less mysterious 
(e.g. Carr 2007; Bostrom 2002). 
From a rational and scientific point of view, an appeal to God suffers from 
being a non-naturalistic explanation. Furthermore, God is often linked with the 
“God of the gaps” assumption. If we can not understand a phenomenon, we use 
God to explain it, and we thus do not seek another explanation. This attitude can, 
by  its  very  definition,  explain  everything.  A parallel  can  be  made  with  the 
seemingly  opposite  approach  to  the  fine-tuning  problem,  holding  that  the 
universe's parameters happened by pure random chance.  Indeed,  this appeal to 
chance works everywhere and is not restricted by any limit; so it can also explain 
everything. One should also note that  in fine,  appealing to a multiverse with a 
selection effect is similar to the chance explanation. Indeed, in both cases we have 
the chance to be in a life-permitting universe. 
Iris Fry (1995) already pointed out in the context of explaining the origin 
of  life  that  appealing to  chance or  to  God are  after  all  similar  attempts.  This 
situation is comparable with the “God” or “Multiverse” alternative. Both options 
thus surprisingly suffer from similar shortcomings. Are there other possible roads 
to address the fine-tuning problem?
This paper aims explicitly and carefully to use two great analogies, to open 
new research axes.  These are  computational and  biological analogies. We first 
clarify what physical constants and initial conditions are, to better grasp what it 
means  to  state  that  they are  fine-tuned.  We thus  review some propositions  to 
classify  the  two  principal  sets  of  physical  parameters:  physical  constants  in 
particle  physics  and initial  conditions  in  cosmology.  Before  exploring  the two 
analogies, we investigate the basic functioning of analogical reasoning. We do this 
to avoid naïve ontological statements such as “the Universe is a computer” or “the 
Universe  is  alive”.  We  then  analyse  aspects  of  computational  and  biological 
analogies.  Among others,  this leads us to questionning the distinction between 
laws and initial conditions. We also point out some of the epistemological limits 
of Smolin's attempt to tackle the fine-tuning problem with his biological-inspired 
theory of  “Cosmological  Natural  Selection”.  We then  propose  a  philosophical 
extension to it, “Cosmological Artificial Selection” which includes a possible role 
for intelligent life. 
1 Physical constants and initial conditions
We distinguish between dimensional and dimensionless physical constants, 
as proposed by Michael Duff in (Duff, Okun, and Veneziano 2002). If a constant 
has a unit after its value, it is dimensional. Dimensional constants depend on our 
unit system choice and thus have a conventional aspect. The velocity of light  c, 
the reduced Planck constant  ħ  or  the gravitational  constant  G  are dimensional 
constants (their respective dimensions are, for example, m.s-1, eV.s and m3.kg-1.s-2). 
Certainly,  we can for example make the velocity of light equal to 1, and thus 
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apparently dimensionless. However, this applies only to a particular unit system, 
and the constant will be dimensional again in another unit system. 
By contrast, dimensionless constants are dimensionless in any unit system. 
They are ratios between two physical quantities, such as two forces or two masses. 
For example, the electron-proton mass ratio is me/mp = 1/1836.15... Since the two 
quantities are masses, we can get rid of the units (i.e. the dimension), and keep 
only  a  pure  number.  Other  dimensionless  constants  are  deduced  by a  similar 
dimensional analysis. If the analysis leads to a pure number without dimension, 
we have a “dimensionless” constant.
Along with this dimensional versus dimensionless distinction, Jean-Marc 
Lévy-Leblond  (1979,  238) proposed  another  complementary  classification  of 
physical  constants.  Three  types  are  distinguished,  in  order  of  increasing 
generality: 
A. Properties of particular physical objects considered as fundamental constituents 
of  matter;  for  instance,  the  masses  of  "elementary  particles",  their  magnetic 
moments, etc.
B. Characteristics of classes of physical phenomena: Today, these are essentially the 
coupling  constants  of  the  various  fundamental  interactions  (nuclear,  strong  and 
weak, electromagnetic and gravitational), which to our present knowledge, provide a 
neat partition of all physical phenomena into disjoint classes. 
C.  Universal  constants,  that  is  constants  entering  universal  physical  laws, 
characterizing  the  most  theoretical  frameworks,  applicable  in  principle  to  any 
physical phenomenon; Planck constant ħ is a typical example. 
The classification is only intended to be a basis for discussing and analysing the 
historical evolution of different physical constants. For example, the constant  c, 
the velocity of light, was first discovered as a type-A constant. It was a property of 
light, as a physical object. With the work of Kirchhoff, Weber, Kohlrausch and 
Maxwell, the constant gained type-B status when it was discovered that it also 
characterized electromagnetic phenomena. Finally, it gained type-C status when 
special  and  general  relativity  were  discovered,  synthesizing  concepts  such  as 
spatio-temporal  intervals,  or  mass  and  energy  (see  (Lévy-Leblond  1979, 
252-258) for a detailed account of  the status change of c). 
What happens next, when a constant has reached its type-C status? The 
fate of universal constants (type-C), explains Lévy-Leblond, is to "see their nature 
as concept synthesizers be progressively incorporated into the implicit common 
background of physical ideas, then to play a role of mere unit conversion factors 
and often to be finally forgotten altogether by a suitable redefinition of physical 
units."  (Lévy-Leblond 1979, 246). More precisely, this remark leads him to the 
distinction of three subclasses of type-C constants, according to their historical 
status: 
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(i) the modern ones, whose conceptual role is still dominant (e.g. ħ, c); 
(ii)  the  classical ones,  whose conceptual role is  implicit  and which are 
considered as unit conversion factors (e.g. thermodynamical constants  k, 
J); 
(iii)  archaic ones, which are so well  assimilated as to become invisible 
(e.g. the now obvious ideas that areas are square of lengths). 
If  all  dimensional  constants  follow  this  path,  then  they  all  become 
“archaic”, and thus integrated in the background of physical theories. The fate of 
dimensional constants seems then to fade away. Is it possible to seriously consider 
this remark, and try to relegate all dimensional constants to archaic ones? Michael 
Duff  (Duff  2002;  Duff,  Okun,  and  Veneziano  2002) did  a  first  step  in  this 
direction by convincingly arguing that the number of dimensional constants (type-
C) can be reduced to ... zero! Thus, he considers constants like c, G, ħ, which are 
often considered as “fundamental”,  as merely unit conversion factors. According 
to his terminology, only dimensionless constants should be seen as fundamental. 
A dimensionless physics approach is also proposed in the framework of 
scale  relativity  (Nottale  2003,  16).  Following  the  idea  of  relativity,  one  can 
express any physical expression in terms of ratios. Indeed, in the last analysis a 
physical  quantity  is  always  expressed  relative to  another. Of  course, 
experimentalists  still  need to refer to metric systems, and often to many more 
dimensional physical constants than just the common c, G and ħ. The point here is 
that it is possible to express the results in physical equations without reference to 
those dimensional constants (see also  (Lévy-Leblond 1979, 248-251)). 
What are the consequences of these insights for fine-tuning arguments? If 
the fate of dimensional constants is to disappear, then the associated fine-tuning 
arguments with these constants should also disappear. Considering what would 
happen if a type-C dimensional constant would be different has to be considered 
skeptically. Such a scenario has already been considered, for example by Rozental 
(1980) where he analysed what would happen if the Planck constant were to be 
increased  by  15%.  Again,  as  Duff  argued,  the  problem  is  that  dimensional 
constants  are  conventions,  and  changing  them  is  changing  a  convention,  not 
physics. It is thus only meaningful to express the possible changes in terms of 
dimensionless constants. 
In  fact,  most  fine-tuning  arguments  focus  on  considering  changes  in 
dimensionless constants. Typically, they consider what would happen if we were 
to change one of the four fundamental dimensionless coupling constants. These 
include α for electromagnetism,  αG for gravity,  αW  for the weak nuclear force and 
αs  for the strong nuclear force. It should be noted that these constants are actually 
not constant, since they change with energy scale (Wilczek 1999). 
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The main conclusion in this area of study is that there are  conditions  on 
these constants for key events in the evolution of complexity in the universe to 
occur. For example, during the big-bang nucleosynthesis, the condition αG < (αW)4 
must  be  fulfilled,  or  else  all  hydrogen  goes  to  helium.  Bernard  Carr 
(2007a) provided  a  detailed  account  of  other  constraints  related  to  these  four 
constants  for  the  baryosynthesis,  nucleosynthesis,  star  formation  and  planet 
formation to occur. 
Along with these coupling constants, there is a whole other set of fine-
tuning arguments based on cosmological parameters.  These include parameters 
such as matter density (Ω), amplitude of initial density fluctuations, photon-to-
baryon ratio, etc. For example, the “total density parameter Ω must lie within an 
order of magnitude of unity. If it were much larger than unity, the Universe would 
recollapse on a time-scale much less than the main-sequence time of a star. On the 
other hand, if it were much smaller than unity, density fluctuations would stop 
growing before galaxies could bind.”  (Carr 2007, 80). We wrote in introduction 
that one of the main challenges of modern physics is to construct theories able to 
reduce this number of parameters, both in the standard model of particle physics 
and in cosmological models. Parameters involved in cosmological models can be 
explained  by  new  physical  theories.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  dimensionless 
cosmological constant, whose value has been predicted by scale relativity (Nottale 
2008, 27-31). 
Following  Duff  and  Lévy-Leblond,  we  saw  that  type-C  constants  are 
bound to disappear. Another challenge we would like to propose is the following: 
could  type-A  and  type-B  constants  emerge  from  initial  conditions  in  a 
cosmological model? If we were be able to explain all these constants in terms of 
a cosmological model, it would certainly be a great achievement. Smolin (1997, 
316) also argued that fundamentally, progress in quantum mechanics must lead to 
a cosmological theory. Indeed, all particles ultimately originate from the big-bang, 
thus a complete understanding of particle physics should include an explanation  
of their origin, and thus relate with a cosmological model.  
In a certain sense, progress in this direction has already happened, if we 
consider the discovery of big-bang nucleosynthesis. Properties of atomic elements 
could be thought as fundamental constituents of matter, and thus type-A constants, 
until  we  discovered  they  were  actually  formed  at  the  big-bang  era.  If  we 
extrapolate this trend, a future cosmological model may be able to derive many 
(or even all) type-A constants from initial conditions. 
The  same  can  be  said  about  fundamental  coupling  constants  (type-B). 
Special scale relativity can indeed predict the value of αs  (the strong nuclear force) 
at the Z mass energy level. This was predicted with great precision, and has been 
confirmed by experimental measures (see (Nottale 2008, 26-27) in this volume for 
further details). Thus, if physics continues its progress, it is reasonable to conceive 
that particle physics models would become integrated into a cosmological model. 
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The  consequence  for  fine-tuning  arguments  is  that   fine-tuning  of  physical  
constants would progressively be reduced to initial conditions of a cosmological  
model. 
Given this analysis of physical constants, let us now examine an argument 
against the idea of fine-tuning proposed by Chaisson (2006, xvi-xvii):
Rather than appealing to Providence or "multiverses" to justify the numerical values 
of some physical constants (such as the speed of light or the charge of an electron), I 
prefer to reason that when the laws of science become sufficiently robust, we shall 
naturally  understand  the  apparent  "fine-tuning"  of  Nature.  It's  much  akin  to 
mathematics, when considering the value of π. Who would have thought, a priori, 
that the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter would have the odd value of 
3,14159.... ? Why isn't it just 3, or 3,1, or some other crisp number, rather than such 
a peculiar value that runs on ad infinitum? We now understand enough mathematics 
to realize that this is simply the way geometry scales; there is nothing mystical about 
a perfect circle -yet it surely is fine-tuned, and if it were not it wouldn't be a circle. 
Circles exist as gracefully rounded curves closed upon themselves  because π  has 
the odd value it  does. Likewise,  ordered systems in Nature, including life,  likely 
exist because the physical constants have their decidedly odd values. 
First, we can remark that the speed of light and the charge of the electron 
are  dimensional constants.  As we analysed,  it  makes not  much sense to speak 
about a variation, and thus a fine-tuning of them (see also (Duff 2002)). 
Let  us  look more  closely at  Chaisson's  suggestion  that  if  “the  laws of 
science  become sufficiently  robust  we shall  naturally  understand  the  apparent 
'fine-tuning' of Nature”. Considering what we have argued so far, we can agree 
with this.  We have outlined Duff's  proposal that  dimensional  constants  can be 
reduced to 0. We have suggested that fundamental coupling constants could be in 
future  explained  from  more  general  principles,  and  that  many  apparent 
“fundamental constants” in the past can nowadays be explained by more general 
theories. Accordingly, a great deal of fine-tuning has been and certainly will be 
explained by more advanced physical theories. 
Let us now examine the analogy with π. We can see a disanalogy between 
mathematical and physical constants. Mathematical constants are defined a priori 
by the axioms: they are  internal to the system and are generally definable and 
computable numbers. For example, we have plenty of algorithms to calculate π. 
This is not the case with physical constants. Many of them remain external to the  
system, in the sense that they are not computable from inside the model. At some 
stage  there  has  been  a  measurement  process  to  get  their  values.  We  can 
reformulate Chaisson's position by saying that progress in science will allow us to 
understand (or compute) these constants, from more fundamental principles. We 
will develop this computational view in the third section of this paper. 
However,  if  we  saw  that  future  physics  could  understand  physical 
constants in terms of a cosmological model,  it  is unlikely that this would also 
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include the initial conditions of this model. Indeed, if we were to have a theory 
deciding all values of initial conditions in a cosmological model, it then leads to 
the idea of a “final theory” or a “theory of everything”. This would bring many 
conceptual and metaphysical problems (Rescher 2000). One of these problems is 
that, ironically, this idea of a final theory is an act of faith and is thus similar to the 
Providence explanation  (e.g. Davies 2008, 170). Smolin (1997, 248) wrote that 
the “belief in a final theory shares with a belief in a god the idea that the ultimate 
cause of things in this world is something that does not live in the world but has 
an existence that, somehow, transcends it.” Fine-tuning arguments based on initial 
conditions of a cosmological model thus remain intact in Chaisson's critique. 
2 Analogies for scientific purposes
We have seen some aspects of physical parameters from a physical point 
of view. We will shortly turn to other approaches to the fine-tuning issue, inspired 
by computational and biological analogies. However,  let  us begin with a short 
digression explaining how analogies can be used for scientific purposes.  Many 
great scientific discoveries have been triggered by analogies (see  (Holyoak and 
Thagard 1995, chap.  8) for plenty of examples).  This constitutes an important 
motivation to understand in greater detail the functioning of analogical reasoning. 
Analogical reasoning is certainly an essential cognitive tool, which nevertheless 
needs to be carefully used. 
What is an analogy? It is a structural or functional similarity between two 
domains of knowledge. For example, a cloud and a sponge are analogous in the 
sense that they can both hold and give back water. More precisely, we can give the 
following definition: “an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain 
(the  base)  into  another  (the  target)  such  that  a  system of  relations  that  holds 
among  the  base  objects  also  holds  among  the  target  objects.”  (Gentner  and 
Jeziorski 1993, 448-449). In this very simple example, the relations “holding and 
giving back water” which are verified in the base (the cloud) are also verified in 
the target (the sponge). 
Analogical  reasoning  is  recognized  to  be  a  basic  cognitive  mechanism 
allowing us  to  learn  and solve problems  (e.g.  Minsky 1986;  Hofstadter  1995; 
Holyoak and Thagard 1995). Leary (1990, 2) even argued that language and every 
kind  of  knowledge  is  rooted  in  metaphorical  or  analogical  thought  processes. 
Indeed,  when  we  do  not  know a  domain  at  all,  we  must  use  analogies  as  a 
cognitive tool to potentially gain some insights from what we already know. In 
this manner, a map from the known to the unknown can be drawn. 
Specifically, Holyoak and Thagard (1995, 185-189) argued that analogical 
reasoning is helpful in discovering, developing, educating, or evaluating scientific 
theories. Indeed, they allow us to propose new hypotheses, and thus discover new 
phenomena. These new hypotheses trigger us to  develop new experiments and 
theories.  Let  us  note  however  that  there  is  nothing  automatic  or  easy  in  this 
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process. The relational system should first be examined in both domains, and then 
a more precise analogy or disanalogy can be found worthy of testing. 
The  educating part  of  analogies  is  useful  for  diffusing  scientific 
knowledge,  both  to  colleagues  and pupils.  Indeed,  it  can  be  very helpful  and 
efficient to consciously use analogies to help others grasp a new idea, based on 
what they already know. 
The  evaluating  part  confronts  us  with  one  of  the  main  dangers  of 
analogies. One should emphasize that  an analogy is not a proof. Analogies can 
thus not properly be used to prove statements, but their main utility is in giving 
heuristics for  discovering  and  developing  scientific  theories.  To  illustrate  this 
point, let us consider the teleological argument of God's existence popularized by 
William Paley (1802), based on the analogy of our Universe with a watch. It goes 
as follows:
(1) A watch is a fine-tuned object.
(2) A watch has been designed by a watchmaker.
(3) The Universe is fine-tuned.
(4) The Universe has been designed by God.
In the base domain (1-2), we have two objects, the watch and the watchmaker. 
They are linked by a “designed by” relationship. In the target domain (3-4), the 
Universe is like a watch, and God, like a watchmaker. That the relation (1)-(2) is a 
verifiable fact does not imply at all that the same  relation  “designed by” in (3)-
(4) should be true. There is no causal relationship between the couple (1)-(2) and 
(3)-(4).  This reasoning at most gives us an heuristic invitation to ponder whether 
the universe is fine-tuned.  Although it is a logically flawed argument, one can 
appreciate that this reasoning induces a strong intuitive appeal. 
There are in fact  other pitfalls  associated with analogical reasoning.  To 
avoid  them,  Gentner  and  Jeziorski  (1993,  450) proposed  six  principles  of 
analogical reasoning (Gentner 1993, 450):
1. Structural consistency. Objects are placed in one-to-one correspondence and 
parallel connectivity in predicates is maintained.
2. Relational focus. Relational systems are preserved and object descriptions 
disregarded.
3. Systematicity. Among various relational interpretations, the one with the greatest 
depth - that is, the greatest degree of common higher-order relational structure - is 
preferred. 
4. No extraneous associations. Only commonalities strengthen an analogy. Further 
relations and associations between the base and target - for example, thematic 
connections - do not contribute to the analogy. 
5. No mixed analogies. The relational network to be mapped should be entirely 
contained within one base domain. When two bases are used, they should each 
convey a coherent system.
6. Analogy is not causation. That two phenomena are analogous does not imply that 
one causes the other. 
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Is it possible to further generalize the use of analogical reasoning into a 
science which would focus only on the structural or functional aspects of systems? 
Studying different models in different disciplines having structural or functional 
similarities leads to the development of very general interdisciplinary scientific 
frameworks, like the network or systems theory paradigms. Indeed, Ludwig van 
Bertalanffy  defined  general  systems  theory  as  an  interdisciplinary  doctrine 
“elaborating principles and models that apply to systems in general, irrespective 
of their particular kind, elements, and 'forces' involved” (Bertalanffy, quoted in 
(Laszlo 1972, xvii)). In a similar fashion, the study of networks is independent of 
the nodes and types of relations considered. 
To  conclude  this  section,  one  can  use  Hesse's  (1966,  8) pragmatically 
valuable distinction between positive, negative and neutral analogies. The positive 
analogy addresses  the question:  what  is  analogous?  and constitutes  the set  of 
relations  which  hold  in  the  two domains.  The  negative  analogy addresses  the 
question: what is disanalogous? and constitutes the set of relations which do not 
hold in the two domains. Finally, neutral analogies trigger the question:  are the 
two domains analogous? To answer this last question, one has to examine or test 
if such or such relation holds in the target domain.
Given this analysis, we can now carefully explore the fine-tuning issue, 
aided by computational and biological analogies. Since we have claimed in the 
first  section  that  fine-tuning  arguments  could  be  in  future  reduced  to  initial 
conditions, we will now focus on this aspect. 
3 The computational universe
The idea that our universe is analogous to a computer is a popular one. We 
can  see  it  as  the  modern  version  of  a  mechanistic  worldview,  looking  at  the 
universe as a machine.  There are various ways to consider this  analogy,  with 
cellular  automata,  e.g.  (Wolfram  2002) with  quantum  computing  e.g.  (Lloyd 
2005), etc. The analogy has been pushed so far that a modern version of idealism 
has even be considered, i.e. that our universe would actually be run by a computer, 
and  we might  be  living  in  a  computer  simulation  (e.g.  Bostrom 2003;  Martin 
2006). 
We saw that fine-tuning arguments might ultimately be reduced to initial 
conditions of a cosmological model. Here, we examine what the initial conditions 
are from a computational perspective, and discuss the relation between laws and 
initial  conditions.  This  is  conducted  within  the  framework  of  Algorithmic 
Information  Theory  (AIT,  (Chaitin  1974;  1987)).  We  will  then  argue  that 
computer simulations provide an indispensable tool if we wish to tackle the fine-
tuning problem scientifically. We will conclude by pointing out some limitations 
of this computational analogy.  
AIT studies complexity measures on strings. The complexity measure -the 
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Kolmogorov complexity2- of an object such as a piece of text is a measure of the 
computational resources needed to specify the object. Below is a simple example 
originally  presented  in  the  Wikipedia  encyclopaedia  (2008) :
consider the following two strings of length 64, each containing only lower-case 
letters, numbers, and spaces:
abababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab
4c1j5b2p0cv4w1 8rx2y39umgw5q85s7ur qbjfdppa0q7nieieqe9noc4cvafzf 
The first string admits a short English language description, namely "ab 32 times", 
which consists of 11 characters. The second one has no obvious simple description 
(using the same character set) other than writing down the string itself, which has 64 
characters.
In this AIT framework, laws represent information which can be greatly shortened 
by  algorithmic  compression  (like  the  “ab  32  times”  string);  whereas  initial 
conditions represent information which cannot be so compressed (like the second 
string). If we import this analogy into physics, a physical law is to be likened to a 
simple program able  to  give a  compressed description of  some aspects  of the 
world; whereas initial conditions are data that we do not know how to compress. 
Can  we  interpret  this  distinction  between  physical  laws  and  initial 
conditions in a cognitive manner? We either express our knowledge in terms of 
laws if  we can compress  information,  and in  terms of initial  conditions if  we 
cannot. In this view, scientific progress allows us to dissolve initial conditions into 
new theories, by using more general and efficient algorithmic compression rules. 
In mathematics, Gödel's limitation theorems state that in any sufficiently 
rich logical system, there will remain undecidable propositions in that system. But 
using  another  stronger  system,  one  can  decide  such  previously  "undecidable" 
propositions  (even  if  new  undecidable  propositions  will  arise  in  the  stronger 
system...). For example, the consistency of Peano's arithmetic cannot be shown to 
be  consistent  within  arithmetic,  but  can  be  shown to  be  consistent  relative to 
modern set theory (ZFC). 
There is a theorem similar to Gödel's incompleteness in AIT. Informally, it 
states that a computational system cannot compress structure in a system that is 
more  algorithmically  complex  than  this  computational  system.  Let  us  assume 
again that physical laws represent compressible information, and initial conditions 
incompressible  information.  Are  initial  conditions  in  cosmological  models 
algorithmically incompressible? There are two ways to answer this question. 
First, we can interpret this incompressible data in an absolute way. This 
data is then “lawless, unstructured, patternless, not amenable to scientific study, 
2 also  known  as  program-size  complexity,  Kolmogorov-Chaitin  complexity,  descriptive 
complexity, stochastic complexity, or algorithmic entropy.
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incompressible”  (Chaitin 2006, 64). Suggesting that those initial conditions are 
incompressible  implicitly implies  that  we,  poor humans,  will  never  be able  to 
understand them. This attitude freezes  scientific  endeavour  and thus  has  to  be 
rejected. Limitation theorems are only valid within formal systems, because one 
needs the system to be completely formalized and specific formal tools to be able 
to  prove  them.  Therefore,  we  should  be  extremely  careful  when  exporting 
limitation theorems into other less formalized domains. Moreover, the history of 
science has shown that it is hazardous to fix boundaries on human understanding. 
Let us take the example of infinity, which was for many centuries thought to be 
understandable  only  by  a  God  who  is  infinite,  and  not  by  finite  humans.  A 
rigorous  theory  of  infinite  numbers,  constituting  the  foundations  of  modern 
mathematics,  has  finally  been  proposed  by  the  mathematician  Georg  Cantor. 
Therefore,  boundaries  are  likely  to  be  broken.  We  will  shortly  see  how  the 
multiverse  hypothesis or  computer universe simulation bring  us  beyond  the 
apparently incompressible initial conditions. 
The second option is that incompressible information may reflect the limits 
of our theoretical models. If we are not able to account for the reasons of initial 
conditions, it is a hint that we need a broader theoretical framework to understand 
them. This situation can be illustrated by considering the problem of the origin of 
life. In this context, initial conditions for life to emerge are generally assumed 
without justification: chemical elements are assumed to be here, along with an 
Earth  with  water,  neither  too  far  nor  too  near  from the  Sun,  etc.  With  these 
hypotheses (and others), we try to explain the origin of life. Now, what if we try to 
explain the origin of these initial suitable conditions for life? We would then need 
a broader theory, which in this case is a theory of cosmic evolution. If we then aim 
to explain initial conditions in cosmology, we are back to the problem of fine-
tuning. 
As  we  wrote  in  the  introduction,  multiverse  models  are  precisely 
attempting to introduce a broader theory to explain those initial  conditions, by 
proposing the existence of various other possible universes with different initial 
conditions.  The  problem  is  that  the  multiverse  hypothesis  is  a  metaphysical  
assumption. George Ellis (2007a, 400) expressed it well:
There  can  be  no  direct  evidence  for  the  existence  of  other  universes  in  a  true 
multiverse,  as  there is  no possibility of  even an indirect  causal  connection.  The 
universes are completely disjoint and nothing that happens in one can affect what 
happens  in  another.  Since  there  can  be  no  direct  or  indirect  evidence  for  such 
systems,  what  weight  does  the  claim  for  their  existence  carry?  
Experimental  or  observational  testing  requires  some  kind  of  causal  connection 
between an object and an experimental apparatus, so that some characteristic of the 
object  affects  the  output  of  the  apparatus.  But  in  a  true  multiverse,  this  is  not 
possible. No scientific apparatus in one universe can be affected in any way by any 
object in another universe. The implication is that the supposed existence of true 
multiverses can only be a metaphysical assumption. It cannot be a part of science, 
because science involves experimental or observational tests to enable correction of 
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wrong theories. However, no such tests are possible here because there is no relevant 
causal link.
To improve testability, Ellis further suggests examining a variation on the causally 
disconnected universes, considering multi-domain universes that are not causally 
disconnected. Still, I would like to emphasize the philosophical importance of the 
multiverse hypothesis, because it is a logically consistent way to tackle the fine-
tuning problem. Is there a way other than the multiverse to theorize about “other 
possible universes”? This is what we will analyse now.  
One  of  the  main  limitations  of  fine-tuning  arguments  is  that  the  vast 
majority of them vary one single parameter of physical or cosmological models 
and conclude that the resulting universe is not fit for developing complexity. What 
if  we would change  several parameters at  the same time? For example,  if  the 
expansion rate of the universe had been greater, and gravity had been stronger, 
could  the  two  changes  cancel  each  other  out?  Systematically  exploring  those 
possibilities seems like a very cumbersome enterprise. As Gribbin and Rees wrote 
(1991, 269): 
If we modify the value of one of the fundamental constants, something invariably 
goes wrong, leading to a universe that is inhospitable to life as we know it. When we 
adjust a second constant in an attempt to fix the problem(s), the result, generally, is 
to create three new problems for every one that we "solve". The conditions in our 
universe really do seem to be uniquely suitable for life forms like ourselves, and 
perhaps even for any form of organic complexity. 
A way to overcome this problem would be to use  computer simulations  to test 
systematical  modifications  of  constants'  values.  An  early  attempt  of  such  an 
approach has been proposed by Victor Stenger (1995; 2000). He has performed a 
remarkable  simulation  of  possible  universes.  He  considers  four  fundamental 
constants, the strength of electromagnetism α; the strong nuclear force αs, and the 
masses of the electron and the proton. He then analysed “100 universes in which 
the values of  the four parameters were generated randomly from a range five 
orders of magnitude above to five orders of magnitude below their values in our 
universe, that is, over a total range of ten orders of magnitude”  (Stenger 2000). 
The distribution of stellar lifetimes in those universes shows that most universes 
have stars that  live long enough to allow stellar evolution and heavy elements 
nucleosynthesis.  Anthony  Aguirre  (2001) reached  a  similar  conclusion  by 
proposing “a class of cosmologies (based on the classical ‘cold big-bang’ model) 
in which some or all of the cosmological parameters differ by orders of magnitude 
from the values they assume in the standard hot big-bang cosmology,  without 
precluding in any obvious way the existence of intelligent life.”  In conclusion, 
other possible universes may also be fine-tuned!
It  is  certainly  possible  to  critique  Stenger's  simulation  as  being  too 
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simplistic. Maybe we should consider other or more “fundamental” constants to 
vary; or to vary the laws of physics themselves. Stenger did not attempt to vary 
physical laws and it seems indeed a very difficult enterprise, because we do not 
even know how to make them vary (see Vaas 1998).
In fact,  the distinction between laws and boundary conditions is fuzzy in  
cosmology  (Ellis 2007b, sec. 7.1). One can see boundary conditions as imposing 
constraints, not only on initial conditions (lower boundary of the domain), but also 
at the extremes of the domain. Both physical laws and boundary conditions play 
the same role of imposing constraints on the system at hand. Because we can not 
re-run the tape of the universe, it is difficult -if not impossible- to distinguish the 
two. In this view, some laws of physics might be interpreted as regularities of 
interactions progressively emerging out of a more chaotic state. The cooling down 
of the universe would progressively give rise to more stable dynamical systems, 
which can be described by simple mathematical equations. 
A  similar  situation  occurs  in  computer  science.  One  can  distinguish 
between a program, which is  a set  of  instructions,  and the data  on which the 
program operates.  The program is analogous to physical  laws,  and the data to 
initial  conditions.  This  distinction  in  computer  science  can  be  blurred,  when 
considering self-modifying programs, i.e. a program which modifies itself. Also, 
at a lower level, both the program and the data are processed in the form of bits, 
and here also the distinction is blurred. 
  Back to Stenger's simulation, it does not answer the following questions: 
would  other  interesting  complex  structures  like  planetary  systems,  life, 
intelligence, etc. evolve in those other universes? However, this is only an early 
attempt  in  simulating  other  possible  universes,  and  the  enterprise  is  certainly 
worth pursuing. The fine-tuning problem could then be seriously tackled, because 
we  would  know  precisely  the  likelihood  of  having  our  universe  as  it  is,  by 
comparing it to other possible universes. To summarize, this approach needs to:
(1) define a space of possible universes
(2) vary parameters defining this  space,  to see how likely it  is  to obtain a 
universe fine-tuned to develop complex structures. 
Many multiverse scenarios such as those in (Carr 2007) proposed answers to step 
(1). The second proposed step can be tackled with computer simulations. 
I argued in (Vidal 2008) that a simulation of an entire universe will result 
from future scientific  activity.  Such a  simulation  would  enable  us  not  only to 
understand our own universe (with “real-world modelling”, or processes-as-we-
know-them) but also other  possible universes (with “artificial-world modelling”, 
or  processes-as-they-could-be).  In  this  way,  we would be able  to  scientifically 
assess to what degree our universe is fine-tuned or not. If it turns out that our 
universe is not so special, then a response to fine-tuning would be a principle of 
fecundity:  “there  is  no  fine-tuning,  because  intelligent  life  of  some form will 
emerge under extremely varied circumstances” (Tegmark et al. 2006, 4).
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We thus need to develop methods, concepts and simulation tools to explore 
the  space  of  possible  universes  (the  “cosmic  landscape"  as  Leonard  Susskin 
(2006) calls it in the framework of string theory). In (Vidal 2008), I proposed to 
call this new field of research “Artificial Cosmogenesis”. It is an attempt to a 
“general cosmology”, in analogy with  Artificial Life which appeared with the 
help of computer simulations to enquiry about a “general biology”. 
In  summary,  if  we  assume  that  initial  conditions  are  analogous  to 
incompressible information, then there are two possible reactions. Either we claim 
that we reached the limit of scientific understanding; or we recognize that we need 
an extended framework. Multiverse and computer simulations of other possible 
universes are examples of such extended frameworks. 
Let us now see some limits of this computational analogy. If we apply our 
careful  analogical  reasoning,  we  can  ask  “what  is  disanalogous  between  the 
functioning of our universe and that of a computer?”. We can at least make the 
following restrictions. In a computational paradigm, space and time are assumed 
to be independent, and non-relativistic.  Most of the well studied cellular automata 
even  use  only  two  spatial  dimensions,  which  is  of  course  a  limitation  for 
complexity to develop. 
A  fundamental  difference  between  a  physical  and  an  informational-
computational paradigm is that the former has at its core conservation laws such 
as  the  conservation  of  energy,  where  the  total  amount  of  energy  remains 
unchanged in  the  various  transformations  of  the  system.  By contrast,  the  bits 
manipulated by computers are not subjected to such conservation laws. We neither 
create  nor  destroy  energy,  whereas  we  easily  create  and  delete  files  in  our 
computers.  This  difference  can  be  summarized  by  the  adage:  “When  sharing 
energy, we divide it. When sharing information, we multiply it.”  (formula that I 
borrow from Pierre-Alain Cotnoir). 
Another  limit  of  this  computational  paradigm  (which  is  similar  to  a 
Newtonian worldview) is that when we have initial conditions, and a set of rules 
or laws, then the evolution of the system is trivial and predictable: it is just an 
application of rules/laws to the initial conditions. There would not be much more 
to understand, as such a model would capture the whole of reality. 
The complexity of interactions (such as synergies, feed-back loops, chaos, 
random errors, etc.) is not in the focus of this approach.  The biological analogy is 
more  appropriate  in  giving  insights  into  the  complexity  of  interactions. 
Embryologists know that the formation of a fetus is a process of an incredible and 
fascinating  complexity,  leading  from  one  single  cell,  to  the  complexity  of  a 
billions-cells organism. The development of the individual is certainly not as easy 
to  predict  from  the  genome  to  the  phenotype  as  was  the  case  with  the 
computational paradigm: we just needed the initial conditions and a set of rules to 
understand  the  dynamic.  By  contrast,  in  biology,  phenomena  of  phenotypic 
plasticity have been identified, i.e. the acknowledgement that phenotypes are not 
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uniquely  determined  by  their  genotype.  This  becomes  particularly  clear  when 
considering genetically identical twins. They exhibit many identical features, but 
also a unique differentiation, due to more stochastic processes occurring during 
the development.  As Martin Rees (2000, 21) noticed, cosmology deals with the 
inanimate  world,  which  is  in  fact  simpler  than  the  realm  of  biology.  A 
phenomenon is difficult to understand because it is complex, not because it has a 
huge extension. 
4 The biological universe
The idea that our universe is similar to an organism has a long story, which 
is still very inspiring. It can be traced back to the Ancient Greece (see Barrow and 
Tipler 1986 for historical aspects). One general aim of the “Evo Devo Universe” 
research community is to explore how traditional cosmology can be enriched by 
introducing a biological paradigm, as suggested by George Ellis  (2007b, Thesis 
H4).  More  specifically,  the  field  of  evolutionary  developmental  ("evo-devo") 
biology (e.g. Carroll 2005) provides a great source of inspiration, acknowledging 
both the contingency of evolutionary processes and the statistically predictable 
aspect of developmental processes. We will now focus our attention on what is 
analogous in biological systems regarding initial conditions. 
Lee  Smolin's  Cosmological  Natural  Selection  (CNS)  hypothesis  is  an 
example of a biologically-inspired approach to the fine-tuning problem (Smolin 
1992; 1997; 2007). One can introduce his theory with an (other!) analogy.  The 
situation in contemporary cosmology is analogous to the one in biology before the 
theory of evolution, when one of the core questions was “(1) Why are the different  
species as they are?”. It was assumed more or less implicitly that “(2) Species are 
timeless  categories”.  In  present  physics,  the  question  behind  the  fine-tuning 
problem is “(1') Why are the physical constants as they are?”.  Currently, it  is 
usually assumed (probably from the remains of the Newtonian worldview) that 
“(2')  Physical  constants  are  timeless”.  It  is  by  breaking  assumption  (2)  that 
Darwin was able to theorize about the origin of species. Analogously, Smolin is 
trying  to  break  assumption  (2'),  by theorizing  about  the  origin  of  constants.  
According to this natural selection of universes theory, black holes give 
birth to new universes by producing the equivalent of a big-bang, which produces 
a baby universe with slightly different constants. This introduces variation, while 
the differential success in self-reproduction  of universes (via their black holes) 
provides the equivalent of natural selection. This leads to a Darwinian evolution 
of  universes,  whose  constants  are  fine-tuned  for  black  hole  generation,  a 
prediction that can in principle be verified.
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One might be surprised by the speculative aspect of this theory. Although 
Smolin  emphasizes  the  refutability  of  CNS  and  thus  its  scientific  aspect  in 
(Smolin  2007),  he  himself  is  not  proud  that  the  theory  talks  about  processes 
outside the universe (Smolin 1997, 114). This conjectural aspect of the theory puts 
it at the edge of science and philosophy (Vaas 1998). Let us stress once again that 
when we attempt to answer the metaphysical question  “why is the universe the 
way it is?”, we must be ready to cross the border of current experimental and 
observational science. Attempting to answer this issue leads to the construction of 
speculative  theories.  The  nature  of  the  inquiry  then  becomes  philosophical, 
because  we  aim  at  answering  our  most  profound  questions  here  and  now, 
whatever their difficulty and our limited knowledge (Vidal 2007). 
This non-scientific (but not un-scientific) aspect would at first sight be a 
reason to fall into an intellectual relativism, where every theory would have equal 
value,  since  anyway,  there  seems  to  be  no  way  to scientifically  compare 
competing  speculations.  This  is  correct,  but  it  is  still  possible  to  compare 
speculations from a philosophical standpoint.  I proposed a general philosophical 
framework  and  criteria  to  compare  philosophical  speculations  (Vidal  2007; 
2009b). In the following pages, we will intentionally address the problem from 
this  speculative  philosophical  point  of  view,  focusing  our  attention  on  the 
objective  criteria we  have  identified  for  a  good  philosophical  system.  A 
philosophical system is better than an other, when, other things being equal:
(1) It has a better fit with all the natural sciences.
(2) It addresses and adequately resolves a broader range of philosophical 
questions.
(3) It exhibits greater internal and systemic coherence. It thus has fewer 
anomalies.
From this point of view, CNS has some limitations. Firstly, the roles of life 
and  intelligence  are  incidental.  Criterium (2)  is  then  poorly  satisfied  because, 
without  including  life  in  the  cosmic  picture,  this  theory  diminishes  its 
philosophical scope and depth considerably. Indeed, the philosophical endeavour 
is mainly concerned with the relation between humanity and intelligence on the 
one  hand  and  the  universe  on  the  other  hand.  Secondly,  the  theory  does  not 
propose a hereditary mechanism for universe replication  (Gardner 2003, 84). Its 
internal coherence is thus imperfect and could be improved regarding criteria (3). 
As Gentner and Jeziorski proposed in the third principle of analogical reasoning 
(see the second section), one should seek for the greatest possible systematicity in 
the relational network. Is it possible to overcome these two shortcomings? 
A few authors have dared to extend CNS by including intelligent life into 
the picture (Crane 2009; Harrison 1995; Gardner 2000; 2003; Baláz 2005; Smart 
2008; Vidal 2008; Stewart 2009). They put forward the hypothesis that life and 
intelligence could perform this mechanism of heredity, thus playing an essential 
17
EDU 2008 p296
role in the Darwinian evolution of universes. To better  grasp this extension of 
CNS,  Baláz  and  Gardner  proposed  to  consider  von  Neumann's  (1951) four 
components of a self-reproducing automaton. We summarized this completion of 
CNS in table 1. below. 
Let us describe these four components in more detail. Physical constants 
are analogous to DNA in biology, and to the  blueprint  of  this self-reproducing 
automaton.  The universe at  large or the cell  as a whole constitute the  factory. 
When  furnished  with  the  description  of  another  automaton  in  the  form  of  a 
blueprint,  the  factory will  construct  this  automaton.  The  reproducer reads  the 
blueprint  and  produces  a  second blueprint.  In  the  cell,  these  are  reproduction 
mechanisms of the DNA. The controller will cause the reproducer to make a new 
blueprint, and cause the factory to produce the automaton described by the new 
blueprint.  The  controller  separates  the  new construction  from the  factory,  the 
reproducer  and the  controller.  If  this  new construction  is  given  a  blueprint,  it 
finally forms a new independent self-reproducing automaton.
Components Description BIOLOGY(cell)
COSMOLOGY
(universe)
Blueprint Gives instructions for the construction of the automaton
Information contained 
in the DNA Physical constants
Factory Carries out the construction Cell The universe at large
Reproducer Reads the blueprint and produces a second blueprint
The reproduction of 
the DNA
CNS:?
Intelligence unravelling 
the universe's blueprint
Controller Ensures the factory follows the blueprint
The regulatory 
mechanisms of the 
mitosis
CNS:?
A cosmic process, 
aiming at universe 
reproduction
Table 1. Components of a von Neumann’s (1951) self-reproducing automaton. The 
second column  provides a general description of the automaton functions. The third 
and fourth columns propose examples respectively in biology - the cell  - and in 
cosmology - the universe.  
We now clearly see the limits of the CNS model, which is not specifying 
what  the  reproducer  and  controller  are.  Intelligence  unravelling  the  universe's 
blueprint  can  precisely  fulfil  the  reproducer's  function.  This  reproducer 
component is indeed essential for providing a mechanism for heredity. Without 
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heredity,  there  can  be  no  Darwinian  evolution.  The  controller  in  this  context 
would be a more general process, aiming at universe reproduction with the help of 
intelligence. In Table 1, we completed in bold these two missing components of 
CNS,  thus  including  intelligence  in  this  hypothesized  cosmic  reproduction 
process.  
Let  us  now  explore  in  more  depth  the  biological  analogy  of  natural 
selection  and  apply  it  to  cosmological  evolution.  Natural  selection  implies  a 
differential  reproduction  with  a  high  level  of  fidelity,  still  permitting  some 
mutations. Is there a fidelity in reproduction of physical constants in CNS? If the 
fidelity were perfect, there would be no evolution, and thus no dynamic to fine 
tune the constants. If the fidelity were not perfect, it would imply that there are 
slight changes in the constants from one universe to another. Yet the whole point 
of fine-tuning arguments is to show that small changes in physical parameters do 
not  lead  to  a  viable  universe!  It  thus  seems very unlikely that  a  CNS would 
succeed in producing a fine-tuned universe. 
A consequence of this speculative theory is that intelligent life, unravelling 
the universe through scientific understanding, generates a “cosmic blueprint” (a 
term used by Paul Davies  (1989)). The cosmic blueprint can be seen as the set of 
physical  constants;  or  just  initial  conditions  of  a  cosmological  model,  if  our 
previous reasoning holds. One can now throw a new light on the fact that cosmic 
evolution gave rise to scientific activity. In this view, the increasing modelling 
abilities of intelligent beings is not an accident, but an indispensable feature of our 
universe, to produce a new offspring universe. 
I have argued that fine-tuning of this cosmic blueprint would take place in 
“virtual universes”, that is in simulated universes  (Vidal 2008). This scenario is 
likely  if  we  seriously  consider  and  extrapolate  the  exponential  increase  of 
computer  resources.  As  argued  earlier,  simulating  universes  would  also  allow 
virtual experimentation, and thus to compare our own universe with other possible 
ones.  This endeavour would therefore help to progress concretely on the fine-
tuning issue.
One can interpret this approach as a variation on the multiverse proposal. 
However,  the  selection  of  universes  would  take  place  on  simulated  universes, 
replacing  Smolin's  natural  selection  of  real  universes (Barrow 2001,  151).  In 
CNS, we need many generations of universes in order to randomly generate an 
interesting fine-tuned universe. In contrast,  these simulations would dramatically 
improve  the  process  by  artificially  selecting  (via  simulations)  which  universe 
would exhibit the desired features for the next generation universe. This would 
facilitate the daunting task of producing a new universe. In this case it would be 
appropriate to speak about a “Cosmological Artificial Selection” (CAS), instead of 
a “Cosmological Natural Selection”. 
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One question which naturally arises when considering this CAS, is “why 
would intelligent life want to produce a new offspring universe?”. This is an issue 
which  would  deserve  much  more  development,  but  we  briefly  propose  the 
following answer (see also  (Harrison 1995; Vidal 2008)). The core problem an 
intelligent  civilization  has  to  deal  with in  the  very far  future  is  the  inevitable 
thermodynamical  decay  of  stars,  solar  systems,  galaxies  and  finally  of  the 
universe itself. This scenario is commonly known as the heat death (e.g. Adams 
and  Laughlin  1997;  Ćirković  2003  for  a  review).  Surprisingly  there  is  little 
interest in this fundamental and inevitable ageing of the universe. In the realm of 
biology, the solution to the problem of aging is reproduction. Could it be that an 
analogous solution would take place at the scale of the universe? Pursuing this 
cosmic replication process would in principle enable the avoidance of heat death 
in a particular universe  (Vidal 2008). Cosmic evolution would then continue its 
course indefinitely. 
This  approach  may  sound  like  science-fiction.  It  is  however  no  more 
extravagant  than  the  competing  explanations,  which  are  the  belief  in  a 
supernatural  God, or the ontological statement  that  there actually exist  a  huge 
number or an infinity of other universes. To summarize, the perspective of a CAS:
1. Proposes a response to the heat death problem.
2. Enables  us  to  scientifically  progress  on  the  fine-tuning  problem,  via 
universe simulations. This remains acceptable even if one does not wish to 
endorse the complete speculative framework proposed, i.e. with intelligent 
life involved in universe reproduction.
3. Offers intelligent life a fundamental role in cosmic evolution.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis  of  physical  parameters  led  us  to  the conclusion that  fine-
tuning of physical constants would progressively be reduced to the fine-tuning of 
initial conditions in a cosmological model. However, it is unlikely that a physical 
theory would derive  all cosmological initial conditions. Multiverse and universe 
simulations are two similar options to go beyond this limitation, because they both 
propose ways to vary those initial conditions. 
The computational analogy suggests a description of the universe in terms 
of information and computation. Simulations have already started to be used to 
tackle the fine-tuning problem, allowing us to vary  several physical parameters, 
and exploring the resulting possible universes. 
We outlined a philosophical extension of Smolin's “Cosmological Natural 
Selection” theory, inspired by a biological analogy. It led us to the hypothesis that 
intelligent life is currently unravelling a cosmic blueprint, which could be used in 
the far future to produce a new offspring universe. Simulating an entire universe 
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would be an efficient way to fine tune this cosmic blueprint. Furthermore, this 
offspring universe would perpetuate cosmic evolution beyond the predictable heat 
death of our universe. 
Physical, computational and biological descriptions are different ways to 
model  the  universe.  Providing  that  we make clear  and  explicit  our  analogical 
reasoning, keeping this diversity of possible modelling approaches is certainly a 
way to constantly enrich and cross-fertilize our models. Importantly, we have to 
acknowledge  the  limits  of  scientific  enquiry  when  tackling  the  fine-tuning 
problem.  A philosophical  approach  allows  us  to  keep  a  rational  and  critical 
attitude. 
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Abstract: The cosmological theory of the author, discussed elsewhere in this journal,
has a number of implications for the interpretation of initial conditions and the fine-
tuning problem as discussed by Vidal.
In his introduction, Vidal (2009) notices that many authors (see his references) have
emphasized the importance of fine-tuning of the constants of physics and the initial
conditions of the universe for the emergence of life. The concept of initial conditions
is a typical classical idea as in classical physics the future “depends” uniquely on an
earlier state, and therefore one can ask the question whether this initial state is fine-
tuned. However, since nature is quantum-mechanical (QM), it is more relevant to
consider the concept “initial state” in the QM context.
In QM the specification of the state is done via the state vector, which can be defined
as a string of creation operators operating on the vacuum state. These operators
specify the momentum and further quantum characteristics (e.g. spin) of each
individual elementary particle. Transitions are then expressed by Feynman diagrams,
which are expressible in the parameters of the standard model. Hence, the current
state of the universe is a result of a string of such quantum transitions (such as the
creation, annihilation or scattering of particles). However, in each transition many
future states are allowed (generally an infinity of them), so our current reality is a
consequence of these random quantum choices. If one uses the language of wave
function collapse (Bell 1986), one can state that each choice is associated with a
collapse of the wave function. The issues around wave function collapse are also
referred to as the measurement problem. Hence, the current state vector neither allows
us to specify our future, nor our past, in contrast to classical physics. The initial state
thus plays a more special role than in classical physics (where it is equivalent in
information content to the state specification at any other time). However, since there
is no continuous and deterministic relationship between the initial state and the
current state, it is also difficult to argue that the existence of life is due to the fine-
tuning of the initial state. Apart from this, we think this question is largely academic.
There are strong indications (Penrose 2008) that the initial universe had zero entropy.
Hence, the initial state vector does not require any specific information and is thus not
fine-tuned  (unless one wants to call its trivial zero entropy status fine-tuned).
As Penrose states (Penrose 2008, p.162): the spatial isotropy and homogeneity of the
initial universe is an indication that the gravitational degrees of freedom were not
excited at the beginning of the universe. Technically this leads to the condition that
the Weyl tensor equals zero and that the entropy is zero or minimal at the beginning.
These are exactly the properties displayed by the cosmological model by the author
(Greben 2009). In this theory, the initial state is a singular state, which only consists
of classical vacuum energy, whose effective density becomes infinite in the big bang
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limit. No physical particles are present, so no particle states have to be specified and
the information content of the big bang state is zero. The first physical particles are
created in the particle epoch, which is characterized by the time 5x10-24 seconds (see
Eq. 58, Greben 2009). At that time entropy increases and the random quantum choices
specify where and when particles are created. Hence, the initial conditions do not play
a role in ensuring a universe where life can exist. However, the subsequent string of
transitions specify the universe and therefore determine amongst others the nature of
the universe and its contents. Vidal does not comment on the role of the collapse of
the wave function. However, I think this is the quantum replacement of the initial
conditions in classical physics, as a given history (controlled by random events) leads
to a specific state, which functions as the initial state at that time.
We now make some comments on the fine-tuning of parameters. With time the
number of free parameters in physics has reduced. However, the number of free
parameters in the standard model (usually quoted as 21) suggests that this is still an
effective theory, resulting from a more fundamental theory with fewer parameters.
Often the fine-tuning discussions refer to the values of the nuclear masses (Davies
1982). However, these masses follow in principle from the standard model. Hence,
any such fine-tuning must be referred back to more fundamental parameters of the
standard model. Similarly, any fine-tuning of the parameters of the standard model
must be explained in terms of the parameters of a more fundamental model (if it
exists). Hence, the question is: what is the minimal number of free parameters that
characterize nature? The fewer the number of independent parameters, the more
doubtful it becomes to talk about fine-tuning. In our paper (Greben 2009) we indicate
how the particle physics scale is related to the fundamental cosmological parameters
G  and e , the latter being the vacuum energy density. The relevant mass scale is
given by ( ) 125/ 6/1 »Ge  MeV. This suggests that particle mass parameters in the
standard model can be expressed in terms of cosmological parameters (notice that e
is related to the Hubble constant via GH pe 8/3 20= ). Assuming one can demonstrate
this for both quark and lepton masses, the fine-tuning problem is enormously reduced.
This would undermine the fine-tuning ansatz for dimensionfull constants. Another
coincidence - the closeness of the density of the universe to the critical density - is
explained naturally in the author’s model (Greben 2009).  This removes another fine-
tuning problem. Hence, the author feels that it may well be premature to take recourse
to the anthropic principle and to multiverse models to explain apparent fine-tuning
properties, as it still an open question whether fine-tuning exists.
In conclusion, we disagree with Vidal that fine-tuning of physical constants would
progressively be reduced to the fine-tuning of initial conditions, and rather would
dismiss the importance of fine-tuning for initial conditions. We suspect that the
apparent fine-tuning of parameters will be resolved by a deeper understanding of the
laws of nature.
Penrose, R. 2008. “Causality, quantum theory and cosmology”, in “On space and
time”, Ed. S. Majid, Cambridge University Press
Bell, J.S. 2004. “Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics”, Cambridge
University
Davies, P.C.W. 1982. “The Accidental Universe”, Cambridge University Press
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Abstract: According to the scenario of cosmological artificial selection (CAS) and artificial
cosmogenesis, our universe was created and possibly even fine-tuned by cosmic engineers in
another universe. This approach shall be compared to other explanations, and some far-reaching
problems of it shall be discussed.
Why are the laws and constants of nature as well as the boundary conditions as they are? And
why do they appear to be special – even fine-tuned for life? If they would be only slightly different,
complex information-processing structures – and, hence, intelligent observers – probably could not
have developed (e.g. Leslie 1989, Vaas 2004a, Carr 2007, Tegmark 2010). According to the
scenario of cosmological artificial selection (CAS) and artificial cosmogenesis (Vidal 2008 & 2010)
the fine-tuning of our universe is the result of an – at least partly – intentional action: a creation of
our universe as (or via) an extensive computer simulation or as a physical experiment by cosmic
engineers in another universe. This is a bold speculation, but it is not unscientific in principle. So
what are the arguments? Are there better alternatives? And what problems have CAS proponents
to solve?
There are many options for explaining the fine-tunings (Vaas 2004a & 2009). They might (1) just
be an illusion if life could adapt at very different conditions or if modifications of many values of the
constants would compensate each other; or (2) they might be a result of (incomprehensible,
irreducible) chance, thus inexplicable; or (3) they might be nonexistent because nature could not
have been otherwise, and with a fundamental theory we will be able to prove this; or (4) they might
be a product of selection: either observational selection within a vast multiverse of (infinitely?)
many different realizations of those values (weak anthropic principle), or a kind of cosmological
natural selection making the measured values quite likely within a multiverse of many different
values, or even an teleological or intentional selection. CAS is one example of the latter – but there
are other alternatives, for instance some versions of the strong anthropic principle (i.e. an
impersonal teleological force or a transcendent designer) including deistic or theistic creation. Even
worse, those alternatives are not mutually exclusive – for example it is logically possible that there
is a multiverse, created according to a fundamental theory by a cosmic designer who is not self-
sustaining, but ultimately contingent, i.e. an instance of chance.
A fundamental theory has its explanatory limits and cannot ultimately get rid of some fine-tunings if
it has empirical content at all, and transcendent causation is beyond physics and runs into deep
philosophical problems (Vaas 2004a & 2006a). Thus a multiverse scenario is most promising
(Vaas 2004a & 2004b & 2010a). Here, CAS (which does not exclude a fundamental theory)
competes with two much simpler kinds of multiverse scenarios: (1) those with an equal or random
distribution of laws, boundary conditions and/or values of constants, and (2) those with a
probability distribution of some kind.
Within the first scenario, the fine-tunings can be understood by observational selection: We are
able to live only in a specific universe whose physical properties are consistent with our existence
– a prerequisite for it –, and therefore we should not be surprised that we observe them. But this is,
strictly speaking, not a physical explanation (Vaas 2004a), and it might not even be testable, i.e.
predictive (Smolin 2010). So one might claim that CAS is superior.
Within the second scenario, the fine-tunings are the result of cosmological natural selection
(Smolin 1992, 1997 & 2010). This could be seen as both the nearest relative of and the strongest
alternative to CAS. It seems to be testable, but CAS proponents might still argue that it does not
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explain enough. Furthermore, it has many problems of its own (e.g. Vaas 1998 & 2003). But this is
also the case for CAS (Vaas 2009):
First and foremost, there is the problem of realizing CAS: It is completely unclear whether
universes can not only be simulated to some extent but also physically instantiated. A few scientific
proposals are already on stage (see Ansoldi & Guendelman 2006 for a review), but still in their
infancy.
Second, one must distinguish between intentional creation and simulation (even if it would be
empirically impossible to decide between them from "within"). A simulated universe does not have
all the properties of a physically real universe – as a simulated river might obey hydrodynamical
equations but doesn't make anything wet. Admittedly, deep epistemological problems are lurking
here. And perhaps it will be possible to make the simulation so real that the missing properties are
simply irrelevant; or to make it at least so useful that, for instance, conscious life within it is
possible and the creators could "upload" their minds, knowledge and experiences. But the
hardware problem remains: How can something simulate something else which is comparably
complex? And if the programmer's universe is doomed, their universal computer and, hence,
computed simulation sooner or later should be doomed too.
On the other hand CAS might be praised for stressing that in principle design is – although not
mandatory of course – at least possible within a cosmological and naturalistic framework. In
contrast to theistic postulates of transcendent, nonphysical entities and causation, a CAS scenario
is fully reconcilable with ontological naturalism. Cosmic engineers are not something "above" or
"beyond" nature (i.e. the multiverse), but a part and, indeed, a product of it. However, this implies a
further problem:
If there are cosmic engineers at work, perhaps some of them having fine-tuned our universe, how
did they emerge in the first place? In other words: What or who created the creator(s)?
To avoid an infinite explanatory regress, it seems most probable that they arose naturally in a life-
friendly universe themselves. Then at least the creator's home universe should have formed
without any intentional fine-tuning. Thus, either its origin was pure chance or the outcome of
cosmological natural selection or the result of a multiverse "generator" according to some
fundamental laws etc. Therefore the CAS scenario just shifts the fine-tuning problem to the
problem of explaining an earlier fine-tuned universe where the cosmic engineers evolved. This is a
major objection against CAS.
Furthermore one might wonder whether CAS has any convincing explanatory force at all. Because
ultimately CAS tries to explain something complex (our universe) with something even more
complex (cosmic engineers and engineering). But the usual explanatory scheme is just the
converse: The explanans should be simpler than the explanandum. Furthermore, CAS adds
something qualitatively new: While multiverse and fundamental law scenarios postulate some new
nomological regularities, CAS postulates an intentional cause in addition. CAS is therefore a
mixture of explanations: physical and intentional. Intentions are not, as such, nonphysical, and
actions can be conceptualized as specific causes (Davidson 2001), so there is no reason to
abandon naturalism here; but intentional explanations are nevertheless not epistemologically
reducible to physical explanations. Without further knowledge however it is impossible to tell
anything about the intentions of the creator(s), and an intentional explanation without explaining
the intention might be considered as a shortcoming. But speculations are possible, e.g. scientific
curiosity, a truly universal entertainment, or building a rescue universe if the engineer's one is
dying (Vaas 2006b & 2010b).
These arguments are not a knock-out objection. And if it would be possible for us to carry out
artificial cosmogenesis by ourselves, a strong case for CAS can be made even within its
explanatory restrictions. If so, it seems quite unlikely, however, that our universe is the very first
one to accomplish artificial cosmogenesis. This would violate the Copernican principle because our
location in spacetime, in this case the multiverse, would be very special. So contrary to the
problems sketched above, our universe might indeed be a result of cosmological artificial selection
– one link within the probably future-eternal chain. Then the spark of life may endure endlessly.
And even if we or our successors would not be able to pass it on, being a tiny dead end within a
flourishing realm of evolution, we will at least have envisioned it.
EDU 2008 p308
References
Ansoldi, S., Guendelman, E.I. (2006): Child Universes in the Laboratory; arXiv:gr-qc/0611034
Carr, B. (2007): The Anthropic Principle Revisited. In: Carr, B. (ed.) (2007): The Universe or
Multiverse? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 77–89.
Davidson, D. (2001): Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Leslie, J. (1989): Universes. Routledge, London 1996.
Smolin, L. (1992): Did the universe evolve? Class. Quant. Grav. 9, 173–191.
Smolin, L. (1997): The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Smolin, L. (2010): Cosmological Natural Selection: Status and Implications. In: Vaas, R. (ed.)
(2010): Beyond the Big Bang. Springer, Heidelberg.
Tegmark, M. (2010): The Mathematical Universe: Eternal Laws and the Illusion of Time. In: Vaas,
R. (ed.) (2010): Beyond the Big Bang. Springer, Heidelberg.
Vaas, R. (1998): Is there a Darwinian Evolution of the Cosmos? – Some Comments on Lee
Smolin's Theory of the Origin of Universes by Means of Natural Selection. Proceedings of the
MicroCosmos – MacroCosmos Conference, Aachen; arXiv:gr-qc/0205119
Vaas, R. (2003): Problems of Cosmological Darwinian Selection and the Origin of Habitable
Universes. In: Shaver, P.A., DiLella, L., Giménez, A. (eds.): Astronomy, Cosmology and
Fundamental Physics. Springer, Berlin, pp. 485–486.
Vaas, R. (2004a): Ein Universum nach Maß? Kritische Überlegungen zum Anthropischen Prinzip in
der Kosmologie, Naturphilosophie und Theologie. In: Hübner, J., Stamatescu, I.-O., Weber, D.
(eds.) (2004): Theologie und Kosmologie. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 375–498.
Vaas, R. (2004b): Time before Time. Classifications of universes in contemporary cosmology, and
how to avoid the antinomy of the beginning and eternity of the world. arXiv:physics/0408111
Vaas, R. (2006a): Das Münchhausen-Trilemma in der Erkenntnistheorie, Kosmologie und
Metaphysik. In: Hilgendorf, E. (ed.) (2006): Wissenschaft, Religion und Recht. Logos, Berlin,
pp. 441–474.
Vaas, R. (2006b): Dark Energy and Life's Ultimate Future. In: Burdyuzha, V. (ed.) (2006): The
Future of Life and the Future of our Civilization. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 231–247.
arXiv:physics/0703183
Vaas, R. (2009): Life, the Universe, and almost Everything: Signs of Cosmic Design?
arXiv:0910.5579
Vaas, R. (ed.) (2010a): Beyond the Big Bang. Springer, Heidelberg
Vaas, R. (2010b): Eternal Existence. In: Vaas, R. (ed.) (2010): Beyond the Big Bang. Springer,
Heidelberg.
Vidal, C. (2008): The Future of Scientific Simulations: from Artificial Life to Artificial Cosmogenesis.
In: Tandy, C. (2008): Death And Anti-Death. Ria University Press, Palo Alto, pp. 285–318;
arXiv:0803.1087
Vidal, C. (2010): Computational and Biological Analogies for Understanding Fine-Tuned
Parameters in Physics. Foundations of Science (this issue)
EDU 2008 p309
Fine-tuning, Quantum Mechanics 
and Cosmological Artificial Selection
Clément Vidal 
Department of Philosophy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Center Leo Apostel, and  
Evolution, Complexity and Cognition, Brussels, Belgium. 
clement.vidal@philosophons.com http://clement.vidal.philosophons.com
 
Abstract: First, Greben criticized the idea of fine-tuning by taking seriously 
the idea that “nature is quantum mechanical”. I argue that this quantum view is 
limited,  and that  fine-tuning  is  real,  in  the  sense  that  our  current  physical 
models require fine-tuning. Second, I examine and clarify many difficult and 
fundamental  issues  raised  by  Vaas'  comments  on  Cosmological  Artificial 
Selection. 
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1 Reply to Greben 
Greben disagrees with my proposal that fine-tuning of physical constants 
would progressively be reduced to initial conditions. He would rather “dismiss 
the  importance  of  fine-tuning  for  initial  conditions”  and  “suspect  that  the 
apparent fine-tuning of parameters will be resolved by a deeper understanding 
of the laws of nature”. Greben's position on the fine-tuning problem is perhaps 
the most  commonly held position among physicists.  It is thus important  to 
discuss this perspective.
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1.1 Initial conditions and quantum mechanics
The idea of “initial conditions” comes from a classical and deterministic 
(Newtonian, Laplacian) view of physics. I underline this point in my paper as 
a limitation of a purely physical approach, to motivate the exploration of a 
more biologically inspired analysis. Emphasizing the importance of quantum 
mechanics (QM), Greben takes another road, and analyses initial conditions 
from a quantum perspective. 
We should note that  the use of QM for understanding the origin of the 
universe is arguably one of the most difficult subject in theoretical physics. 
Yet we have to admit that introducing ideas from QM is necessary. This is due 
to the fact that physics in the big bang era involves very high energies (and 
very small scales), which are best described by QM.  Given the difficulties of 
the  unresolved issues  involved,  I  hope that  this  discussion will  not  be  too 
confusing for the reader.
I  suspect  Greben  and  I  hold  very  different  epistemological  positions 
regarding physical theories. It might seem like a point of detail, but it is not. 
The  expression  “nature  is  quantum-mechanical”  sounds  like  a  strong 
ontological  statement  to  me.  I  would  rather  say  something  like:  “at  the 
smallest  known  scales,  QM  provide  the  most  accurate  models”.  This 
divergence will be reflected implicitly in my reply below. 
How important  is  QM really?  QM is  not  all  of  physics,  and has  a 
limited domain of application.  For example,  although the evolution of stars 
involves  many  quantum  phenomena,  it  is  predictable  with  astrophysical 
models (e.g. with the Hertzsprung-Russell diagram). So, it is not because at 
the smallest scales we use QM, that QM can explain the rest of physics. On 
larger scales (i.e. non quantum), we have other models, offering predictions 
and explanations. Connecting the different scales in nature (from quantum to 
cosmological)  is  a  major  challenge  in  physics,  on  which  Scale  Relativity 
(Nottale 2009) already made impressive progress. 
Today, by combining different insights in different branches of physics, we 
can reconstruct the story of the universe, despite all the uncertainty involved in 
quantum processes. So, it is certainly possible to connect the initial state with 
our  current  state,  even  if  there  is  randomness  in  quantum  processes. 
Ehrenfest's theorem shows for example how average quantum values evolve 
deterministically.  The  key  is  not  to  focus  only  on  one  physical  scale  and 
approach. 
I  found Greben's  idea  that  initial  conditions  are  incrementally  specified 
from a zero entropy state quite fascinating. I do not know whether it is correct 
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or  not.  I  simply  hope  that  we  will  soon  be  able  to  test  this  theory  with 
(potentially refutable) observations. 
However,  we  can  note  that  Greben's  interpretation  of  QM  in  terms  of 
Feynman diagrams is limited.  Indeed,  Feynman's  diagrams are efficient  for 
scattering theory,  but when bound states are involved, this is no longer the 
case.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  Schrödinger's  equation,  describing  the 
evolution of the wave function through time, is deterministic. 
Greben also wonders why I did not speak about the collapse of the wave 
function  at  the  level  of  the  universe.  This  idea  implies  that  we  use  the 
measuring formalism of QM... at the level of the universe. Yet, this is deeply 
problematic. Who measures the universe?  To make a measurement, we need 
an observer, so it is very difficult  to make sense of this suggestion. Which 
observer could have existed at the big bang era?
To sum up, I would like to emphasize that Greben's conclusion that “it is 
difficult to argue that the existence of life is due to the fine-tuning of the initial 
state” only holds if we restrict our analysis to this QM approach ("nature is 
quantum-mechanical"),  and  that  we  endorse  the  interpretation  of  QM  he 
presents. 
1.2 Entropy of the universe 
Did the initial universe have zero entropy? Greben says it is the case. He 
quotes a paper by Penrose to support this claim. However, I would like to put 
Penrose's  reasoning in context.  In his  article,  Penrose actually describes an 
important  paradox in cosmology.  If we draw the spectrum of the observed 
microwave background radiation (MBR), it turns out to be very close to the 
Planck  spectrum.  This  Planck  spectrum  is  a  typical  example  of  thermal 
equilibrium,  i.e.  a  state  with  maximum  entropy.  However,  following  the 
second law of thermodynamics, if entropy can only increase, going back to the 
initial  state of our universe,  it  should be at  a  minimum entropy.  Hence the 
paradox, was the initial entropy of the universe maximum or minimum? 
The  answer,  writes  Penrose,  is  that  the  MBR is  to  be  interpreted  as  a 
thermal equilibrium between radiation and matter. We can also note that the 
MBR is not primordial from the point of view of the origin of the universe, 
since the universe is  already about  400 000 years  old at  that  time.  So,  its 
maximal entropy could be interpreted as a final state. Anyway, since we do 
not have a theory of quantum gravity, the entropy related to the gravitational 
field remains an open question. 
3
EDU 2008 p312
1.3 Fine-tuning
The  reader  might  wonder  why  I  speak  about  31  free  parameters, 
whereas Greben writes there are only 21. In fact, this divergence is not that 
important,  since it  is merely a matter  of convention,  or, more precisely,  of 
“compromise balancing simplicity of expressing the fundamental laws [...] and 
ease of measurement.” (Tegmark et al. 2006)
I agree with Greben about the attitude and the scientific fruitfulness of 
always searching for better theories, further explaining fine-tuning. I agree that 
as a general trend, the number of free parameters has reduced. I also agree that 
if particle mass parameters in the standard model can be expressed with the 
help of cosmological parameters, this is an indication that we progress with 
our physical models. 
However, Greben concludes that it is still an “open question whether 
fine-tuning exists”. I disagree with this statement.  Fine-tuning does exist as a 
characteristic  of  our  current  physical  and  cosmological  models.  There  are 
these  free  parameters  that  today remain  unexplained  theoretically.  We can 
give them any value, and they remain compatible with the theory. To choose 
the right values, we make experiments or observations and fill them in in the 
model.  Finding other ways to deduce those values is still a major problem in 
modern physics (Smolin 2006, 13). Furthermore, many of these parameters are 
sensitive  to  slight  changes,  which  have  important  consequences  for  the 
evolution of the universe. It is in that sense that we can say that they are fine-
tuned. The open question is not whether there is fine-tuning, but whether we 
will  be  able  in  the  future  to  explain  all  these  parameters  from  a  more 
fundamental  theory.  A  way  to  avoid  such  confusion  is  to  reformulate 
statements like “the universe is fine-tuned” to “our current physical  models 
require fine-tuning”. 
1.4 Conclusion on Greben's Comment.
I agree with Greben that fine-tuning should not be seen as an unexplainable 
“miracle”. It is indeed fundamental to leave space for scientific progress on 
this issue, continuing to reduce the number of free parameters. I conjecture 
that this progress will stop at the level of initial conditions of a cosmological 
model.  Greben  conjectures  that  fine-tuning  will  be  resolved  by  a  deeper 
understanding of the "laws of nature". It is interesting to note that in this later 
case,  the  problem  would  not  be  numerical,  but  of  structural  symmetries 
concerning physical laws (Greben, private communication). 
Whatever the most advanced resulting theories on fine-tuning will be (at 
the level of laws, universal structures, initial  or boundary conditions),  what 
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could an intelligent civilization do with such knowledge? This invites us to 
ponder about the more speculative part of my paper, Cosmological Artificial 
Selection  (section  4),  about  which  Rüdiger  Vaas  points  out  the  most 
challenging issues. 
2 Reply to Vaas
Responses to fine-tuning like chance, God, multiverse, a fundamental 
theory,  Cosmological  Natural  Selection  (CNS),  Cosmological  Artificial 
Selection (CAS) or a combination of them might well be correct. However, 
when dealing with such a difficult topic, we have to acknowledge the limit of 
the enterprise. For example, there are observational limits regarding the early 
universe, i.e. data we will never get. Neither science nor philosophy will bring 
us  certain  answers  and  this  is  an  invitation  to  humility,  honesty,  and 
carefulness when approaching those ultimate questions in cosmology (see also 
Ellis 2007, 1259; Vaas 2003, section 7)
Speculating on those issues can easily lead very far. For this reason, we 
need to have clear ideas on  how and  why we speculate.  I  distinguish three 
kinds of speculations to navigate into their variety (Vidal 2009a):
1. Scientific: a speculation is scientific if we have strong reasons to think 
that  we  will  be  able  in  the  future  to  have  observations  or 
experimentations corroborating or refuting it.
2. Philosophical:  a  speculation  is  philosophical  if  it  extrapolates  from 
scientific  knowledge  and  philosophical  principles  to  answer  some 
fundamental philosophical questions.
3. Fictional: a speculation is fictional if it extends beyond scientific and 
philosophic speculations.
In my papers (2008; 2009b) I have presented CAS as happening in the 
future. In the end, considering these metaphysical uncertainties, I think it is 
more fruitful to try to contribute to shape the future than to understand the 
past. However, the full CAS scenario also concerns the origin of the universe 
and the meaning of intelligent life in it. What is more, this full scenario also 
presents epistemological, logical, and metaphysical difficulties that I did not 
address in my previous papers. I would like to thank Vaas for bringing these 
question to the front, because they indeed deserve attention.
I will show that the difficulties raised by Vaas can largely be weakened 
and put into perspective. I strat by inviting to carefullness when using terms 
such as "creation" and "design". Then I invoke a principle of rational economy 
to tackle fine-tuning and propose to explicit the scope of the inquiry regarding 
cosmological issues. I discuss if universes can be simulated and instantiated. 
Importantly, I distinguish fine-tuning from other related metaphysical issues. 
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Finally, I propose a possible metaphysical framework to approach the question 
"how did the cosmic engineers emerge in the first place?".
Obviously,  given  the  number  and depth  of  the  issues  raised,  I  will 
straightforwardly  focus  on  urgent  remedial,  and  develop  in  details  the  full 
picture and arguments in later works. I hope this response will help to clarify 
the scope and even beauty implied by CAS. 
2.1 Vocabulary confinement
First, I would like to forcefully stress that the whole CAS scenario is 
naturalistic,  and,  as  Vaas  notices,  is  fully  compatible  with  ontological 
naturalism.  This  is  why I  would  rather  be  careful  with  the  term “create”, 
because it generally supposes to get something out of nothing, whereas here it 
is question of a “creation out of something”...
Since Vaas  (2010) speaks about “design” when discussing CAS, it is 
important  to  notice  that  scientists  loath  the  term  “design”  in  explanatory 
contexts. Why? Because it freezes scientific explanation. If we are confronted 
to  something  to  explain,  the  “design”  answer,  like  the  god  of  the  gaps 
explanation, will at the same time always work, and explain everything (nay, 
rather nothing). In fact,  the intentional explanatory mechanisms involved in 
CAS do not interfere at all with normal scientific explanation. On the contrary, 
maybe surprisingly, CAS as a whole can be seen as an invitation to a fantastic 
scientific and technological challenge. 
2.2 Rational economy and scope of the inquiry
Vaas  describes  four  major  responses  to  fine-tuning.  From a  logical 
point of view, he also correctly points out that they are not mutually exclusive. 
However, each of them was developed to be an independent  and sufficient 
response.  Since  all  of  them  are  speculative,  what  benefit  do  we  gain  by 
combining  them?  Taking  seriously  those  combinations  as  explanations 
resembles more fictional speculation than anything else. One might argue that 
such an attempt would please at  the same time proponents of the different 
options, but even this is not certain. A principle of rational economy should be 
at play here, e.g. : 
Never employ extraordinary means to achieve purposes you can realize by ordinary 
ones  (Rescher 2006, 8)
Is CAS simpler or more complicated than other multiverse scenario? 
Vaas writes that CAS “competes with two much simpler kinds of multiverse 
scenarios”.  First,  I  agree  with  Vaas  that  scenario  (1),  an  observational 
selection effect, is not a physical explanation, and therefore that CAS does not 
compete with it.  Concerning scenario (2), I  disagree that CNS is “simpler” 
than CAS. Since this  claim might  seem surprising,  we first  must  make an 
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important epistemological remark about the concept of simplicity.  It is well 
known that simplicity is very hard to define, and specialists consider it to be 
subjective  (Heylighen  1997),  or  largely  context  dependant  (Kuhn  1977; 
McMullin 2008). So we need to make explicit  the cosmological  context  at 
play here, or the scope of the inquiry, as Ellis (2007, 1245) already suggested. 
The scope we discuss here concerns four fundamental problems:
(1) Why do the laws of physics, constants and boundary conditions 
have the form they do? 
As we saw in details in the main article, this question mainly 
concerns the fine-tuning problem. 
(2) Why not nothing? 
This is certainly one of the deepest metaphysical question. The 
formulation  here  is  a  shorter  version  proposed  by  Apostel 
(1999) of  Leibniz'  “why  is  there  something  rather  than 
nothing?”. 
(3) What is the meaning of the existence of intelligent life in the  
universe? 
This  question  asks  about  the  meaning of  intelligence  in  the 
universe.  Are  life  and  intelligence  merely  epiphenomena  in 
cosmic evolution? As Davies  (1999, 246)  formulates it, why 
did  the  laws  of  the  universe  engineere  their  own 
comprehension? 
(4) How can intelligent life survive indefinitely?
The future of the universe is gloomy. Physical eschatology (see 
Ćirković 2003 for a review) teaches us that none of the known 
scenario  seem  to  allow  indefinite  continuation  of  life  and 
information processing in the very long term (Vaas 2006). 
These four questions are more philosophical than scientific.  Another 
way to put it is to see CNS as a  scientific speculation, tackling question (1), 
whereas CAS is a  philosophical speculation, tackling questions (1), (3) and 
(4). Question (2) has a special status, because it is metaphysical. Looking at 
question (1) alone, CAS is indeed not a simple explanation at all, and CNS is 
much  better.  However,  CAS is  ultimately  busy  with  those  three  (or  four) 
questions  together.  I  insisted  strenuously in  my papers  (2008;  2009b) that 
CAS shall  foremost  be seen a  speculative  philosophical scenario,  precisely 
because of its  more ambitious  and comprehensive scope than CNS. In one 
sentence, CAS is a speculative philosophical scenario to understand the origin  
and future of the universe, including a role for intelligence. 
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As Vaas notices, since CAS is a close relative of CNS, it might also 
have scientific aspects, but they are rather peripheral and I will not discuss or 
insist on them here. With these preliminary considerations, we can now dive 
into the problems of CAS.
2.3 Can universes be simulated and instantiated? 
Vaas asks whether CAS can be realized. The two underlying questions are:
(a) Can a universe be simulated?
(b) Can a universe be instantiated?
Those two questions are major challenges, and efforts to answer them are still 
in their infancy. The coming discipline of Artificial Cosmogenesis (ACosm) is 
meant  to  tackle  those  challenges  explicitly.  As  in  Artificial  Life  (ALife), 
ACosm can be divided in two efforts, soft ACosm and hard ACosm. 
Soft ACosm consists in making computer simulations of other possible 
universes and is therefore busy with question (a). Performing simulations for 
this purpose does not require to simulate every detail. A simplified simulation 
to  understand  the  general  principles  of  cosmogenesis  would  in  principle 
suffice. It is useful here to remember the metaphor of artificial  selection in 
biology, where the ones performing it do not need to understand the whole 
process.  It  is  enough  that  they  know  how  to  foster  traits  over  others. 
Cosmologists  have  already  started  to  simulate  and  model  other  possible 
universes  (this is implicit in multiverse models. See also e.g. Stenger 2000; 
Aguirre 2001). 
Hard  ACosm  consists  in  producing  universes  in  the  real  world 
(question  (b)).  As  Vaas  mentions,  there  are  already  early  attempts  in  this 
direction.  This is a challenge which is probably orders of magnitudes more 
difficult than soft ACosm, but not impossible. Black holes are good candidate 
for this realization. First, from a physical point of view, they exhibit enormous 
densities (similar to the big bang singularity), which are susceptible to modify 
the structure of space-time and give birth to baby universes. Second, from a 
computational point of view, Lloyd (2000) argued that the ultimate computing 
device would be a black hole. 
So one might speculate  that,  in the very far future,  the hypothetical  use of 
black  hole  computers  will  meet  with  universe  production.  For  other  hints 
towards this realization, see also (Gardner 2003, 167-173; Vidal 2008; Smart 
2008). 
2.4 Are we in a simulation? 
I totally agree with Vaas' critique of the idea that we are in a computer 
simulation. The problem “how can something simulate something else which 
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is comparably complex?” is indeed highly problematic. This is why in Soft 
ACosm we do not have to simulate every detail. As Vaas acknowledges, to 
run computer simulations, we need some hardware, and to make it continue 
indefinitely in our universe seems very difficult, if not impossible. In the end, I 
consider the question of whether we are in a simulation or not, as a fictional 
speculation which therefore does not deserve that much attention. 
2.5 Fine-tuning and related metaphysical issues
“Who  created  the  creators?”  is  typically  a  metaphysical  problem. 
Whatever reply X will be to this question, we can always ask: “where does X 
which created the creator come from?”. In the last analysis, whatever reply we 
provide,  at  least  the  metaphysical  question  (2),  “why  not  nothing?”  will 
remain. These questions are metaphysical and should not be confused with the  
fine-tuning problem (Harrison 1998). The fine-tuning problem is concerned 
with question (1) above, and “who created the creator?” is of a metaphysical 
nature, like question (2). 
If we take into account this distinction, then it follows that no response 
to  fine-tuning  escapes  metaphysical  issues.  Indeed,  if  we  could  prove  that  
there is indeed a fundamental theory, we could still wonder why it is here, and 
why it gave rise to our universe, rather than having just nothing. If we could 
prove that  there is  indeed a God,  we run into the same problem of “who 
created the creator?”.  If we could prove that there is indeed a multiverse,  we 
must answer: how did the multiverse start in the first place? Where do the 
generative mechanism, like the space of possible universes and the variation of 
this space from one universe to another come from? 
In conclusion, to properly respond to “who created the creator?” in the 
framework of CAS, as with other options, we need to develop a metaphysics 
(see the last section). 
2.6 Who created the creators? 
In the complete CAS scenario, we need to assume an intentional cause, 
which  is  not  present  in  other  naturalistic  scenarios.  However,  it  is  still 
logically possible to assume that CAS will happen in the future, but did not 
happen in the past. In that case, there would be no intentional cause involved 
to explain the origin of the universe. If we consider CAS as only valid in the  
future,  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  hold  the  following  logically  consistent 
positions: 
(a) God as the first cosmic engineer and CAS
(b) Fundamental theory and CAS
(c) Multiverse and CAS
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(d) Skepticism and CAS
A religious person might go with (a), a scientist might like (b) or (c). The 
skeptic  (d)  might  say that  we should stop arguing  about  the  origin  of  the 
universe, since anyway it is unlikely that we get unambiguous support for such 
or such option. Still, he could agree that CAS is an interesting prospect for the 
future of intelligence  in the universe.  Those four options  would still  allow 
intelligent life to take up the future of their universe. 
However,  as  Vaas  also  remarks,  considering  such  options  would 
violate  the  Copernican  principle.  So,  how can  we respond?  Following  the 
Copernican principle and being faithful to the principle of rational economy 
afore mentioned against the combination of explanations to fine-tuning, what 
could the scenario (e) “CAS and CAS” be? 
2.7 Towards a cyclical metaphysics?
 Vaas points out that “CAS tries to explain something complex with 
something even more complex”. This critique was also made by Byl (1996). It 
is indeed correct,  but the underlying fundamental  problem is that  the usual 
explanatory scheme Vaas describes does not hold when we bring a kind of 
“ultimate  theory”  at  play  (Rescher  2000).  By  ultimate  theory,  I  do  not 
necessarily mean a “theory of everything” like it is sometimes speculated in 
physics;  but  a  general  “all  encompassing”  scheme  of  explanation  (if  one 
allows such a speculative attempt). Accordingly,  the explanatory scheme of 
CAS is not usual, but comparing the scope of classical explanations and CAS, 
we can argue that the explanatory force of CAS is much wider (see also Vaas 
2010  where  Vaas  acknowledges  this  broad  view  on  CAS).  We  can  now 
summarize  three  levels  to  interpret  CAS,  where  each  level  includes  the 
precedent: 
(i) CAS in the future
This  is  the  scenario  I  have  described  in  my papers  (2008;  2009b),  which 
provides : a response to heat death, a guarantee to scientifically progress on 
the fine-tuning issue, a role for intelligent life in cosmic evolution. For what 
happened in the past, positions (a)-(d) are all logically possible options. 
(ii) CAS in the future and in the past
This is scenario chooses option (e) "CAS with CAS" to tackle the origin of the 
universe. This implies that our universe has been produced and fine-tuned by 
an intelligent civilization. 
(iii) CAS in the future, past and a metaphysics
However, position (ii) implies further metaphysical problems. A metaphysics 
for CAS is needed to avoid a shift of the fine-tuning problem, and to propose a 
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framework to answer metaphysical questions like “who created the creators?” 
or “why not nothing?”. We attempt in the following lines the sketch of one 
such possible framework. Others are also certainly possible. 
Although it  is  at  odds  with our  knowledge of  cosmic  evolution,  to 
avoid a shift of the fine-tuning problem, one can suppose that the tuning of 
new universes  is  not enhanced as the universal  reproduction  cycle  repeats. 
Indeed,  if  we  assume  a  complexification  between  universes,  we  will 
automatically  shift  the  fine-tuning  problem  (see  also  in  this  volume  Vidal 
2009a). In addition,  we must assume that there is no “first  universe”.  This 
might sound strange for we are used to think in a linear way, with a beginning, 
a  middle  and  an  end.  However,  it  is  possible  to  postulate  a  cyclical 
metaphysics, where there is no beginning at all, only an indefinitely repeating 
cycle.  To  sum  up,  in  this  metaphysical  picture  (iii),  CAS  describes  an 
indefinite  cycle  of  self-reproductive  universes,  mediated  by  intelligent 
civilization.
It is also important to emphasize that circular explanations and infinite 
regresses  are  not  necessarily  vicious  (Gratton  1994).  One  attributes 
viciousness to such reasoning, but this is based on the assumption that “there 
is some obligation to begin a beginningless process or to end some endless 
process” (Gratton 1994, 295). To sum up, instead of trying to avoid an infinite 
explanatory regress, we can choose to embrace it, without any contradiction. 
2.8 Conclusion on Vaas' comment
To conclude, in contrast to what Vaas wrote, I would like to stress that 
CAS is more than a “physical experiment”, “a simulation” or an attempt to 
build a “rescue universe”.  The response of an intelligent  civilization to the 
awakening  that  their  particular  universe  is  doomed  (heat  death  or  another 
gloomy scenario) is likely to be a strong driver to produce a new universe. 
Therefore,  CAS is  not  about  playing  with virtual  universes,  nor  making  a 
physical experiment to see what it is like to produce a universe. The “rescue 
universe” idea is interesting,  although it  would be more about rescuing the 
evolution  of  the  cosmos  at  large,  rather  than  the  memory  of  a  particular 
intelligent civilization.
I do not see evidence for a God, a fundamental theory coming soon or 
proofs of a multiverse actually realized. Yet, I see overwhelming evidence of 
our exponential use of computer resources, both memories and computational 
power (Moore's law). Those advances have a tremendous impact on our lives 
and societies,  and this will continue.  In particular,  computers are more and 
more  ubiquitous  in  scientific  activities,  for  example  in  maths  (to  assist  in 
proofs), in studying complex systems (by simulating them), in biology (e.g. 
with biotechnologies, and their databases of genomes, protein networks, etc.), 
in cosmology (with many projects of large-scale simulations of the universe) 
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and of course with ALife and its legitimate successor, ACosm. If we choose 
and manage to successfully conduct  soft  and hard ACosm,  (i) CAS in  the  
future would  be  realized.  It  would  then  give  us  strong  indications  and 
inspirations  to  think  that  broader  interpretations  of  CAS,  (ii)  or  (iii)  are 
accurate.
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Abstract: The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is
beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future
evolution of life in the universe.  These models and associated evidence show that
evolution on Earth has a trajectory.  The scale over which living processes are
organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability.
Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of
a wider developmental process.  According to these theories, the developmental
process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the
reproduction of universes.  This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key
parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and
produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome
may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe
and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes).  Theory suggests that when life
emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord.  However, at
a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge
that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally.  The organisms
must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and
destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown.
Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the
further development of life and intelligence in the universe.  Humanity’s
increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly
bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition.
Keywords: conscious evolution; development of the universe; evolution of the
universe; intentional evolution.
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1. Introduction
Until recently, a scientific understanding of the natural world has failed to provide humanity with
a larger meaning and purpose for its existence.  In fact, a scientific worldview has often been
taken to imply that the emergence of humanity was an accident in a universe that is completely
indifferent to human concerns, goals, and values (e.g. see Weinberg, 1993).
Humanity has had to supplement a naturalistic understanding with beliefs in supernatural beings
and processes if it wanted a worldview that includes a meaningful role for humanity in a larger
scheme of things.
But recent advances in evolutionary science are beginning to change this.  In particular, we are
rapidly improving our understanding of the evolutionary processes that have produced life on
Earth and that will determine the future evolution of life in the universe.  While it is far too early
to tell with certainty, it is possible that the universe and the evolution of life within it have been
shaped by yet larger evolutionary processes to perform particular functions that are relevant to
these larger processes.
If this proves to be the case, then these functions have a purpose in the same sense that the
functions performed by our eyes have a purpose in the larger evolutionary processes that have
shaped humanity.
This paper explores some key implications for humanity of the larger-scale evolutionary and
developmental processes that appear to operate in the universe and beyond.  In particular, the
paper shows that humanity has a role to play in these processes.  It also shows that the success of
the processes depends critically on humanity (and other organisms that reach a similar stage in
evolution) understanding this role and embracing it intentionally.
We begin by briefly surveying some of the main theories of these larger-scale processes.
2. The Trajectory of Evolution
Many theorists have suggested that evolution exhibits large-scale trends (see Blitz, 1992; Ruse,
1996 for overviews).
In particular, it has often been noted that evolution has moved through a sequence of transitions
in which smaller-scale entities are organized into larger-scale cooperatives.  Self-replicating
molecular processes were organized into the first simple cells, communities of simple cells
formed the more complex eukaryote cell, organizations of these cells formed multi-cellular
organisms, and organisms were organized into cooperative societies.  A similar sequence appears
to have unfolded in human evolution: from family groups, to bands, to tribes, to agricultural
communities and city states, and so on (e.g. see de Chardin, 1965; Corning, 1983; Blitz, 1992)
As this sequence unfolded, a progressively higher proportion of living processes were organized
into cooperative organizations of larger and larger scale.  This long sequence also seems to have
been associated with a series of improvements in evolvability (the capacity to discover effective
adaptations).
However, evolutionary biologists have been very reluctant to accept that these apparent patterns
represent actual evolutionary trajectories (e.g. see Gould, 1996; Ruse, 1996).
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In large part this is because these hypotheses about directionality were not accompanied by
explanations of how the claimed trajectories were produced by known evolutionary processes.
This left them open to the criticism that they necessarily relied on impermissible teleological
mechanisms.
The view that the evolutionary process is not directional eventually became widely accepted
within the modern evolutionary synthesis (Gould, 1996).  But this was not because any evidence
or theory conclusively ruled out large-scale directionality.  Instead, as demonstrated in detail by
Ruse (1996), opposition to directionalism was given considerable impetus by the actions of the
founders of the synthesis who were in fact themselves directionalists.  As part of their intentional
efforts to build the professional standing of evolution as a scientific discipline, the founders used
their power as editors and peer reviewers to cleanse the synthesis of notions of direction,
progress and purpose.  Apparently they feared that to do otherwise would embroil their fledgling
field in public controversy and attract criticism that it was unscientific.  Ironically, the intentional
and sustained efforts of directionalists paved the way for anti-directionalism to become
mainstream dogma in evolutionary biology during the second half of the twentieth century.
2.1 The evolution of cooperation
Until near the end of the 20th century, the hypothesis that evolution moves in the direction of
producing cooperative organizations of larger and larger scale gained little traction.  In large part
this was because mainstream biology held to the view that selfishness, rather than cooperation, is
favored in evolution (e.g. see Williams, 1966; Dawkins 1976).  This position notes that selection
will act against entities that invest resources in cooperation but do not capture any of the benefits
it produces.  They will be outcompeted by ‘selfish’ entities that undermine cooperation by taking
the benefits without contributing anything in return (e.g. cheats, free-riders and thieves).
According to this position, only limited forms of cooperative organization are likely to emerge at
any level, and then only under restricted conditions.  Cooperation will be restricted to those
limited circumstances in which individual entities are somehow able to capture the benefits of
cooperating.  This can occur where the interactions between entities are ‘collectively
autocatalytic’ (i.e. where the actions of each entity that participates in a cooperative process
increases the fitness of one or more others, and its fitness is in turn increased by other entities).
The simplest form of collective autocatalysis is where two entities engage in reciprocal
exchanges of benefits.
Examples at various levels of organization of cooperation that is collectively autocatalytic are:
autocatalytic sets of proteins (e.g. see Bagley and Farmer, 1991); RNA hypercycles (e.g. see
Eigen and Schuster, 1979); autocatalytic cycles of indirect mutualism in ecosystems (e.g. see
Ulanowicz, 1986); kin selection amongst multi-cellular organisms (e.g. see Hamilton, 1964); and
reciprocal altruism (direct and indirect) amongst humans (e.g. see Trivers, 1971).
However these forms of collective autocatalysis fall far short of accounting for the major
evolutionary transitions.  They are unable to explain how evolution has apparently organized
smaller-scale entities into complex larger-scale cooperatives that eventually become entities in
their own right.
In part this is because free-riding, cheating and theft can be expected to undermine and disrupt
autocatalytic processes.  Furthermore, these processes will emerge only where interactions
between entities just happen to form a closed autocatalytic system.  There is no reason to expect
that advantageous cooperative processes will be collectively autocatalytic.  Those that are not
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will fail to self-organize and will be undermined by individual selection.  The complex forms of
cooperative organization that are necessary if a group is to become an entity in its own right will
not emerge.
2.2 Advances in understanding the evolution of complex cooperative organization
However, in the past two decades considerable progress has been made in understanding how
evolution has repeatedly organized independent entities into larger-scale cooperatives.  A
number of researchers have contributed to the development of a thorough understanding of
specific transitions, such as the transition to multi-cellularity (Buss, 1987; Michod, 1999).
Others have attempted to develop more general models that are applicable to all the transitions to
larger-scale cooperation (Stewart 1995, 1997a,b, 2000; Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1995;
Heylighen, 2006).
In general, this work has shown that evolution can organize complex cooperation amongst self-
interested individuals once particular conditions are met.
Stewart (1995; 1997a,b, 2000) shows that evolution will favor the emergence of cooperation
amongst self-interested entities when they are embedded in a particular form of organization that
makes it in their interests to cooperate.  In this form of organization, sets of evolvable constraints
(managers) constrain the activities of the self-interested entities, preventing free riding and other
actions that undermine cooperation.  Furthermore, the evolvable constraints ensure that entities
that contribute to effective cooperation are rewarded.  As a result, entities capture the benefits of
their cooperation and cooperation can be favored by individual selection.
An organization managed by a set of evolvable constraints therefore escapes the limitations that
prevent collective autocatalysis from producing complex cooperative organization.  The manager
can ensure that any cooperative process that benefits the organization as a whole is sustainable,
even if the process itself is not collectively autocatalytic.  It achieves this by using its power to
ensure that entities that contribute to the process benefit from doing so, as well as by restraining
free-riding and cheating.
Examples of evolvable constraints include the RNA that managed early cells, the DNA that is
reproduced in each cell of a multi-cellular organism (and that thereby manages the interactions
between cells), and the governments that manage modern human societies (e.g. see Stewart,
2000).
Importantly, a manager is able to harvest some of the benefits that flow from any cooperation
that it organizes.  As well as using these resources to reward cooperators, the manager can also
use some to enhance its own fitness.  In this way it captures some of the benefits of organizing
cooperation.  Selection will therefore tend to favor managers that are able to organize effective
cooperatives.
As a consequence, it is in the interests of the manager to organize cooperation, and in the
interests of the smaller-scale entities to cooperate.  In this form of organization, the interests of
all the members of the organization (including the manger) are aligned with the interests of the
organization as a whole.
Evolution will tend to favor cooperative organizations over independent entities because of the
advantages that cooperation can provide.  For example, cooperation enables the exploitation of
synergies, including through specialization and division of labor (Corning, 1983; Stewart, 2000).
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And the larger the scale of cooperative organization, the more resources commanded by the
cooperative, the greater its power, the greater the impact and scale of its actions, and therefore
the wider the range of environmental challenges that it can meet successfully.  And the greater
the evolvability, the greater the capacity to respond effectively to any adaptive needs and
opportunities.
Larger scale and greater evolvability both have the potential to provide evolutionary advantage
to living processes across a wide range of environments.  This is because they are meta-adaptive
capacities— they improve the ability to adapt in all circumstances, although they are not
themselves an adaptation to any specific circumstance (it is also worth noting that both are
deeply interrelated— increases in scale and power generally increase the range of possible
adaptive responses, and hence enhance evolvability [Stewart, 1995])
As improvements in these capacities are discovered, life will tend to evolve directionally.  Of
course, this trajectory will often be masked by meandering, halting and back-tracking,
particularly where the process that searches for improvements relies on blind trial and error.
Furthermore, improvements in these capacities will be favored only when the advantages they
provide outweigh their cost.  As a consequence, directional change will often stall until evolution
discovers a cost-effective way of enhancing the capacities.
Taken together, the research of the last two decades constitutes a very strong case that the
apparent trajectory of evolution towards larger-scale cooperative organization and greater
evolvability is ‘real’.  It is driven by processes that do not rely on teleology and are readily
understandable within modern evolutionary theory.
3. Extrapolating the Trajectory
The extrapolation of this trajectory is reasonably straightforward, at least initially.
The next major transition on Earth would be the formation of global cooperative society (Stewart
1995, 1997a, 2000; Heylighen, 2007).  Such a society would be enabled by a system of global
constraints (governance) that organizes cooperation (including market processes) and that
suppresses destructive competition (including war and international pollution).  The evolvability
of human society is also likely to increase rapidly through the continued development of artificial
intelligence and other technology, and also through the fundamental transition in human
psychology which will be discussed in Section 5 below.
Extrapolating this trajectory further would see the continued expansion of the scale of
cooperative organization out into the solar system and beyond, and the further enhancement of
evolvability (including through the intensification and compression of intelligence discussed by
Smart, 2008).  However, the expansion of the scale of cooperative organization might occur
largely by linking with other organizations of living processes that originate elsewhere, rather
than by ‘empire building’.  This linking up could be expected to greatly increase evolvability
through the exchange of knowledge and technology (including artificial intelligence).
The possibility of life arising elsewhere seems high.  There does not appear to be anything
special about this planet, the emergence of life on it, or its evolutionary trajectory that make it
unlikely to have occurred elsewhere.  The details can be expected to differ, but it is likely that the
general increase in evolvability and the step-wise increase in the scale of cooperative
organization will be ubiquitous.  And as we will discuss below, any other living processes that
are expanding out into space can be expected to be cooperators, not hostile. (However, there is
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no consensus within the scientific community about the likelihood of extraterrestrial life and the
‘specialness’ of Earth.  For an overview of the debates, see Dick, 1996.)
If the trajectory continues in this way, the scale of cooperative organization would continue to
expand throughout the universe, comprised of living processes from multiple origins.  As it
increased in evolvability and scale, its command over matter, energy and other resources would
also expand, as would its ability to use these resources intelligently to pursue whatever
objectives it chooses.  The ability of cooperative life to influence large-scale events in the
universe would increase, and it might even develop a capacity to impact on processes outside the
universe we currently know.
The question of whether the trajectory is likely to continue in this way is discussed in Section
5.2.
4. The Developmental Possibility
4.1 Current developmental hypotheses
With our current level of knowledge and intelligence, we cannot say much about the nature of
any larger-scale processes in which our universe is embedded.  But as a number of theorists have
noted, the following considerations raise some intriguing possibilities (see Davies, 2006 for a
broad overview):
(1) The known universe exists (there is something rather than nothing), and it is reasonable to
presume that it owes its existence to processes that exist outside it.
(2)  The fundamental laws and parameters of the known universe seem extraordinarily finely
tuned to the needs of life— slight changes would produce a universe in which life would seem
highly unlikely.
(3) the evolution of life follows a trajectory that appears likely to eventually produce a universe
that is controlled and managed in significant respects by intelligent life (including artificial
intelligence).
A number of theorists have tried to account for these considerations by suggesting that our
universe and the evolution of life within it is a developmental process that has itself been shaped
by evolutionary processes of even wider scale (Crane, 1994; Harrison, 1995; Gardner, 2000,
2003, 2005, 2007; Smart, 2000, 2002, 2008; Vidal, 2008).
According to this hypothesis, the basis laws and parameters of the universe have been tuned so
that it eventually develops into an entity that is managed by intelligence.  This intelligence is
‘developmentally destined’ to organize the reproduction of the universe and to tune the
parameters of the ‘offspring universes’ so that they are especially conducive to the development
of life and intelligence.  The effectiveness of the tuning of the developmental process is
enhanced as the cycle repeats.
The developmental singularity hypothesis (Smart, 2002, 2008) includes much of this basic
schema, but suggests that life will transcend the universe and initiate the reproduction cycle
without linking up with other living processes on the scale of the universe.  Smart builds on the
idea that life on Earth will enter a post-biological technological singularity in the relatively near
future, possibly this century (Adams, 1909; Good, 1965; Vinge, 1993; Broderick, 1997).  This
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accelerating trend towards higher evolvability will continue as intelligence rapidly increases in
density and efficiency through compression in matter/energy and space/time.  Eventually, this is
postulated to produce local intelligences with black-hole-analogous features— a highly local,
dense and maximally computability-efficient network of entities that the hypotheses terms a
‘developmental singularity’.  Smart goes on to suggest that this local (Earth originating)
intelligence will interact with some other intelligences that originate elsewhere, and then begin
the process of universe reproduction in the quantum domain of black holes.
Smart points out that a particular strength of his hypothesis is its ability to parsimoniously
explains the Fermi Paradox— the hypothesis suggests that the reason why we do not see evidence
of intelligence or life elsewhere in our universe is because soon after life reaches our stage of
development, it enters the developmental singularity, effectively disappearing from view in our
space/time.
4.2 Other developmental possibilities
However, work on developmental models is only in its early infancy.  Existing models do not
explore all the broad classes of developmental possibilities and their implications.
In particular, the key models incorporate the assumption that the only source of inherited
information provided to offspring universes is transmitted through the equivalent of the germ
line— i.e. through the particular values of the fundamental laws and parameters that shape how
the offspring universes will develop.
This assumption seems to be based largely on an analogy with the development and evolution of
life on Earth prior to the emergence of cultural evolution.  For most organisms on the planet,
inherited information is transmitted primarily through the germ line.  Very little is transmitted
from parent to offspring during their lives, or between adults.  This is a serious limitation in
evolvability— all the adaptive information that is acquired by an organism during its life dies
with it.
This limitation was overcome somewhat with the evolution of humanity and the emergence of
cultural modes of transmission.  Humans undergo a relatively short period of development in the
womb where the information they inherit is largely restricted to the germ line.  But this is
followed by a much longer period in which they acquire cultural information that has been
accumulated across the generations and is transmitted to them during their lives.  The emergence
of cultural transmission paved the way for the massive enhancement in evolvability that
produced human science and technology.
The transmission mechanism postulated by current developmental models of the universe is not
quite as limited as the mechanism that applied prior to the emergence of cultural transmission on
Earth.  Most models suggest that when an intelligence is tuning the parameters of offspring
universes, it would draw on the knowledge it acquired during the life of the universe.  But this is
still an extremely limited information channel.  Most of the science and knowledge acquired by
the intelligence would be lost.  This limitation would be even more serious if universes governed
by intelligence engage in extra-universal interactions and activities that affect their evolutionary
success.  Most of what is learnt about those interactions would be lost.
We could therefore expect that extra-universal evolutionary processes would favor transmission
between parent universes and their offspring, and between adult and young universes, once the
young universes have developed sufficiently.  It would also favor transmission between adult
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universes.  If these forms of transmission are achievable, they would significantly enhance the
evolvability of offspring universes, including their capacity to engage in extra-universal
interactions that affect their fitness.  The germ line of a universe that fails to develop or to
receive these forms of transmission could be expected to suffer a similar fate to a human germ
line that fails to support cultural transmission.
Life and intelligence that is committed to contributing to the successful development of its
universe can therefore be expected to search for every feasible way of opening up possibilities
for such transmission.  It will also seek to exploit any potential for other cooperative interactions
between universes for whatever projects are relevant to evolution and development at that level.
The fact that we are not yet receiving such transmission does not rule out its existence.  It might
simply mean that like individual humans, life in the universe might have to achieve a particular
level of development before this form of transmission is feasible and productive.  This possibility
is also consistent with the likelihood that intelligent life on a planet would not be contacted by
life originating elsewhere until it reaches a particular level of development (Stewart, 2000;
2008a).
It is also far too early to rule out the possibility that transmission can occur between intelligent
universes, or that intelligent universes can be involved in some extra-universal evolutionary
dynamic that involves interaction between them and some larger environment.  To attempt to
decide these issues on the basis of current physics would be even less reliable than Lord Kelvin’s
impressive 1895 proof that heavier-than-air flight is impossible.  The difficulty we face in trying
to evaluate these possibilities at our current scale and intelligence would be similar to the
challenge facing an intelligent bacterium in our gut that is trying to make sense of the social
interactions that humans engage in.
We are in a similar position in relation to developmental hypotheses in general.  We have
insufficient data at our present state of knowledge and intelligence to adequately test these
hypotheses.  And there are a number of competing non-developmental hypotheses that can
account for the same evidence.  Some alternatives such as the multiverse hypothesis account for
the apparent fine tuning of the universe for life on the basis of a kind of blind trial and error— it
postulates a large number of universes each with different fundamental laws and parameters,
with chance favoring the likelihood that some will suit the emergence of life (e.g. see Susskind,
1995).  Other alternatives are similar to the developmental hypotheses in that they account for
fine tuning through the operation of intelligence.  For example, a class of models suggests that
our universe could be a simulation designed and initiated by an unknown intelligence operating
outside the universe (Bostrom, 2003; Martin, 2006).
To summarize to this point, there is a very strong case that the evolution of life on Earth has been
directional.  There is also good reason to suggest that this trajectory applies to life that originates
elsewhere in the universe.  If the trajectory continues, life from different origins will link up to
form cooperative organizations of increasing scale and evolvability.  This is consistent with the
possibility that the evolution of life in the universe is itself part of a larger developmental and
evolutionary process.  Other evidence such as fine-tuning is consistent with this possibility.  But
it is far too early to treat developmental hypotheses as anything other than possibilities.
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5.     The Transition to Intentional Evolution and Development
This section focuses on a critical psychological transition that needs to occur if evolution on a
planet is to advance beyond the emergence of a global society and go on to contribute to any
larger-scale developmental and evolutionary processes.
Up until the emergence of global society, natural selection and cultural processes will tend to
drive evolution along its trajectory towards greater evolvability and increased scale of
cooperation.  As we have seen, cooperative organizations that are larger in scale and more
evolvable will out-compete others.  But these forms of competition-driven selection will come to
an end as a global society emerges.  The global society will not be involved in direct or
immediate competition with other planetary societies (Stewart, 2000).
Once this stage is reached, the actions and objectives of the global society would be determined
by the values and goals of its members (provided the global society is organized democratically).
The society will do what is necessary to advance the evolutionary process only to the extent that
this is consistent with the goals and motivations of its members.
However, it is highly unlikely that the desires and motivations of the members of the global
society will be consistent with the needs of future evolution.  Their desires and motivations will
have been shaped by past evolution to be successful in previous environments, not for the future.
In large part, members of the society will continue to pursue the proxies for evolutionary success
implanted in them by their evolutionary past.
In the case of humanity, members of the global society will continue to spend their lives
pursuing the positive feelings produced by experiences such as popularity, self-esteem, sex,
friendship, romantic love, power, eating, and social status.  And they will continue to strive to
avoid the negative feelings that go with experiences such as stress, guilt, depression, loneliness,
hunger, and shame.
The way in which these desires and motivations are satisfied will be influenced significantly by
cultural factors, but the goals of behavior will be largely unchanged.  And these goals will in turn
determine the ends that will be served by technological advances, including the uses to which
artificial intelligence and genetic engineering are put.
It is only by chance that the desires and motivations of global citizens will be consistent with the
needs of future evolution and development.  The selection processes that shaped these
predispositions operated without foresight and were not influenced by the needs of future
evolution.
In the much longer term, selection processes will operate to some extent between planetary
societies.  But these processes will not force immediate changes in values within the societies.
For example, societies with values that lead them to vegetate on their planet of origin will have
minimal impact and relevance in the future evolution of the universe.  But unless new processes
begin to operate, there is nothing to drive such planetary societies to change their values so as to
align them with any longer-term developmental or evolutionary imperatives.  There is nothing to
stop them continuing indefinitely to shape their technology (including artificial intelligence) for
the satisfaction of ‘stone age’ desires.
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5.1 The need for freedom from the constraints of past evolution
For these reasons, a planetary society is unlikely to intentionally contribute to the success of any
larger developmental and evolutionary processes until it realigns its values with the needs of
those processes.  The success of any wider processes would therefore seem to depend on the
willingness of planetary societies to adopt pro-evolutionary goals and values (Stewart, 2000,
2001 and 2008a).  Any wider developmental processes within the universe can succeed only to
the extent that intelligent life is motivated to carry out the tasks that will advance the process and
eventually reproduce the universe.
Here I will suggest that this fundamental change in values is likely to emerge as the members of
the planetary society begin to realize the possibility that they are living in the midst of a
developing universe.
Once evolution on a planet produces organisms that have the capacity to develop realistic models
of their environment, they are likely to develop theories of the evolutionary process that
produced them and the world about them.  Eventually they are likely to begin to construct
models which reveal the direction of evolution on their planet and how the trajectory is likely to
continue throughout the cosmos in the future.  They will begin to awaken to the possibility that
this trajectory is part of a larger developmental process that has been shaped and tuned by wider
evolutionary processes that may eventually reproduce the universe.
They will see from their models that selection will drive evolution along its trajectory to the
point that they have reached.  But they will also see that unless they now commit to intentionally
advancing the evolutionary process, it will stall on their planet.  Unless they intentionally align
their values with those of the wider evolutionary process, life on their planet will not participate
in any wider-scale developmental process in the universe.  It is as if they are living in the midst
of a developmental process that depends for its continued success on their commitment to
intentionally advance the process.
Although their immediate desires and emotions will often clash with the demands of future
evolution, it is likely that their most fundamental values will be consistent with making a
commitment to pursue evolutionary and developmental goals. This is because the deepest and
most fundamental values held by intelligent organisms that reach this stage in evolution are
likely life-affirming and meaning-seeking.
These values will tend to motivate them to choose to act in ways that lead to the survival and
thrival of the living systems of which they are part.  They will see that it is only by assisting the
advancement of any larger-scale developmental trajectories that they can contribute to something
that has a chance of surviving indefinitely.  Any other actions they could take would be futile—
such actions would have only temporary effects, and in the long run, everything would be as if
they had never lived.  Setting out intentionally to contribute to the success of any wider-scale
developmental and evolutionary trajectories is the only action they can take that keeps open the
possibility that their life and actions can have meaning in a larger context.
Deriving pro-evolutionary goals from fundamental values in this way would not commit the
naturalistic fallacy (Stewart, 2008a).  The fallacy arises when values are derived from facts alone
(i.e. when ‘oughts’ are derived from ‘is’s’ alone), not when they are derived from more general
values (i.e. when ‘oughts’ are derived from other ‘oughts’ as well as ‘is’s’) [also see Wilson et
al., 2003].
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5.2 Commitment before certainty
It is of critical important to recognize that the reasons for the adoption of pro-evolutionary goals
are valid irrespective of whether the organisms know with certainty that the universe is a
developmental process.  The reasoning applies even though they may be in the same position as
humanity is at present.  Humanity has discovered the trajectory of past evolution and can see
how it is likely to continue into the future.  But we cannot yet be certain that the trajectory is part
of a wider developmental and evolutionary process that will reproduce the universe.
But organisms that reach this stage in the trajectory of evolution will realize that they cannot wait
until certainty is achieved before they commit to advancing the evolutionary process.  If any
developmental process is to have the greatest chance of success, they need to begin immediately
to invest their resources and intelligence in advancing the process.  It may be a very long time
until their science and intelligence is developed to a point where they can know for sure whether
they are in the midst of a developmental process.  It is likely that the true nature of any larger-
scale evolutionary processes (particularly any extra-universal aspects) will only be discovered
gradually, after significant improvements in evolvability.
In fact, it seems likely that absolute certainty may never be reached.  Any large-scale processes
that have shaped the development of the universe may in turn be shaped by even larger-scale
processes, and so on.  And it would seem that intelligence could never know if it had discovered
the processes of the largest-scale, even if there are such processes— it would seem impossible to
ever rule out the possibility of new discoveries and advances, or the existence of processes of
even wider scale.  The development and evolution of life and intelligence seems likely to prove
to be in the nature of a journey without a final destination.
Given this context of fundamental uncertainty, and given that the success of any developmental
process depends on their willingness to advance the process, organisms would appear to have
only one option to ensure that they can participate in larger-scale processes if they exist.  They
will have to act as if they are in the midst of a developing universe and intentionally take the
action needed to advance the process.  Strategically, this means they will have to begin
immediately to build the capacities they will need to participate in the wider processes if they
prove to exist.  They need to get into the game and to stay in it long before its final nature is
clear.  Only by acting as if the universe is a developmental process can they ensure that they will
be able to contribute positively to any developmental and evolutionary processes that are
eventually proven to exist.  A key element of this strategy will be to invest significant resources
in attempting to discover all they can about the larger-scale evolutionary processes within the
universe and beyond.
For as long as their science leaves open the possibility that they can participate in meaningful,
larger-scale developmental and evolutionary processes, they will need to continue to build
capacity so they can take advantage of any possibilities that arise.  Even if their universe happens
to be the first to arise in which life emerges, such a strategy would maximize their chances of
developing the means to reproduce the universe and initiate an on-going process.
Advancing the local trajectory of evolution by linking up with life that originates elsewhere
would appear an important and productive way to build this capacity.  It would enable the
formation of cooperatives of larger and larger scale that are more powerful and able to influence
larger-scale events in the universe (this would be of critical importance if mature universes prove
to participate in extra-universal events and associated evolutionary dynamics).  As mentioned
earlier, it would also enable evolvability to increase through the sharing of knowledge,
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intelligence and different perspectives.  Life that wants to position itself to contribute to the
success of any larger-scale developmental processes in the universe would appear to have good
reason to build capacity in this way.
However, some theorists have questioned whether the continued expansion of the scale of
cooperative organization is likely.  Smart (2008) argues that the key trend will be towards the
increasing efficiency and density of intelligent computation which will remain local.  Although
he acknowledges that the linking up of intelligences from different origins to share knowledge
and intelligence would be advantageous, he postulates that this will occur in localized areas, such
as black holes.  Cirkovic (2008) critiques some of the arguments that have been advanced
previously to support the view that the scale of cooperative organization will continue to expand,
but not the main argument outlined in this paper.
It is not possible to decide conclusively between these competing hypotheses at our current level
of knowledge and intelligence.  However, we can be more certain that these issues will be of
great interest to any living processes that decide to contribute to the success of developmental
and evolutionary processes in the universe.  A key priority for pro-developmental life will be to
identify the capacities it should build and the actions it should take to best advance these
processes.
5.3 The inadequacy of an intellectual commitment
However, a mere intellectual decision to align their goals with the trajectory of evolution will not
free the organisms from the desires, motivations and emotions inherited from their biological and
cultural past (Stewart, 2000, 2001).  Their thought processes are unlikely to be able to easily
modify their inherited predispositions.  When a capacity for thought first arises, it would be
unable to understand why motivations and emotions influence behavior in the particular ways
that they do.  It would not understand their adaptive purposes.  Selection would therefore be
likely to act against the emergence of any capacity for thought to override these predispositions,
since it is likely the outcome would be maladaptive.
Thus humans do not use their thought processes to choose their desires and emotional responses,
or their likes and dislikes.  Humans generally use thinking and rationality to devise better ways
to achieve their ends, not to determine their ends.
As a result, in order to fully align their values with the trajectory of evolution, the organisms
would first have to free themselves from the predispositions inherited from their biological and
cultural past.  Since these changes will not be driven by natural selection, the organisms will
have to develop this new psychological capacity intentionally, through changes to their
‘software’ rather that their ‘hardware’ (Stewart, 2001).
Living processes that have completed this transition will not be hostile as they move out into
space.  They will be motivated by pro-developmental goals, and know that in order to achieve
these goals, they will need to work cooperatively with other living processes.
5.4 The significance of the transition as a major enhancement of evolvability
The transition to intentional evolution produces a fundamental change in evolvability and in the
way evolution unfolds (Stewart, 2000 and 2001). Prior to the transition, evolution relies largely
on natural selection to advance the evolutionary process.  But natural selection operates mainly
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by trial and error, and has no foresight— it is blind to future possibilities.  Evolution’s search for
innovation and adaptation is driven by a particularly unintelligent process.
After the transition, intelligent organisms intentionally seek to advance evolution.  When
deciding how to adapt, they use foresight and modeling to take into account the future effects of
alternative adaptations, including the long-term evolutionary effects.  As a result, the
evolutionary process itself will begin to advance intelligently and with foresight.
6.     Implications for Humanity
Humanity is beginning to enter the early stages of the transition to intentional evolution and
development.
As outlined earlier, our evolutionary science has established a strong case that the evolution of
life on Earth is directional.  We have good reasons to believe that this trajectory applies to life
wherever it originates, and continues after life reaches our stage.  Some of the most recent
developments in evolutionary science suggest the possibility that this wider trajectory is itself
part of a large-scale developmental process that has been shaped and tuned to reproduce the
universe.
Until now, evolution on Earth has moved along this trajectory of its own accord.  However, it is
becoming increasingly clear to evolutionary science that evolution will continue to advance only
if certain conditions are met:  humanity must awaken to the possibility they we are living in the
midst of a developmental process; we must realize that the continued success of the process
depends on our actions; and humanity must commit to intentionally moving the process forward
(Stewart, 2008a).
As yet there is no certainty that such meaningful larger-scale developmental and evolutionary
processes exist.  However, it is clear that if humanity is to put itself in a position to contribute to
these processes if they do exist, it must commit to the pursuit of evolutionary goals now, long
before certainty is achieved.  Robust strategizing does not have to await robust science.  It is
possible to identify courses of action that are strategically optimal despite radical long-term
uncertainty.
As humanity begins to enter the transition to intentional evolution, we are seeing events emerge
that are of great evolutionary significance.  Similar events are likely to occur on any planet that
moves through the transition.  In particular, a key milestone on each planet will be its first global
scientific conference that is convened to discuss the large-scale evolution of life in the universe
and beyond.  On this planet, this evolutionary milestone occurred in 2008 (The conference on the
Evolution and Development of the Universe, held in Paris in October 2008).
If the transition is to be completed successfully, humanity will have to free itself from the
dictates of its biological and cultural past.  Humanity will have to align its goals and motivations
with the needs of any larger-scale evolutionary and developmental processes (Stewart, 2008a).
The imminent possibility of a technological singularity lends great urgency to the development
of these new psychological capacities and to the adoption of pro-evolutionary goals.  Unless we
develop these capacities before hand, the artificial intelligence and other technologies that enter
any singularity will have been engineered to serve humanity’s ‘stone age’ desires, as they are at
present.  They will not be engineered to serve pro-developmental goals.
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There is abundant evidence that the psychological organization of humans is such that we have
the potential to free our behavior from the dictates of our evolutionary past (Stewart 2000, 2001,
2007).  The world’s spiritual and contemplative traditions have discovered a variety of practices
and techniques that can be adapted to develop the new psychological software that is needed.
These practices can also enhance the ability of humans to understand and manage complex
systems (Stewart, 2007, 2008a).  Work has begun on using the tools of scientific inquiry to
model and understand how these capacities can be developed and how the practices that train
them can be enhanced (Stewart, 2007).  The discoveries of the contemplative traditions about the
human potential for enhanced modes of consciousness are being shorn of their mystical
associations and are being integrated into mainstream science.
As humanity begins to enter the transition we also see the first attempts to initiate a political
program that explicitly seeks to advance the evolutionary process (Stewart 2008a and 2008b).
If humanity goes on to complete this great evolutionary transition, we will have embraced a role
that provides meaning and purpose for our existence.
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What and that humans do:
Participating in the meaning of life, a contributor’s critiqueFranc RottiersGhent University, Centre for Critical PhilosophyBlandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent+32 484 34 18 61franc.rottiers@ugent.bewww.criticalphilosophy.ugent.be
AbstractThe aim of this contribution is to critically examine the metaphysicalpresuppositions that prevail in Stewart’s answer to the question “are we in themidst of a developmental process” as expressed in his statement  “that humanityhas discovered the trajectory of past evolution and can see how it is likely tocontinue in the future”.
What and that humans doHumans select certain elements out of the local dynamics they are confrontedwith and translate them in records. These selections are part of objectificationprocesses and have a sequential nature. This means that though a selectedelement can be ‘recorded’, this does not imply that the record itself has anabsolute, ‘objective’ status. Also, to repeat a particular selection only implies thatthe objectification procedure is repeated, not that the record will be exactly thesame. Of course, some records will be inscribed in a system that, for reasons ofvisibility and communication, will require some level of stability. When renderedvisible and communicable in a system, records can be operationalized. This iswhat humans do.What humanity does – and this can be extrapolated from Stewart’s argument – isrelate to a global system in which the operationalization of records aims atcapturing the organization of the global system. This requires the cooperationeffort of all humans. Moreover it requires an effort founded on competition-driven selection situated at larger developmental scales. In the end however,competition will be obsolete. It is the moment at which the global society willemerge. This moment has however yet to come.Now is a good time to ask the question whether we indeed are “in the midst of adevelopmental process?” It is, within Stewart’s metaphysical perspective, a
necessary question to ask. The answer, i.e. “that humanity has discovered thetrajectory of past evolution and can see how it is likely to continue in the future”,represents a mere possibility as we can never be certain about the destination ofthe trajectory. In fact, this kind of uncertainty is exactly the same as the oneexpressed in perspectives addressing the increasing complexity of society. Sowhat are the consequences of taking up the perspective Stewart presents?
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When addressing the necessity of the question, the perspective ‘that humans do’,
that they engage in objectification procedures, that they contribute to a complexsociety, has to make room for the perspective ‘what humans do’, how and whythey participate in society, acquire competences and learn to be ‘objective’ in asociety where complexity ‘increases’. In the latter perspective, the questioningactivity cannot be but necessary and static because the records to be inscribedand the system in which they are inscribed will only allow ‘all knowing’ globaldescriptions of the Laplacean demon kind (Matsuno & Salthe, 1992). Such globaldescriptions however, have a very particular characteristic, i.e. they arerelatively absolute. As complexity is confined to the status of ‘always increasing’,all global descriptions will fit this definition absolutely and the questions thatpertain to this absoluteness will be necessary. Relative to this absoluteness, allanswers to necessary questions cannot be but possible. The rationale here is thatthe realm of possible answers is the only realm left over where humanevolvability can further ‘develop’ – as a possible answer. This however, rendersthe possibility of a questioning activity, especially with regard to the possibilityof evolvability and development, immobile. Let’s put the perspective moreconcrete in the context of Stewart’s argument: a trajectory is identified anddeemed necessary for the evolvability and development of humanity; though theend of this trajectory is known absolutely, i.e. it is inscribed in a likely future thatruns analogous with the perspective that complexity in society increases, theanswers are merely possibilities relative to this absolute position and in essencedisconnected from an engaged entity that can ask possible questions. Only‘humanity’ can pose necessary questions, not ‘humans’.  That is one perspectiveon the matter.So what would become possible when we subscribe to the perspective thatallows for the possibility of the question and the necessity of the answer, i.e. theanswer always being the givenness of complexity, more precisely that there iscomplexity? Well, then the perspective that humans do, can to its fullest extent,be further explored. That humans do is not about part-taking in a whole, notabout cooperative organization, which is merely the operationalization of “anunhappy marriage between atomism and a materialistic (and often mystical)holism in which a predominantly atomistic and functionalist conception of theorganism per se is coupled with a holistic conception of a ‘central directingagency’ conceived as a material entity —  the so called ‘genetic programme’ —which is supposed to determine, order and unify the atomic units and events”(Webster & Goodwin, 1982, p. 16). Within such a perspective, which is the onethat subscribes to increasing complexity, the whole coincides with the parts, theconsequence of which is that the organism as a structured entity cannot claim itsplace. That humans do, is exactly about taking up the perspective that humanscan appear as structured entities, meaning that they can appear as engagedindividuals, not statically concerned with possible answers trying to tacklesociety’s apparent increasing complexity, but that they can dynamically invest ina questioning activity that allows for the possibility of asking questionspertaining to the matter that there is complexity, what this exactly is, is not somuch of interest. To put it in other words, records can be operationalized, theyneed not be. This is just one of the possibilities.
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The rationale behind Stewart’s argument concerning the meaning of life isdirected at humanity and directs humans to organize themselves in acooperative/participative way. The aim of this commentary was to lay bare thatStewart’s position gives voice to a perspective that needs to be taken up asperspective. Other perspectives are possible. The meaning of life need not besituated in participative practices that are in need of competent and competitivebehaviour. Complexity is here and always has been here. It is tangibly present as‘the’ necessary answer, also for people that, while unable to participate fully tosociety due to exclusion mechanisms, do contribute to it. It are thosecontributions that are in danger to be stripped away from the meaning of life for‘humanity’.
ReferencesMatsuno, K. & Salthe S.N. (1992). Global Idealism/Local Materialism. Biology and
Philosophy, 10, 309-337.Webster G. & Goodwin B.C. (1982). The origin of species: a structuralistapproach. J. Social Biol. Struct., 5, 15-47.
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Abstract:  I  discuss  some of  the  speculations  proposed  by Stewart  (2009). 
These include the following propositions: the cooperation at larger and larger 
scales, the existence of larger scale processes, the enhancement of the tuning 
as the cycle repeats, the transmission between universes and the motivations to 
produce a new universe.   
I  do  largely  share  Stewart's  general  vision  of  cosmic  evolution  and 
development, and I very much value the speculations he proposes. Connecting 
in such a coherent way intelligence and the evolution of the universe is rarely 
attempted,  and  even  more  rarely  so  inspiring.  The  significance  of  the 
worldview outlined here is potentially of paramount importance for the future 
of intelligence. 
Obviously, it would be boring for the reader to state all the points were we 
do  agree.  Therefore,  I  will  focus  on  (relatively  minor)  issues  where  our 
positions  diverge,  to  sharpen  and  extend  them  or  hopefully  to  reach 
agreement. 
As Stewart acknowledges, many themes in this paper are speculative: "the 
difficulty we face in trying to evaluate these possibilities at our current scale 
and intelligence is likely to be similar to the challenge facing an intelligent 
bacterium in our gut that is trying to make sense of the social interactions we 
engage  in."  Speculating  on  those  issues  can  easily  lead  very  far.  For  this 
reason,  we  need  to  have  clear  ideas  on  how and  why we  speculate.  I 
distinguish three kinds of speculations to navigate into their variety :
1. Scientific: a speculation is scientific if we have strong reasons to think 
that  we  will  be  able  in  the  future  to  have  observations  or 
experimentations corroborating or refuting it.
2. Philosophical:  a  speculation  is  philosophical  if  it  extrapolates  from 
scientific  knowledge  and  philosophical  principles  to  answer  some 
fundamental philosophical questions.
3. Fictional: a speculation is fictional if it extends beyond scientific and 
philosophic speculations.
Cooperation at larger and larger scales
At  several  places  in  the  text,  Stewart  suggests  that  cooperation  will 
continue to expand at larger and larger scales (e.g. page 4, 10). It is of course 
an  open  possibility,  and  it  would  certainly  be  exciting  to  be  able  to 
communicate with most or even all other supposed intelligent civilizations in 
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the universe. It is a scientific speculation in the sense that we are likely to 
understand if such a cooperation is possible in the future. Nevertheless, I think 
there  are  severe  difficulties  to  this  scale  extension  scenario.  My concerns 
regard the why and the how. First, why would an intelligent civilization want 
to do that? Travelling in space costs time, money, energy, etc. We know that it 
is technically possible to go to the Moon. However great and inspiring this 
exploit is, humanity has done it only a handful of times, certainly because it is 
very expensive and a great technical challenge, and gives finally a relatively 
poor pay-off. What would make such an expense of energy profitable? 
Second, how would intelligent civilization achieve that? What are the other 
cooperative organizations interesting to collaborate with in our solar system? 
Where would intelligent civilization go? The arduous problem is that distances 
are huge in the universe. We can be reminded that even at the speed of light, it 
takes about 8 minutes to reach the Sun, 4.2 years to reach the nearest  star 
Alpha Centauri and 2.5 million years to reach the nearest Galaxy Andromeda.
Even assuming such an extension, how could communication actually take 
place at very large space scales? Communication would be extremely slow, 
also  because  of  the  huge  distances.  The  cooperation  would  therefore  be 
inefficient and probably not that interesting.  Imagine that you have to wait 
several years to get an answer to a message you just sent... 
Some authors speculated that there might be shortcuts (wormholes), leading 
from one  part  of  the  universe  to  another  very  distant  one  (Thorne  1994). 
However, these wormholes are speculative theoretical entities, and it is even 
more speculative to suppose that any form of life or information could transit 
in them.
 
The largest scale processes
Stewart remarks that "intelligence could never know if it had discovered 
the processes of the largest-scale" (page 9). A first line of reasoning is to state 
that if space-time is really the basic structure of everything else, then we do 
not need to suppose any wider processes. 
This  reasoning  is  a  kind  of  "tower  of  turtles"  speculation:  is  there  an 
infinity  of  larger  and  larger  scales  processes?  This  idea  is  similar  to  the 
proposition that we might be in a computer simulation. We would also never 
know it for sure, and there might be an infinity of simulations simulating other 
universes. As with the simulation, the careful answer is that we do not know, 
and we will certainly never be able to know for sure if there are such processes 
at play. 
My pragmatic response to this issue is: no need to worry. Indeed, let us 
analyse the proposition with Leibniz' logical principle of the identity of the 
indiscernibles. This principle states that “if, for every property F, object x has 
F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y”. Let x be our known 
reality, and y be the supposed largest-scale we would be living in. If we have 
no  way to  distinguish  between  them,  they  are  identical.  Unless  we find  a 
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property F that could only exist in a larger scale-universal process and not in 
reality, this hypothesis is useless.
For  this  reason,  I  would  qualify  this  speculation  and  the  simulation 
hypothesis as fictional.
The tuning is enhanced as the cycle repeats
Stewart proposes that "the effectiveness of the tuning of the developmental 
process  is  enhanced  as  the  cycle  repeats."  (page  5).  This  speculation  is 
philosophical, and even properly metaphysical. Modern cosmic evolutionary 
theory shows an increase in complexity from the Big Bang to the development 
of our modern technological society. So, why shouldn't we also expect a kind 
of evolutionary progress between universal cycles? 
It is yet not necessary to enhance the tuning at the level of universes. All 
what is needed here is a reproduction mechanism, which is fertile (i.e. enables 
further universe reproduction). An undesirable (metaphysical) implication we 
encounter if we suppose this enhancement, is that if we look back in the cycle, 
earlier universes should be simpler and simpler. Then we face again the fine-
tuning problem for these very early universes. We would just have shifted the 
fine-tuning of our universe to the fine-tuning of other previous universes (See 
also Vaas and my reply Vidal). 
Transmission between universes
In  analogy  with  biological  organisms,  Stewart  suggests  that  a  "parent 
universe" could transmit information to the offspring universes (page 6). This 
is  a  very  interesting  and  exciting  scientific  and  philosophical  speculation. 
However, physical constraints are likely to rule out this possibility.
 I suspect the constraints from one universe to another are too strong to 
pass on messages. Let us assume that a whole new disconnected space-time 
structure is generated from one universe. Such a space-time has a different 
causal  structure  from the  previous  universe.  Therefore,  it  is  by  definition 
impossible  to  make  the  two  communicate,  because  the  common  causal 
relationship between the two vanishes after the reproducing event.
Motivation to produce a new universe
Stewart emphasizes the importance of motivation from intelligent life to 
take part into a supposed developmental process (e.g. page 7). This question of 
motivation is properly philosophical,  more precisely ethical.  It  is indeed of 
prominent importance. 
However, even if we had the certainty to be in an developmental process, 
this would be just part of the motivation to produce a new universe. Two other 
drivers are likely to be central. 
First,  as  described  by  Stewart  page  9,  the  most  fundamental  values  an 
intelligent civilization would have are life-affirming, meaning-seeking. Those 
values are likely to be strongly connected to the idea of surviving indefinitely 
(Lifton  and  Olson  2004). A  strong  commitment  to  these  values  would 
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reinforce the willingness of an intelligent civilization to participate actively to 
the evolutionary process. 
However, there is a second driver for intelligence to reproduce the universe. 
It  is  well  established  that  there  will  be  a  progressive  end  of  all  stars  in 
galaxies,  including our Sun. The universe will  irreversibly decay towards a 
state of complete disorder or maximum entropy. This scenario is commonly 
known as the "heat death"  (Adams and Laughlin 1997; Ćirković 2003 for a 
review). Certainly, modern cosmology shows that there are some other models 
of the end of the universe (such as Big Bounce, Big Rip, Big Crunch..., see 
(Vaas 2006) for an up-to-date review). However, the point is that none of them 
allows the possibility of the indefinite continuation of life as we know it.  I 
argued in  (Vidal 2008) that awareness to this gloomy fate would be a driver 
for intelligent civilization to produce a new universe. 
It is often objected that this problem is far too far in the future to consider it 
as a serious preoccupation. However, the situation here is analogous to climate 
change, except the problem concerns an even larger scale than the Earth. A 
few decades ago, few people were seriously concerned with climate change. 
Nowadays,  people,  various  organizations  and  governments  have  started  to 
seriously mobilize  to  tackle  this  complex  issue.  What  produced this  shift? 
Among  other  factors,  the  strong  integration  and  globalization  of  society 
contributed to this sensitivity about climate change. Indeed,  it  is  only  since 
recently that we have such numerous and precise channels of information from 
every corner of the world, which provides us an unprecedented understanding 
of the planet as a whole. This leads us to a global awareness of what happens 
on this planet.
Similarly,  a  global  awareness  will  finally  emerge  from  our  increasing 
understanding of the cosmos. Only after such an awakening, will an intelligent 
civilization start to actively tackle such a large-scale problem. I hope Stewart's 
paper and this special issue will contribute to let us look ahead and awaken us 
to such a cosmic perspective. 
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Abstract: Vidal’s and Rottiers’ commentaries raised a number of important issues about the
possible future trajectory of evolution and its implications for humanity.  My response
emphasizes that despite the inherent uncertainty involved in extrapolating the trajectory of
evolution into the far future, the possibilities it reveals nonetheless have significant strategic
implications for what we do with our lives here and now, individually and collectively.  One
important implication is the replacement of postmodern scepticism and relativism with an
evolutionary grand narrative that can guide humanity to participate successfully in the future
evolution of life in the universe.
R1. Is the evolutionary perspective ‘privileged?  Can it support a new viable ‘Grand
Narrative’?
Rottiers suggests that the evolutionary worldview outlined in my paper is just one possible
perspective amongst many and that it is not privileged over the multiplicity of other
perspectives.
Rottiers’ perspective appears to resonate strongly with the postmodernist rejection of the
possibility of a ‘grand narrative’ that is capable of providing a comprehensive account and
explanation of human existence.  Lyotard (1979) argued that the rise of rationality and science
has undermined the possibility of a believable grand narrative.  He reaches this conclusion in
relation to materialist grand narratives (e.g. Marxism) as well as in relation to ones that rely on
supernatural processes.  According to Lyotard, attempts to develop materialist grand narratives
have failed to meet the tests of science (see, for example, Popper, 1957).
To the contrary, my paper shows that the emerging evolutionary perspective is capable of
surviving postmodernist scepticism and relativism.  The evolutionary perspective outlined by
the paper is not teleological, and meets the other tests of science.  Furthermore, it is highly
relevant to human concerns and preoccupations.
Evolutionary processes have shaped humanity and will determine its future.  Humanity can
ignore the evolutionary consequences of its actions, but evolution will not.  Evolutionary
processes determine what it is that can survive and thrive into the future.  Values, ethical
principles, perspectives and political systems that are not aligned with these processes will be
temporary.
It is true that the ways in which we express our theories of evolution will be influenced by
culture.  Our theories will always be maps, never territories.  And our evolutionary theories will
always be susceptible to being appropriated and shaped by particular interests for ideological
purposes.  But the evolutionary processes-in-themselves are not culture-bound.  And our best
maps of these processes will be our best guides to what will survive into the future.
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Evolution has been and will continue to be ‘the great marginalizer’.  In the face of evolution, all
perspectives, all values and all actions are not equal.  Some will survive and flourish, others will
not.  Denying this or just wishing it were otherwise will not stop marginalization.  In fact, it
invites it:  as I have argued in my paper, a planetary civilization that is not guided by an
evolution-based grand narrative is highly likely to be marginalized, locally as well as globally.
R2. Cooperation at larger and larger scales
Vidal questions whether human civilisation will be motivated to expand beyond Earth and link
up with any other civilisations it encounters.
It is true that humanity’s current values and desires may fail to motivate the actions that are
needed to evolve humanity successfully into the future.  They may not motivate humanity to
exploit the evolutionary advantages that will flow from expanding the scale of human
organisation and linking up with any life that originates elsewhere (e.g. the advantages of
increased evolvability, greater power to influence events over larger and larger scales, more
extensive cooperative division of labour, etc.)
It is therefore likely that if humanity is to continue to survive and thrive into the future it will
need to complete the transition to intentional evolution outlined in my paper— humanity will
need to intentionally free itself from the desires and needs shaped by its biological and cultural
past and instead develop the capacity to find motivation and satisfaction in whatever needs to be
done to achieve future evolutionary success.  This will also necessitate shaping the economic
system so that it appropriately funds pro-evolutionary activities.
Vidal also questions the feasibility and practicality of extra-planetary civilisation due to the
huge distances involved.
This is an issue that is encountered to some extent in every transition to larger-scale
organisation.  The processes that coordinate activities across a cooperative will necessarily
operate at significantly slower rates than the processes that operate within the members of the
cooperative.  The relative slowness of the coordinating processes that organize cooperatives has
not prevented their emergence repeatedly during the evolution of life on Earth.  This is despite
the fact that some of the differences in scale between members and cooperatives are extremely
large.  For example, the descendants of prokaryote cells that are found within the cells of the
human body now participate in human activities that are coordinated across the globe.  The
relative difference in scale between prokaryote cells and a planetary organisation is broadly
comparable to the difference in scale between a planetary organisation and the solar system.
The evolutionary record suggests that the advantages of larger-scale cooperative organisation
have repeatedly outweighed the relative slowness of larger-scale coordination processes.  As
yet, there is no reason to believe that this will cease to be the case for extra-planetary
organisations.
R3. The largest scale processes
Vidal argues that if any postulated largest-scale processes are indistinguishable from our know
reality, they are identical to know reality and any speculation about the postulated processes
should be classed as fictional.
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However, whether any postulated larger-scale processes are distinguishable is likely to depend
on the knowledge and technology of the living processes in question.  As life develops, it may
eventually discover ways to distinguish a yet larger-scale process which encompasses its
previously-known reality.  This possibility may or may not be relevant to any particular
conception of what is classed as ‘science’ by a particular culture at a particular point in its
evolution.  But this possibility will be highly relevant to life that wants to make good strategic
decisions about how to evolve and perpetuate itself— the nature of any such larger-scale
processes may have a significant practical impact on what it needs to do in order to survive and
flourish indefinitely.
R4. The tuning is enhanced as the cycle repeats
Vidal argues that the ‘intelligent tuning’ hypothesis does not solve any fine-tuning problem for
pre-intelligence universes (see also Vaas’ commentary to Vidal’s paper, this volume).
This is true, but does not rule out the ‘intelligent-tuning’ hypothesis.  The exploration and
testing of this hypothesis will be critically important to life and intelligence as it develops in a
particular universe.  Life will need to discover the precise nature of any such large-scale
evolutionary processes (including any extra-universal processes) if it is to work out what it has
to do to survive and thrive indefinitely.
R5. Transmission between universes
Vidal argues that physical constraints rule out the transmission of adaptive information between
universes (except during any ‘reproduction event’).
Humanity’s current understanding of the relevant physics certainly seems to suggest this.  And
life may not discover anything new about how to achieve such transmission as it evolves into
the future, linking up throughout the universe, increasing massively in scale, and continually
bootstrapping its intelligence over billions of years.  It is possible that there is nothing
additional to be learnt about this issue beyond what our science has discovered already, after a
couple of hundred years.
But if nothing new is learnt, it is unlikely to be for want of trying.  The transmission of adaptive
information between universes would massively increase evolvability.  Recognition of these
benefits is likely to have driven attempts to accomplish such transmission in any previous
universe, and will surely drive it in this universe.
R6. Motivation to produce a new universe
Vidal argues that recognition of the fact that life will eventually be obliterated due to the ‘heat
death’ of the universe, a ‘big crunch’ or other such event will be a powerful driver for
intelligence to reproduce the universe.
He makes a strong case.  In general, the threat of large-scale extinction events can be expected
to strongly motivate life and intelligence to build its capacity to survive the threats (including by
increasing its evolvability, its scale and its power).  There are many such threats that confront
life on this planet, now and in the future:  global warming, nuclear war, collision with asteroids,
engulfment of Earth by the sun when it becomes a red giant, collision with other star systems,
and so on and so on.  Due to the prevalence of large-scale extinction threats, intelligent life that
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declines to develop its capacities and instead spends its time vegetating on its planet of origin in
the pursuit of narrow ‘stone age’ desires is likely to be temporary.  It will forgo its opportunity
to participate positively in the greatest adventure of all— the evolution of life and intelligence in
the universe and beyond.
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